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SUMMARY 
As a contribution to the continuing debate among trade and
development economists as to the role of industrial strategies
in the pattern of economic development, this study analyses the
experience of one developing country, Nigeria, with an import
substitution strategy. The performance of the industrial sector
is critically assessed and related to the trade policy adopted.
Using published data, the study covers 24 industries and a period
of 16 years, beginning 1963 and extending to 1978.
An analysis of the structure of protection reveals a con-
siderably high and wide ranging levels of effective protection,
in favour of consumer-goods oriented sectors. The relationship
between these rates of effective protection on the one hand and
import substitution and sectoral growth on the other was examined
using various parametric and non-parametric tests of association.
The evidence, which is only suggestive in nature, indicates that
the structure of protection does play a role, albeit a minimal
one, in stimulating industrial growth.
Using Input-Output techniques, the employment, foreign exchange
and output implications of the present strategy of Import-
Substitution and of a hypothetical strategy of export promotion
are analysed. There is a general absence of 'key' employment
sectors and, paradoxically, an export promotion strategy is found
to be less employment generating and more capital using but less
foreign exchangeusing than the existing strategy.
Although there is a considerable scope for capital-labour
substitution in many industries, it was found that the often
recommended policy of getting prices 'right' will not be sufficient
to bring about an appreciable improvement in the employment
situation.
The development of factor productivity between 1963 and 1978
for each of the 24 industries was analysed; and three possible
determinants of productivity are investigated: capital intensity
and technical progress, output growth (the Verdoorn's Law) and
trade policy. With regards to the latter, it was found that
periods of especially slack productivity growth roughly correspond
to those in which there was especially restrictive trade policy
as quantified by high erps. The economic efficiency of the -
manufacturing sector was appraised using the criteria of net social
profitability, social rate of return and Domestic Resources Costs
(DRCs). Evidence was found in support of the hypothesis that the
resource pull of protection to the protected industries is
accompanied by higher rates of private, but lower rates of social
profitability for the more heavily protected sectors.
The overall conclusion of the thesis is that the policies of
protection should have been more rationally applied and the IS
strategy more rationally executed in line with the country's
enunciated objectives.
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1CHAPTER ONE
1:1 Dff.r.stislu
The emphasis on rapid industrialisation in the less developed
countries (LDCs) is often regarded as a sinequanon in national efforts
to cope with the general features of underdevelopment.
Industrialisation is expected not only to contribute to economic
growth but to be the 'engine of growth' and technical progress, to
accomplish structural change and diversification of the economy, to
generate financial surplus (including domestic investible surplus,
foreign exchange etc), to alleviate the urban unemployment problem, to
help absorb the often redundant rural labour force and develop their
skills, to raise the earnings per head of the population, and to help
in the growth and development of technological and material
self-reliance etc.
The degree of emphasis on particular objective(s) could vary
from one developing country to another and over time, depending upon
historical, political and socio-economic factors. For example, in an
industrially backward country, with low per capita income, abundant
unskilled labour and limited familiarity with advanced technology, the
priority may be on the establishment of industries which generate
higher income and employment. An oil rich economy could afford to
foster industrial development without the unnecessary worries about
foreign exchange etc. Very often however, majority of the LDCs have a
multiplicity of objectives and would prefer to foster industrial
development on all fronts.
For majority of the LDCs, trade policy has proved to be the most
convenient tool at their disposal for the promotion of
2industrialisation. The protection of 'infant industries', it is
usually argued, is necessary to give entrepreneurs sufficient
encouragement to achieve the necessary levels of industrial investment
and the desired degree of diversification of industrial activity.
This view is indicative of the scepticism regarding the efficacy of
market forces in allocating resources. In general, policy makers (and
some economists) in the LDCs are profoundly suspicious of the ability
of the market to generate and allocate investment resources
effectively.
The degree of overall protection to the industrial sector varied
greatly among the LDCs and within LDCs for different activities and at
different time periods. Numerous studies' carried out on Latin
American and Asian countries during the 1970's indicated that these
differences in policy were by and large responsible for the
differences in the pace and efficiency of industrial growth and hence
in the levels of industrialisation achieved. Specifically, the
appraisal of industrial policies in these countries has revealed that
the benefits to the national economy of a strategy which emphasises
protection have not been as was expected. Thus, while
industrialisation has been fairly rapid and the manufacturing sectors
have registered fairly high rates of growth, the strategy has produced
rather disappointing results on other fronts: the explicit and
implicit resource costs of 'nourishing' the 'infants' is often
unbearable; in some cases, the industrial policies turn out industries
with negative value-added at world prices - implying a negative effect
on the balance of payments - and burden the growth of other
industries; real incomes are often depressed because of the high
prices industries must charge in order to make even a low rate of
return etc.
3It is important therefore, especially for those countries on the
threshold of industrial development to undertake a periodic
comprehensive review of their industrial policy and strategy and to
evaluate and select those sectors the promotion of which would ensure
the rapid realisation of an appropriate mix of objectives. This is
the main objective of this study. We intend to evaluate the Nigerian
industrial sector performance in view of the multiplicity of
objectives thrust upon it and examine the extent to which its
performance is influenced by the trade policy adopted.
The starting point of an analysis of performance is the
identification of the country's broad and specific objectives as well
as the strategy of industrialisation. This will be briefly examined
next.
1:2 Objectives and Strategy of industrialisation in Nigeria
At the time of independence in 1960, the Nigerian economy
exhibited all the features that characterize an underdeveloped
economy: it was an arche-typical dual economy with a small export
enclave devoted almost entirely to agricultural produce, which
constituted over 90 percent of the country's exports. As the colonial
administration was preoccupied with the expansion of trade in raw
materials, the economy emerged at independence without any basis of
industrialisation, as neither the infrastructure nor the trained
manpower for industrialisation was developed. Because of the
widespread pessimism regarding the long-term prospects of agricultural
exports from LDCs, the independent government viewed structural change
in favour of industry as a necessary prerequisite for modernisation
4and long-term growth. Given the low base of industrialisation in the
country and the increasing demand for manufactured goods from abroad,
the strategy of 'planned' and 'regulated' industrial development - via
import-substitution - became particularly attractive after
independence and has remained the dominant feature of the country's
industrialisation efforts.
The Nigerian policy makers view national development planning as
the most effective way of dealing with the numerous problems of
economic backwardness. Thus since independence, a series of four
five-year plans have been elaborated2 . This is in addition to various
other documents which reflect the thinking of the government with
regards to the desired degree and form of industrialisation3.
Government committment to 'planning' was explicitly stated in one of
the recent 'guidelines'
In order to ensure that industrialisation brings in its wake
truly beneficial economic and social development, the growth of
industries has to be regulated and guided along definite
channels to achieve certain set of objectives.4
What are those objectives?
The major goals of economic policy after independence as set out
in the first development plan (1962-68/70) were
i. to stimulate the establishment and growth of industries which
contribute both directly and materially to economic growth.
ii. to enable Nigerians to participate to an ever increasing
extent in the ownership, direction and management of Nigerian
industry and trade.5
The industrial development objectives enunciated in the subsequent
plans were no more than a continuation and further elaboration of the
5above objectives. The main objectives for the second plan (1970-74)
were to
i. promote even development and fair distribution of industries
in all parts of the country
ii. ensure a rapid expansion and diversification of the
industrial sector of the economy
iii. increase the incomes realised from manufacturing activity
iv. create more employment opportunities
v. promote the establishment of industries which cater for
overseas markets in order to earn foreign exchange
vi. continue the programme of import substitution.6
These objectives feature prominently in the most recent plan document
(1981-85), with added emphasis on growth, maximisation of local
value-added (i.e. industrial linkages), efficiency and
competitiveness, and employment generation. Thus:
while the strategy of import substitution will continue to be
pursued, greater emphasis will henceforth be placed on
industries that will rely on local resources thereby reducing
the sectors dependence on imported inputs... This is one way to
reduce foreign exchange leakages and maximize the benefit from
our industrialisation efforts7
Accordingly, the government plans to ban the importation of materials
for industrial use if such materials are locally available and
promises 'active support and encouragement' to industries which
explore the possibilities of increasing local inputs.
The government's interest in efficiency and competitiveness is
perhaps influenced by the experiences in the newly industrialising
countries of Asia and Latin America. According to the fourth plan:
6Competition will be encouraged to ensure cost effectiveness and
to ensure that the gains of industrialisation are passed to
consumers. The need for international competitiveness
underscores the need for efficiency rather than reliance on
permanent protection by government.8
Other specific objectives of the industrial policy in the fourth
plan are to
i. ensure increased level of self-reliance in the supply of
industrial products.
ii. increase employment opportunities
iii. maintain rapid growth of the manufacturing sector with a
view to increasing its share in the gross domestic product to a
minimum of 12%
iv. give maximum encouragement to private sector industries9
etc.
In industrial, as in many other aspects of development, the enunciated
objectives may be conflicting. The output and employment objectives
are often cited as examples: the promotion of labour-intensive
industries may generate high level of employment, a large share of
wages in output and possibly a small investible surplus and a slower
rate of growth of output and employment; learning skills, so essential
to industrial progress, may sometimes be achieved only at the cost of
sacrifices in efficiency or in programmes with only very slow private
returns and this may run counter to the objective of raising output
rapidly; the pursuit of the growth objective may lead to increasing
inequalities in income distribution and wealth; a policy in which
investment is made on the basis of technological linkages may suffer
from lack of adequate employment creation etc. According to the
government, "these inconsistencies are fully recognised and efforts
will be made to strike a reasonable balance between the specified
objectives")-0
 However, while government objectives often include
7the creation of "a just and egalitarian society" and "a land of bright
and full opportunities for all citizens" 11 , the encouragement of
"maximum growth of investment and output consistent with our economic
potential and national aspiration u12
 remain the overall and overriding
objective.
1:3 Constraints and Potentials 
The Nigerian government seem to be fully aware of, and view with
seriousness certain "institutional constraints and bottlenecks which
constitute obstacles to industrialisation". These are listed as
i. infrastructural inadequacy in the supply and management of
water, electricity, communication facilities, transport
especially railway, port facilities etc.
ii. restrictive industrial policy and administrative bottlenecks
that frustrate investments in a number of worthwhile projects;
iii. shortage of industrial manpower and the relative
unattractiveness of manufacturing to indigenous business-men;
iv. slow implementation of the public sector manufacturing
projects which are generally to act as the foundation for the
growth of the sector as a whole13.
They are equally optimistic however, that the economy has the
potentials and opportunities of "creating an industrial base that can
guarantee self-sustaining growth in the future". The favourable
conditions are that:
Nigeria is richly endowed with the physical as well as the human
resources necessary for industrial development. The domestic
market is large and expanding ... The emerging entrepreneurial
group in the country is dynamic and capable of exploiting the
potential in both the domestic and world markets.14
Above all, the tremendous increase in oil revenues as a result of
higher prices and greater production in the 1970's provided the
8government with much larger revenues than it had ever anticipated and
thus offered distinct opportunities for the government to accomplish
its social, political and economic objectives.
In this study we shall be concerned with the objectives of
(manufacturing) growth, industrial diversification (linkages),
employment provision, productivity and efficiency. The main questions
to which we shall try to provide answers are: to what extent has the
country's reliance on industrialisation via import-substitution
hindered or promoted the realisation of these objectives? Does the
performance of the Nigerian industrial sector provide any basis for
advocating a re-orientation of industrial policy and strategy? The
specific lines of enquiry will be examined next.
1:4 Organisation of the Study
The present study contains 8 chapters. In the next chapter, we
shall be concerned with the role of international trade in the
efficient allocation of resources in the LDCs. The assumptions,
implications and critiques of the classical and neo-classical theories
of international trade are examined. We also briefly review some of
the consequences, observed in other LDCs, of departing from the 'free
trade' principle. In order to provide the necessary basis for the
evaluation of investment efficiency using cost-benefit analysis, we
examine the essentials of the Little and Mirrlees method of project
appraisal.
The third chapter provides a detailed description of the overall
structure of the Nigerian economy. We examine how the structure has
evolved over the years and whether the changes which have occured are
indicative of any meaningful structural change.
9The historical evolution of the instruments of industrial
protection, their quantification and effectiveness in the
re-allocation of resources within the manufacturing sector will be
examined in chapter four.
Using input-output techniques, we examine in chapter five, the
employment, foreign exchange and output implications of the
industrialisation process. Attempts are made to answer questions such
as: to what extent can reliance on the IS strategy lead to
unfavourable results with respect to employment? What are the
employment potentials of a hypothetical export promotion strategy as
compared to the present strategy? To what extent do domestic
industries carry out exchanges among themselves? Are there any
conflicts between the various objectives?
In chapter six further issues related to the Employment effects
of industrialisation are examined. Using production functions, we
examine the extent to which factors of production can be substituted
for each other. To what extent are factor requirements influenced by
factor prices? What will be the exact impact on factor requirements
and hence employment when input prices are adjusted for distortions?
We also examine measures of, and various factors influencing, factor
productivity growth in the manufacturing sector. Both 'partial' and
total factor productivity growth over a period of time are analysed.
In chapter seven, using cost-benefit analysis, we examine the
efficiency of investment in the industrial sector. Measures of
private, as well as social profitability are examined. Using the
concept of Domestic Resource Costs (DRC), we examine the international
competitiveness of industries and hence the extent to which resources
are being effectively used to save and/or earn foreign exchange.
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Finally, in-Chapter 8, we examine '
 the major finding, conclusions
and limitations of the study.
1:5 Period of study and statistical basis
i. Period of Study
The study covers a period of 16 years, from 1963 to 1978
although for some specific emperical investigations, emphasis is
placed on only one or two years. Thus for example, while rates of
profitability and effective protection are estimated for only 1974 and
1977, the rates of growth of labour and total factor productivity, as
well as substitution elasticities are computed for a period beginning
in 1963 and extending to 1978. In all cases, the availability of data
is the principal determinant of the period chosen. For example,
estimates of nominal rates of protection, (which are required to
obtain effective rates of protection) are not available to us for any
years other than 1974 and 1977. Similarly the period of study could
not be extended beyond 1978 because detailed information about the
manufacturing sector is available only up to that date.
ii. Data used
The main source of data used in this study is the Industrial 
Survey of Nigeria published by the Federal Office of Statistics (FOS)
Lagos, Nigeria. The survey covers all manufacturing establishments
employing ten or more persons and is published on an annual basis.
The main variables are defined below:
(a) Gross Output: the sum of output produced and sold by the
establishments, value of goods sold in the same condition as
purchased, value of assets produced by own efforts and receipts from
contract done by the establishments.
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(b) Value-added: the difference between gross output and
industrial costs and is 'census value added'. In otherwords, it is
defined by the FOS in such a way that excise taxes paid on domestic
production are treated as part of value-added. Thus, the published
value added data are not at factor cost. No data is available to net
out excise tax and moVe closer to the 'pure concept of value-added'
(c) Labour: This is simply the number of people who are
regularly on the payroll of establishments. It thus does not include
working proprietors, unpaid family workers and apprentices. The
number of hours worked by employees, which is the more frequently used
concept of labour input, is not available.
(d)Wages and salaries: These are the earnings of employees and
do not include contributions to national provident funds and other
benefits received by employees.
(e) Industrial costs/cost of purchased inputs: This category
includes cost of raw materials, component parts, fuel, electricity and
other incidental expenses by the establishments.
(f)Capital: Unfortunately, no estimates of the value of capital
stock are reported by FOS. However, the original book value of fixed
assets at industry level is provided from 1963 to 1972. We found it
necessary therefore to generate the industry level physical capital
stock series using the formula:
Kt+1 ' It
	 (1-6)1(t
where
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Kt = base year capital stock (the original book value of
fixed assets)
It
 = Net capital expenditure
6 = rate of depreciation of the capital stock.
The reported original book value of fixed assets and net capital
expenditure are each made up of the value of residential and
non-residential buildings, transport equipment, machinery and
equipment, land and land improvement. As there is no reason to
believe that residential buildings form a 'productive' part of
industry's assets, these were deducted from the total figures
provided. Since no sector specific depreciation rates are available,
we applied a uniform rate of 11%.
(g) Nominal rates of protection: The nominal tariff rate (ti) on
output is estimated as the ratio of the total duty collection (T1) for
each sector to the sectoral c.i.f. import values (n):
T.
t_ = -/
3	 M
-3
As is to be expected, the collection nominal tariff rate, as defined
above, differs a great deal from the scheduled rate as provided in the
tariff codes perhaps due to the numerous exemptions of duties granted
to various importers. For instance, the scheduled rate varies in the
transport equipment sector from about 10%-500% while in 1977, the
ratio of duty collection to c.i.f. import value for the same sector
was 84%. Although the scheduled rates are provided in much more detail
and are therefore more precise, they are often less reliable being
constantly revised, sometimes up to 3 times a year. Except therefore
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in cases where we are unable to obtain total duty collections for some
sectors, we have chosen to work with the collections rates as obtained
above.
(h) The input-output table: To our knowledge, there are only 3
input-output (I-0) tables available for the Nigerian economy. The
first one was constructed by N. Carter (1963) 16 and published in 1963.
20 sectors were identified, 4 of which were primary, 5 tertiary and
the rest engaged in some form of manufacturing. Using various
techniques and data from other LDCs, Oyejide (1975), Clark (1972) and
Kuyvenhoven (1978) 17 had at different times updated and disaggregated
the Carter Table. Of these, only that of Clark is available to us.
The third input-output table available to us was constructed using
1973 as a base, by the National Accounts Survey Commission (NAsc)18
and published in 1981 by the Federal Ministry of National Planning,
Lagos. All productive activities in the economy were aggregated into
25 sectors, 6 of which are primary, 9 manufacturing and 10 tertiary.
In addition, there are five categories representing final demand and
one composite category representing value-added.
There is no doubt that an indepth analysis of development
problems would require not only a more recent but also a less highly
aggregated table, than is presently available. For example, even
though one could make the assumption that the 1-0 coefficients are
fairly stable over a short period, the conclusions derived from the
use of a table constructed more than 10 years ago could be misleading
especially in a world that is undergoing rapid technological
transformation.
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By nature, however, 1-0 tables are almost always historical especially
in an economy like Nigeria with a weak statistical base and where
modern techniques of compilation and reconciliation of data are
virtually non-existent.
We decided to disaggregate the NASC table into 35 sectors (5
primary, 24 manufacturing and 6 tertiary) and to update it using 1977
as a base year.
	 The method of disaggregation i8 discussed, briefly,
in Chapter 5 and further examined and illustrated in the Appendix.
1:6 Classification of Sectors used in the Study
This study deals essentially with the manufacturing sector only,
although reference is made to other economic sectors especially in
chapter 5 where we deal with input-output analysis. The following
classification, dictated by the availability of data, is adopted:
Sector
code
NASC classification 	 Sector	 ISIC
(1973	 input-output)	 code	 code
Our Classification
(updated input-output)
PRIMARY
1 Agriculture 1 Agriculture
2 Livestock 2 Livestock
3 Forestry 3 Forestry/Fishing
4 Fishing
5 Oil Mining 4 Oil mining
6 Other mining and 5 Other mining and
Quarrying Quarrying
MANUFACTURING
7 Food, Drink, Beverages 6 3111/3122 Food processing
and Tobacco 7 3131/3133 Alcoholic beverage
8 3134 Non-alcoholic beverage
9 3140 Tobacco.
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Sector	 NASC classification Sector ISIC Our Classification
code	 (1973 input-output) code code (updated input-output)
8	 Textiles, wearing	 10	 3211 Textiles
apparel & leather goods
11	 3213 Made-up textiles
12	 3220 Wearing Apparel
13 3231/3233 Leather products -
except for footwear
14	 3240 Footwear
9	 Wood & wood products 15 3311/3320 Wood products and
including furniture	 Furniture
10	 Paper & paper products 16 3412/3420 Paper & paper products,
printing & publishing	 printing & publishing
11	 Drugs and Chemicals
	
17 3511/3512 Industrial Chemicals
including Fertilizers.
18	 3521 Paints
19	 3522 Drugs & Medicines
20	 3523 Soap, perfumery,
cosmetics & other
cleaning preparations.
21 3529/3540 Other chemical products
products of Petroleum
and coal.
12	 Rubber & Plastic	 22 3551/3560 Rubber & plastic
products	 products
13	 Basic metal products 23 3610/3699 Cement, glass & other
building materials
24 3710/3812 Basic Metals, Cutlery
& Metal Furniture.
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Sector
code
14
NASC classification Sector ISIC Our Classification
(1973 input-output) code code (updated input-output)
Fabricated Metal
	
25 3813/3819 Fabricated & structural
products, machinery	 metal products
equipment
26 3822/3829 Machinery I (industrial
and agricultural)
27 3832/3839 Machinery II (electri-
cal, including TV and
Radio repairs etc)
28 3841/3843 Transport equipment
(including vehicle
repair & assembly).
15	 Miscellaneous	 29 3851/3909 Miscellaneous
Manufacturers	 Manufacturers
TERTIARY 
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
Electricity & water	 30
Building & construction 31
Transport	 32
Communication
Distributive Trade 	 33
Finance & Insurance 	 34
Producer of government
services
Hotel and Catering	 35
Professional Business
& other services
Housing
Electricity & water
Building & construction
Transport and
Communication
Trade
Finance & Insurance
Other services
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CRAFTER 'IWO
Less Developed Countries
2:1. Introduction
There are two vital interrelated theoretical and practical
issues to the LDCs in the field of international trade and development
literature. The traditional central issue is whether the economic
development of the LDCs is, (or could be) on balance, hindered or
promoted by 'free trade'. A related issue concerns the applicability
of the conventional or orthodox theories of trade to the present day
conditions of LDCs. In the development literature, the question is
often asked: how useful a guide is the principle of comparative cost
advantage to the best pattern of resource allocation in these
countries?
Conflicting views have been put forward by different writers.
At one extreme, the classical and neo-classical writers have generally
conceived of the role of international trade as an 'engine of growth'.
In other words, they saw no conflicts between gains from trade and
those from growth. As Robertson (1938) 1 puts it,
'The specialisations of the 19th Century were not simply a
devise for using to the greatest effect the labours of a given
number of human beings; they were above all, an engine of
growth'
The neo-classicists2 have upheld and re-affirmed the conclusions
of the older theories and have argued that the conventional theories
offer a reasonable approximation to the role of
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free-trade in the development process but that actual policies in the
LDCs are misguided - being the result of short-run political
expediency rather than economic rationality.
At the opposite extreme are theorists 3
 who express scepticism
about the virtues of free-trade as an engine of growth. They contend
that international trade has operated with a fundamental bias against
the poor countries - a bias which, they argue, cannot be overcome
without a qualitative change in the internal structure and external
relations of the LDCs. They dismiss the classical and neo-classical
theories of free-trade since the structures upon which they are built
are completely irrelevant and unrealistic to the long-run development
aspirations of the LDCs.
Between the two extremes are those who argue for the
'rehabilitation' of the 'neglected elements' of conventional trade
theory or who argue that as it stands, the theory is only partially
relevant or that it can be made more operational by recasting it in a
dynamic framework and by an explicit consideration of certain
'elements of reality' which are hitherto either totally ignored or
treated as special cases or considered as oddities. Such elements
include (product, labour and money) market imperfections,
externalities and various other distortions and barriers - both social
and institutional - that stand in the way of the LDCs in achieving an
optimum pattern of resource allocation. It is consideration of these
"elements of reality" that has made economists devise criteria for
resource allocation which use 'shadow prices' in preference to the
prices established by 'free' market forces.4
In the following section (2.2) we shall critically examine the
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assumptions, implications and conclusions of the classical and
neo-classical theories of trade. In section 2:3 we shall point out
some of the consequences of a protectionist development strategy which
have been noted in the growing body of trade and development
literature. The discussion will be brief since similar issues will be
examined in later chapters. Then in section 2:4 we shall briefly
outline one of the well-established approaches to project analysis in
the LDCs and also show how efficiency prices, needed for optimum
resource allocation in the presence of distortions can be practically
estimated.
2:2 The Classical and Neo-classical Theories of Trade
The basic proposition of the classical (comparative cost)
doctrine is that if trade is left free, each country in the long-run
tends to specialise in the production of, and to export those
commodities in whose production it enjoys a comparative advantage in
terms of real costs and to obtain by importation those commodities
which could be produced at home only at a comparative disadvantage in
terms of real costs and that such a specialisation and exchange is to
the mutual advantage of the participating countries. The classical
doctrine rests explicitly on the premises that there is a single
factor of production whose productivity is invariant in each activity,
international differences in production functions which are the
dominant factor determining comparative advantage, perfect
competition, absence of barriers to trade and flexibility of wages and
prices.
As a theorem, no logical objections can be raised against this
doctrine: that is, if the assumptions under which it is based are
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correct or hold in the real world, then it becomes almost trivial -
though no longer illuminating - to show that comparative costs
differences will lead to a profitable exchange of commodities. But
the fundamental issues are: (a) why and how do real costs come to
differ among countries and (b) in a world of imperfect competition,
where prices do not necessarily reflect real costs and where all
countries irrespective of their level of development, impose varying
degrees of restrictions on their foreign trade, will 'free trade'
necessarily reflect the structure of comparative advantage?
The Heckscher-Ohlin (H/0) theorem (i.e. the neo-classical
theorem) supplies answers to the first question above. According to
the theorem, different initial endowments of factors of production
give rise to differences in comparative costs. It states that
international trade will be conducted in accordance with international
factor endowment so that assuming only two factors of production
(labour& capital), those countries with relatively abundant supplies
of labour will specialize in the production of, and export labour
intensive commodities while countries with relatively abundant
supplies of capital will specialize in the production of, and export
capital intensive goods and obtain by importation labour intensive
commodities. This arises simply because the former countries will be
able to produce labour intensive goods relatively more cheaply while
the latter will produce capital intensive goods relatively more
cheaply.
The H-0 model may be said to be based on the following
assumptions.
Al. All productive resources are fully employed, completely
immobile internationally, fixed in quantity and constant in quality.
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A2. Within each country, factors of production (labour and
capital) are perfectly mobile, prices of products and of factors are
flexible and there is perfect competition.
A3. Tastes, preferences and technology are identical between
countries.
A4. There is full-equilibrium in the sense that all
consequences of adjustment are fully absorbed into the system; all
changes are fully reflected in market prices.
Although the classical and neo-classical theories rest
explicitly upon totally diverging premises with regards to the
explanatory factor in determining trade flows - [differences in
initial factor supplies in the case of the neo-classical model, rather
than international differences in production functions or real costs
as in the classical model] - they reach virtually the same conclusion:
namely that the extension of the international division of labour
offers a unique combination of advantages viz - it widens the extent
of the market, allows a more efficient use of world resources and
promotes, therefore, economic development. By raising the national
income of all participating countries, free trade could allow the
achievement of higher levels of savings, capital formation and income
growth than would be possible without trade. From these follows the
famous dictum that free-trade (no restriction) is potentially better
than no trade (total prohibition) - although it is also realized that
restricted trade is better than no trade.
This free-trade theory can be readily demonstrated using a
2-good (X and Y) and one country example, using figure 1. The economy
produces only 2 goods Y and X measured along the horizontal and
vertical axis respectively. TT is the economy's production
YI	 Imports	 1
Fi g ure	 1
_
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possibility (or transformation) curve. Before the country has the
opportunity to trade, the production - cum - consumption point is at
Po, Co, where the marginal rate of substitution in consumption (elsxy)
is equal to the domestic marginal rate of transformation in production
(M2T01). With no trade, this is the country's 'best' position i.e. at
which highest welfare is achieved (as described by the social
indifference curve, SI0).
The opening up of the opportunity to trade will now expose the
country to a (new) set of relative commodity prices which will affect
both production and consumption patterns. The slope of the line FF
represents the (new) international exchange rate. At this rate of
exchange, existing factors will be reallocated in such a way that more
of the relatively inexpensive goods (Y) will be produced and fewer of
the expensive ones (X). In terms of the diagram this means that the
economy moves along the production frontier from point Po to a point
such as PI where the domestic marginal rate of transformation ODRA
is equal to the marginal rate of transformation through trade (MRTf).
Similarly, there will be a movement away from the pre-trade
consumption point Co to a point such C1 on a higher indifference curve
SI'. That such an exchange of goods can or does lead to gains can be
seen by noting that FF lies everywhere (except at P1) above the
economy's production possibilities frontier, so that with trade and
with production at P the community can consume more of both
commodities.
2:2:1 Major Implications of Trade Theories
A.	 A central theorem of trade and welfare is that in the absence of
any domestic or foreign impediments to trade (or distortions), the
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allocation of resources that result from 'free trade' is Pareto 
Optimal or efficient, in the sense that it is impossible to make any
one person better off except by making someone else worse off. The
necessary conditions for pareto -efficiency are the following: with
perfect competition the domestic price ratio Pd/Pd must be equal to
x y
the ratio of marginal costs MCx/MCy and the foreign price ratio
pxf/pyf.
pd /pd = mc AvIC = pf /pf
x y	 x y	 x y
2:1
If, in addition, we assume no factor price differential in the
economy, the factor-price ratio in X, (P L/PK)x is equal to the
factor-price ratio in Y (PL/PK)y
f PL1
h -1 =
K)	 K)
As we have observed in equilibrium (point C1 in fig. 1) the following
relationship holds:
MRS
xY = MR?xY
 = MRT
f
xY	 2:3
(given, respectively by the relevant absolute slopes of SI]. TT and
FF). Finally, efficiency also requires that for production to take
place on the economy's production-possibilities frontier, the marginal
rate of substitution of one factor (labour, L) for another (Capital,
K) must be the same in both X and Y i.e.
MRSLK MRSLK	 2:4
The equalities (2:1)-(2:4) can be brought together to show the
optimality of trade and perfect competition; 4/p]ccl is identified with
f f
MRS,; MCy/MCx with MRTxy, (VPL ) with MRSLK and MRSLK and Py/px with
2:2
MRTxy.	 Thus equations (2:3) and (2:4) can be
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obtained by making the proper substitutions in equations (2:1) and
(2:2). Hence, the free trade equilibrium is necessarily
pareto-efficient.
B. The second implication concerns the world distribution of
income. If, in addition to those assumptions (Al-A4) enumerated above
we further assume incomplete specialisation in production of both or
any of the commodities and non-reversability of factor intensities,
the international exchange of goods will tend to equalise the prices
of factors of production between the participating countries.
C. Third, in the 'pure theory' of international trade with its
assumptions of flexible domestic and international prices and of
capital immobility internationally, trade is always balanced for each
country and balance of payments problems will never arise: or more
appropriately, balance of payments deficits can be covered or
eliminated by the use of fiscal policies. Thus internal and/or
external disequilibrium can only arise from faulty expenditure
policies.
D. Finally, one of the most emphasized implications concerns the
allocation of resources, including productive factors into different
economic activities. Since international differences in factor
supplies are the dominant explanatory factors of trade flows, it
follows that for the capital poor, labour rich LDCs like Nigeria, the
most favourable type of export-industry is one requiring more labour
and less specialised capital and material inputs, in order to boost
employment and to enjoy all the benefits of comparative advantage.
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2:2:2 A Critique of Trade Theories
The arguments against the free-trade principle or theory are
many and varied and it will be necessary therefore to be selective.
The main arguments often put forward are that some of the assumptions
underlying the theory are grossly irrelevant and inappropriate for an
analysis of development patterns and that the theory has failed to
deal adequately with certain real world phenomena despite their
evident and increasing importance.
Implicit in the argument for free-trade is the assumption that
the productive structures of economies (LDCs) are flexible and markets
elastic enough for these countries to adjust themselves quickly to the
changing conditions of the world market by specialising in a new line
of production. Technically, in terms of our earlier diagram, this
implies that economies are actually on their production possibility
frontiers and that it is 'painless' and easy to move along the curve
in either direction. While this may, to some extent, be true in the
relatively developed and diversified economies, it can hardly be
applicable to an underdeveloped economy that relies heavily on one or
two products for exports. For such countries, one can meaningfully
speak of comparative advantage only if they have a choice say, between
diversifying their economies and promoting exports or starting import
substitution. For reasons to be advanced shortly, the applicability
of the first option cannot always be guaranteed and this makes the
very idea of comparative advantage indeterminate.
The ability to re-allocate or the 'capacity to transform' in
these economies could be inhibited not only by the frictions and
distortions which characterize the majority of LDCs - unemployment and
under-employment of resources, factor immobility and factor price
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rigidity and low levels of productivity etc - but also by the
conspicuous absence of 'input-imports' which are important, indeed
necessary, to avoid further underutilisation of existing resources and
frustration of the growth potentia15 . The neo-classical writers
however argue that the inability to reallocate resources with the
opening up of the opportunity trade need not prevent a country from
realising the potential gains from trade - specifically that the
country in question could realise at least a consumption gain. This
is so long as factor prices are flexible enough to prevent the under
employment of resources6 . But it should also be realised that, at the
same time, the opening up of the opportunity to trade could result in
production losses which may be great enough to more than offset the
potential gains from a reallocation of consumption. This can be seen
by noting that where a potential traditional 'import-competing' sector
exists before trade, the opening up process could mean that those
factors in the LDC sector must accept much lower rewards otherwise the
'import-competing' products they produce will be unmarketable and
therefore extinguished, and the factors unemployed. But as Linder
(1967) 7 argued, it is most unlikely that factors of production in this
sector will accept lower rewards since by definition, incomes in a
backward country are necessarily at a subsistence level and therefore
irreducible. This in effect implies that the sector will be
destroyed. One could thus reach a completely different result from
that of the conventional theory: the opening up of the opportunity to
trade need not lead to a rational allocation of resources, it could
destroy some productive sectors and lead to unemployment and therefore
a loss, rather than a gain to the country. It must not be thought
that these are merely theoretical curiosities. Historical studies
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show that when a backward country is linked up, usually under duress
(e.g. as a result of colonial conquest) with the more economically
advanced nations, the opening up process undermines, rather than
rationalises the productive structures. Lewis (1955) 8
 argues for
example, that during the 'free-trade' era between Britain and India
"quite highly developed industries were adversely effected by cheap
imports from Lancashire and from Birmingham". The colonial governor
of Northern Nigeria once commented upon the impact of imports on
industrial production thus:
I foresee with great regret the decline of Kano as a commercial
centre when European goods supersede her manufactures 	  the
cotton of Zaria will then cease to come to the looms of Kano or
the skins and hides to her tannaries.9
Even if the internal reallocation of resources was possible with the
opening up of the opportunity to trade, many of those opposing
openness will argue that the comparative cost doctrine will have a
limited validity since it ignores the fact that the LDCs face certain
external and internal obstacles in exploiting their comparative
advantage and promoting exports whether of primary products or of
manufactures. First, it is often argued - that, there are certain
supply limitations to the expansion of exports. In a backward
country, the general level of productivity may be so low as to inhibit
the production of a sufficient amount of these goods which are in fact
demanded abroad. To be a successful export producer an LDC must
import from abroad the most essential imports in the form of capital
and intermediate goods; since there is no reason to believe that the
productivity of the imported inputs will be high in the LDCs, one
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could arrive at the paradoxical result that the requirement of these
inputs for export production might demand more foreign exchange than
the exports eventually yield. In addition, there are often the
problems of shortage of skill and of entrepreneurial ability for
producing the type of product for which world demand is expanding and
which can be supplied at low cost. Finally there also is the
existence of certain institutional limitations which take the form of
an inability or difficulty of providing export credits, the absence of
a coherent sales organisation and knowledge of required designs etc,
which could interact with the above, to inhibit the profitable
development of exports.
It is true that in the case of primary export production, the
low productivity in the export sector and the institutional barriers
enumerated above may not inhibit exports. In fact, history has shown
that particular primary export lines could create prosperity although
typically for a short time. However, over the long-run, primary
exports could cease to be profitable either because of adverse shifts
in demand consequent on competition from cheaper sources of supply or
from synthetics, or because of the income - and/or price -
inelasticity of foreign demand, or simply because of changes of
tastes. Sustained growth then would require resource flexibility and
innovation sufficient to permit shifts into new exports line or into
production for the domestic market. Thus the comparative cost
doctrine and its prediction that trade will always balance will have a
limited validity so long as
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(i) a country is 'import-sensitive' in the sense that essential
inputs have to be imported so as not to grind the growth
process to a halt
(ii) a less developed country is not able to export the goods in
which it is most competitive since there might be limited or
no demand for these products in the advanced countries
(iii) a backward country, even when faced with a favourable
foreign demand, is not able to export enough of those goods
in the production of which it has a comparative advantage,
since the expansion of output will steeply raise costs of
production.
The second major limitation of the theory derives from its
assumption about technology. By assuming identity of production
functions, the neo-classical theory cannot adequately handle
international trade in knowledge and technological services - a topic
of particular interest for the less developed countries. In a world
where technology is produced and sold in imperfect markets, where huge
sums are expended in the form of R & D to further monopolise
technology and where knowledge is neither immediately nor freely
available across countries, it is hardly realistic to assume that
production functions are the same everywhere. Moreover, since
technology is monopolised, any initial difference (i.e. any initial
gap) is likely to be perpetuated and production functions will
continue to differ. Neither is it realistic, whether in a static or
dynamic framework, to discuss international trade in complete
isolation from the movement of factors of production, especially
capital. For this ignores the enormous role of the multinational
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corporations, not to mention the fact that a good deal of
international trade takes the form of capital goods - and these are
precisely the forms in which real capital and technology are
transferred from one country to another. The above considerations
will help to make the whole idea of constant technology and fixed
endowments illusory: this is because the process of technology
transfer could cause a shift in their (i.e. LDC's) production function
and could potentially contribute to capital accumulation. This in
turn will tend to gradually increase and/or change the comparative
advantage in relatively capital intensive and sophisticated
commodities. As such, the factor proportions and the resulting
comparative advantages which guide the optimum allocation of resources
cannot be regarded as absolute and unchangeable but should be viewed
as a continuing process.
Some models of international trade flows which attempt to
incorporate on going changes in technology have in more recent years
been formulated10 . It should be recognised that these models are not
a replacement of the factor proportions theory. Instead, they are
developed as a supplement, providing some insight into the neglected
aspects of the international economy. The 'Technological-gap' and
'product-cycle' models seek to explain how dynamic comparative
advantage may operate; that is, ways in which the composition of a
country's trade could be determined by the rate of technical progress.
Specifically, they show how products and process innovated in the
industrialised countries may subsequently become more efficiently
produced in the LDCs. According to the 'product-cycle' model, the
production of certain products undergoes a similar evolution from
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"initiation" through a 'maturing' phase to a "standardised" phase with
input requirements changing over the life cycle of the products (skill
intensive initially, then capital intensive and finally labour
intensive). A new product is likely to be initiated in the large
industrial countries like the U.S. where skilled labour is available
and where their high percapita incomes create a unique consumption
pattern and provides a favourable market. However, as the product
becomes standardised, other smaller developed countries may have a
comparative advantage in the production of the commodities.
Innovation will then be disseminated, as the technology is transferred
to the third world, and mass production of the product will be
feasible. This represents the third and final stage of the products
life cycle.
The chief difficulty with these models is that they are positive
rather than normative theories of trade flows. As a consequence, they
can say very little about an appropriate trade strategy for an
underdeveloped country. Should the LDCS pursue a free-trade policy
and therefore rely on the ability of the industrialized countries to
innovate and 'transfer' technology to them? or should the LDCs pursue
an appropriate strategy with a view to developing an indigeneous
technology to their own needs? The typical view of the 'anti-openess'
group is that dynamic comparative advantage as outlined in these
models involves continuous technological dependencell.
The classical and neo-classical trade models are also criticized
for being so preoccupied with the question of production, consumption
and exchange (i.e. with static allocative efficiency) which emerge as
a result of trade between economies with given tastes, technology and
fully utilised resource endownments, that little, if any, attention is
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paid to real developmental issues except in the narrowly restricted
domain of arguments for infant industry tariff protection. 'Economic
progress' in the trade models is equated with increasing the aggregate
availability of consumable goods and/or increasing the degree of
exchange (i.e. exports) with the outside world. But for some
countries it is argued, neither of these need be a sufficient
specification of what is meant by progress and for some neither may
even be considered a necessary condition. Governments may be
concerned with explicating an economic strategy that attaches priority
to satisfying basic needs, to achieving economic self-reliance, or
self sufficiency or even to creating a better pattern of income
distribution; industries may be developed for their "effect on the
general level of education, skill, way of life, inventiveness, habits,
store of technology, creations of new demand, dynamism as well as the
direct Marshallian external economies" 12
 etc. In the neo-classical
approach all these objectives may be regarded as economically
irrational, since their pursuit may lead to a pattern of investment
allocation that is sub-optimal in welfare terms, in the sense that it
does not maximise the flow of consumption over a given period. The
neo-classicists will further argue that the static effects of trade
which have been the subject of so much criticism and discussion were
after all not the only positive effects of free trade: As Haberler
(1959) stated, "trade bestows very important indirect benefits which
also can be described as dynamic benefits upon the participating
countries"- 3 . Myint (1958) also reminds us of Adam Smith's
productivity doctrine: international trade not only widens the extent
of the market and the scope of the division of labour but as a result
also "raises the skill and the dexterity of the workmen, encourages
technological innovations, overcomes technical indivisibilities and
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generally enables a country to enjoy increasing returns and economic
development"14.
But whether such dynamic benefits actually accrued to the LDCs
with the introduction of free-trade is really misty, as can be
verified from the historical experiences of some LDCs. Ashworth
(1952) for example notes that for many LDCs,
contact with the outside world did not bring about a comparable
change in the methods of existing native industries and
activities carried on for local consumption...15
The neo-classicists will argue that these potentially positive dynamic
effects of free-trade are blocked by the imperfect nature of local LDC
markets; the anti-openness group would, on the other hand, prefer to
believe that it was the specialisation in technologically stagnant
commodities with unstable world prices that is responsible. Myint
(1958) himself admits that in many cases, the expansion in primary
export production was "achieved simply by bringing more land under
cultivation with the same methods of cultivation used in the
subsistence economy... and exports were produced by fairly simple
methods involving no radical departure from the traditional techniques
of production employed in subsistence agriculture"16.
A final, though by no means least important, issue relates to
the optimality of the market mechanism in providing an essential
ingredient for guiding economic development. The core of the
flea-classical paradigm is based upon the assumption of rational and
well-informed actors interacting upon perfectly competitive markets in
pursuit of their self-interest. This assumption of perfect
competition is necessary for differences in comparative costs to be
reflected in differences in comparative prices. It is well known
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however, that markets are far from being perfect and prices observed
in the market could differ from the 'social' or 'shadow' prices
because of such factors as non-competitive behaviour, externalities
and distortions introduced by government policy, with the latter being
perhaps the most pervasive especially in the LDCs. As such, the
free-market mechanism will not provide an adequate guide for a
socially optimum resource allocation. Even where prices reflect real
costs, they can be usefully employed only in cases where economic and
social institutions are highly developed as to respond to market
signals. In most LDCs where there is in fact a pre-market level of
organisation, poorly integrated markets and where information about
trading opportunities is not freely available, market signals or
incentives may not have much effect. It will not be appropriate
therefore to talk of 'specialisation' along a 'comparative advantage'
as a result of relative price changes.
These arguments as presented above have furnished strong
incentives for underdeveloped countries to adopt explicit strategies
for economic growth and development which center on a strategy of
industrialisation via import substitution. For example, the
inevitable structural imbalance between the capacity to import and the
capacity to export (demand and supply of foreign exchange) provides a
natural incentive to avoid balance of payment problems by substituting
domestic production for imports. The possible existence of dynamic
external economies and the assertion that they are seldom reflected in
market costs and prices has formed the basis for the infant industry
argument for tariff protection. Central to this arguement is the idea
that during the initial stages of industrial (or economic)
development, the 'infants' are assumed to learn both from their own
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experiences and from each other and that they will eventually 'grow
up' and be able to generate sufficient savings in costs to compensate
the economy for the losses they suffer during the learning period when
protection is necessary. In principle therefore, the infant-industry
argument is an argument for temporary protection to correct a
'distortion' which does not last forever but disappears gradually with
the passage of time. The crucial question is whether such 'infants'
will infact eventually grow and overcome their historical handicap to
compete effectively and without protection against imports, and this
can only be verified by an empirical investigation of the actual
experiences of countries that pursued such a strategy. More
fundamentally, the question might be asked, how well do countries
which adopt anti-trade policies perform, vis-a-vis those that accept
the 'free-trade' doctrine? This will be briefly examined next.
2:2:3 The Neoclassical Critique of IS
The defenders of the free-trade principle could point out that
most of these criticisms are unfounded and that the LDCs are only
being unnecessarily pessimistic; they could argue too, that the growth
performance of those countries which took a relatively favourable view
of foreign trade has not been a story of almost unrelieved gloom such
as had been suggested by the sceptics. It was forcefully argued
especially by Nurkse (1959), for example, that the largest source of
economic change in the economies of the regions of new settlement in
the 19th century - such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand - was the
rapid growth of import demand from the industrializing countries,
notably Britain, both to satisfy domestic consumption demand and to
provide the raw materials needed for their industries. This in turn
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induced foreign private investment in the new areas and led not only
to an enlargement of their export sectors but also to the building of
'overhead facilities essential to the expansion of domestic facilities
as well'. For these countries, therefore, international trade could
have provided a dynamic impetus to the economy and acted as an 'engine
of growth'. In more recent years, the highly successful records of
economic growth and structural change achieved by those LDCs, notably
Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong, with an 'outward-oriented'
posture might have impressed even the pessimists.
In contrast, experience of recent decades has shown that the
adoption of an 'inward-looking' posture - the continual use of high
and very uneven protection combined with exchange controls - by some
LDCs results, often in inferior and unsatisfactory results in
industrial development as well as in economic growth. The examples
most cited are those of India, Pakistan, Chile and a dozen or so of
other countries in Latin America and Africa. Empirical evidence tends
to suggest that although some of these countries have achieved fairly
rapid rates of growth in manufacturing output, this has not been
accompanied by any appreciable dynamic changes in their economic
structures; that the growth in their real income has been rather
disappointing and the strategy has been inimical to the realisation of
the very objectives that industrialisation was set out to achieve.
The most widely discussed effects of protection assessed within the
neo-classical framework include (i) the production inefficiency costs,
as measured by the effective rate of protection (erp), (ii) the
generation of structural imbalances in the economy - such as sectoral
imbalances between agriculture and industry and greater inequality in
income distribution - and the apparent inability to make the national
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income grow as fast as envisaged by policy makers, (iii) the excessive
dependence on imported inputs by industries and hence the inability to
save foreign exchange, (iv) the tendency to suppress the growth of
exports which in combination with (iii) above, further creates a
divergence between the demand and supply of foreign exchange
culminating in serious balance of payments problems, (v) the inability
to generate enough employment opportunities for the rapidly growing
labour force, (vi) the tendency to encoyrage the growth of an
industrial structure which is economically and technically
inefficient, and whose input requirements are independent of
domestically supplied inputs, as a result of which little, if any,
interindustrial linkages are fostered and there is often relatively
little impact upon the country's technology as measured in aggregate
production functions and (vii) the emergence of a structure of
production in which it is impossible to use all available capacity
without large scale capital inflows18 etc.
Clearly, not all LDC industrial structures will exhibit these
features at the same time and for particular economies other features
may emerge. But the 'mainstream' view is that such basic pattern is
applicable to the majority of LDCs pursuing the IS strategy. Let us
further examine a few of these issues here, while deferring the rest
to later chapters.
The overall growth and foreign exchange effects of the IS
strategy have been the greatest source of concern in the literature
especially because they are the most emphasized objectives of
industrialisation in the LDCs. The growth effects are attributed to,
or manifested in, several factors, not mutually exclusive, including
the tendency of ISI to create substantial structural imbalances in the
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economy, the 'exhaustion' of IS opportunities and the difficulty in
moving to a 'higher phase' of the process, the excessive reliance on
activities that have detrimental effects on the economy's saving rate
and the effects of IS policies on other sectors in the economy.
The generation of structural imbalance between subsectors of
manufacturing and agriculture is a fairly complex phenomena and a
generalisation of the causes will be difficult. It is now widely
agreed however, that an important factor are the IS industrial
policies which inevitably turn the terms of trade against the latter
(agriculture) and hence lead to a transfer of real income and
resources to the former (manufacturing). Empirical evidence suggests
that, in promoting the industrialisation process, the usual fashion in
most LDCs is to favour consumer industrial goods and often selected
intermediate goods, by offering high effective protection, while the
primary sector, which has hitherto been the main source of income and
foreign exchange is so highly taxed or disprotected that it often
receives much less when trading domestically than if it trades in the
international market. Specifically, the depression of the primary
sector is accomplished in various ways: first, export taxes are often
imposed with a view to encouraging domestic use of local raw
materials; second, with the objective of ensuring a regular supply of
agricultural produce at 'reasonable' or 'affordable' prices for
consumers, producer prices are fixed at below market levels; third,
there is the over-valued exchange rates which result from the high
tariffs granted to the manufacturing sector, with the consequence that
the foreign currency obtained from exports is converted into a
relatively small amount of domestic currency. In all three cases,
primary producers will thus receive only a fraction of the world
market prices of their exports. On the other hand, because of
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restrictions on competing imports, the prices of domestic manufactures
are substantially increased. In other words, an artificial price
differential is created between primary produce and manufactured
goods, with the latter being the more favoured.
While the extent of discrimination varies from country to
country, the problem is shown to be widespread. In Brazil, according
to Bergsman (1970), while the bias against agricultural output is
difficult to discern, 'the bias against agricultural exports is much
clearer. The implicit tax on exports (relative to the free-trade
situation) averaged 31 percent in the period 1954-64'. He further
estimated that value-added for the domestic market was about 50% more
than for export19 . Hansen and Nashashibi (1975) estimated effective
rates of protection (erp) and DPC for 14 major crops in Egypt to show
the degree of protection for the years 1961, 1963 and 1964. In each
of the years, close to 50% of the crops received negative protection
and "typically, it is the export crops that were negatively
'protected" 20 . They also found that between 1961 and 1969, the
weighted average rate of taxation for 9 or field crops increased
from - 0.5 (1961) to -25.3% (1969). For the main export crop
(cotton), the taxation was even higher, reaching 41%, if value-added
was valued at international prices and above 50% if valued at domestic
prices21 . Similarly, Lewis (1970) found that in Pakistan, the terms
of trade agriculture received were less than 2/3 what it might have
received had it been able to trade directly in world markets22.
The overall effect will be a substantial loss of growth
opportunities for the economy as a whole. This can be seen in at
least 2 ways. First, export earnings, critical for financing the
foreign exchange component of industrial inputs will be severely
depressed and so will the saving capacity of the economy; second, the
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potential market for manufactured goods from the industrial sector is
diminished or even destroyed since the main source of wage income is
neglected. This limited internal purchasing power of the primary
sector compounded by the absolute level of poverty, the often highly
skewed income distribution which characterize the majority of the
LDCs, and the high prices of manufactures will further imply that the
demand for most of the domestically produced consumer goods will
expand only relatively slowly especially if the development process
does not involve significant changes in the direction of more
progressive income distribution. Even in the unlikely event of rapid
industrial expansion, the size of the domestic market for a previously
imported good now domestically produced, will be limited to the volume
of goods previously imported and may fail to sustain the momentum of
domestic-marked-based industrialisation for long. As pointed out by
power (1963) 23 once consumer goods become completely
import-substituted - i.e. the limits of domestic market are reached -
one or more of the following become necessary if growth is to continue
unabated: (a) the penetration of the export market by the already
established industries m the extension of the process from finished
consumer goods production to a 'second phase' of import-substitution
involving the development of industries manufacturing intermediate and
capital goods and other consumer durables and (c) the 'search' for an
internal market for new consumer goods. The latter option may be
constrained unless supported by either (a) and/or (b).
However, the incentive to expand exports could be severely
limited because (i) the often excessive protection provided the
'infants' forces domestic costs above the world level causing factors
to shift out of export producing and/or (ii) of the deflation of
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foreign exchange associated with protected import substitution. The
problem could be aggravated because of the supply and institutional
problems already enumerated in the previous section. Moreover,
further industrial growth on the basis of the profitable establishment
of a producer goods sector nnay not be automatically induced and
could be constrained by several factors. First, such industries are
said to be by nature highly sophisticated, capital and import
intensive and subject to important economies of scale. Thus success
in their operation will depend crucially on the resource endowment of
the economy, its market size and not the least, the efficiency of the
previous import substitution. However, if the market for consumer
goods is extremely narrow, that of the equipment necessary to produce
them will be even narrower. Secondly, investment in the new
industries may be unattractive - given the high profitability of the
already established consumer goods, thanks to the higher protective
tariff rates - unless they can either effectively cut into the subsidy
of the consumer goods industry or press for increases in protection.
Both options will no doubt be resisted by existing producers, for fear
of higher costs, possible poorer quality of inputs and irregular
supply.
In view of these problems, most - though by no means all -
countries then take the 'easy' option, which is the tendency to cover
the widest possible range of consumer products, "in quest of a very
high level of self-sufficiency" 24 . But the continued spread of
protection over a wide range of goods:
.... implies in some cases an uneconomically small scale of
production... It means scattering thinly scarce capital, foreign
exchange, technical and organisational talent. It means in
short doing many things poorly instead of few things wel125
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The 'excessive' concentration of investment in the consumer goods
sector which appears as the 'easiest' option could moreover work to
retard the growth of the economy. The analysis of Pakistan's
industrialisation policy by Soligo and Stern (1965) shows how the
growth of real income was retarded: "as the indigenous production of
consumer goods increases, consumption is 'liberalised' and savings do
not increase as quickly as they otherwise might. Ultimately, the rate
of growth in real income will be lower when import substitution in
consumer goods is permitted" 26 . Similar conclusions were arrived at by
Power (1963) and Kahn (1963)27.
Perhaps the second most serious defect of the IS process is that
once it is adopted as a development strategy, there are 'built-in'
tendencies which not only confine output to the domestic market and
suppress the growth of exports as we have already noted, but also lead
to excessive dependence on imported inputs. The sources of this
dependence are many and include the nature of the products being
import substituted, and, often, the lack of capital and intermediate
goods sectors etc. Evidently, the more domestic IS is limited to
consumer goods production or to the assembly of durable goods, though
the output of these may rise, the more equipment, components and raw
materials to produce them are needed and must be imported; with low
tariffs on and preferential exchange rate treatment of capital goods,
imports make for lavish orders. But the further this process is
extended and the longer it continues the more technically complicated
and costly the equipment that must be imported, so that unless exports
could expand fast to generate the needed foreign exchange, to purchase
inputs, countries must resort to foreign borrowing or aid. But as one
writer puts it, this option "can only keep the wolf from the door
47
temporarily while making him more rapacious in the very long-run"28.
Not only will this entail the use of an ever larger share of foreign
exchange earnings to service the debts but "can be used only to permit
the economy to continue to live with the policies that produced the
-
specific shortages to begin with" 9 . When new loans are not
forthcoming, the inevitable consequence will be to grind the expansion
of the import-substitution industries to a halt or to operate with
considerable under-utilized capacity due to shortage of inputs.
Even the non neo-classical economists admitted the dismal
'failure' of the ISI strategy. It is instructive to note that
Prebisch himself, the architect of the strategy in Latin American
countries remarked that
"The proliferation of industries of every kind in a closed
market has deprived the Latin American countries of the
advantages of specialisation and economies of scale. Owing to
the protection afforded by excessive tariff duties and
restrictions, a healthy form of competition has failed to
develop to the detriment of efficient production"30.
They, however, argue that it is not import substitution per se that is
to blame, but a badly conceived import substitution. First, it is
argued, in many instances, the strategic targets of industrialisation
were not adequately identified, nor was there any analysis of the
optimum feasible sequence of the exploitation of resources through
manufacturing; second, most countries would have found it extremely
difficult to choose the priority industry branches which could
undertake the domestic production of capital goods and intermediate
products, adequately diversify the industrial structure and promote
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exports, since the IS strategy is based on the existing market and
socio-economic structures, with highly unequal income distributions.
Finally and most importantly, it is argued that a real, i.e.
sustained, broadly based and widely acceptable pattern of development
cannot come about by a spontaneous process of trial and error which
was all that IS strategy entailed. Thus if what is sought is rapid
economic development and structural change, comprehensive economic
planning is indispensable. The need for 'planning' and/or project
selection and evaluation is also widely accepted even within the
neo-classical school although differences of opinion remain as to the
nature and form that it should take. In the face of distortions and
market imperfections, what should be the principles underlying a
proper selection of projects in LDCs? This will be our next topic of
discussion.
Market Imperfection and Resource Allocation: 
2:3 Application of Little and Mirrlees Project Appraisal Methods
If there exist distortions (policy-imposed or otherwise) in the
economic system, then the value of a commodity expressed in terms of
its domestic market price is generally different from its true
economic, or efficiency or accounting value; to arrive at the latter,
several adjustments have to be made to domestic market prices. Such
distortions need not affect the value of commodities only. It has
been argued for example, that wages paid to manufacturing employees in
LDCs are often above the value of their marginal product in
alternative employment which is the relevant economic cost of labour,
and the social cost of borrowing or the opportunity cost of capital may
be understated as a result of certain imperfections in the capital
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market. Here too, adjustments to domestic market prices (including
interest rates) are called for to arrive at their economic
contribution. In the following sections we shall discuss and
illustrate, in simple terms, the standard methods and assumptions
employed in the estimation of the opportunity costs (or shadow prices,
or accounting prices or efficiency prices) of output and inputs. It
must be emphasized that our analysis does not purport to provide a
comprehensive and rigorous theory of shadow pricing, on the contrary,
we take as given the theory as developed by Little and Mirrlees (LM)31
and reinterpreted by Squire and Van de Tak (ST) 32 . We shall first
briefly discuss the main and relevant (for our purposes) features of
the methodology, then consider its main shortcomings and finally show
haw the relevant prices will be practically estimated for application
in later chapters.
2:3:1 Main Features of LM/ST Methodology:
(i)  Valuation of output and material inputs
Essentially, the LM approach is concerned with the estimation of
shadow prices that can be used in the evaluation of the outputs (or
benefits) and inputs (or costs) of public sector industrial projects
in the LDCs, although it has also been recommended for use in the
private sector in situations where government commercial and
industrial policies 'have a large or dominant influence' as in
Nigeria.
The components of a project are divided into 3 broad categories
for purposes of the analysis: (1) traded goods and services, (2)
non-traded goods and services and (3) unskilled labour. Traded goods
are further subdivided into those (i) "goods which are actually
imported or exported (or very close substitutes are actually imported
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or exported) and (ii) goods which would be exported or imported if the
country had followed policies which resulted in an optimum industrial
development"33.
Traded outputs (benefits) and inputs (costs) of the project are
to be valued at prices which they command on the world market or at
border prices which will be c.i.f. for importables and f.o.b. for
exportables. Such a procedure "expresses their real cost or benefit
to the country in terms of foreign exchange: and free foreign exchange
is a good yardstick of value because it can be used to satisfy almost
any needn34 . The goods which fall into the second category of traded
goods (partially traded goods or potentially traded) could be valued
either directly at border prices as in the case of actually traded
goods or treated as non-traded goods, depending on one's estimation as
to whether present distortionary policies will continue or are likely
to be changed. Alternatively, a mixed procedure could be followed:
first, they can be considered as fully traded only, and valued at
border price directly, then they are considered as non-traded and
valued at border prices using the procedure to be shortly described.
The two values are then weighted together according to the likelihood
that they will be imported and domestically produced. To estimate,
even approximately, if and in what proportion goods in a sector will
be partially imported or produced domestically, may however be
difficult. It is usually assumed therefore that output is either
actually traded or non-traded.
With respect to the latter, the recommended approach is also to
value them at their 'border prices' to "ensure that we are valuing
everything in terms of a common yardstick" 35 . This can be done by
making the assumption that increases in the demand for the goods are
met only by an increase in supply and that there is a constant per
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unit cost of production. In this event, the accounting price of a
non-traded good can be approximated by its marginal social cost of
production. The latter can be expressed in terms of the total cost of
the inputs - traded and primary - needed for the production of the
non-traded good by again invoking the assumption that prices are
independent of the structure of domestic preferences. The value of
each non-traded input is then broken down into their traded,
non-traded and primary inputs elements; one would then go on breaking
the non-traded elements until one is left with the primary and
tradable input elements only of the non-tradable input. The tradable
input element is then valued directly as previously discussed and the
primary inputs are shadow priced using the procedure to be discussed
below. The shadow price of the good is then obtained as the sum of
the border price of traded inputs plus the border price of the primary
inputs.36
(ii) The Valuation of Primary Inputs
In valuing factor inputs, the same general principles apply,
once the relevant primary inputs are chosen. Usually these consist of
labour employed, capital inputs and foreign exchange. The border
price of the latter is of course unity since it is the unit of
account. TO obtain the border prices of labour and capital, one
should first estimate their marginal productivities in alternative
use.
The value of the foregone marginal product of labour is
estimated by making appropriate assumptions about the operation of the
labour market in the economy. In perfect labour markets with no
significant unemployment or under-employment, the market price of
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labour (the wage rate = is determined by the interaction of demand
and supply, the former being the marginal productivity curve. The
marginal product of labour (m) in its alternative employment is then
taken as a reasonable measure of foregone output and is equivalent to
the market wage. The market for unskilled labour especially in the
rural areas of LDICs is often cited as a case which approximates this
situation and hence the opportunity cost of unskilled labour may b e
approximated by the wage rate prevailing in the rural labour market.
In other words, the supply price of labour to the project (or
industry) is equal to the marginal productivity of labour in
agriculture, which could be significantly lower than the going market
wage rate in the industrial sector. One would then apply a conversion
factor to express it at border prices.
It has been suggested that in estimating the supply price, or
the social opportunity cost of labour one should take into account not
only the differential marginal productivity in agriculture and
industry but also a multitude of such factors as the opportunities for
alternative jobs, the private disutility of effort, the private cost
of any migration and job training etc. Thus for example, if the
creation of a new urban job induces an additional migration from the
agricultural sector, it will be reasonable to assume that the migrant
will incur some (monetary and social) costs in moving to an urban life
and in acquiring special skills. In this eventuality, the relevant
measure of the social opportunity cost of labour may indeed be higher
than the agricultural wage he sacrificed, and the market wage rate
will be taken as a rough approximation of the shadow wage rate.
In imperfect labour market situations where there is
unemployment/under-employment and/or surplus labour, the measurement
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of m is much less straightforward and a careful analysis is therefore
required to obtain reasonable measures of m. In general, it is often
assumed that if the economy is characterized by surplus labour and/or
disguised unemployment, the physical marginal product of labour may be
significantly below the prevailing market wages and could be close to
zero. This is because, in agricultural work for example, where work
is shared by family units, the withdrawal of the labour of one worker
from the unit need not significantly affect the level of output since
other members could take over the work hitherto performed by the
worker whose labour is withdrawn. Indeed, if the additional worker
employed by a given industrial enterprise has been hired from a pool
of unemployed, then the opportunity cost of labour is assumed to be
zero. However, one should be careful in equating m to zero especially
since unemployment in agriculture is often seasonal. Moreover as Sen
(1975) pointed out:
"Even if the MPL could fall to zero for total amount of labour
that would not be a point of work equilibrium unless the
peasants had no disutility of work whatsoever. With a positive
marginal disutility of effort, the work equilibrium would be at
a positive marginal product of labour"37.
If the open and/or disguised unemployment is essentially a
seasonal phenomenon, m could be estimated by employing a weighted
average of market wages, the weights being the ratio of labour
utilisation to labour availability in the different seasons. Thus at
peak periods (when the available labour is fully utilised) m
approximates the market wage, while in slack periods, it is suggested
that A I m < W, where A is some unspecified lower bound determined by
an assumed marginal disutility of work which is in turn partly
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determined by some minimum subsistence leve1 38 . In practice this
procedure will be immensely difficult and would involve accurate
sample survey observations of seasonal wages as well as rates of
seasonal utilisation and availability of labour, which we do not have.
The assumptions which we shall use to estimate a value of m in Nigeria
will be specified in the next section.
The need for a shadow rate of interest - or a discount rate -
has received a great deal of attention in the LM method. Any project,
it is asserted, will have effects on savings, investments and thus
future growth as well as on present consumption. LM are of the view
that more rapid growth (and higher savings and investments) may be
preferred by governments to immediate consumption. Indeed it would
appear that their main test of a project's worth is its ability to
generate savings and growth. However, they are also of the view that
saving and investment could be below the socially optimum level, for
various reasons, which range from the 'irrationality' of individuals
who prefer to consume now than later, to market imperfections and
other government constraints, economic or political. It may be
difficult for the government through its fiscal policy to ensure that
the additional savings generated to promote growth and future
consumption are as valuable as the additional present consumption. It
is therefore necessary to choose an appropriate discount rate which
can be used to make benefits and costs in later years commensurate
with those occuring now. Various discount rates can be suggested,
each corresponding to the 'numeraire' in which costs and benefits are
expressed. For example, using consumption as the 'numeraire' the
appropriate discount rate is the Consumption Rate of Interest (CRI):
It is then the rate of fall overtime in the value of the marginal
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utility of consumption, at the average level of consumption. 14-14
suggested the use of the Accounting Rate of Interest (ARI), using
public income as the 'numeraire':	 It is then the rate of fall
over time in the value of public income measured in domestic currency
equivalent of foreign exchange. Ideally, the ARE should be chosen
such that the demand and supply of public projects are in balance.
Other things being equal, high ARI will result in an excess supply of
investible funds since only few projects will pass the test of a
positive net present value; conversely, a low ARI will result in
demand for investible funds exceeding supply, since too many projects
will have a positive net present value. As a lower bound estimate of
ARI, the real rate of return on foreign lending (if the country is
lending abroad) or the marginal cost of foreign borrowing (if the
country is borrowing from abroad) is suggested. Ideally however, it
is suggested that the ARI should equal the rate of return, evaluated
at accounting prices, on marginal investment in the public sector;
i.e. to the opportunity cost of capita1 39 . The estimation of the
latter using Nigerian data will be undertaken in section 2:4.
When all project's inputs and outputs are expressed or valued in
terms of their foreign exchange value, LM point to the potential
benefits, one of which is that "import substitution and exporting is
encouraged to the maximum desirable extent" 40 ; in addition, this takes
care of the possible employment problems since "producers are
encouraged to use labour, instead of imported inputs to the maximum
desirable extent" 41 . More fundamentally, once such revaluations have
been adopted, balance of payments problems or foreign exchange crises
can be avoided since, "a really acute foreign exchange crises would be
reflected in a high ARI, which would discourage the part of the
economy controlled by government from undertaking projects with
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large initial foreign exchange reguireuents"42.
One of the added attractions and desirable features of the LM/ST
methodology is the explicit consideration given to certain social
objectives such as the trade-off between growth and equity.
Traditional approaches to project appraisal in LDCs have hitherto
considered and emphasized only the former objective and have
accordingly estimated only efficiency as opposed to social pricing
parameters. Consider for example, the valuation of labour input. In
the 'traditional' approach the efficiency price of labour is measured
simply as its opportunity costs in an alternative form of employment:
in effect the marginal output of labour forgone elsewhere because of
its use in the industrial project. In social pricing however,
attempts are made to incorporate distributional and other
considerations by introducing income weights which vary according to
the real income of the recipient. Specifically, if one wishes to take
into account the objective of altering the income distribution in
favour of the poor, then the change in consumption of a poor man is
given a higher weight than the same change in consumption of a rich
man derived from a project. Where there are constraints on achieving
the desired level of investment and growth, savings may be valued
differently from consumption etc. We however, consider that the
incorporation of the equity objective would require a much more
detailed treatment than can be done within the limited scope of this
thesis. Besides, we do not think that the Nigerian government takes
seriously such objective even though it is stated in every plan
document. We shall thus consider only the efficiency prices.
2:3:2 critique of LM/ST Methodo1oq3j43
Despite the growing applications of the LM methodology in
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cost-benefit analysis, its practical usefulness has been questioned.
One of the main - indeed the  main - criticism of the approach is the
reliance on 'border prices' as indicators of the best pattern of
resource allocation in LDCs. The use of world prices can be
rationalised, it is argued, only in so far as they are 'optimum' or
'efficient'. This is however not necessarily so, as pointed out by
many economists in the literature. According to Kaldor (1963), for
example,
the underdeveloped countries are confronted by Monopolistic
Markets in their purchases of manufactured goods, where prices
are kept at higher than competitive levels by international
private cartels, or simply by the absence of price competition
among producers operating in imperfect markets44.
It can be argued, therefore, that what LM have done is simply a
replacement of domestic prices that are distorted by taxes, tariffs
etc and hence do not reflect the social value of costs and benefits,
by world prices that are themselves distorted by non-competitive
behaviour of producers. Moreover, as Lal and Streeten (1977) have
pointed out "the relative values of these products represent the
demand patterns and preferences of the developed countries" 45 which
are "what programes of industrialisation in underdeveloped countries
ought to be designed to change" 46 . Perhaps even LM recognised such
shortcomings when they admitted that the use of world prices is not
necessarily because they are "more 'rational' than domestic prices,
but simply because they represent the actual terms on which the
country can trade"47.
But even if world prices are by themselves 'efficient', or
'optimum' the method has the additional drawback that it ignores the
existence of a multitude of constraints - external and internally
imposed - preventing the adoption of optimum policies. Moreover,
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their appropriateness in project appraisal will crucially depend on
how fully integrated the economy is to the world market and on the
extent to which world prices can be properly identified.
It can be said that the underlying assumption in the LM approach
is that all aspects of LDC industrial planning should be or can be
seen in terms of their integration with the industry of the outside
world or that world prices should heavily influence all domestic
investment decisions in the LDCs. This implies and/or requires that
the outputs and inputs of the projects in question are in fact fully 
traded in the sense that increases in domestic supply of the goods or
increases in domestic demand for them affect only the foreign balance
but not production and consumption decisions and/or prices elsewhere
in the economy. Thus if all output of a project will be exported or
at least can have an unlimited access to the world market, it
certainly makes a perfectly good sense to value at the going f.o.b.
prices its output since that necessarily represents the actual trading
opportunities facing the country. The real challenge to the
methodology is however constituted by the presence of 'potentially' or
'partially' traded goods as well as that of non-traded goods. The
former are certainly not unimportant in view of the many trade
restrictions imposed by LDCs, and if one assumes that such
restrictions are not likely to be radically altered, then it makes
little sense to value these at world prices. The problem posed by the
presence of non-tradables is that their prices are set in the local
market and therefore any change in their supply will affect domestic
production and consumer prices. In addition, their marginal value to
consumers could differ significantly from their marginal production
cost as a result of market imperfections or policy induced distortions
such as indirect taxes. The divergence between price (i.e. marginal
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value) and marginal social cost does not arise if the commodity is
fully traded since it can be assumed that its supply can be increased
at a fixed international price. With non-traded goods such as
electricity, an incremental unit could be obtained not necessarily by
increasing production but by depriving other users or by a combination
of the two. Thus the world price rule is not strictly applicable
without a knowledge of the internal demand conditions.
Joshi (1974), Stewart (1972) and Stewart and Streeten (1974)48
have discussed extensively why in fact many goods may be non-traded or
why integration with the world market may be less than perfect and in
some cases not even desirable for the LDCs. The possible range of
non-traded goods may be greater than is conventionally assumed (a) if
there exists under-utilised capacity in local industry, (b) if local
markets are badly articulated or poorly integrated such that they fail
to respond quickly to changes in prices, (c) because of non-optimal
trade policy which discourages exports and/or imports and/or (d)
because the external demand of the good is non-existent or is less
than perfectly elastic, or simply limited. The four factors are of
course, interrelated: for example (d) could arise because of either
m or (c); and (a), as we shall see, could arise because of (c), but
each could also operate independently of the others. We can
illustrate the situation by considering first, the problem of excess
capacity. The operation of a new industrial project in the economy
may neither increase exports nor decrease imports if it stimulates the
local demand for, or local supply of, hitherto dormant resources. In
other words, it is not international trade but local production and/or
prices which are changed. This argument depends of course, on the
assumption that the existence of idle capacity was initially caused by
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inadequate domestic demand rather than by factors such as (i)
inefficiency in the utilisation of inputs or in management (ii) poor
labour relations (iii) internal supply bottlenecks of inputs and/or
(iv) the adoption of non optimal policy in trade. If for example, the
latter is the most important or proximate cause, then it can be argued
that the use of a more optimal policy such as the adoption of a
realistic exchange rate could eliminate the excess capacity by
boosting exports. In this event, the increase in the demand for
inputs by the project could only be met by a reduction in the amount
of the good that could be potentially exported and hence it cannot be
said that the use of world prices is inappropriate in valuing the
good. Problems could still arise however, if the external demand
elasticity for these goods is less than perfect. Thus an increase in
the demand for, or supply of them by the new project will lead to a
change in their world price which will in turn have repercussions on
domestic consumption and production. However, it is also argued that
less than perfectly elastic demand does not by itself provide any
argument for abandoning the world price rule for valuing commodities.
LM argue that the 'problem' could be easily dealt with by expressing
the marginal export revenue as an approximate measure of the
accounting price of the good. There are three major problems involved
here: first, the procedure requires accurate estimates of foreign
demand elasticities which may be difficult in practice. Second, the
procedure ignores the social value and foreign exchange costs of
changes in domestic producer and consumer incomes i.e. the
substitution effects - resulting from the price change which could be
as important as the direct foreign exchange effects of the change in
price of exports and third, it is assumed that any incremental unit of
the good will be made available for exporting. The latter assumption
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may not be valid if export opportunities are limited, for reasons
other than the adoption of a non-optimal trade policy.
The second major criticism is that the LM approach excludes from
consideration many of the issues raised by the critics of free-trade
theory which we have already examined. Such issues relate to
government objectives other than increases in consumable goods as well
as to the consideration of the dynamic issues of growth and
development which the LDCs are most concerned with. For various
reasons, few LDCs have evidenced a desire - rightly or wrongly - to
accept the discipline of existing international prices and postpone
industrial investments in lines they regard as important but in which
do not have an international comparative advantage. Thus, an iron and
steel industry may be preferred to a cotton textile industry even in
an economy with a shortage of capital, if the former industry is
deemed more likely to foster greater inter-industrial linkages in the
economy and generate further external economies. The possibility of
formulating objectives that do not explicitly consider integration
with the world market was either ignored by LM or considered as an
oddity. For example, on the objective of self-sufficiency, they argue
that "there is rather seldom a very good reason for making (relative
or complete) self-sufficiency in particular goods a policy
objective"49 . The important indirect effects of projects are also
ignored by LM not only because "these ... would generally be
exceedingly difficult to measure" but also that "they will on balance
be unimportant"50.
Admittedly, whatever objective is formulated by the LDCs the
cost-effectiveness of projects is still relevant: but whether it
should be determined on the basis of world prices even in the event
that output does not enter into world trade is the real question.
62
The applicability of the world price rule in project evaluation
implicitly assumes that such prices can indeed be unambiguously
identified. It has however been emphasized in the literature51 that
for many of the goods that enter world trade considerable variations
in prices exist depending upon factors such as the quantity traded,
the technical and quality specifications, sources and conditions of
supply and even the times at which transactions take place. The
ambiguity and irrelevance is increased in cases where international
transactions are the subject of bilateral agreements and/or contracts.
A more serious error in the conventional assumption that there is a
unique set of border prices is the possibility of intra-firm transfer
pricing which takes place often for a variety of reasons, including
different rates of profit taxes in different economies and overcoming
capital repatriation laws. Since such prices are not necessarily
those that would be set in a normal competitive commercial transaction
on the world market, they bear little relation to a 'hypothetical
border price' and could be subject to considerable fluctuation in
response to tax and other industrial policies of the governments52.
The problem posed by the possibility of transfer pricing could in
principle be avoided if the project analyst could identify with some
degree of certainty a reference price that would be charged for
similar items in a commercial transaction in the world market. In
practice, this maybe difficult, especially when the problem is
prevalent, and when the number of goods involved is not one, but
several.
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The existence of the various problems enumerated may no doubt
impair - though not necessarily completely invalidate - the
operational usefulness of the LM approach. Some of these problems
posed could be real, rather than merely theoretical and could be
difficult toaccommodatediothers, while real, could be exaggerated and
yet others may be less important or even non-existent at all times in
all countries. The challenge posed by 'potentially' traded goods is
perhaps the most real but its importance will vary from country to
country depending upon the extent of government intervention in the
economy. As will be shown in later chapters, the Nigerian
government's interference with trade has been fairly extensive and
therefore most commodities are defacto only partially traded.
However, given the economy's lack of productive capacity, a move to an
optimal situation would certainly entail an increasing importation of
these goods - i.e. the goods will become fully traded. We need not
assume of course that such a move will in fact take place. But at
least one is not far off the mark by valuing these at border prices
bearing in mind of course the limitations. The problem of non-traded
goods 'proper' is, perhaps, of lesser magnitude. The proportion of
those goods we can identify from our input-output table as non-traded
inputs in total (raw material) inputs varies from only 8% (in
Petroleum & coal products industry) to about 27% (in paints). The
share of non-traded inputs in total costs ranges from about 7% (in
made-up textiles, leather and petroleum & coal industries) to about
21% (in paints). This implies that even if distortions were to
increase the price of non-traded inputs by 50%, raw material cost will
go up only by about 4 to 13%; and total costs will go up only by
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about 3.5 to 10.5%. Thus even if non-tradables are not properly
valued, the magnitude of the bias will not be great. Besides, we can
argue with Baldwin 53 that most of the non-traded goods (e.g.
electricity) consist mainly of traded goods which can be easily
'border priced', others (e.g. construction) consist mainly of labour,
which can be shadow priced, while the rest (e.g. transport) consist of
both traded goods and labour. Thus while some problems could indeed
arise, they should not be exaggerated.
The problems of transfer pricing can also be assumed to exist in
Nigeria without our being able to fully substantiate the claim. The
Nigerian government recognised the problem and attempted to deal with
it by promulgating the pre-shipment Inspection of Imports Decree in
1978, which makes it compulsory for all importers of goods into
Nigeria to obtain a Clean Report of Findings attesting to the quality,
quantity and price of the goods being imported54 . This is not a place
to evaluate the success or otherwise of the decree but it at least
gives us the assurance that if the problem does exist, it is being
checked and possibly minimized.
Finally, as to the consideration of other objectives such as
industrial linkages, we accept that they cannot be easily incorporated
into the cost-benefit analysis. But we hope that we have taken care
of these by considering them as separate topics of discussion in other
chapters.
We shall now move on to consider how the accounting values of
goods and of primary inputs could be practically estimated.
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2:4 Practical Estimation of Conversion Factors
2:4:1 Conversion factors for traded goods 
The general formula for conversion factors is specified as
B. = E.1	 3
E 1• :=aj
ai Aj/Pi 55 2:5
aj = proportion of marginal expenditure devoted to the jth
commodity
Aj = shadow price of the jth commodity
.=market price of the jth commodity.1,3
In practice this formula will be difficult to apply given that it
requires a detailed information on the consumption pattern of the
individual at different income levels or on the consumption patterns
of different income groups and expenditure elasticities which are not
readily available.
As an approximation and under certain assumptions, use can be
made of
M + X 
SCF -
M(l+t
m
) + X(1 -tx)
M = value of imports
X = value of exports
tx= ad valorem taxes on exports
te ad valorem taxes on imports.
2:6
Equation (2:6) is used under the assumptions that (a) the economic
environment in Nigeria will not alter radically in the next few years;
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m all goods are (potentially) tradable or at least that consumption
expenditure on non-tradable items is small or negligible and (c) export
demand and import supply are infinitely elastic; an assumption which
appears realistic in the Nigerian situation.
It may prove useful sometimes to obtain SCF separately for
consumption, intermediate and capital goods. One mieds only
reinterprete X, M as say the value of exports and imports of the
relevant category and obtain average import and export taxes levied on
each category. As these are not specifically required in this study,
no attempt is made at their estimation.
The SCF obtained from (2:6) bears a close relation to the more
familiar concept of shadow exchange rate (SER):
SCF/OER = 1/SER56
	2:7
where OER - Official exchange rate.
Thus it translates domestic values into world values expressed in
units of the domestic currency and division by the OER expresses the
results in foreign exchange. Thus it will be particularly useful
especially in situations where the direct estimation of the SER proves
difficult as is usually the case.
Of more relevance than the SCF are the sectoral conversion
factors derived by slightly modifying equation (2:6) thus
M.
_  1
a. -JIV1.(1+tm.)	 l+tm. 2:8
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2:9
M. 1 
M.(1+ .)
	 l+tm.
where e6N = output (input) conversion factor.j(
Thus, for each sector, the conversion factor is expressed as the
reciprocal of one plus the nominal tariff. The use of only import
values and taxes in equations (2:8) and (2:9) can be justified since
Nigeria's manufactured export structure remains undeveloped and
sectoral exports of manufactures are quite negligible57 . Another
modification introduced is with regards to the effects of non-tariff
distortions on the domestic price level. In estimating these
conversion factors we assumed that the ratio of the maximum possible
domestic price to import price is determined more or less by the
tariff rate on output and input alone. We do, however, recognise the
existence of various distortions that contribute to the divergence of
domestic prices from border prices and which, therefore, make the
domestic price of the commodities generally much higher than the
c.i.f. plus tariff price. We have in mind the effects on prices of
advance deposits on imports, quantitative restrictions and exemptions,
monopoly power of importers and domestic producers etc. Admittedly,
many or all of these are hard to quantify precisely and to include in
our calculation. For example, the effect of quantitative restrictions
WM can be formally incorporated by including an additional item in
equation (2:8) or (2:9), say tQM, representing the tariff equivalent
of QR. This would be done by expressing the border price of each good
subject to a quota or restriction as a percentage of the domestic
retail market price less a transport marketing margin. But it has to
be recognised that this is not easy to do and may take considerable
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time. However, ignoring these influences will no doubt grossly
underestimate the impact of protectionist policy in Nigeria. We
therefore assume at the risk of extreme over simplification, 2 premium
rates of 40% and 60% in adjusting for the divergence of the c.i.f.
plus tariff rates and the domestic prices of the commodities. The
premium inclusive sectoral conversion factors are then given as
40%
1 	 1 
j	 1.-Fbm. -1- (I)	 '	 (/) =	 60%
J
1 	 1 
	 40%
-
	
1- +tin	 60%
These are displayed in tables 2:1 and 2:!2. respectively for the years
1974 and 1977.
2:4:2 The Accounting Price of Labour and Capital 
The economic price of labour or the shadow wage (SR) can be
estimated using the expression
5NR = SCF.M58
	2:10
where M = foregone marginal product of labour at domestic prices
SCF = standard conversion factor which translates M in to
border prices.
The various assumptions needed to obtain an accurate (or an
approximate value of u) have already been discussed in the previous
section. In general, the estimation of (2:10) would require a
detailed knowledge of the rural and urban labour markets of the
economy.
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Table
	 Sectoral Conversion Factors for Output and
Material Inputs -1974.
SECTOR
Tariff-adjusted
(1)	 (2)
Adjusted with a premium
rate of	 35%.
(3)
	
(4)
6 3111/3122 Food 0.876 0.769 0.621 0.687
7 3131/3133 Alcoholic bev. 0.531 0.769 0.448 0.687
8	 3134 Non-alcon.bev. 0.489 0.769 0.418 0.606
9	 3140 Tobacco 0.562 0.769 0.470 0.606
10	 3211 Textiles 0.745 0.769 0.591 0.690
11	 3212 Made-up	 text. 0.742 0.769 0.589 0.690
12	 3220 Apparel 0.667 0.769 0.541 0.606
13	 3231/3233 Leather 0.917 0.800 0.694 0.625
14	 3240 Footwear 0.482 0.769 0.413 0.606
15 3311/3320 Wood 0.600 0.769 0.496 0.606
16 3412/3420 Paper 0.717 0.909 0.573 0.690
17 3511/3512 Chemicals 0.812 0.909 0.632 0.690
18	 3521 Paints 0.698 0.909 0.561 0.690
19	 3522 Drugs 0.684 0.909 0.552 0.690
20	 3523 Soap 0.308 0.909 0.278 0.609
21 3529/3540 Other Chem. 0.775 0.909 0.609 0.690
22 3551/3560 Rubber 0.816 0.769 0.635 0.690
23 3610/3699 Cement 0.861 0.833 0.622 0.690
24 3710/3812 Basic Metals 0.952 0.909 0.714 0.690
25 3813/3819 Fab.Metals 0.812 0.769 0.632 0.714
26 3822/3829 Machinery 0.843 0.909 0.651 0.609
27 3832/3829 Elect.Machinery 0.701 0.909 0.563 0.690
28 3841/3843 Transport Equip 0.841 0.909 0.649 0.690
29 3851/3909 Misc.products 0.801 0.909 0.626 0.690
Notes: Cols (1) and (3) output conversion factors derived as af1/1+tij
and 1/1+brti+r
 respectively;Cols(2) and (4) material input conver-
sion factors derived as Br1/1+tmi and 1/1+t+r respectively,
where ter = tariff on output,tmi =tariff on inputs and r= premium
rate.
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Table 2:2 Sectoral Conversion Factors for Output and
Material Inputs -1977.
Sect or
code
Tariff-adjusted
(1)	 (2)
Adjusted with a premium rate of
40%	 60%
(3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)
6 3111/3122	 Fgrolde 0.757 0.876 0.581 0.649 0.521 0.574
7 3131/3133	 Alcoholic bev. 0.718 0.833 0 . 5	 85 0 . 6	 52 0.502 0.556
8	 3134	 Non-alcoh.bev. 0.891 0.903 0.657 0.663 0.581 0.586
9	 3140	 Tobacco 0.434 0.750 0.586 0 .577 0.344 0.517
10	 3212	 Textiles 0.703 0.617 0.549 0.689 0.494 0.606
11	 3212
	
Made-up text 0.826 0.952 0.621 0 .495 0.552 0.450
12	 3220	 Apparel 0.580 0.756 0.471 0.581 0.430 0.520
13 3231/3233
	
Leather 0.943 0.833 0.685 0.625 0.602 0.556
14	 3240	 Footwear 0.465 0.833 0.392 0.625 0.363 0.556
15 3311/3320
	
Wood 0.588 0.717 0.476 0.557 0.434 0.502
16 3412/3420	 Pape r 0.891 0.753 0.657 0.579 0.581 0.519
17 3511/3512	 Chemicals 0.757 0.750 0.581 0.577 0.521 0.512
18	 3521	 Paints 0.630 0.547 0.503 0 .449 0.547 0.553
19	 3522	 Drugs 0.682 0.897 0.536 0.660 0.484 0.583
20	 3523	 Soap 0.461 0.855 0.389 0.637 0.361 0.566
21 3529/3540	 Other Chem. 0.969 0.944 0.698 0.685 0.613 0.603
22 3551/3560 Rubber 0.860 0.909 0.640 0.667 0.567 0.588
23 3610/3699 Cement 0.909 0.751 0.667 0.645 0.588 0.571
24 3710/3812 Basic Metals
25 3813/3819 Fab.Metals
0.506
0.827
0.848
0.826
0.458
0.621
0.633
0.641
0.419
0.553
0.562
0.568
26 3822/3829 Machinery 0.836 0.913 0.626 0.669 0.557 0.590
27 3832/3839 Elect.Machinery 0.758 0.909 0.582 0.667 0.521 0.588
28 3841/3843 Transport Equip. 0.(1(31 0.952 0.657 0.690 0.580 0.606
29 3851/3909 Misc.products 0.868 0.870 0.644 0.645 0.571 0.571
Note:cols (1),(3),and (5) are output conversion factors:
cols (2),(4) and (6) are input conversion factors.
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Ideally, since labour employed is not homogeneous, the
estimation of SKR would entail an investigation into the various types
of labour used.., skilled, unskilled, professional, clerical etc. - by
an industry and into their likely employment alternatives and/or
supply prices. One would presumably arrive at a different SWR for
each category of labour. Unfortunately, the scarcity of detailed
income and wage statistics in the Nigerian manufacturing sector will
not permit this. The SWR estimates to be derived are therefore to be
interpreted as representing the average of the skill mix of workers
employed in the Nigerian industry.
It would also be desirable to obtain estimates of SWR separately
for say rural and urban sectors in order to represent the usual
segmentation of the labour market in LDCs. However, very little is
known to us about the operation of the labour oarket in the rural
areas except that it is characterized by considerable under-employment
and unemployment. Given the large agricultural base of the Nigerian
economy, a great many problems arise with regards to estimates of wage
trends in the rural sector. For one thing, agricultural income
consists largely of 'subsistence output' or products consumed by the
farm family out of its own production. For another, even where such
estimates are available, a comparison with urban incomes will be
inherently difficult given the existing urban rural price differences
which are in turn difficult to measure. A recent study 59
 sets the
average rural income at N92 at rural prices and N128 at town prices
which may or may not be a good guide to agricultural wages and
certainly does not provide an acceptable measure of output forgone in
the case of say, skilled labour.
The urban labour market is itself highly segmented and
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characterized by a fairly high level of unemployment. There is a
'modern' wage sector, consisting of government establishments and the
modern industrial sectors; the latter could be further segmented into
large-scale and small-scale establishments. What is significant is
that wage determination could differ from one segment to the other.
Then there is also a 'traditional' non-wage sector which will not be
considered here.
In the urban wage sector government intervention (e.g. minimum
wage legislation) and unionisation are important aspects of the labour
market. In addition, some employers - statutory corporations and
large multinational firms especially - appear to pursue a conscious
policy of paying wages that are far above what can be considered as
the going market wage rate60.
Usually every 4 or 5 years the government sets up public service
commissions to review salaries and wages of government employees61.
Usually the scope of each commission includes a broad spectrum of
subjects such as wages, social welfare, transport, government
reorganisation etc. A minimum wage is then established to be applied
to the civil service only, although often with the recommendation that
the private sector should follow suit. Nigerian trade unions then
regard the resulting changes in minimum wages as providing an insight
into the rate of change of market wages and accordingly use them in
their negotiation with employers. The government claims that it
"fully supports the principles and practice of free and voluntary
negotiation, collective bargaining and joint consultation" 62 . To a
large extent therefore, in the private sector, it is the operation of
market forces rather than the opinion of government appointed
tribunals that determine wages. Although unionisation seems to be an
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important aspect of the urban labour market, the rapidly growing urban
labour force plus several restrictive union legislations would limit
the unions' ability to derive manufacturing wages significantly in
excess of the marginal productivity of labour in the sector. This is
more so in the small scale establishments where unionisation may be
non existent. It may therefore not be too unrealistic to assume that
the manufacturing sector wage approximates m. However, given the
existence of minimum wage legislation - even though strictly
applicable to the public sector only - one cannot rule out the
possibility of a 'spill-over' into the private sector 63 ; and given
also the growing open and disguised unemployment, it would be safer to
set m at a lower level than what the average market wage level
represents and then carry out a sensitivity analysis to test the
roboustness of our results. Thus it is assumed further that m is 20%
and 25% below the actual market wage. We in addition used the SCF to
obtain SWR at border prices.
The Opportunity cost of Capital (OCC) 
The derivation of the opportunity cost of capital (OCC), like
the estimation of the capital stock itself, is highly problematic and
inherently hypothetical and our estimates should be regarded only as a
rough guide to the true value of the parameter. We shall follow the
general S-T and related approaches in deriving such estimates.
In the general S-T methodolgy64 , the OCC at domestic prices is
given by the incremental labour/capital ratio multiplied by the
incremental wage/labour ratio (the marginal product of labour) less
the incremental output/capital ratio. The value of OCC so derived can
be translated into border prices by multiplying it by the ratio of the
standard conversion factor to a conversion factor for investment.
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More formally the OCC can be expressed as
AQ ( AL	 SCFCCC = [-- - — * --I *
AK OK AL 	 'CF
where
Q = net domestic product
K = net fixed investment
L = employed labour force
W = wages
The value of AQ/AK (which is the inverse of the incremental
capital-output ratio) is assumed to lie within the range .30-.35 which
is not very different from the values found for most LDC5 65 . Estimate
of the employment investment ratio[= 0.000113;isobtained by dividing
the change in labour employed in the manufacturing sector between 1975
and 1978 (= 61252) by the change in net investment in the sector
during the same period (N541221 thousands). As a rough approximation,
the marginal productivity of labour(v41C)is assumed to be equal to N
1110, obtained as the difference between wages per head in 1975 and
1978, at 1975 prices. Thus the value of OCC will lie somewhere
between 0.205 and 0.225, and when multiplied by a conversion factor of
0.65, the value at border prices will be somewhere in the region 13.2%
to 14.6%. (The conversion factor is the four-year average conversion
factor, from 1975-1978 and is equal to 0.87; when a premium of 40% is
added, the value of 0.65 is arrived at). This may or may not
represent the true OCC since the values of the parameters used in the
estimation are derived from the manufacturing sector only, rather than
from the whole economy as should ideally be the case.
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The value of OCC can also be derived from a C-D type production
function. Let
Q = A ert Kal! 66
where
Q = output
A = constant
r = rate of technical progress
K = capital stock employed
L = labour employed.
The incremental output/capital ratio is then given by
dQ _ aA
e
rtKa-1LdK
which with little manipulation can be equivalently written as
dQ	 rt a-1 K
— = aPie K LdK
_ Q
- a
where ais the share of capital stock in output, which here is assumed
to be .761. Thus OCC - .228 - 2.66 (or 14.8% - 17.29% at border
prices). Here again, we have had to rely on data from the
manufacturing sector to obtain estimate of the share of capital in
value-added. It could be significantly biased especially since it was
derived as a residual.
Finally, the value of OCC is often approximated by the
prevailing interest rates in the economy, by project specific economic
rates of return and/or by the average rate of return on foreign loans.
The use of interest rates in the economy is based on the assumption
that capital markets are perfect and therefore the rate of interest
represents a perfect and rational guide to investment opportunities in
76
the economy. The prevailing lending rates of interest (from April
1982) in the Nigerian economy are as follows
Minimum	 Maximum
Commercial Banks	 10.5	 14
Nigerian Industrial Development Bank 	 11.5
	 14
Nigerian Bank for Commerce & Industry 	 11.5	 14
Federal Mortgage Bank
	
8	 14
Insurance Companies	 8	 14
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria (1982) "Monetary circular No. 15:
Central Bank Credit Guidelines", 21st April, Lagos.
Thus this gives a wide range (8-14 percent) for OCC and if it is
assumed that the rates are set to attract investment and do not truly
reflect the economic environment, the maximum may be significantly
higher.
The various estimates then suggest a value of OCC which could
range from as low figure as 8% to as high as 26.6%. The choice of an
approximate value for OCC will thus be highly value-judgemental and
probably subject to errors of unknown magnitude. We shall generally
work with a figure of 15% with alternative rates of 10% and 20% being
employed for a sensitivity analysis.
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2.5. Summary and Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we discussed fairly extensively some of the
inadequacies of the 'free-trade' principle. The main argument
presented is that the comparative advantage doctrine cannot be
accepted as a basis for development policy in the LDCs either because
some of its underlying assumptions cannot be empirically validated or
because of its neglect of certain dynamic considerations in
development. Such criticisms reflect fairly accurately the views held
not only by those who prescribe the IS strategy for LDCs but also by
some neo-classical economists.
We also pointed out many of the problems associated with the IS
strategy as observed in empirical studies, from the neo-classical
perspective. It was pointed out in particular that this fo ya of
industrialisation could retard, rather than promote, growth and could
worsen, rather than improve, the foreign exchange position of a
country because of its high import-intensity and its effects on
exports.
The mounting criticisms of the comparative cost doctrine -
especially with its assumption of perfect markets - and of the costs
of the IS strategy in the LDCs generated a distinct but related
literature on cost-benefit analysis. The LM/ST approach which uses
border prices as a basis for calculating the shadow prices of all
benefits and costs of industrial projects was briefly discussed. It
was pointed out that the approach may not be wholly accepted within
the protectionist school because like the Orthodox 'free-trade'
theories, it is concerned mainly with the question of resource
allocation efficiency assessed in the context of international trade.
The approach is criticised both on the question of methodology and on
the basic principles underlying it.
78
Our acceptance of the LM/ST methodology does not mean that we
believe in 'free-trade' or that we do not recognise that Nigeria does
have other objectives. World prices are used simply to enable us to
get a standard of reference in planning industrial investment in
Nigeria, because we believe that the country's productive base must
allow for, among other things, a profitable specialisation in the
international economy if and when such opportunities exist. In any
case, the prices estimated in section 2:4 are only 'second-best' which
implies, the assumption that existing non-optimal policies in Nigeria
will remain in force during the period of the analysis, rather than
'first-best' which would have amounted to predicting the values which
would prevail when policies have been changed.
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CHAPTER 3
The Growth and Development of the Nigerian Economy
3.1 Introduction
The rate of economic transformation of Nigeria during the last
two or three decades has been fairly rapid and surpassed that of
almost any other country in the African continent. Less than 3
decades ago, the country was classified as poor, predominantly
agricultural and highly dependent for its revenue and foreign exchange
earnings on exports of few agricultural commodities. In 1960, for
example, the total Gross National Product (GNP) of the country was
estimated to be slightly above US$4 billion and with an estimated
population of about 53 million, per capita income was thus less than
US$100. Between 1960 and 1970, the annual rate of per capita GNP
growth was significantly less than 1 percent. With a share of 11
percent in Gross Domestic Product (MP) in 1960, industrial activity
was virtually non-existent and manufacturing, with a contribution of
only 4.5 percent to GDP was confined to simple processing of
agricultural products. The GDP shares of industry and manufacturing
were far below the average shares for Less Developed Countries (LDCs)
in Africa, Latin America and Asia'. The underdevelopment of the
economy was further suggested by other economic indicators of growth.
In 1960 for example, the ratios of gross domestic savings and gross
domestic investment to income were respectively seven and thirteen
percent. Domestic savings were therefore enough to finance only about
one-half of the gross domestic capital formation. Moreover, the
savings income ratio was considerably lower than the average ratio for
law income countries in Africa, less than one-half of the average for
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all low income countries and far below the realised ratio in
twenty-two of the thirty nine African countries for which data was
available2.
Following the discovery and subsequent production and export of
petroleum, Nigeria began to experience the first tremor" of economic
change. The petroleum sector had, by the middle of the last decade
taken over the agricultural sector, as the main agent of economic
growth. Since 1973, more than 75 percent of Federal Government
revenue and 90 percent of foreign exchange earnings have come from the
petroleum sector; these have made it possible to finance and execute
expensive infrastructural and industrial projects. The persistent
balance of payments deficits which characterised the late 1950's and
early 1960's were turned into surpluses and foreign reserves continued
to cumulate. By 1979 for example, the level of international reserves
was 26 times higher than the 1970 leve1 3 . In 1979, the total GNP was
estimated to be about US$75 billion, almost 20 tines the 1960 level
and at least 3 times bigger than the GNP of any one single country in
Africa4 . With an estimated population of about 80 million, per capita
income was almost 10 times the 1960 figure.
Of the 39 sub-Saharan African countries for which data is
available, only Gabon had a higher saving income ratio in 1979 than
Nigeria and the latter's investment ratio of 31 percent was surpassed
only by that of Mauritiania, Guinea-Bissau, Togo, Botswana and
Mauritius% The rate of growth of the domestic investment-income
ratio in 1970-79 (17.8 percent) more than doubled the figure achieved
between 1960 and 1970 6 . Between 1960 and 1979 per capita income
increased by less than 1 percent per annum in 17 African countries,
averaged less than 2 percent for all sub-Saharan countries and less
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than 1 percent for all low income countries in Africa, compared with
Nigeria's 3.7 percent7; during the last decade, a significant number
of African countries recorded a negative rate of growth of income per
capita, compared with Nigeria's 4.2 percent, a figure that surpassed
even that of the so-called high growth countries like Kenya, Malawi
and Ivory-Coast whose per capita income growth had averaged an annual
2.7 percent between 1960 and 1979.
Clearly, compared to other developing areas in Africa, insofar
as these figures can be taken as indicative, Nigeria's per capita GDP
and its overall performance must be rated as fairly impressive.
However, the growth in GNP and/or GNP per capita, while significant,
can be a very partial criterion of success. Of crucial importance is
the extent of economic diversification and its corrollary, the ability
to generate and sustain growth from within. It is pertinent therefore
to examine the extent to which we can interpret these changes in
Nigeria during the past decades as reflecting a meaningful
diversification of the economy. Do these rapid changes, brought about
essentially by an influx of external rent signify an unambiguous
economic development? Would they enhance the country's ability for
sustained economic growth?
As a convenient analytical starting point, we shall be concerned
in this chapter, with the growth of the country's national income and
its components; hence with the evolving structure of the economy.
Specific factors to be discussed are (a) the level and growth of gross
domestic product (b) the industrial origin of GDP and the performance
of the major sectors of the economy. These are discussed in the
section which follows. In Section 3:3 the importance of the external
sector in the economic growth of Nigeria will be examined. In section
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3:4 we shall discuss the growth and structural characteristics of the
manufacturing sector and section 3:5 provides a summary of, and
conclusion to the chapter.
Table 3:2 Growth in the GNP per capita in Selected Countries and Sub-
regions
Population
	
GNP per capita average
(millions)	 annual growth rate
(percent) 
Countries	 (Mid-1979)	 1960-70	 1960-79	 1970-79
Sub-Sahara 343.9 1.3 1.6 0.8
Low income 187.1 1.6 0.9 -0.3
Nigeria 82.6 0.1 3.7 4.2
Other Middle Income 74.2 1.9 3.2 -0.5
South Asiaa 890.5 1.5 - 1.5
All developing 3245.2 3.5 - 2•7b
Low income 2260.2 1.8 1.6 1.6b
Middle income 985.2 3.9 3.8 2.8b
All industrialised 671.2 4.1 4.0 2.5b
a	 Bhutan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Burma, India, Sri Lanka and Pakistan;
b	 1979-80, 1970-78
SOURCES: The World Bank, Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan
Africa, Tables 1.1 p3, Table 2, p144; and World Development
Report, 1980.
3:2 The Level. Composition and Growth of GNP: 1950-1980 
The overall performance and the changing structure of the
economy can be judged from the growth and composition of GDP as well
as the growth of gross fixed capital formation. Estimates of GDP at
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constant factor costs are presented in column 1 of Table 3:3, while
columns 2 and 3 show the average annual growth rates of the series.
For analytical convenience and given the discontinuity in the series
(see end of Table 3:3) we find it appropriate to consider three
distinct phases of GDP growth: the first from 1950 to 1957, the second
from 1958/59 to 1972/73 and the third thereafter. What is immediately
evident from the table is that the performance of the economy during
the entire period under review - and even within the sub-periods - was
far from smooth. It can be observed that during the first period,
there was a general deceleration of growth, especially from the second
half of the 1950's. Although Gross Domestic Product increased in
absolute terms in each of the years (except 1954), it can be seen that
its rate of growth during the period was on the decline, from 7.7
percent in 1951 to 2.6 percent in 1955 and -2.4 percent in Ig56.
Between 1950 and 1957, the average annual rate of growth was only
about 4 percent. The growth rate of GDP picked up again during the
immediate post independence years, reaching very impressive levels of
11 percent in 1960/61, 9 percent in 1963/64 and averaging 6.6 percent
between 1958/59 and 1965/66. Thereafter, the annual percentage
increase in output declined sharply from 6.74 percent in 1965/66 to
-3.24 percent in 1966/67. The decline in absolute as well as in
percentage terms, continued throughout the war years 5 , reaching an
alarming level of -15.5 percent in 1967/68. This was followed by a
period of recovery from 1969/70. The annual percentage increase in
output rose to 27 percent and to 31 percent in 1970/71. The absolute
levels of GDP in 1969/70 (N3234.5 million) and 1970/71 (N4242 million)
were far above the pre-war level of N3146 million. This rapid
recovery which started even before the end of the civil war, clearly
96
Table 3:3 Amount and Rate of Growth of Gross Domestic Product
of Nigeria,1950 -1979/80*
Year Gross Domestic
Product (GDP)
(Nm)
Change in GDP
(Nm) (%)
1950 1377.40 ---- ----
1951 1482.80 105.40 7.70
1952 1587.00 104.20 7.70
1953 1623.20 36.20 2.30
1954 1744.20 121.00 7.50
1955 1790.40 46.20 2.60
1956 1747.40 -43.00 -2.40
1957 1820.00 72.60 4.20
1958/59 2084.20 ----- ----
1959/60 2230.40 146.20 7.00
1960/61 2483.40 253.00 11.34
1961/62 2492.20 8.80 0.35
1962/63 2597.60 105.40 4.23
1963/64 2825.60 228.00 8.80
1964/65 2948.00 122.40 4.33
1965/66 3146.80 198.80 6.74
1966/67** 3044.80 -102.00 -3.24
1967/68** 2572.20 -472.60 -15.52
1968/69** 2544.20 -28.00 -1.09
1969/70** 3234.50 690.30 27.13
1970/71 4242.00 1007.50 31.15
1971/72 4721.50 479.50 11.30
1972/73 5007.10 285.60 6.05
1973/74 11223.62 ----
1974/75 12194.54 970.90 8.70
1975/76 12500.50 306.00 2.50
1976/77 13744.30 1243.80 9.90
1977/78 14749.20 1004.90 7.30
1978/79 13966.90 -782.30 5.60
1979/80 14618.40 651.50 4.70
Notes: * Figures for 1950-1957 are at constant 1957 factor cost
and fiscal year beginning January 1st; those for 1958/59
to 1972/73 are at constant 1962/63 factor costs, while
those for 1973/74 to 1979/80 are at constant 1973/74
factor costs and fiscal year beginning April 1st.
** Figures do not include estimates from the war affected
areas
Sources: Federal Office of Statistics,Annual Abstract of 
Statistics;National Accounts of Nigeria (1976);and 
Gross Domestic Product of Nigeria and Allied Macro
Aggregates,Vol.1,No.1,April 1982.
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demonstrated the resilience and strength of the economy. It can be
seen that inspite of the interruptions, the annual average rate of
output growth achieved during this (i.e. 58/59 - 72/73) period
surpassed the corresponding rates in the first and third periods.
In the latter period (73/74 - 79/80) the rate of output growth
achieved amounted to 4.5 percent, only slightly higher than the
average rate of growth during the 1950-57 period. Assuming an average
rate of growth of population of 2.5 percent per annum, the average GDP
growth rates imply average per capita income growth rates of 1.5
percent (1950-1957), 4.1 percent (1958/59 - 1965/66), 4 percent
(1958/59 - 1972/73) and 2 percent (1973/74 - 1979/80).
The growth rates achieved, and the proportion of output supplied
by each of the main economic sectors - viz agriculture, mining,
manufacturing and services - are presented respectively in tables
(3:5) and (3:4). These can be used not only to assess the relative
importance of the various economic sectors in the economy but also to
examine the extent to which any meaningful structural shift has
occurred over the years.
Virtually all the major sectors of the economy developed rapidly
though unevenly. During the periods 1950-1957 and 1958/59 - 1972/73,
the annual average increase of production were respectively 2.9
percent and 2.3 percent in the Agricultural sector, 8.1 and 11.32
percent in the Mining and 5.6 and 10.75 in the Manufacturing sector.
The relatively higher rate of growth for the latter emanates possibly
from the low base from which it started. The growth in the primary
i.e. agricultural sector, has further slowed dawn since the middle of
the 1970's. Annual percentage increases fluctuated considerably from
10 percent in 1974/75 to -10 percent the following year, to about 6
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Table 3:4 Distribution of Nigeria's Gross Domestic Product by
Four Major Economic Sectors (1950 - 1979/80)
Year: Agriculture
Nm
Mining
Nm
Manufacturing
Nm
Services
Nm
1950 913.60 66.48 95.20 6.93 37.80 2.75 327.60 23.8
1951 989.00 66.81 105.80 7.15 38.00 2.75 347.60 23.4
1952 1006.00 63.43 98.80 6.23 41.60 2.62 439.60 27.7
1953 1042.80 64.86 112.40 6.94 42.60 2.63 421.60 26.0
1954 1099.00 63.00 140.00 8.02 45.40 2.60 460.00 26.3
1955 1128.20 62.81 144.80 8.06 47.20 2.63 476.00 26.5
1956 1087.20 62.19 149.20 8.50 53.40 3.05 458.40 26.2
1958/59 1344.40 60.96 187.20 8.49 90.60 4.11 462.00 26.4
1959/60 1409.00 68.81 229.20 11.19 104.00 5.08 305.60 14.9
1960/61 1597.80 64.42 29.80 1.20 109.60 4.40 746.20 30.0
1961/62 1549.80 62.20 43.40 1.70 130.20 5.20 768.80 30.8
1962/63 1605.80 61.80 54.00 2.10 146.40 5.60 791.40 30.5
1963/64 1737.80 61.50 58.80 2.10 170.00 6.00 859.00 30.4
1964/65 1731.40 58.70 79.60 2.70 181.00 6.20 956.00 32.4
1965/66 1742.20 55.40 149.80 4.80 221.00 7.00 1033.80 32.9
1966/67** 1581.80 52.00 210.40 6.90 221.60 7.30 1031.00 33.9
1967/68** 1358.00 52.80 163.80 6.40 190.00 7.40 860.40 33.5
1968/69** 1338.00 52.60 85.00 3.30 200.40 7.90 920.80 36.2
1969/70** 1539.50 47.60 261.30 8.10 263.40 8.10 1170.30 36.2
1970/71 1890.10 44.60 508.90 12.00 317.60 7.50 1525.40 36.2
1971/72 1982.90 42.00 711.60 15.10 307.70 6.50 1719.30 36.4
1972/73 1852.10 37.00 840.60 16.80 378.60 7.60 1935.80 38.6
1973/74 3371.50 30.00 2020.60 18.00 496.90 4.40 5334.60 47.5
1974/75 3718.40 30.50 2246.90 18.40 480.50 3.90 5748.70 47.1
1975/76 3339.90 26.70 1802.60 14.40 593.80 4.80 6764.20 53.9
1976/77 3307.10 24.10 2279.60 16.60 732.40 5.30 7425.20 54.2
1977/78 3502.90 23.70 2370.90 16.10 778.20 5.30 8097.20 54.9
1978/79 3128.70 23.10 2180.60 15.60 889.90 6.40 7677.70 54.9
1979/80 3135.10 21.40 2446.70 16.70 995.00 6.50 8081.60 55.3
Notes: * * Excludes data from the war affected areas.
Sources: FOS,Annual Abstract of Statistics,National Accounts of
Nigeria and Gross Domestic Product and Allied Macro
Aggregates,vol 1,no 1,April 1982.
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Table 3:5 Annual Average Growth Rates of Major Economic Sectors
Year	 Agriculture	 Mining	 Manufacturing	 Services
(Nm) (%) (Nm) (%) (Nm) (%) (Nm) (%)
1950 ---- ---- ---- ---- ----
1951 75.4 8.2 10.6 11.1 0.2 0.5 20.0 6.1
1952 17.0 1.7 -7.0 -6.6 3.6 9.5 92.0 26.5
1953 36.0 3.8 13.6 13.8 1.0 2.4 -18.0 -4.1
1954 56.4 5.8 27.6 24.6 2.8 6.6 38.4 9.1
1955 29.2 2.7 4.8 3.4 1.8 3.9 16.0 3.5
1956 -41.0 -3.6 4.4 2.9 6.2 13.1 -17.6 -3.7
1957 26.8 2.4 15.2 9.2 1.8 3.4 28.0 6.1
1958/59 ---- ---- --- --- --- ---- ---
1959/60 64.6 4.8 42.0 22.5 13.4 14.8 -156.4 -33.9
1960/61 188.8 13.4 -199.4 -86.9 5.6 5.4 440.6 144.2
1961/62 -48.0 -3.0 13.6 45.6 20.6 18.8 22.6 3.0
1962/63 56.0 6.6 10.6 24.4 16.2 12.4 22.6 2.9
1963/64 132.0 8.2 4.8 8.9 23.6 16.1 67.6 8.9
1964/65 -6.0 -0.4 20.8 35.4 11.0 6.5 97.0 11.3
1965/66 10.8 0.6 70.2 88.2 40.0 22.1 77.8 8.1
1966/67 -160.4 -9.2 60.6 40.5 0.6 0.3 -2.8 -0.3
1967/68 -223.8 -14.2 46.6 -22.2 -101.0 -45.6 -170.6 -16.5
1968/69 -20.0 -1.5 -78.8 -48.1 10.4 5.5 60.4 7.4
1969/70 201.5 15.1 176.3 207.4 63.0 31.4 249.5 27.1
1970/71 350.6 22.8 247.6 94.8 54.2 20.6 355.1 30.3
1971/72 92.8 4.9 202.7 39.8 -9.9 -3.1 193.9 12.7
1972/73 130.8 -6.6 129.0 18.2 70.9 23.0 216.5 12.6
1973/74 ---- ---- ---- ----
1974/75 346.9 10.3 226.3 11.2 -16.4 -3.3 414.1 7.8
1975/76 -378.5 -10.2 -444.3 -19.8 113.3 23.6 1015.5 17.7
1976/77 -32.8 -0.9 477.0 26.5 138.6 23.3 661.0 9.8
1977/78 195.8 5.9 91.3 4.0 45.8 6.3 672.0 9.1
1978/79 -284.2 -8.1 -190.3 8.0 111.7 14.4 -419.5 -5.2
1979/80 -83.6 -2.6 266.1 12.0 65.1 7.3 403.9 5.3
Source: Computed from Table 3:4.
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percent in 1977/78, and to 8 percent and -3 percent in 1978/79 and
1979/80 respectively. The average annual compound rate of growth
between 1973/74 and 1979/80 was -1.2 percent, while the corresponding
rates for the manufacturing, mining and services sectors were
respectively 11.5, 3.2 and 7.2 percent.
Relating these sectoral developments to the growth of the
economy between 1950 and 1979 suggests that the period of higher
average rate of economic growth was between 1958/59 and 1972/73. This
was precisely the period when both manufacturing and mining were
expanding at a fast rate, while the agricultural sector was virtually
stagnant.
Table 3:6 Summary of Growth Rates of GDP and Main Economic Sectors
(Percent)
Growth in: 1950 - 1957 1958/59 - 1972/73 1973/74 - 1979/80
GDP 4 6.5 4.5
GDP/Capita 1.5 4 2
Agriculture 2.9 2.3 -1.2
Mining 8.1 11.32 3.2
Manufacturing 5.6 10.75 11.5
Services 5.8 8.95 7.2
Note: A further breakdown of this period indicates that even higher
rate of output growth was achieved between 1970/71 and 1972/73. This
amounted to 8.6 percent, an impressive figure given that it was much
higher than the growth rate of 6.3 percent projected in the 2nd
National plan. A large part of this growth was due to increased
production of petroleum which grew at 28.5 percent p.a. and the
services sector with a 12.65 percent rate of growth.
SOURCE: Computed from Tables 3:3 to 3:5.
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Inspite of the slower rate of growth, the predominance of
agriculture in economic activity is evident, from Table 3:4. The
sector's contribution to GDP averaged more than 60 percent between
1950 and 1963/64 and more than 50 percent between 1965/66 and 1968/69.
Indeed, it can be seen that throughout the 1950's and early part of
the 1960's (until 1964) there was more or less a parallel movement in
the output of the agricultural sector and in GDP such that variations
in the latter were almost always accompanied by variations in the
former, in the same direction. By the middle of the 1960's however,
it was clear that the economy was changing direction. This can be
illustrated by the following sectoral contributions to increases in
GDP between 1950 and 1957, 1958/59, 1972/73, 1973/74 and 1979/80.
Table 3:7 Sectoral Contributions to Increases in GDP
Growth in:	 1950 - 1957 1958/59 - 1972/73 1973/74 - 1979/80
(%)
100.00
-6.69
12.55
13.49
80.82
SOURCE: Computed from tables 3:4 and 3:5.
Thus the remarkable features of the late 1960's and early 1970's
when compared to the earlier period was the reversal in the role of
(Nm) (%) (Nm) (%)
GDP 442.60 100.00 2922.90 100.00 3394.80
Agriculture 200.00 44.90 507.70 17.37 -236.40
Mining 69.20 15.54 653.40 22.35 426.10
Manufacturing 17.40 3.91 288.00 9.85 458.10
Services 158.80 35.69 1473.80 50.42 2747.00
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agriculture from a 'leading' to a 'lagging' sector in the economic
development of Nigeria, the rising importance of the mining and
manufacturing sectors, and the tremendous growth of the services
sector. That more than 80 percent of the increment to GDP in the
1973/74 - 1979/80 was due to the expansion of the services sector
casts some doubts on the real significance of recent economic growth,
especially in view of its weak linkages with the rest of the economy.
Along with the significant expansion in output and the change in
the pivot of the economy, was the impressive growth in the value of
gross fixed capital formation (GFCF); from N76 million in 1952/53 to
N615 million in 1965/66, just before the war. There was an absolute
decline thereafter, until 1979/81 when the pre-war level was
surpassed.
The average annual rate of growth implied by the figures in
Table 3:8 was 20 percent during the period 1952/53 - 1978/79 (1975
prices). The increases were particularly rapid at the beginning and
end of the period: in 1952/53 - 1960/61, the average rate of growth
was 16.51 percent while in 1970/71 - 1978/79 a rate of growth
averaging 33.73 percent was achieved. Even more impressive perhaps is
the rising share, with only minor fluctuations, of capital formation
in GDP throughout the period under review. The share increased
significantly from only 6 percent in 1952/53 to more than 31 percent
in 1978/79. The average ratio was 9.6 percent during the years
1952/53 - 1960/61 rising to 14.88 and 22.75 percent during the years
1961/62 - 1971/72 and 1972/73 - 1978/79 respectively. The decline
during the war years was not particularly significant since, as can be
seen, the ratios achieved during these years surpassed the
corresponding ratios achieved throughout the 1950's and early part of
the 1960's.
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Table 3:8 Domestic Capital Formation,Savings and Related Macro
Variables (at 1975 Prices).
Year
	 GDP	 Gross fixed	 Domestic saving
Capital formation
(Nm)	 (Nm)	 %of GDP	 (Nm)	 %of GDP
1952/53 1174 76 6.47 97 8.30
1953/54 1262 108 8.56 140 11.09
1954/55 1368 118 8.62 151 11.04
1955/56 1592 129 8.10 186 11.68
1956/57 1704 181 10.62 132 7.75
1957/58 1802 182 10.09 127 7.05
1958/59 1880 226 12.02 147 7.82
1959/60 1940 218 11.23 139 7.16
1960/61 2400 258 10.75 121 5.04
1961/62 2378 258 10.85 129 5.42
1962/63 2516 305 12.12 183 7.27
1963/64 2946 393 13.34 328 11.13
1964/65 3145 503 15.99 378 12.02
1965/66 3361 615 18.29 548 16.30
1966/67 3614 602 16.65 562 15.55
1967/68 2950 484 16.40 384 13.02
1968/69 2878 438 15.21 344 11.95
1969/70 3851 550 14.28 531 13.79
1970/71 5621 883 15.71 900 16.01
1971/72 7098 1283 18.08 1377 19.39
1972/73 7703 1401 18.19 1637 21.25
1973/74 9001 1506 16.73 2165 24.05
1974/75 16962 3231 19.05 6732 39.69
1975/76 20405 4939 24.20 5404 26.48
1976/77 25449 6335 24.89 7101 27.90
1977/78 28015 8243 29.42 7937 28.24
1978/79 28737 9031 31.43 6814 23.71
Source:International Monetary Fund,International Financial 
Statistics, 1982.
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Table 3:9 Composition of Gross Fixed Capital Formation.
(Amount (Nm) and Percentage Distribution (%)}
1960/61 -1981*
Year Total Building Land Transport Machinery
&Construction
(	 Nm	 ) (Nm)	 (%) (Nm) (%)	 (Nm)	 (%) (Nm)	 (%)
1960/61 321.0 184.2	 57.4 23.0 7.2	 48.0	 15.0 65.8	 20.5
1961/62 370.2 194.4	 52.5 62.0 16.7	 41.8	 11.3 72.0	 19.4
1962/63 352.0 210.2	 59.7 51.2 14.5	 24.0	 6.8 66.6	 18.9
1963/64 388.6 220.8	 56.8 66.2 17.0	 33.2	 8.5 68.4	 17.6
1964/65 501.2 237.8	 47.3 64.2 12.8	 52.2	 10.4 147.0	 29.3
1965/66 585.0 300.0	 51.3 68.2 11.7	 56.2	 9.6 160.6	 27.5
1966/67 550.0 296.2	 53.9 64.8 11.8	 52.2	 9.5 136.8	 24.9
1967/68 462.0 252.2	 54.6 49.4 10.7	 49.8	 10.8 110.6	 23.9
1968/69 405.0 217.2	 53.6 42.8 10.6	 46.0	 11.4 99.0	 24.4
1969/70 465.6 292.0	 62.7 25.9 5.6	 59.1	 12.7 88.6	 19.0
1970/71 689.9 417.0	 55.7 24.1 3.2	 127.7	 17.1 179.3	 24.0
1971/72 954.4 588.2	 55.2 28.9 2.7	 152.3	 14.3 295.9	 27.8
1972/73 1140.2 712.9	 62.3 32.6 2.9	 151.1	 13.2 248.2	 21.2
1973/74 2502.0 1919.4	 76.7 30.7 1.2	 228.6	 9.1 323.3	 12.9
1974/75 2491.5 1852.3	 74.4 45.8 1.8	 291.1	 11.7 302.3	 12.1
1975/76 3249.7 2001.6	 61.6 43.6 1.3	 531.0	 16.3 673.5	 20.7
1976/77 5218.5 2942.3	 56.5 47.1 0.9	 1025.0	 19.7 1203.2	 23.1
1977/78 5857.6 3445.2	 58.4 51.7 0.9	 937.0	 16.0 1422.9	 24.3
1978/79 5491.2 3506.1	 63.8 51.7 0.9	 687.0	 12.5 1246.0	 22.7
1979/80 5044.7 3510.9	 69.6 51.2 1.0	 626.0	 12.4 856.5	 17.0
1980/81 5790.6 3874.6	 66.9 56.7 1.0	 754.0	 12.9 1104.8	 19.1
1981 6215.1 4095.2	 65.9 56.6 0.9	 866.1	 13.9 1197.2	 19.3
* figures for 1960/61 -1972/73 are at 1962/63 factor costs; the rest are at
1973/74 factor costs.
Sources: Federal Office of Statistics,National Accounts of Nicieria,and 
Gross Domestic Product and Allied Macro Aggreqates/ V011,Nct i Nrrii 198z.
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It is however, interesting to observe that the structure of the
Nigerian GFCF has barely changed over the years. Since the 1950's it
has been dominated by the expenditure on building and construction
which in 1981 accounted for more than 65 percent of total capital
formation in the economy. The contribution of machinery and of
transport equipment sectors has remained fairly low and been subject
to considerable fluctuations. The distribution of GFCF over the years
is depicted in Table 3:9. It can be seen that out of a total positive
increase of about N819 million (1962/63 factor cost), the increases of
the expenditures on building and construction, transport equipment and
machinery were respectively N528.7 million (64.5%), NI03.1 million
(12%) and 182.4 million (22%); similarly the increase of N371.3
million recorded for the value of GFCF (at 1973/74 factor cost)
between 1973/74 and 1981 was contributed largely by increases in
expenditure on building and construction (N2175.8 million or 59%)
followed by machinery (N973.9 or 23.5%) and transport equipment
(N637.5 or 17%). This is hardly a reflection of the rapid structural
shifts in the economy and clearly indicates the relative
insignificance of the machinery producing sectors in the economy.
Under normal circumstances the high ratio of capital formation
to GDP would indicate a similarly high ratio of saving to income.
However, until quite recently the saving performance of the country
was anything but impressive. In columns 4 and 5 of table 3:8 are
presented the level of savings and the ratio of savings to GDP in 1975
prices. Both have to be interpreted with care since they were derived
as a residual and could therefore be subject to some statistical
errors of unknown magnitude. The saving-income ratio rose from 8.3
percent in 1952/53 to slightly above 11 percent in 1956/57. Between
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1957/58 and 1969/70, the ratio fluctuated considerably from about 5
percent in 1961/62 to 16 percent in 1965/66. The discrepancy-often
large - between the saving - ratio and the investment ratio is a
notable feature of the economy during most of the period. Such a
discrepancy was probably not as disturbing to the government as one
would have thought, especially in the latter years since it could
easily be financed by the running down of external reserves or as in
earlier years, of surpluses accumulated by the Statutory Marketing
Boards. In addition, the financing of investment has often been made
available on very easy terms from governmental sources and as a result
the need of the business sector to save would have been considerably
reduced.
The savings performance of the economy in more recent years
while not spectacular, is more respectable, thanks mainly to the
increasing earnings from the export of petroleum. Between 1971/72 and
1978/79, the saving income ratio averaged more than 20 percent, rising
from 19 percent in the former to 23.7 percent in the latter year,
having reached a peak of 39.7 percent in 1974/75.
Of particular interest is also the response of output to the
substantial increases in the capital stock. This can be usefully
employed to assess the extent to which the capital stock was used
productively and efficiently. One such measure is the incremental
output-capital ratio (or its inverse the capital-output ratio)
computed and presented in Table 3:10. The ICOR has been so highly
erratic as to make any firm conclusion about investment productivity
during the entire period difficult. In general terms, and making use
of the results of studies elsewhere conducted, it does seem that
investment efficiency in Nigeria was on the low side. For example,
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Table 3:10 Incremental Output-Capital and Capital-Output
Ratios in the Nigerian Economy (1952/53 -1978/79)
Year Capital Output
Ratio
ICOR*
1952/53 ---- ----
1953/54 1.16 0.86
1954/55 0.98 1.02
1955/56 1.96 0.52
1956/57 0.90 1.11
1957/58 0.55 1.83
1958/59 0.43 2.35
1959/60 0.27 3.76
1960/61 2.12 0.47
1961/62 0.08 11.94
1962/63 0.53 1.87
1963/64 1.41 0.71
1964/65 0.51 1.96
1965/66 0.43 2.32
1966/67 0.41 2.44
1967/68 -1.11 -0.90
1968/69 -0.15 -6.83
1969/70 2.22 0.45
1970/71 3.22 0.31
1971/72 1.69 0.59
1972/73 0.47 2.13
1973/74 0.93 1.08
1974/75 5.26 0.19
1975/76 1.06 0.94
1976/77 1.02 0.98
1977/78 0.41 2.46
1978/79 0.88 11.31
* GDP(t+1) - GDP(t)/GFCF(t).
Source: Computed from Table 3:8.
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the gross investment ratio increased from 11 percent to 13 percent
during the period 1960-65 and 1965/70 respectively, and averaged about
12.0 percent in the period 1960-1970; On the other hand, for the same
periods GDP decreased from about 5 percent to about 3 percent and
averaged about 4 percent, indicating the fact that the increased
investment was not matched with corresponding increased output as one
would expect, at least on theoretical grounds.
Table 3:11 Growth Rates of GDP, Investment Ratio and the Incremental
Capital Output Ratio (1960-1970)
Annual rate of	 Gross Investment	 ICOR
Year
	 growth of GDP Ratio (constant prices) (constant prices)
1960-65 4.78 11.4 2.4
1965-70 2.69 12.9 4.8
1960-70 3.73 12.2 3.3
SOURCE: Olaloku, F.A. et.al . The Structure of the Nigerian Economy.
The University of Lagos Press 1979, Table 8:4, p156.
3:3 The Nigeria's External Sector 1950-1978
Although in a formal sense, the saving/investment disequilibrium
is identical with the export/import imbalance, one may gain a better
insight by analysing these variables separately. In this section
therefore we focus on the level and growth of Nigeria's traditional
exports (i.e. agricultural and petroleum exports) and imports while
deferring the discussion on manufactured exports to later sections.
One of the principal features of Nigerian economy is its extreme
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dependence on external trade. Since the end of the second World War,
the propulsive and dominant sectors in the economy have always been
external: during the 1940's and 1950's, agricultural exports played
the dominant role only to be replaced by oil exports from the middle
of the 1960's9 . The openness of the economy is partly suggested by
the fairly high ratios of exports and imports to GDP over the years.
Thus during each of the years 1952/53 to 1969/70, Nigeria's exports
and imports were typically close to 15 percent of GDP and during most
of the 1970's the ratios were typically much higher. The composite
ratio has remained slightly above 30 percent throughout the 1950's and
1960's, reaching a peak of about 62 percent in 1977/78.
The importance of trade is further suggested by the following
figures: Nigeria's total exports in 1970, 1971, 1972 and 1979 amounted
to US$1239.6, 14310.6, 2,180.3 and 18,073 million respectively and
represented (a) 41.5, 53.6, 53.4 and 76.0 percent of the total exports
of all West-African countries combined and (b) 10.6, 15.1, 15.4 and
16.0 percent of the total exports of all African countries except
South-Africa. It is instructive to note also that in each of these
years except 1979, the value of Nigeria's exports was the second
highest in Africa, while in value-terms, Nigeria's imports surpassed
that of any single country in the region10.
Table 3:12 depicts the level of merchandise imports, domestic
exports and re-exports and the behaviour of trade balance from 1950 to
1978. Broadly speaking the period can be divided into 3 parts, the
first from 1950 to 1954, the second from 1955 to 1965 and the third
thereafter. The principal feature of the first and the third periods
is the relatively large surplus on trade recorded for each of the
years. Between 1950 and 1954, total exports - including re-exports -
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Table 3:12 Value of Nigeria's External Trade and Visible
Balance 1950-1978 (N,000)
Year Merchandise
Imports
Merchandise exports
	 Visible
Domestic	 Re-exports	 Balance
1950 123732 176974 3470 56604
1951 169108 233220 6910 71020
1952 226536 250270 8790 32524
1953 216580 241778 6686 31884
1954 228138 292484 6580 70926
1955 272234 259632 5436 -7166
1956 305426 264522 4624 -36280
1957 304936 248354 6714 -49868
1958 332548 265582 5518 -61448
1959 356810 321010 5984 -29632
1960 431782 382428 n.a. -92354
1961 445038 340134 7122 -97782
1962 406438 328028 9216 -69194
1963 415112 369730 9614 -35768
1964 507760 420924 8376 -78460
1965 550788 526492 10046 -14250
1966 513992 557394 10774 54176
1967 447100 476192 7444 36536
1968 385162 413010 9160 37008
1969 497382 629262 7042 138922
1970 756420 877060 8306 128946
1971 1078906 1280836 12500 214430
1972 990064 1421770 12442 444148
1973 1224786 2269370 9045 1053629
1974 1737324 5783883 10954 4055713
1975 3721476 4920185 9148 1189857
1976 5148475 6743715 7351 1602591
1977 7089718 7621716 8971 540969
1978 8140788 6308490 16271 -1816027
* fiscal year beginning January 1st.
Sources: Central Bank of Nigeria,Economic and Financial Review
Federal Office of Statistics,Annual Abstract of
Statistics,(1981 edition),p 107.
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Table 3:13 Share of Nigeria's Foreign Trade in GDP
1952/53 - 1978/79 (1975 prices)
Year
	
Exports	 Imports	 Composite
Nm	 %of	 Nm	 %of	 ratio
GDP	 GDP
1 2 3 4 5=2+4
1952/53 228 19.42 207 17.60 37.02
1953/54 253 20.05 221 17.51 37.56
1954/55 257 18.79 224 16.37 35.16
1955/56 309 19.41 252 15.83 35.24
1956/57 256 15.02 305 17.89 32.91
1957/58 283 15.70 338 18.76 34.46
1958/59 272 14.47 351 18.67 33.14
1959/60 287 14.79 366 18.87 33.66
1960/61 350 14.58 487 20.29 34.87
1961/62 346 14.55 475 19.97 34.52
1962/63 364 14.47 486 19.32 33.79
1963/64 410 13.92 475 16.12 30.04
1964/65 462 14.69 587 18.66 33.35
1965/66 578 17.19 645 19.19 36.38
1966/67 599 16.57 639 17.68 34.25
1967/68 521 17.66 621 21.05 38.71
1968/69 467 16.23 561 19.49 35.72
1969/70 683 17.74 702 18.22 35.96
1970/71 954 16.97 937 16.67 33.64
1971/72 1422 20.03 1328 18.71 38.74
1972/73 1522 19.76 1286 16.69 36.45
1973/74 2467 27.41 1808 20.09 47.50
1974/75 6244 36.81 2743 16.17 52.98
1975/76 5453 26.72 4988 24.44 51.16
1976/77 7840 30.81 7074 27.79 58.60
1977/78 8481 30.27 8787 31.36 62.63
1978/79 7373 25.66 9590 33.37 59.03
Source: computed from IMF(1982),op cit.
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grew at a compound rate of 14 percent, per annum compared with a
corresponding rate for imports of 7 percent. The higher value of
exports than imports in each of the years resulted in favourable trade
balances. It has been suggested by economic historians that the
tremendous increase in the value of total exports during most of these
years resulted mainly from the post-war economic reconstruction in
Europe which led to increased demand for Nigeria's major export
products; meanwhile the wartime restrictions on the importation of
many of the goods were only partially lifted so that the level of
imports was much lower than it would have been-.
During the second period however, the value of merchandise
exports increased rather slowly and throughout the period, there was a
persistent deficit in the country's balance of trade. Imports
continued to accelerate partly because of the relaxation of import
controls just before independence and partly too because the growth of
the economy from the boom in agricultural exports in the previous
period, was generating demand for increased amounts and a wider range
of consumer goods. From 1966, the non-oil sector continued to record
large deficits on current account. These however, were turned into
surpluses, thanks to the tremendous growth in petroleum exports.
Between 1966 and 1970 the average annual rate of growth of exports
(imports) was about 12 percent (10 percent) while between 1971 and
1978 an average annual growth rate of about 27 was recorded.
The diversification of Nigeria's exports in the past three
decades is an interesting aspect of their performance. In each of the
years between 1950 and 1961, exports originating from the agricultural
sector formed at least 81 percent of total exports. Between 1962 and
1968 the proportion fluctuated between 50 percent and 77 percent and
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Table 3:14 Annual Average Growth rates of Nigeria's
Mcdor Export Groups 1950-1978.
Year Exports
%
Agricultural	 Petroleum
Nm	 %	 Nm
1950 ---
1951 47.95 29.97
1952 19.93 9.59
1953 -1.34 -5.85
1954 46.48 21.67
1955 -35.87 -13.75
1956 6.42 2.85
1957 -14.68 -6.34
1958 21.97 10.13
1959 35.98 15.07
1959 35.98 15.07	 3.45 176
1960 7.20 2.62	 3.41 63.14
1961 1.00 0.35	 14.27 161.89
1962 -2.30 -8.13	 10.39 44.98
1963 25.90 9.96	 6.87 20.53
1964 13.10 4.58	 23.76 58.89
1965 23.40 7.82	 72.08 112.42
1966 -29.90 -9.72	 47.75 35.06
1967 -28.00 -9.57	 -39.73 -21.59
1968 9.90 3.74	 -70.22 -48.69
1969 13.80 5.03	 198.02 267.61
1970 -23.00 -7.98	 237.77 87.41
1971 -27.00 -10.18	 443.21 86.94
1972 -89.20 -34.15	 223.20 23.42
1973 78.10 45.41	 717.30 60.98
1974 25.90 10.36	 3472.20 183.37
1975 -45.40 -16.45	 -802.60 14.96
1976 43.50 18.86	 1758.50 38.54
1977 101.60 37.07	 751.20 11.88
1978 37.10 9.87 -1671.00 -23.63
Source: computed from Table 3:15.
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Table 3:15 Value of Exports of Major Commodities 1950-1978.
(N,000)
Year Total
exports*
Non-Petroleum
exports
Agricultural
exports
Petroleum exports
1950 180444 180044 100.0 155960 88.7
1951 240130 240130 100.0 207904 86.6
1952 259060 259060 100.0 227834 87.9
1953 248464 248464 100.0 214498 86.3
1954 299064 099064 100.0 260982 87.3
1955 265068 265068 100.0 225108 84.9
1956 269146 269146 100.0 231526 86.0
1957 255068 255068 100.0 216846 85.0
1958 271100 269144 99.3 238818 88.1 1956 0.70
1959 326994 321590 98.4 274800 84.1 5404 1.65
1960 339428 321200 94.6 282000 83.1 8816 2.59
1961 347256 323800 93.3 283000 81.5 23092 6.65
1962 337072 300700 89.2 260000 77.2 33478 9.93
1963 379344 338992 89.4 285900 75.4 40352 10.64
1964 429300 365100 85.1 299000 69.7 64114 14.14
1965 536538 400600 74.7 322400 60.1 136194 25.38
1966 568168 384300 67.6 292500 51.5 183946 32.38
1967 483636 338800 70.1 264500 54.7 144216 29.82
1968 422170 348200 82.5 274400 65.0 73998 17.53
1969 636304 364282 57.25 288200 45.3 272022 42.75
1970 885366 375400 42.4 265200 29.9 509790 57.58
1971 1221337 268337 21.9 261200 21.4 953000 78.03
1972 1434212 258000 18.0 172000 12.0 1176200 82.01
1973 2277442 383900 16.9 250100 11.0 1893500 83.14
1974 5794837 429100 7.4 276000 4.8 5365700 92.59
1975 4925493 362400 7.4 230600 4.7 4563100 92.64
1976 6751066 429500 6.4 274100 4.1 6321600 93.64
1977 7630687 557900 7.3 375700 4.9 7072800 93.64
1978 6324761 923160 14.6 412800 6.5 5401600 85.40
* including re-exports.
Sources: Central Bank of Nigeria,Economic and Financial Review; 
FOS,Annual Abstract of Statistics11981 edition),p107.
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by 1969, it began to decline steadily from about 45 percent to an
average of about 4 percent in the period 1974-1977. During the 1950's
and 1960's, the export crops of cocoa, ground nuts, cotton, palm
products and rubber were the strategic products of the Nigerian
economy providing more than 75 percent of the total export earnings.
Nigeria was the world's largest exporter of ground-nuts in the 1950's
and 1960's, and of palm oil products until the beginning of the last
decade, and was the second largest exporter of cocoa. In 1946, 1950
and 1960 these three export crops accounted for 63.5, 70 and 61
percent of Nigeria's total exports. By the middle of the 1960's,
these export products still accounted for about 50 percent of total
export earnings although the value of petroleum exports by 1965
surpassed the export value of any single crop. Earnings from oil
exports increased from less than N2 million in 1958 to about N9
million in 1960 and N1,176 million in 1972. The major turning point
was in 1973 when oil prices almost quadrupled (from a level of US$3.8
per barrel to a level of US$14.7 per barrel). Nigeria's exports of
petroleum thus increased between 1973-1974 by almost 300 percent.
This tremendous increase in the value of petroleum exports dwarfed the
role of agricultural export earnings in total exports. Whereas
agricultural exports in 1960 accounted for 3/4 of the value of total
exports, they fell to a minimum level of 2.4 in 1980, while petroleum
exports moved in the opposite direction from a level of 2.7 percent of
total export value in 1960 to a level of more than 95 percent in 1980.
The change in the relative position of the agricultural and
petroleum exports is further depicted in the table below. Between
1950 and 1957, total exports, including re-exports increased by about
N75 million. Agricultural exports alone contributed about N57 million
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(76 percent) to the increase, the rest being accounted for by the
export of tin ores and columbite. Between 1958 and 1965, oil exports
contributed slightly more than 50 percent of the total increase in
exports, leaving agriculture with a share of 31 percent. By the
middle of the 1960's the transformation of Nigeria to a predominantly
oil exporting economy was virtually complete. Of the increase in
exports amounting to N5756.6 million, exports of petroleum amounted to
N5217.7 (90 percent) leaving agriculture with just 2 percent.
Table 3:16
Contribution of Major Exports to Increases in Taal Exports: 1950-1978 
Increase in 1950-1957
Nm
1958-1965
Nm
1966-1978
Nm
Total Exports 74.624 (100) 215.438 (100) 575.66 (100)
Petroleum
Exports 134.238 (50.5) 521.78 (90.63)
Non-Petroleum
Exports 74.624 (100) 131.456 (49.48) 538.86 (9.4)
Agriculture
Exports 56.886 (76.23) 83.582 (31.49) 120.3 (2.09)
SOURCE: computed from table 3:15
The relative worsening of the agricultural exports was however not
entirely because of the rising relative importance of petroleum
exports. Indeed as table 3:14 reveals, the former have been
characterised by low rates of increases, save for few odd years, even
before the advent of the latter. It can be discerned from the table
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that by the middle of the 1960's agricultural exports began to decline
even absolutely. Various possible explanations offered run from the
familiar arguments of inherent instability in international market
demand for agricultural exports, through to the domestic investment
and agricultural policy of the government, to the recent developments
in the Nigerian economy, although it is extremely difficult to
disentangle the effects of each of these with any degree of precision.
The single most emphasised factor contributing to the decline
was perhaps the Nigerian government's exploitative Marketing Board
policy. When initially set up in 1946 and 1949 by the colonial
administration, these monopoly trading institutions - the Marketing
Boards - were charged with the responsibility of stabilising export
prices by setting up a buffer between export producers and the
fluctuating world commodity prices. Over the years however, they were
increasingly used to extract surpluses from the agricultural export
producers for the financing of regional development projects. Very
often export producers were paid only about half of the world market
prices for their produce while the rest accrued to the governments.
This was clearly noted by a World Bank Mission to Nigeria:
"Although the original objective in establishing the Marketing
Boards was to stabilise prices earned by farmers to improve the
Marketing Organisation, they have been used during the sixties
as a convenient instrument for taxing agriculture.., the return
to the farmers engaged in production of exports is low"12
The 1972 Marketing Board reforms introduced by the Federal
Government did little to encourage the farmers back to the farm.
Apparently the peasants had by then decided to shift to the production
of food crops the prices of which were rising and not subject to
government controls13.
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It is also generally agreed that some of the poor performance of
the 1970's had certainly been due to bad weather. The sub-Sahara
region experienced a quick succession of drought years between the
late 1960's and 1973/74 with only one or two years of recovery in
between. A period of satisfactory weather in the mid 1970's was then
followed by a number of poor years starting in 1977/78.
The changes that have occurred in the country's trade structure
cannot be divorced from the recent developments in the domestic
economy. From the middle of the 1970's the booming economy of the
Nigerian home market, demanded a growing share of agricultural produce
which would normally be exported. Thus for example, advances in
manufacturing might have accounted, at least partially, for the
decline in the export of cotton, palm oil, hides and skins and rubber,
while population growth and rising income levels could have led to
increases in the demand for items such as vegetable oil. The export
of such raw materials were either banned or regulated by means of a
general export tariff, licencing and quotas in order to produce an
adequate domestic supply at favourable prices, and foster the
elaboration of national raw material goods. The attempt to alter the
allocation of resources in favour of industry became more real.
3:4 The Manufacturing Sector: Gtowth and Structural Characteristics
From the foregoing it is apparent that modern manufacturing
activity in Nigeria is a fairly recent phenomena and the country's
degree of industrialisation must be rated as one of the lowest in the
world, despite, as we shall see, the recent - i.e. post independence -
industrial tempo. The relative backwardness of the manufacturing
sector has its roots in the colonial policy and structure. Prior to
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independence in 1960, the country like all other colonies in Africa
and Asia was seen mainly as a vast source of raw materials for, as
well as a vast market of consumer goods manufactured in the
industrially advanced West. The indigenous small scale village
industry that there was, was said to have been virtually destroyed by
imports of consumer goods and the few foreign firms which dominated
the export-import trade resisted further industrialisation in the
country in order to protect their trading interests14.
In this section we shall examine the contribution of the sector
to the growth in National Income and the growth as well as the output
and input structure of the individual branches of the manufacturing
sector. The policies that were employed to promote industry will be
examined in the next chapter.
The sector's contribution to National income over the period
1950 to 1979/80 was depicted in Table 3:4. Its share in GDP averaged
21.7 percent between 1950 and 1957 and 6.51 and 5.82 percent
respectively during the 1960's and 1970's. The largest contribution
made by the sector (8. 10%) was in 1969/70. This fell to less than 4
percent in 1974/75 and remained thereafter close to the average of
5.82 percent.
The relative insignificance of the sector can be judged by
comparing these shares with the corresponding shares achieved in other
countries. In 1960 and 1979, the average contribution of
manufacturing to GDP was 11 and 13 percent respectively for all low
income countries, 22 and 25 percent for middle income and 30 and 27
percent for industrialised countries. Moreover of the 79 developing
(law and middle income) countries for which data is available, 63 had
a share of at least 9 percent in 1978; in 1960 of 71 countries, 59 had
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Table 3:18 Comparison of Actual (A) and Derived or
Normal (N) Structure of Nigeria's Manufacturing
Industry, 1957 - 1972.
Sector 1957
(A)	 (N)
1967
(A)	 (N)
1972
(A)	 (N)**
6 3111/3122	 Food 10.50 16.53
3111/3122)Food	 )
7 3131/3133)Alcoholic bev.) 0.202 0.899 0.613 0.903 15.10 7.51
8 3134)Non-alcoh.bev.)
9 3140)Tobacco	 ) 8.70 5.68
10 3211	 Textiles 0.029 0.650 0.478 0.655 15.50 17.46
12 3220	 Apparel 1.51 1.51
13 3231/3233	 Leather 0.992 0.760 0.999 0.765 0.51 0.58
14 3240* Footwear 0.004 0.970 0.519 0.990 0.30 0.86
15 3311/3320	 Wood 0.774 0.803 0.882 0.812 2.30 2.01
16 3412/3420	 Paper 0.312 0.757 0.539 0.761 2.00 1.55
17 3511/3512)Chemical s	) 0.40 5.06
18 3521)Paints	 )
19 3522)Drugs	 ) 0.364 0.640 0.570 0.643 8.20 7.29
20 3523)Soap	 )
21 3529/3540)0ther Chems.	 ) 9.40 2.19
22 3551/3560	 Rubber 0.398 0.900 0.749 0.959 3.40 1.90
23 3610/3699	 Cement 0.098 0.666 0.596 0.753 4.30 4.75
24 3710/3812	 Basic metals 0.50 3.93
25 3813/3819	 Fab.metals 0.057 0.395 0.295 0.410 10.70 3.51
26 3822/3829	 Machinery --- 0.169 0.049 0.172 0.20 1.62
27 3832/3839	 Elect. equip. 1.20 2.64
28 3841/3843	 Transp. equip. 0.036 0.549 0.488 0.578 ---- 4.43
29 3851/3909	 Misc. products 0.50 0.80
* 1957 and 1967 figures are for 3240(Footwear) and 3220(Wearing
apparel)
** (A) =actual shares, (N)=normal shares.
Sources: Oyejide,T.A.(1975),op cit,pp.25
Federal Republic of Nigeria,The Third Plan(1975-1980) 
pp.150
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shares greater than the 5 percent share achieved in Nigeria (see Table
3:1 and reference therein).
A comparison of the actual with the derived or expected 'normal'
pattern of industrial output can also be used to indicate the infancy
and relative backwardness of the sector15 . The relevant information
is depicted in Table 3:18. As of 1957, of the number of industries
for which data is available, only one, leather products, had an actual
share greater than its expected or normal; in 1972, 21 of the 28
industrial branches had actual shares much below their expected
normal' shares. For the remaining nine sectors - Beverages, Tobacco,
Wood and Furniture, Paper, Printing and Publishing, Petroleum
Products, Rubber and Plastic products and Metal products - the higher
than normal shares achieved is more of a reflection of the
availability of raw materials in the economy than of any extra effort
at industrialisation.
To determine more closely the intertemporal changes that have
occurred within the manufacturing sector we present in table 3:19 time
series estimates of gross output, value-added, number of
establishments, number of people employed, wages and salaries paid and
net capital expenditure incurred over the 1963-78 period. The annual
rate of change of each variable is also presented. In table 3:20 we
present the annual rate of growth of output, purchased inputs and
primary factors for each of the 24 manufacturing sub-sectors.
Over the 16 year period under consideration, the number of
industries employing ten or more people increased by 426 from 649 in
1963 to 1075 in 1978. This represented only a 2-fold increase and a 3
percent annual average growth rate.
However, it can hardly be denied that the real gain in
industrial production since independence has been immense. Over the
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period 1963-78, the manufacturing sector output has grown at an annual
compound rate of 14.6 percent. An analysis of value-added originating
from the sector shows that in current prices, it has increased ten
fold from N109 million in 1963 to N226 million in 1978. It is
significant that even after allowing for price increases, the increase
in value-added was about eight-fold between these periods from
N2,145,700 in 1963 to N16p 3000 in 1978. It can also be seen that
the gross output series has shown a fairly consistent upward trend
except for the sharp drop during the country's political crisis.
The growth rates of both gross output and value-added look
rather impressive for at least two reasons. First, the sector had not
only kept pace with the phenomenal process of expansion of the whole
economy but surpassed even the latter's rate of growth throughout the
decade of the sixties and seventies. The rate of GDP growth rose from
about 3 percent during the period 1960-70 to about 8 percent during
the period 1970-79. Corresponding growth rates of the sector during
these two periods have been 12 and 11 percent respectively. Second,
despite its relative infancy, it has kept pace with the rate of growth
of the manufacturing sector in other countries. For example, of the 9
African countries for which the average annual growth rates of
manufacturing are available for the decade 1960-70, the Nigerian
sector ranks 2nd. Of the 27 countries for which 1970-79 data are
available it ranks highest and of the 66 middle-income countries only
4 - Indonesia, Yemen, Syria and Republic of Korea - had annual average
rate of manufacturing growth that surpassed that of Nigeria, between
1970_79l6. Table 3:21 depicts the average annual rates of growth of
manufacturing output in selected countries.
There is considerable variation in the rate of output growth
achieved by the individual industries within the sector - with the
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Table 3:20 Average Annual Growth Rates of Output and Factor
Inputs in Manufacturing Industry,1963 -1978.
Sectors labour capital raw mat value
added
gross
output
wages/
head
consumer goods 10.56 13.94 12.62 14.31 13.04 1.37
Food 13.30 17.00 9.10 14.20 10.90 0.42
Alcoholic bev. 9.70 12.60 12.10 12.10 10.70 1.10
Non-alcoh.bev. 14.10 9.70 21.30 16.20 18.40 3.90
Tobacco 8.20 2.50 -2.70 -4.30 -3.90 -5.00
Textiles 14.60 16.30 17.80 15.30 16.60 2.60
Made-up text. 14.30 22.20 12.90 24.70 15.70 4.70
Apparel 9.30 30.50 8.50 15.30 12.60 2.60
Leather 9.50 -1.20 10.10 11.90 10.80 1.80
Footwear 11.40 12.50 10.40 15.80 13.00 1.90
Wood 6.00 20.20 9.60 6.90 9.20 -5.60
Paints 12.80 9.50 13.60 17.60 15.70 3.40
Drugs 10.10 15.50 33.60 35.70 33.90 1.96
Soap 14.30 17.00 18.70 18.10 18.50 1.71
Misc.products 1.20 10.80 1.70 0.80 1.50 3.70
Intermediates 11.28 18.03 11.89 15.14 12.77 1.87
Paper 9.30 5.10 17.50 17.70 17.80 3.50
Chemicals 13.20 28.10 12.40 12.50 12.50 2.50
Other Chems. 2.90 14.80 12.70 13.30 13.10 1.90
Rubber 12.60 5.30 12.70 14.80 13.70 1.30
Cement 12.60 12.60 11.70 13.30 12.30 -0.12
Basic metals 17.40 22.90 1.20 21.30 5.50 -0.01
Fab. metals 11.00 37.40 15.00 13.20 14.50 4.00
Capital goods 11.90 18.47 13.10 17.30 15.17 2.43
Machinery 19.00 23.30 17.20 26.50 21.90 -1.40
Elect.	 equip. 22.00 22.60 19.00 22.30 20.30 5.00
Transp.	 equip. -5.30 9.30 3.10 3.10 3.30 -5.70
* trend rates of Growth
Sources: Computed from FOS,Industrial Surveys 1963 - 1978.
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I Table 3:21 An International Comparison of Average Annual
Growth Rates of Manufacturing Sectors 1960-70 and
1970-1979.
Country/Region Growth Rates (%)
1960-1970 1970-1979
Low-income 6.5m 3.7m
Middle-income 7.0m 6.6m
-Oil exporters 7.0m 8.2m
-Oil importers 7.5m 6.6m
Industrialized 6.2m 3.0m
Selected Countries
(1)	 Africa
9.10 11.80Nigeria
Kenya 11.40
Ghana 4.40
Zambia 0.40
Ivory Coast 11.60 7.20
(2) Latin America
Brazil 10.90
Mexico 9.40 6.40
Chile 5.50 -1.00
Argentina 5.70 1.90
(3)	 Asia
India 4.80 4.50
Pakistan 9.40 3.70
Malaysia -__- 12.40
Korea 17.60 17.80
m implies median value;
-- implies not available
Source: The World Bank (198j),World Development Report, 
Table 2
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lowest rate of - 4 percent registered for Tobacco products and the
highest of 34 percent for Drugs and Medicines. On the whole however,
the performance is fairly impressive. Of the 24 industries
considered, about half have had a rate of output growth above the mean
of 13 percent. Important growth sectors include Drugs and Medicine,
Machinery and Electrical equipment, Soap and Perfumery and Paper
Products, Printing and Publishing.
To facilitate a further analysis of structural changes, and
assess the relative importance of industries in the manufacturing
sectors we computed the percentage contribution of industries to total
gross output, value-added employment and wages. These are presented
in Table 3:22. In the first 5 columns of the table are simple
averages of these variables for each sector while the sectoral shares
of 1963, 1968, 1973 and 1978 are shown in the other o3imns.
The dominance of import-substituting industries producing mainly
consumer goods can be readily observed from these tables. Over the 16
year period the average share of this group of industries in total
gross output and value-added amounted to respectively 56.4 percent and
64.4 percent. The dominant constituents of the consumer goods sector
in terms of contribution to output and value-added are industrial
branches manufacturing food and related products, textiles, soap and
perfumery and alcoholic beverages. Together these accounted for
around 32 percent to 44 percent of the total output of the
manufacturing sector in different years. In terms of employment
provision, a similar pattern is observable: the consumer oriented
sectors have maintained the lead over the years increasing their share
from 60 percent in 1963 to about 65 percent in 1978. Here the bulk of
the employment is accounted for by the industrial sectors producing
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textiles, wooden furniture and fixtures and food and related products.
The textiles sector has on the whole remained the highest employer of
labour since 1963 through to 1978.
The output and employment shares of the intermediate goods
sectors have been subject to considerable fluctuations over the years.
The sector's output share fell slightly to 30 percent in 1968, from 32
percent in 1963, then rose again to 32 percent a decade later. Within
this group, the dominant activities are chemical products, basic and
fabricated metal products in terms of output contribution and
fabricated metal products and paper products in terms of employment
shares. The former 3 sectors contributed about 19 percent of the
total output in the manufacturing sector or close to 60 percent of the
total output produced by the intermediate goods sector.
There is hardly any capital goods production in the Nigerian
economy. In 1963, the dominant industry within the capital goods
sector was Transport equipment - which consists mainly of vehicle
repairs, sales and service and bicycle assembly - with a gross output
share of 20 percent. A decade later the share dropped to less than 1
percent rising again to 8 percent in 1978. The electrical equipment
sector - which consists mainly of assembly and repair of radio and
T.V. sets - looks perhaps as the most promising within this category,
increasing its gross output share from 0.2 percent in 1963 to about 3
percent in 1978.
On the whole it can be observed that the ratio of the output
share of consumer to producer oriented sectors has increased from 2.88
in 1963 to 3.63 in 1968 and 4.03 in 1978. The corresponding ratio of
consumer-intermediate oriented sectors are 1.88, 1.87 and 1.64. Not
surprisingly, the ratio of the employment share of consumer to
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intermediate (capital) oriented sectors has also been on the increase
from 1.73 (4.32) in 1963 to 1.98 (13.70) in 1978.
In table 3:23 the contribution of manufacturing industries at
the 4 digit level to total value-added in the manufacturing sectors of
Brazil, India, Mexico, Republic of Korea and Turkey, is compared to
that of Nigerian industries as at 1970 and 1978. In column 7, of the
table we show the 1970 average shares achieved by each industry group
in the 6 countries combined. It can be seen that only in five
industrial groups did the Nigerian manufacturing sector exceed the
average achieved by the countries. These sectors include Beverages,
tobacco, textiles, petroleum and coal products and fabricated metals.
In 1970 the manufacture of machinery, electrical and transport
equipment each contributed less than 1 percent of value-added in
Nigeria but contributed respectively 7.35, 5.34 and 8.69 percent in
Brazil; 4.08, 3.33 and 3.34 in India and 3.07, 4.81 and 6.66 percent
in Mexico. A similar pattern exists in the case of the intermediate
goods sector. The ratio of the share of consumer to producer oriented
sectors output varies from 1.7 percent in Brazil to 3.2 percent in
Mexico, and to 4.3, 5.2, 6.75 and 36.33 percent respectively in Korea,
India, Turkey and Nigeria.
The use of the 1970 shares for Nigeria especially may be
objected to since the other countries must have started their
industrialisation programmes much earlier than Nigeria. What is more
appropriate therefore is (a) a comparison of Nigeria's position in
1970 with that of other countries at an earlier date or (b) a
comparison of these countries' position as at 1970 with that of Nigeria
at a later date. We follow the latter option and present in column 2
the value-added shares achieved in 1978 and in column 9 the average
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Table 3:23 Contribution of Major Manufacturing Sectors to Manufacturing
Value-added : A comparison of 6 Developing Countries.
Sector Country
Average
8	 9
Nigeria
1	 2
Brazil
3
India
4
Mexico
5
Rep. of
Korea
6
Turkey
7
Food 11.73 14.40 13.32 8.31 18.24 14.13 15.94 13.61 14.1
Beverages 15.30 14.20 2.27 1.16 2.05 4.50 4.34 4.93 3.9
Tobacco ) 8.67 2.60 1.41 4.27 1.02 3.80 13.02 5.36 4.3
Textiles 14.79 13.40 9.14 21.77 9.94 15.70 13.92 14.21 14.0
Apparel n.a.
Made-up texts. 0.51 0.30 1.68 3.79 8.09 6.70 2.32 3.85 3.8
Leather 0.51 0.60 0.63 1.63 1.43 0.33 0.40 0.82 0.8
Footwear 1.02 1.30 1.65 3.61 5.02 0.66 0.91 2.14 2.2
Wood 2.04 3.30 4.58 5.03 2.05 3.42 1.61 3.12 3.3
Paper 3.57 4.20 6.17 3.37 5.53 5.43 3.23 4.55 4.7
Chemicals ) 0.51 0.90 5.83 4.03 2.56 6.45 0.81 3.36 3.4
Paints )
Drugs )
Soap )
Other Chems. ) 8.67 16.20 6.88 4.78 5.42 4.91 4.03 5.78 7.1
Rubber 2.53 6.20 3.81 1.67 1.74 3.17 2.52 2.57 3.2
Cement 3.06 5.80 5.94 5.39 5.02 5.60 5.04 5.00 5.5
Basic metals 0.51 3.50 4.01 1.34 1.33 0.34 1.81 1.56 6.6
Fab .metals 6.12 6.10 3.35 5.70 4.10 1.64 4.24 4.1 4.2
Machinery 0.51 3.20 7.35 4.08 3.07 1.93 2.62 3.26 3.7
Elect.
	 equip. 0.51 2.20 5.34 3.33 4.81 4.17 1.82 3.33 3.6
Transp.
	 equip. 0.51 3.40 8.69 3.34 6.66 5.44 3.33 4.66 5.2
Misc. products 1.02 0.30 1.90 5.68 2.15 3.66 1.30 2.71 2.6
Notes: n.a. =data not available.
cols 1,3-7:1970 shares of industry groups in value-added;col 2,1978
share of industry groups in value-added;cols 8 and 9 are,respectively,
the arithmetic means of cols 1 & 3-7 and cols 2 & 3-7.
Sources: Federal Republic of Nigeria,The Fourth Plan 1981-1985,pp.172-173;
FOS,Industrial Survey of Nigeria,1975-1978.
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shares achieved by the six countries. The result does not however
differ in anyway from the one earlier reported. The industrial
branches in Nigeria which have a higher than average ratio are food
processing, beverages, petroleum and coal products, cement and glass
and fabricated metals. In comparison to these averages, the shares of
producer goods sectors are small.
The above comparison must be interpreted with care given the
enormous differences not only in terms of structures of national
economies, but also in resource endowments, the relative importance
assigned to industry in the development programmes, trade and
industrialisation policies. However, the comparison still puts the
Nigerian manufacturing sector in a proper perspective and indicates
the extent to which its growth and characteristics are consistent with
the pattern of the classical import substitution model which these
countries pursued.
Another charactefstic feature of the Nigerian manufacturing
sector, which is also reflective of its relative underdevelopment, can
be recognised from the scope and structure of input goods imported by
industry and from the share of value-added in gross output. Both
measures are indicative of the amount of realised linkages within the
domestic economy and the potential linkages effects which could still
be achieved in the future. For example, a high value-added-gross
output ratio signifies an increasing transformation of domestic raw
materials by local industry. It implies in other words, low material
content in the value of output and hence a greater demand for primary
factors. The 1963-78 average share of value-added in gross output
amount to 43 percent. The share fell to 38.8 percent in 1965, from 40
percent in 1963 and had remained above 40 percent but less than 50
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percent since then. The average shares realised by manufacturing
sectors producing alcoholic beverages, non-alcoholic beverages,
furniture and fixtures, paper products, industrial chemicals and
cement, reached 50 percent and more; eight sectors, including
machinery, drugs and medicines, textiles and paints realised shares of
between 50 percent and the national average of 43 percent. Thus about
62 percent of the sectors realised an above average value-added gross
output ratio. The result appears quite impressive but it must be
remembered that the inclusion of excise taxes in the definition of
value-added inflates the latter and therefore exaggerate the ratios.
Table 3:24 gives an idea of the imported input structure of the
Nigerian manufacturing sector. The extent to which the sector is
heavily dependent upon imported raw materials is immediately evident
from these tables. It can be seen that more than half of Nigeria's
industries had 40 percent and above of their raw materials imported.
For about seven of these, the ratio of imported raw materials to total
raw materials used was 85% and above; About half of the industries
have a raw-material value-added ratio of at least 40 percent. The
1973/75 average ratios for industrial sectors manufacturing made-up
textile goods, fabricated metal products, electrical machinery and
cement and glass products reached 95 percent and above. The
seriousness of the problem was echoed by the government in the most
recent plan document.
On the average about 60 percent of the total raw materials
consumed in the manufacturing sector was imported.... and for
every naira of value-added, the country spent about 60 'Woo on
import of raw materials-7.
The lack of diversification and the general weakness of the
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Table 3:24 Domestic Resource Content of Nigeria's
Manufacturing Industries,1971 - 1975.
Sector Ratio of Imported Raw Matrials to:
Total Raw Materials	 Value-added
(%)	 (%)
1971/72 1973/75 1975 1971/72 1975
6 3111/3122	 Food 33.54 52.30 60.30 103.40 52.60
7 3131/3133	 Alcoholic bev. 46.10 50.70 72.40 14.00 12.20
8	 3134	 Non-alcoh.bev. 45.55 20.90 1.90 24.50 11.20
9	 3140	 Tobacco 7.40 --- 47.80 2.00 ---
10	 3212	 Textiles 29.60 47.10 35.40 35.50 37.10
11	 3212	 Made-up text. 79.65 74.60 50.00 137.50 233.30
12	 3220	 Apparel 51.00 40.10 15.80 120.00 14.50
13	 3231/3233	 Leather 35.53 58.40 41.50 485.30 63.50
14	 3240
	
Footwear 0.03 32.40 15.80 10.00 20.60
15 3311/3320	 Wood 12.68 19.90 38.90 14.30 9.75
16 3412/3420	 Paper 35.85 73.10 45.80 84.00 52.70
17 3511/3512	 Chemicals 65.40 82.40 90.60 942.00 31.70
18	 3521	 Paints 28.85 67.80 67.00 26.00 47.10
19	 3522	 Drugs 45.45 84.10 97.10 42.00 21.60
20	 3523	 Soap 4.50 63.10 17.10 4.50 60.30
21	 3529/3540	 Other Chem. 58.05 83.90 93.00 82.50 13.90
22 3551/3560 Rubber 26.27 63.20 59.70 33.80 55.60
23 3610/3699 Cement 48.83 51.30 50.10 28.90 94.00
24 3710/3812 Basic Metals 20.93 54.10 65.80 23.50 47.50
25 3813/3819 Fab.Metals 75.50 80.60 68.20 116.50 133.00
26 3822/3829 Machinery 84.03 50.10 34.45 233.80 10.40
27 3832/3839 Elect.Machinery 50.30 79.40 86.80 249.50 130.90
28 3841/3843 Transport Equip 22.15 75.20 94.10 238.50 25.70
29 3851/3909 Misc.products 79.38 55.60 48.30 53.30 4.50
Source: Federal Republic of Nigeria,The Third Plan,1975-1980,
P-151 ;and ibid,The Fourth Plan,1981-1985,p. 411
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intermediate and producer goods sectors are also evident from the
changing import structure of the economy. The value of imports rose
more than 9 fold between 1970 and 1977 despite the efforts at import
substitution. Even more significant are the changes in the import
structure: although there has been a significant decline in the import
of consumer goods, this is offset by a rise in the import of capital
goods and raw materials. In otherwords, the industrialisation
programme has not reduced the volume of imports into Nigeria. Rather
what has occurred is a shift in the content of imports - from consumer
goods to intermediate and capital goods, reflecting the weakness of
the local producer oriented industries and hence, the lopsided nature
of industrialisation.
An additional disturbing feature of the manufacturing sector is
its relatively low employment base. Available evidence indicates that
as at 1975, the Nigerian industrial sector absorbed only about 17
percent of the total labour force in the economy. Leading experts on
the Nigerian economy believe that even this figure is
somewhat exaggerated since a substantial part of the industrial
labour designated as being in industry is in cottage and crafts
... (and) some of the people are only marginally employed in
manufacturing and processing since they usually combine cottage
industry and craft with agriculture18.
The number of people employed in industries with 10 or more employees
increased by 240 thousands between 1963 and 1978 with a modest rate of
growth of about 11 percent. The total number of people employed in
manufacturing in 1978 (= 305495) represents less than 1 percent of the
estimated number of gainfully occupied persons in the economy.
The low employment base of the sector could perhaps be
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attributed to the infancyof the industrial production. However,
there is evidence to show that the main reason lies with the
increasing mechanisation of the manufacturing production processes.
For example, although exceptionally high rates of growth of labour
input were achieved by quite a few sectors, it is particularly worth
noting that except for only seven sectors - viz, non-alcoholic
beverages, tobacco, leather, paints, paper products, rubber and
plastics and cement products - the rate of growth of the capital input
exceeded that of labour. For the 24 industries the mean rate of
growth of labour and capital amounted to 11 and 16 percent
respectively. Moreover, whereas the minimum and maximum rates of
growth of labour were - 5.3 percent (transport equipment) and 22
percent (electrical equipment), the corresponding rates for capital
rose - 1.2 (leather products) and 37.5 percent (metal products). At
the same time the industrial sector employees do not appear to have
obtained a reasonably larger share of value-added as one would have
thought. In column of Table 2:18 we see that wages per head increased
at an annual average rate of about 2 percent between 1963 and 1978.
The rate of increase fell by 11.2 percent in 1969 and 5.4 percent in
1969, increased by less than 0.5 percent in 1971. The increase in
1973 was only temporary as it fell again in 1975 and 1976. The
highest rate of increase was achieved in 1978. Some of the individual
sectors no doubt experienced fairly high rates of growth of wages over
the years in comparison to the national average rates of growth were
for example, 5, 4.7, 4, 3.9 and 3.5 percent in electrical equipment,
made-up textiles, fabricated metals, soft drinks and paper products
respectively. However, for several other industries, the rates are
fairly low and in five cases, even negative.
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The industrial sector thus does not appear to have proven a
dynamic source of growth for either employment or income of employees
over the period. Further evidence and the reasons for the phenomena
will be presented in Chapter 4.
3:5 Conclusion
The influx of external rent has enabled some degree of
structural transformation of the Nigerian economy within a decade or
two. The pattern of change is familiar: agricultural output as a
proportion of GDP is declining rapidly in favour of industry - notably
mining and manufacturing - with services retaining a fairly large and
constant share; and primary exports have virtually stagnated, although
the developmental process is still strongly oriented towards the
foreign sector, with petroleum, rather than manufactures forming the
bulk of the exports. In terms of growth, the mining and manufacturing
sectors have taken over as the possible 'leading' sectors in the
economic development of Nigeria. One would be tempted to construe
this evolution as a sign of economic growth and development. However,
such rapid changes in sectoral composition of GDP do not constitute a
sufficient criterion for judging economic development. The more
interesting issues pertain to the dynamism of the 'leading' sectors,
their ability to lead the economy to a self-generating and
self-sustaining growth, to fulfil several objectives of development as
enunciated in Chapter 1. Here the role of the mining sector is
severely limited. The important positive effects of the petroleum
sector cannot be denied. It can in principle offset any inadequacies
in investment resources and relax the foreign exchange constraint. But
its employment, income and investment linkage effects are likely to be
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very minimal. The manufacturing sector then becomes the more (and
perhaps the only) promising means of realising these objectives.
Although a post-independence phenomenon industrialisation has
been rather rapid, at least by third world standards. Fairly
impressive and in a way, respectable rates of growth were registered.
However, measured in terms of its contribution to National income, its
employment base, foreign exchange intensity and economic
diversification, the conclusion is less sanguine. So far,
industrialisation has not yet reduced dependence on imports or built
up a strong diversified production structure. It merely changed the
import structure from dependence on consumer goods to dependence on
intermediate and capital goods. After two decades of import
substitution, only a handful of sectors contribute the bulk of output
and employment of the manufacturing sector.
These and other aspects of manufacturing sector development will
be further examined in later chapters. Attempts will be made to
answer questions such as: why is the structure of the sector as it is?
What is the role of commercial policy adopted by the government in
fostering the high rate of growth? What are the major implications
for productivity and efficiency, for international competitiveness
etc.?
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CHAPTER 4
THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF
PROTECTION IN NIGERIA
4:1 Introduction
The process of industrialisation in Nigeria via Import
Substitution has, over the years, called into play a wide range of
promotional and regulatory instruments designed primarily to direct
and/or guide the pattern and direction of industrial development and
often to accelerate the process itself. Nigerian government
interventionist policies have, over the years, taken a variety of
different forms, the main ones of which are (1) Fiscal. Trade and
exchange rate policies, including temporary exemptions from income
and/or profit taxes for certain category of firms, capital consumption
and accelerated depreciation allowances, custom tariffs and import
controls, credit incentives in the form of provisions for long term
and short-term credits through government owned industrial development
banks' and other financial institutions in the capital and money
markets: (2) Direct public investment in manufacturing either through
the foundation of government enterprises or in partnership with
private - indigenous and/or foreign - enterprises plus (3) Additional 
ancillary services such as the provision of infrastructure and
services at industrial estates and prepared sites (such as cheap
electricity and water supply, transport etc.), industrial manpower
training programmes etc.
It is worthwhile emphasising with other authors that although
the creation of "favourable investment climate" (which the provision
and/or application of these measures entail) to promote local industry
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has been a major policy objective of the government, the tariff and
import licencing systems have also been frequently employed in pursuit
of other different policy goals. These have included at one time, the
need to raise revenue via tariffs and on several occasions to
stabilise short-term to medium-term fluctuations in external payments
and/or internal price level. Admittedly, it is somewhat artificial to
separate the balance of payments and the promotion of industry
objectives since their interaction throughout time is evident. As the
experience of many countries has shown, whether more emphasis has been
put on one or another has essentially depended upon a combination of
the very results of the industrialisation process via import
substitution policy on one hand and short-run national and
international circumstances on the other.
The objectives of this chapter are (a) to analyse the major
policy and regulatory elements of the incentive system as they affect
the manufacturing industry in Nigeria, (b) to quantify the effects of
these policy instruments using the effective protection concept and
(c) to empirically examine the relationship between sectoral growth of
the manufacturing sub-sectors and import substitution on the one hand
and the governmenEs commercial policy as quantified by effective
protective rates on the other; hence to determine the effectiveness of
policy instruments in the general re-allocation of resources.
In section 4:2 a description of the historical evolution of the
two principle technical instruments of protection viz tariffs and
import controls as a function of the aforementioned objectives -
revenue collection, balance of payments equilibrium internal price
stabilisation and the promotion of industry - is provided. Our
objective here is to understand how the structure of protection
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dictated largely by changes in these objectives, has evolved over the
years. The discussion will be largely descriptive rather than
analytical. A brief account is also given of the various incentive
legislations but a discussion of the role of direct public investment
is not provided as is outside the purview of this study. The
effective rates of protection (erp) their definition, measurement as
well as their interpretation are discussed in section 4:3; estimates
of erp using Nigerian data for 1974 and 1977 are also presented and
discussed in this section. In Section 4:4 we employ techniques of
parametric as well as non-parametric tests of association to examine
the relationship between the effective rates of protection on the one
hand and import substitution and growth on the other. In section 4:5
a brief summary of the chapter is provided.
4:2 Trade and Exchange Rate Policies: Historical Evolution and Recent 
Trends
For analytical convenience, the historical evolution of the
Nigerian tariff system is analysed in four stages, (i) the
pre-independence period, from about 1950 to 1960, (ii) 1961 to the
second half of the 1971/72 fiscal year, (iii) 1971/72 to 1975/76 and
(iv) 1975/76 to the present. It must be emphasised that since the
experience of the country with protectionist regime has often been one
of sudden changes, making a precise delineation of 'phases' will be
subject to a necessarily arbitrary selection of dates. As will be
shown, sometimes the 'phases' overlap considerably but the four
periods roughly correspond to phases of liberalisation (1st and 3rd
periods) and of more restrictive (2nd and 4th) regimes.
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4:2:1 1950 - 1960: 'The Pure Revenue Stage' 
The protectionist policy - mainly tariff and import controls -
during this period had the twin objectives of raising funds in order
to finance governmental expenses and the protection of the trading
position of the U.K. in the World market together with strengthening
the international value of the sterling 2 . This is the period Oyejide
(1975) 3 refers to as the 'pure revenue stage' in the history of the
country's tariff making policy. The revenue objective was
particularly crucial since the Federal government has had no reliable
source of income: corporate income was extremely negligible since
there were few manufacturing industries while personal income tax was
essentially a regional source of revenue. The relative importance of
foreign trade taxes in the total revenue of the Federal government is
shown in Table 4:1 and 4:2. In each of the years 1954 - 1960, customs
and excise duties contributed at least 70 percent of the total
government revenue.
Table 4:1
Composition of the Nigerian Government Revenue
1950 - 1960
Year Total
Revenue
Customs & Excise Direct Taxes Other'
Nm Nm Nm Nrn
1950 61.53 34.39 55.89 9.66 15.70 15.48 26.16
1951 65.59 36.32 55.37 10.69 16.29 18.58 28.33
1952 100.65 64.21 63.80 13.55 13.46 22.89 22.74
1953 101.81 67.90 66.69 13.62 13.38 20.30 19.94
1954 118.51 84.21 71.06 11.38 9.60 22.92 19.34
1955 124.96 87.92 70.36 13.43 10.75 23.62 18.90
1956 119.90 89.51 74.65 13.51 11.27 16.88 14.08
1957 141.13 101.58 71.98 13.11 9.29 26.44 18.74
1958 141.89 103.39 72.87 13.33 9.39 25.17 17.74
1959 154.63 111.84 72.33 13.36 8.64 29.44 19.04
1960 177.65 126.12 70.99 12.58 7.08 38.95 21.93
SOURCE: Ekundare, R.O., (1973) op.cit., p233.
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1.	 'Other' revenue includes colonial development and welfare grants
and unspecified revenue.
Few of the items subject to import duty included alcoholic
liquors, cigarettes, bicycles, motor vehicles, building materials,
cotton piece goods, petroleum oil and jewellery. Some of these
attracted fairly high rates of import duties (up to 50 percent on
tobacco products, and 75 percent on alcoholic liquors and jewellery)
essentially because they would not contribute to economic development
and welfare of the people and/or were thought to bring many social
evils. Average tariff rates ranged between 15 and 20 percent with
10-15 percent and 25-30 percent applicable to intermediate and
consumer goods respectively while items that could be roughly
classified as 'capital goods' such as machinery and metal products
carried no import duty4.
The exchange and import control regime could also be described
as extremely liberal and served only to regulate the sources of
imports (and the destination of exports) rather than their volume or
composition. For example, like other British colonies, Nigeria was a
member of the sterling area and therefore subject to the general
prescription of currency/exchange requirements of the area as a whole.
Payments to and from other countries of the area were relatively
liberal while payments to and from countries outside the area were
subject to the sterling restrictions. The import licencing system was
designed along similar lines. The Import Licencing authority (ILA)
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issued two types of licence. The Open General Import Licence (OGI)F
which covered most goods and permitted the importer to procure and
bring into the country without the need to apply for permission, any
of the goods covered by the licence from mainly the U.K. and colonies
as well as from non-sterling area countries designated as 'easy
currency' areas; and the specific licence by which the ILA must give
authorisation before the goods specified in it are impprted. The
countries covered in the licence were mainly the 'hard currency'
areas. TWo additional OGL's were introduced in 1958: the OGL (Dollar
Area) and the (XL (Japan) which permitted the importation without
specific licences of a large proportion of goods from those areas5.
One of the significant features of this period was the fairly
comfortable position in which the country found itself with regards to
foreign reserves. Although the country has consistently been running
a deficit in the current account since 1955, she was able to finance
these partly because of substantial past accumulation of foreign
exchange reserves in the boom years of the Korean War and partly
because of favourable capital accounts position. Thus neither the
balance of payments objective nor that of the promotion of industry
featured in the tariff making policy of Nigeria during this period.
4:2:2 1960/61 - 1970/71 
During the decade of the 1960's the four government objectives
interacted simultaneously to shape the protectionist policy in
Nigeria. During the early part of the 1960's there was the pressing
need to raise revenue for financing the post-independence ambitious
development programmes and foreign trade taxes remained the most
significant and reliable source, even though their relative
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Table 4:2 Sources and Composition of Nigerian Government Revenue,
1965 - 1979.
Year
	
Total	 Tax	 Import	 Excise	 Export Company Petroleum
revenue	 revenue	 duties	 duties	 duties	 tax	 profit
tax
(1)
N,000
(2)	 (3)
	
(4) (5)
	
(6)	 (7)
1961-1965 1602.5 1189.6	 682.2 101.9 139.60	 265.83
1966-1970 2274.2 1663.3
	
703.2 361.2 164.4	 434.70	 ----
1971-1975 14586.7 10737.9	 1525.2 833.3 133.4	 1056.6	 6889.70
1976-1979 33190.4 23278.9	 3995.5 950.7 13.3	 1801.6	 16535.60
Percentage Distribution I
(2) (3)	 (4)	 (5) (6) (7)	 as proportion of
Total Revenue.
1961-1965 74.23 42.57	 6.36	 8.70 16.58
1966-1970 73.14 30.92	 15.88	 7.20 19.12 ---
1971-1975 73.61 10.46	 5.71	 0.90 7.20 47.23
1976-1979 70.14 12.04	 2.80	 0.04 5.40 47.82
Percentage Distribution II
( 3 ) (4)	 (5)	 (6) (7) as proportion	 of Tax
Revenue.
1961-1965 57.34 8.57	 11.74	 22.35
1966-1970 42.27 21.71	 9.88	 26.13 ---
1971-1975 14.20 7.76	 1.24	 9.84 64.16
1976-1979 17.16 4.08	 0.06
	
7.74 71.03
Notes: figures may not add up (to 100%) due to non inclusion of revenue
from other sources,such as mining rents and royalties,interest
payments,posts and telegraphs etc.
Sources: Central Bank of Nigeria(1973),Economic and Financial Review,vol 11
No.2,p38;FOS,Annual Abstract of Statistics,1981 Edition,p144.
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contribution had began to decline. Between 1961 and 1965 revenue from
custom duties contributed about 42 percent of total federally
collected revenue and 57 percent of federally collected tax revenue
a.
compared to 17 percent and 22 percent from company taxes.
By 1961 too, the government made its intentions clear that the
tariff structure was to be employed deliberately as an instrument of
industrial policy. This was indicated by the Minister of Finance in
his Sovereignty Budget speech6 , thus:
the governments are all resolved to encourage the growth of
local industry by providing newly established industries with a
degree of protection, at least until they are strong enough to
stand on their feet.
Tariff rates remained generally law (about 33.3 percent) and fairly
stable. Consumer goods continued to attract highest duty rates (about
33.3 - 40 percent) while capital goods attracted an average rate of
duty of 10 percent. The highest tariff rates were levied on alcoholic
drinks (100 percent), jewellery and cosmetics (100 percent), not for
reasons of protection but as in the previous period on 'moral'
grounds7 . In addition to the low rates of duty, import controls were
further relaxed and the importation of commodities from the Eastern
Block countries hitherto restricted by specific licencing was, in line
with the country's non-aligned posture, considerably liberalised.
Thus by the end of 1961, a position of almost complete liberalisation
of imports into the Nigerian market was reached. Not withstanding the
Minister's prouncement and inspite of the absence of general tariff
increases, the basic objective of tariff policy was still income.
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Table 4:3 Nigeria's External Reserves 1954-1978
June
Year Amount
(Nm)
Annual rate of
change(%)
1954 406 --
1955 406 0.00
1956 402 -1.00
1957 414 2.30
1958 360 -13.00
1959 314 -12.80
1960 310 -1.30
1961 278 -10.00
1962 242 -13.00
1963 166 -31.40
1964 166 0.00
1965 176 6.00
1966 162 -8.00
1967 82 -42.90
1968 90 4.70
1969 96 6.70
1970 160 66.60
1971 284 77.50
1972 284 -10.60
1973 389 53.10
1974 3398 773.50
1975 3315 -2.50
1976 2991 -9.80
1977 2439 -18.50
1978 1161 -52.30
Source: Culled from Ekuerhare,B,U.(1980),"The impact and lessons
of Nigeria's industrial policy under the military gover_
nment 1966-1979". A paper presented at the Department
_
of Economics Staff seminar,Ahmadu Bello University,Zaria
Nigeria.
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By the middle of the 1960's however, the scope and objective of
the protectionist system has had to be broadened. The drawing down of
external reserves previously accumulated accelerated and the level
continued to decline, from over N400 million in 1954 to less than N200
million in 1963 and to the lowest ever level of slightly above N80
million in 1967 over the 1954-1978 period. The sharp deterioration
during the period could be attributed to at least two factors. First,
as a result of the political crisis which began in 1964, so much
uncertainty was created with regards to foreign investment. There was
thus a massive net outflow of capital in the private, especially
non-oil sector. In addition, the civil war had necessitated an
unprecedented rise in foreign exchange financed requirements of the
armed forces. In order to face the deterioration in the balance of
payments and prosecute the war, the government revised its commercial
policy. With the outbreak of the civil war, the OGL (all countries)
was amended and extensive import restrictions were imposed. The
number of items subject to specific licencing was significantly
increased8 . For the first time in 1967, multiple tariff rates for a
large number of items as well as concessionary rates for industrial
users were introduced. The former implied that in the application of
the tariff rates, descrimination is now introduced not only between
industry groups but also within industry - differences being made in
respect of raw materials, component parts and finished products. The
significant increases in tariff rates are reflected in the new tariff
structure: intermediate and capital goods continued to attract low
rates of duty (0-15 percent), finished products 40-75 percent;
'luxury' times, mostly consumer durables such as cars and motor
vehicles (50-150 percent) while their components and parts imported
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for processing in local assembly plants were subject to import duties
in the range of 0 to 10 percent9.
The second factor in the country's balance of payments crisis
was perhaps the intensive industrialisation that took place before and
during the war. Undoubtedly, the government measures and the war had
an important stimulating effect upon the level of domestic production.
Indeed, the war time restrictions could have resulted highly
beneficial to local entrepreneurs. Domestic shortage of essential
commodities, plus a rapidly growing effective demand provided an
extraordinarily profitable conditions for local producers of
consumption goods who expanded production within the severe limits
imposed by the difficulty of obtaining key imports of raw materials,
spare parts, machinery and equipment. Indeed prohibition of importing
a wide range of durable consumption goods could not be extended to the
greater part of the components and raw materials needed for the local
production of a wide variety of locally produced consumer goods.
4:2:3 1971/72 - 1975/76: The Post-war 'oil boom' period
During the first half of 1971/72 fiscal year, the foreign
exchange situation as well as the balance of payments problems
remained critical. In addition, there was a substantial rise in the
cost of living and an inflationary pressure that was aggravated by the
war-time trade restrictions. The solutions to these problems became
the central objective of the 1971/72 government budgetary proposals.
TO that end, import restrictions - especially the import policy of
specific licencing - necessitated by the war were lifted except for a
very few items such as rice, wheat, tobacco, beer stout and 'hot'
drinks. However import tariffs were slightly increased in order to
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raise additional revenue and to provide adequate protection for
locally produced equivalents. Import duty rates on items like dry
cell batteries and components imported by approved manufacturers of
record players and T.V. sets were increased while items like aluminium
and aluminium alloys, unwrought wire rod, galvanised wire etc. which
previously enjoyed duty free concessions were to bear 10 percent duty.
The infant industry consideration in the tariff - setting process was
temporarily set . aside but with the promise that:
in the interest of local industrial development and increased
employment, specific licences may be reintroduced in the future
to protect locally manufactured _goods when such goods are being
produced insufficient quantities10.
There were therefore no radical modifications in either the objectives
of government or in the protection policy itself concerning tariffs
and import controls. The only difference was that while tariffs were
elevated, less emphasis was being placed on physical controls.
The period beginning 1972 however, represented a significant
turning point in the trade and exchange rate policy of Nigeria. As
previously indicated, the first half of the 1970's can be crystallised
as the decade that ushered in the ascendency of oil into the dominant
position of the economy. Crude oil production peaked an average of
about 2.5 million barrels per day between 1972 and 1974. With the
tremendous increase in oil revenues, the government, indigenous as
well as private investors rushed into every conceivable form of
industrial activity: from ball point pens production to integrated
steel mills and imports made for lavish orders. The nominal public
capital programmes of the governments of the Federation during the
Third National Development Plan (1975-1980) were projected at about
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N30 billion, about 15 times the amount (N2 billion) provided for the
public sector under the second plan 11 . The policy makers were so
optimistic that they envisaged that "investment expenditure under the
third plan could be financed entirely by national savings"; indeed,
the level of saving was expected to be well in excess of investment
expenditure in each of the plan years12.
The affluence was so intoxicating that during the first half of
1975, on the recommendation of a salary review commission (The Udoji
Commission), the wages of low income workers were more than doubled
and the overall average salary of Nigeria's labour force was raised by
more than 60 percent. It was estimated that a total amount of N859.3
million was spent on the payment of salary areas throughout the
country with the public sector accounting for 66 percent of the
amount13.
The apparent abundance of foreign exchange and the erroneous
assumption of continued increases in earnings arising from the export
of crude petroleum led most government budgetary measures during the
1st half of the 1970's to considerably liberalise the exchange and
trade restrictions. The increasing monetization of the economy
resulting from the Udoji salary and wage awards inevitably resulted in
an inflationary spiral which could only be contained by encouraging
massive importation of commodities. The government, in addition,
placed a ban on the exportation of several locally produced goods in
an attempt to cure inflation.
On April 1st 1974, import duty relief on raw materials for local
industries was reduced generally to a maximum of 10 percent advalorem
while excise duties were reduced to a maximum of 5 percent thus making
a maximum of about 15 percent tax on the products of the local
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industries, (with the exception of breweries and cigarette
industries). Excise duty on 21 items was abolished. These included
flour, cement, containers, towels and towelling, motor cycles and
bicycle tyres and tubes; duties on building materials, food and trans-
port vehicles and even on consumer luxuries such as TV and radio were
significantly reduced "to ensure that they are available in the local
market at reasonable prices"14 . In addition, items like meat and food
preparations, rice, fresh fruits, maize, motor and motorcycle tubes,
stout beer, and spirits were removed from the list of imports banned
or subject to specific licencing. 15
 Thus during most of the period,
the external economics condition and the need to raise revenue via
tariff ceased to be major objectives of protection policy. The policy
of import licencing not as extensive as in previous years was mainly
aimed at easing the congestion at poets which was unprecedented as a
result of the post civil war economic boom.
The liberalisation episode is clearly reflected in the country's
trade statistics. While exports declined by about 15 per cent (from
N5794.8 million in 1974 to N4922.5 million in 1975) due mainly to a
fall in earnings from the non oil section, the value of imports in
1975 more than doubled the 1974 level, rising from N1737.3 to N3721.5
million. The importation of manufactured assorted goods went up by
more than 100 per cent, machinery and equipment by more than 50 per
cent; food imports increased by 92 per cent and beverages registered a
growth of 433 per cent. 16
 Above all, foreign exchange reserves which
stood at N33.98 million in 1974 (the highest in the country's history)
dropped to N2991 million by 1976.
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4.2.4 1975/6 to the Present
The anti-inflationary drive which involved the liberalisation of
imports between 1972 and 1974 continued during the second half of
1975, although on a reduced scale. This was reflected in the sub-
sequent budgetary proposals. A few industries continued to benefit
from a general reduction in import duties on imports. For example, in
the 1975/76 fiscal year, duties on imports of building materials were
reduced to 20 from 50 per cent; most food items and consumer goods
attracted a duty rate of between 5 and 40 per cent while import duty
relief was granted for few industries like soap and detergent, con-
fectionary and sugar. Similar reductions were made in the 1976/77 and
1977/78 budgetary proposals. In the 1976/77 fiscal year the most
significant changes made were the abolishing of duties on a number of
food imports -- such as ground nuts, baby foods etc, the reductions on
duty rates on imports of parts and components for the transport equip-
ment sector, on imports of building materials, and materials for the
manufacture of footwear. The electronic, metal fabrication and kitchen
utensils and equipment manufacturing industries were exempt from
duties on imported raw materials. Excise taxes were re-introduced,
ranging generally from 2 - 5 per cent. Industries which benefited most
from the 1977/78 tariff changes include wearing apparel, rubber,
electrical equipment, footwear, textiles and spirit distillery and
beer brewing, either because tariffs on competing imports were
increased or concessionary duty rates on imported inputs were provided
or both)-7
In general however, the period saw the re-emergence of stringent
tariff and quantitative import restrictions especially on durable
consumer goods. In each of the fiscal years 1976/77 and 1977/78, the
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importation of more than 60 items, mainly consumer (durables and
non-durables), goods were either banned or placed under specific
licencing. With the significant reduction in duty on imported
essential raw materials (to 10 percent and valorem and in a few cases
down to 5 percent), the tariff measures served to further strengthen
the effective protection enjoyed by Nigerian manufacturing industries.
Again the crucial element that determined the new posture was
the external economic condition. By the end of the 1975/76 fiscal
year, the economic slump had started to set in. The Military
Administration called for 'belt-tightening' in public expenditure and
the adoption of 'low profiles' i.e. curtailment of expensive private
tastes. From the end of the last decade (to the present) many of the
economic problems reminscence of the pre-oil days re-appeared and new
ones began to emerge. The country's economic woes are manifest in
balance of payments problems, drastic budget cuts and high internal
prices of basically all commodities including foodstuff and other
basic consumer goods. The production of crude oil further plummetted
to 1.44 (1981), 1.29 (1982) and 1.23 (1983) million barrels per day,
just a little more than half of 2.4 million b/d peak of 4 years ago;
and from 1.5 million b/d in October 1982 to 400,000 b/d in April 1983,
the lowest rate since the 1960's. In addition, the price fell from
US$40 to US$30 a barre118 . Shortfalls in production and price saw
earnings plummet from around US$22 billion in 1980 to under $10
billion in 1983. As a result imports had to be curtailed to the level
of N60 million a month by the end of 1983 from a N1.5 billion monthly
rate in 1981.
Such external sector developments necessitated the passing of
The Finance Act (1981) and the Economic Stabilisation Act (1982)19,
161
both aimed at revamping the precarious economy. The main features of
the new measures contained in the Acts include:
(a) An increase in the number of items banned from importation from
44 in 1977 to a total of 65 in 1981 and to 77 in 1982. Most of
these were consumer goods such as cigarettes, sugar
confectionary, towels, made-up textiles, bicycle tyres and tubes
and footwear.
(b) The number of items placed under specific licence was increased
from about 20 in 1977/78 to 78 in 1981 and to 103 in 1982. These
included unmanufactured tobacco, packaging materials,
manufactured articles of wood of all types, sewing machines,
asbestos, musical instruments, lorries, trucks including
tankers, tippers, pick-ups and four-wheel drive vehicles.
(c) The level of import duty was significantly increased for some 50
odd items and the level of excise duty on some 10 items altered.
For items on which the duty was previously less than 100 percent
import duty was increased by 5 percent; and for those goods
where the duty was previously more than 100 percent, duty was
increased by 10 percent. The new rates range between 0-5
percent and 500 percent with most machinery and equipment
carrying duties of no more than 10 percent while consumer goods
are heavily penalised.
(d) In August 1982, a new order which made it compulsory to pay
advance deposit against imports was imposed to take effect from
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21st April 1982. The percentage deposits relative to the value
of imports ranged from 25 percent (raw materials and spare
parts) through 50 percent (food, except rice, medicaments,
building materials, capital goods, books) to 200 percent (motor
vehicles and trucks) and 250 percent on motor cars and 'other'
goods2°.
To sum up, the Nigerian tariff structure has evolved over a
period in response to various, often contradictory, government
objectives. The revenue Objective, undoubtedly the most important
before and immediately after political independence, began to lose.
importance in comparison to the emphasis placed upon BOP problems and
to the protection granted to establish industries. More often than
not, the latter objective was secondary to the balance of payments and
price-stabilisation objectives. In other words, short-term
'fine-tuning' in response to external economic conditions appeared to
be the main and most significant feature of the protectionist system
in the country. As a result one would expect that several elements of
instability and inconsistency are introduced into the tariff system
with further adverse effects upon production and investment in the
domestic manufacturing activities.
4:2:5 The Incentives Legislations
Over the years, the Nigerian Government has had also a number of
legislations which offer special incentives to industrial enterprises
"where such incentives are considered necessary in the overall
economic interest of Nigeria " 21 . These have widely varied from the
Aid to Pioneer Industries Act (1952), The Industrial Development
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(Income Tax Relief) Act (1958) amended by Decree 22 of 1971, The
Industrial Development (Import Duties Relief) Act of 1957, The Customs
Duties (Dumped and Subsidised Goods) Act (1958) and The Customs
(Drawback) Regulations of 1958.
One of the most important legislations has been the Aid to
Pioneer Industries applied in conjunction with the Industrial
Development (Income Tax Relief) Act. An activity and/or industry
acquires a 'pioneer status' and is granted a "Pioneer Industries
Certificate" if it is "not being carried out in Nigeria or on scale
suitable to the economic requirements of Nigeria or at all" or if
"there are favourable prospects of further development" 22
 (of the
industry and/or activity). A pioneer industries certificate then
qualifies the industry to pay no company taxes during the first 3
years of its operation where fixed capital expenditure had not been
less than N25,000 for indegenous controlled company and N150,000 for
any other. The tax relief could be extended for a maximum period of 2
years depending on, among others:
(a) The rate of expansion, standard of efficiency and the
level of development of the company.
m The implementation of any scheme -
(i) for the utilisation of local raw material in the
processes of the company and
(ii) for the training and development of Nigerian
personnel in the relevant industry.
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(c) The relative importance of the industry in the economy of
the country23.
The schedule of pioneer industries now consists of about 39
manufacturing activities including the manufacture of basic and
intermediate industrial chemicals, cement, articles of paper-pulp,
paper and paper board, textile fabrics and man-made fibres, leather24
etc.
In addition to the tax holiday under the Income Tax (Accelerated
Depreciation) Act, enterprises are allowed to write off from their
profits, for the purposes of computing taxable income, a large amount
of their capital investment in fixed assets during the earlier years
of trading. This is in addition to the annual capital depreciation
allowance. The prevailing rates which are differentiated according to
the type of asset on which the capital expenditure is incurred and the
type of activity in which the asset is to be used, are as follows:
Qualifying	 Initial Allowance
	 Annual Allowance
Expenditure
1. Plant and machinery
including furniture,
fittings, motor vehicles.
2. Building
a. Industrial
b. Non-Industrial
3. Plantation
4. Mining
20.00	 12.50
	
20.00
	
12.50
	
5.00
	
10.00
	
25.00
	
15.00
	
20.00
	
12.50
SOURCE: Fed. Republic of Nigeria, Incentives to Invest in Nigeria,
Lagos 1980, p.5
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It is doubtful whether these concessions per se would provide as
strong incentives as tariffs and other trade restrictions to the
affected enterprises. For example, whether a firm benefits from PIS
crucially depends upon how quickly it achieves profitability within
the span of the three years the tax holiday is granted. The question
is whether a period of 3 to 5 years is long enough to allow a newly
established firm to stand on its feet and make substantial profits.
It appears that the system is more likely to favour those companies
whose investments have lower gestation periods and where the return on
investment is high and quick yielding in the initial periods. In
general however, manufacturing profitability may be expected to be
lower especially in the initial years of a firm's operation and, in
this eventuality, the incentive value of the tax concession is likely
to be significantly reduced. In addition, although the initial as
well as the normal depreciation allowances may appear to be generous,
their value to the firm may be greatly reduced in an inflationary
situation since the valuation of assets for the purposes of
calculating the allowances is done at historic costs rather than at
the real value or replacement costs.
Indeed, most empirical studies in this field tend to conclude
that direct tax concessions have played only a minor role in
motivating firms to invest in the Nigerian manufacturing sector. For
example, it was shown that an estimated 60 percent of industrialists
benefitting from tax relief would have invested anyway. Many of the
firms considered market conditions and government attitudes as
generally more important in determining their investment decisions25.
However, it must be realised that these direct tax concessions
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are not provided in isolation from other investment incentives such as
tariff and import controls and their effects may be far greater and
more appropriately evaluated in conjunction with these other policies.
The application of the acts could in principle make further
investment easier by allowing firms to amortise their capital quickly
and to build up liquid reserves at an early date. Substantial
benefits could therefore accrue to the economy, where such profits are
re-invested. However, there are no guarantees that such will be the
case. As such, the tax holiday may only work to increase the
incentives provided through trade and licence restrictions and hence
increase the 'excess' (i.e. above normal) profits accruing to the
beneficiary firm. The latter may in turn further reduce competition
(i.e give rise to monopolistic pricing policies) create a captive
market for many products, thereby lessening pressures for increased
efficiency. There is also the possibility that by increasing the
returns to investment in fixed assets, the system of granting tax
holidays and substantial depreciation allowances may act as an
implicit subsidy to capital, could create relative price distortions
in the economy and give rise to artificial incentives to promote
capital intensity in production. This is the more so in an economy
where capital intensity is already being encouraged by low import
duties on capital equipment, low interest rates and over-valued
currency.
The 'Approved User' Scheme (ADS) 
Under this scheme, "approved users" of materials are granted
partial (or full) exemptions with respect to import taxes on
production goods needed for the manufacturing processes for a period
of up to three years provided that the authorities are satisfied these
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imports are not being produced in Nigeria and/or that "it is
impossible to provide the goods and services in question at prices low
enough to compete with the imported equivalent" or that "the imported
finished article bears a lower proportion of import duty than the
materials imported to manufacture the same article in Nigeria"26.
The scheme is intended to benefit/assist both new industries to
become established in Nigeria and an already established industry to
be developed on a scale suitable to the country's overall
requirements.
It was estimated that between 1979 and 1982, the amount of
subsidies provided to eight industries, through the AUS, was close to
Ni billion. About 24 percent of this amount was granted to industries
assembling air conditioners and refridgerators. Other beneficiaries
and the percentages received include industries manufacturing gas, oil
and plastics (20 percent), textiles (18 percent), pulp and paper (12
percent), feed mills (10 percent), building and metal materials (7.9
percent), chemical products (6.8 percent) and beverages (0.82
percent)27.
Thus for a manufacturer with an approved user status, the scheme
will often provide substantial economic benefits in the form of low
import duty of inputs in addition to high rates of import duties on
final output. Often the difference between the 'normal' tariffs on
imported inputs and the rates paid by approved manufacturers can be
enormous. For example, in 1977 'normal' duty on artificial resins was
10 percent, while importation was free of duty for an approved user;
for synthetic rubber latex, while normal rate of duty is 30 percent
the AUS rate was 10 percent; for sheets of unvulcanised synthetic
rubber the rates were 66.2/3 percent and 33.1/3 percent respectively
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and for patent leather 66.2/3 percent and 20 percent 28 , etc. In some
cases, the differences are even larger. For example, in 1973 copper
fittings and parts for boat construction carried an AUS duty rate of 5
percent as against a normal duty rate of 66.2/3 percent and the range
is 5 percent and 66.2/3 percent for certain electrical materials29.
The main disadvantage from the economy's point of view is that
unlike the provisions of the income tax which are linked to objectives
of industrial efficiency, profitability, manpower development and the
maximisation of local value added, the approved user scheme remains
largely legalistic, often making the interpretation of the provision
vague. For example, many firms are highly critical of the protective
effects of AUS because "raw material" is so loosely defined that many
semi-finished products are being brought into the country at
concessionary tariff rates30 . The system could in reality therefore
strongly discriminate against firms engaged in local production of
intermediate and semi-finished products. As a corollary, it could
provide a significant additional incentive for imported-input
intensity in local production of consumer goods putting an additional
strain on the country's balance of payments.
Any advantages conferred on a manufacturer by the application of
this and other related incentive legislations must be weighed against
the unquantifiable costs that result from excessive bureaucracy in
handling matters related to industrial development in the country. As
the government itself recognises
unnecessary restriction and bottlenecks have frustrated a number
of worthy projects, in particular, the multiplicity of
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authorities from whom various permits, licences, etc., have to
be assembled.., confuse the intending entrepreneur ... and
create the possibility of abuse31.
Consider, for example, a manufacturer who wishes to import an
input that is not available in the Nigerian market. Typically, an
approved user certificate must be obtained from the Federal Ministry
of Industries to attest to his legitimacy as a bona fide manufacturer.
(It could take a fairly long time for the Ministry to ascertain local
non-availability of the product given the lack of up-to-date and
statistical data on manufacturing production). He then must obtain an
import licence from a special Cabinet Committee, a Form M confirming
the approval of foreign exchange from the Central Bank, pay an advance
deposit on his consignment and then obtain a clean report of findings
as to the quality, quantity, price, comparison and legality from a
government appointed inspection company. On arrival at Lagos, the
manufacturer will be requested to supply further documents for customs
clearance, etc. Thus even the most patient of industrial
entrepreneurs could well be frustrated by the bottlenecks, and the
cost to the economy, though not easily quantifiable, must be enormous.
4:2:6 Policies and Measures to Promote Manufactured Exports
While the process of tariff-setting typically reflects different
government objectives, the incentive legislations were mainly aimed at
the promotion of domestic industries under import-substitution
programmes. Until fairly recently, there has been no clearly
established goals for export expansion and hence there was the
complete absence of government's effort to mobilise the immense
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potentials that do exist for export oriented industries. This could
perhaps be attributed to the fact that the process of
industrialisation is relatively recent and with a large domestic
market the need to find an external outlet for some products might not
be urgently felt.
Towards the end of the previous decade, there was a change of
direction albeit a half-hearted one, towards the development of
manufactured export industries. As was clearly stated in the
1975-1980 plan document, "the development of export industries will be
an important objective of government policy during the plan period"32.
Towards this end, the government proposed to operate incentive
schemes which have included the following:33
1. The transfer of Commercial and Merchant Banks' credit
allocations for exporting industries from the 'less preferred'
to 'preferred' sector of the economy. This requires Commercial
(Merchant) Banks to allocate at least 6% (4%) of total loans and
advances to the export sector, in contrast to the previous
.arrangement where these percentages were considered as the
maximum attainable credit allocation to the sector.
2. The provision of refinancing facilities through the
redis-counting of short-term bills with respect to the export of
manufactured and semi-manufactured products from Nigeria.
3.	 Full (or partial) exemption from the payment of duties on
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imported inputs used up in the production of an export product,
for a period of more than three years.
4. Liberalisation of conditions under which an industry is granted
a pioneer status: industries with export potentials or the
activities of which will enhance exporting but which do not,
under the existing conditions, qualify for the pioneer status
scheme can be considered for pioneer status.
5. In addition to the initial and annual accelerated depreciation
allowances granted to manufacturers, manufacturing exporters are
to be provided with an extra 5 percent annual allowance on their
plant and machinery and could be extended to qualifying
industrial building expenditure. The granting of the extra 5
percent is however not automatic but tied to the proportion of
the value of total production that is exported from the country.
6. The granting of a generous tax relief on interest on foreign
loans (previously only to the agricultural sector) as follows:
Repayment period
	
Grace period	 Tax exemption
including Moratorium	 allowed
Above 7 years	 not less than 2 years	 100
5 - 7 years	 not less than 18 months	 70
2 - 4 years
	
not less than 12 months	 40
Below 2 years	 not less than 12 months	 Nil
SOURCE: Federal republic of Nigeria Manual of Export incentives, p8.
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7. Finally, an Export-Development Fund was set up in order "to
provide direct grants and offer financial assistance to Nigerian
exporters to cover initial expenses in respect of:
(a) participation in training courses, symposia, seminars and
workshops in all aspects of export promotion;
(b)advertising and publicity campaigns in foreign markets;
(c)export market research studies;
(d)provide design and consultancy;
(e)participation in Trade Missions, buyer-oriented activities,
overseas Trade Fairs, exhibitions and stores promotion;
(f)cost of collecting trade information;
(g)organisation of joint export groups.
The Nigerian Export Promotion Council was set up by Decree 26 of
1976 to:
(a) ensure that Nigeria's export development goals are
adequately defined and integrated into the National Development
Plan so that there is a clear recognition of the priorities
accepted by the Government with respect to the export sector;
(b) formulate policies and programmes through which the export
goals established in the National Plan can be realised;
(c)supervise the implementation of these programmes and ensure
an effective feed-back from experience which would improve the
formulation of future plans for the export sector34.
These are certainly welcome developments although it is perhaps a bit
too early to judge the benefits that accrue to the country in terms of
export expansion from the 'change' in direction. However, more often
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than not, in highly restrictive trade regimes the question is not so
much that the export objective have been totally neglected as that it
is impossible to work towards it within the particular pattern imposed
by policy. This is especially so if the government policies remain
more favourable to the domestically oriented producers. Thus, for
example, in spite of the often high price and a generally low quality
of locally made products intended for the domestic market vis-a-vis
international quality standard of foreign-made equivalents, the profit
margin may be more than satisfactory for domestic entrepreneurs to
venture into exports. Moreover, although such promotional measures
are crucial, one of the key elements - neglected by the Nigerian
government - determining the success of export expansion is the
ability to adopt a stable, realistic exchange rate 35 . With an
over-valued currency, the development of exports could be penalised,
since international competitiveness is drastically reduced. During
the 'oil-boom' period (1973-1975) when Nigeria's position with regards
to external reserves was comfortable, the government appreciated the
Naira to reflect the strength of the currency in response to the
country's economic performance. There were, however, no accompanying
measures to depreciate (or devalue) the Naira in order to avoid the
dangers of its over-valuation with the rapid decline in the level of
reserves especially after 1975. It was estimated that the Naira
appreciated by 80% in real terms between 1973 and 1980 36 . In these
circumstances it is quite understandable that many firms would not
feel compelled to venture into foreign markets with their complex
characteristics and attendant high risk competitiveness.
Having examined the various devices employed by the government
to promote industrialisation, we now move on to quantify and evaluate
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their likely effects. We would like to emphasise in advance that the
full quantification of the various incentives examined in sections
4:2:5 and 4:2:6 is particularly troublesome given the lack of adequate
and systematic information with regards to the operation of these
schemes. Our discussion in the following sections will therefore be
confined to the effects of the more easily quantifiable protective
devices, namely tariffs on inputs and output.
4:3 Protection and Resource Allocation: The Effective Rate of 
Protection OW
Theoretical and empirical studies 37
 on protection have noted
that the net effect of the various protective devices - mainly tariffs
- is to distort the structure of domestic prices as well as lead to an
(inefficient) inter-sectoral and inter-industrial allocation of
resources. In the Nigerian case, this implies on the one hand that a
tariff imposed on commodity imports with possibilities of substitution
causes a divergence between the domestic prices and the world prices
of the commodity with the former being maintained well above the
latter. On the other hand, the imposition of an export tax and the
maintenance of an over-valued exchange rate seriously hampers the
development of exports since their international competitiveness is
drastically reduced and/or eliminated. The domestic supply of
exportables is thus increased while their prices are maintained below
the international price level. The concept of the nominal rate of
protection is devised to give an indicationof the impact of the policy
of protection on the domestic price of a commodity vis-a-vis the
actual or international price.
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The impact of import licencing requirements upon the domestic
price level is similar to that of a tariff to the extent that the
imposition of the former (i.e. import licence) restricts imports of
the commodity below the level that would otherwise occur if only the
latter (i.e. tariff) was applied. But while the impact of a tariff on
the domestic price level can be measured by the nominal tariff concept
(unless the tariff is prohibitive), the protection induced divergence
between the international and internal prices resulting from
quantitative restrictions are much harder to quantify precisely and
can vary over time depending upon demand and supply elasticities for
the commodity and the scope for substitution with similar commodities.
The divergence between the domestic price and the international
price of a commodity is however only one dimension of the actual
distortions generated by a commercial policy; and the nominal rates of
protection on final product of an industry are inadequate and often
misleading indicators of the extent of inefficiency in resource
allocation. This is because in the real world, tariffs are also
imposed on imported material inputs used in the production of the
final product and since the cost of material inputs constitute a
significant element of industrial costs, a tariff on these (which
raises their costs to the producer) would obviously affect the cost
structure and hence the output of domestic industries. The concept of
Effective Rate of Protection is designed to measure these
modifications of the production pattern of a country by specifying
what effects nominal tariffs on outputs and on inputs have on the
value-added or process of an industry rather than on the price of the
protected industry's output.
The main objective of this section is to employ the standard
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neo-classical assumptions and tools of analysis to illustrate how the
concept is measured deferring its empirical implementation to the next
section.
4:3:1 Algebraic formulation of erp
The theoretical formulation of the erp within a partial
equilibrium context is based upon a few basic assumptions about the
economy. First, the economy is assumed to be 'small', that is, with
or without protection, the quantities of any final good x and input i
traded represent only a small fraction of the total international
market movement of the commodities. Thus variations of volumes traded
could hardly provoke changes in actual world prices. Technically this
implies that the foreign elasticities of supply of imports of goods x
and input i are both infinite. Second, the economy is perfectly
competitive with all productive resources fully employed; in
particular the factors of production - labour and capital - are mobile
domestically and their prices, which reflect their opportunity costs,
are flexible. Factors therefore move between activities in response
to changes in their prices. They are however not internationally
traded and therefore immobile. Third, the production process is
assumed to be subject to fixed-input-output coefficients. There are
no substitution possibilities between the primary inputs (labour and
capital) on the one hand and material inputs on the other, and among
the material inputs that are employed in the production of the final
good x.
Now define the effective rate of protection (Zx) as the
proportionate increment in value-added per unit of output made
possible by the protective structure over the 'free-trade' value-added
per unit of output:
4:4
4:5
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Vx = (1 + Zx)V*x
V	 V*Z
x 
=  X — . A
vx*
= effective rate of protection in activity x
= domestic value-added and 'free-trade' value-added
respectively in activity x.
In the absence of tariffs and/or quantitative restrictions,
value-added in activity x expressed in World market values is given by
Y - E A.
x .	 ix
1=1
where Yx and Aix are respectively gross output and value of
intermediate inputs required in the production of x. Equivalently,
value-added per unit of output is given by
V
x 
= 1 - E a.
Ix
i=1
Now let an import duty at rate tx on the finished product x and at
rate ti on inputs be simultaneously imposed. (The former is assumed
to be higher than the latter). Domestic industry will then operate
with a value-added higher than under 'free-trade' and the inflated,
post-tariff value-added is given by
V 1 = l+t - E a.	 (1 +
	 )X 
i= 
Ix
1
= 1- E a. +t - Ea. t.
Ix X	 1X1
i=1
= V +t -	 a. t: , since V =1-LA.
x x 1. = ix I	 x	 ix
1
Thus erp = z x can be equivalently expressed as
V +t - E a. t -v
x	 •	 ix i
4:1
where
	 Z
x
and V and V*
X
x 
= 4:2
4:3
V
x
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= t -a. t.
X	 lix'
	 4:6
Rewriting 4:6 as
t
x
	
E a ixti S
x
 - T
V
x
	 vx
Permits one to decompose the effect of the tariff into the subsidy
effect (Sx) and tax effect (Tx) on value-added. The former increases
value-added, the latter decreases it.
The relationship between Zx and the nominal rate of protection
can be seen as follows: define tx as the weighted average tariff rate
on inputs entering the production process of x
then
Z =t -t	 a.
x	 x	 x. ix
or
	 1—I a.
t
x	
(t -	 )Ea.
X. ix
	 4:7
1
1	 3- a.
iX
Thus the effective rate of protection is equal to, greater than or
less than tx, the nominal tariff rate, according to whether tx is
equal to, less than or greater than the nominal rate of protection.
Considering equation 4:1, erp can be negative when either the
numerator is negative while the denominator is positive or vice-versa.
In the first case, the tariff structure is such that the weighted
average of input tariff exceeds the nominal tariff on the output
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(tx < Eaix t ). In the second case, the value of tradable inputs
exceeds the value of output both measured at world prices. Thus
value-added at world prices is negative. This implies that the
finished good could be purchased abroad more cheaply than the sum of
the importable inputs used up in its production38.
The possibility of having a negative value-added at world prices
makes the interpretation of erp rather difficult. If the denominator
in expression 4:6 is negative, while the numerator is positive, a
positive (nominal) protection accorded to an activity will lead to a
negative effective protection. This must be distinguished from the
case were erp is negative because protection is genuinely negative
(i.e. tx < aj ti) or when domestic value-added is negative. To avoid
this paradox of getting apparently negative erp when protection is
indeed positive, Soligo and Stern (1965) 39 employed the so-called
'17-measure' of effective protection. This expresses the erp as the
difference between value-added at domestic prices and world prices as
a percentage of value-added at domestic prices, i.e.:
u =v _ v* 40	 4:8
V
x
Since VX must be positive or else the industry would not exist, the
denominator here would always be positive. Negative rates of
protection would reveal the existence of genuine negative protection.
The preceding analysis assumes that world market values are
available in estimating the erp. However, if, as is normally the
case, the data is expressed in domestic prices, adjustments have to be
made to obtain value-added at 'free-trade' prices. This can be done
by multiplying the value of production at domestic prices (Yx) and
4:9
4:10
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the value of purchased inputs Aix by the appropriate conversion
factors or accounting ratios:
-V* = Yva - EA.
x	 . ixPIX1
-	 1X
where 0‹x and px give respectively the output and input conversion
factors derived earlier in chapter 2. Thus expressions 4:1 and 4:8
become respectively:
* E
(Y - EA. )-(Y - A* )Z
x 
= x i ix	 x i ix 
(Y* - iA* )ix
and
U
x 
= ( y - A. ) - (Y* -
	 A* )X 1 ix	 x 1 ix
(Y - A. )
x 1 ix
It is also important to introduce two important modifications to the
above expressions. The first concerns the treatment of non-traded
inputs such as electricity, domestic transport, etc. As was earlier
pointed out, since these are not internationally traded, their
domestic prices are not strictly equal to their 'free-trade' prices
plus the tariff on inputs and as such the conversion factors
previously derived cannot be applied to revalue these inputs. TWo
major proposals about the treatment of these inputs have been put
forward:
(a) in a number of studies of prote rtion it is often assumed that
non-traded inputs are in infinitely elastic supply - i.e. supplied at
constant costs. This is the so-called Balassa Method 41 and
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essentially implies that the price of non-tradeables does re rise
with the rise in the price of output and therefore in the event of
moving to a 'free-trade' situation the prices of these inputs remain
unchanged. This is equivalent to saying that non-traded inputs are
subject to zero nominal rate of protection and need not therefore be
converted from domestic prices to 'free-trade' prices. Thus the value
of material inputs is broken down into its traded, A 	 and non-traded
AR parts and domestic value-added is thus expressed as:
kx
7 A	 AN
=	 - ""Kx
while value-added at free-trade prices becomes
\7*x = Y)fC	 Akix
The formula for the effective rate of protection is accordingly
altered to read
(Y - EA ix ) - (Y* - 12k*-t)
x i	 x	 ix 
Z
x = (y*	 111, t	 1\1	 )
x i ix
(b) The second approach, referred to as the "Corden Method" is to
"lump together all the inputs which are protected by a tariff and
treat them as one"42 . In other words, no distinction needs to be made
between the effects on value-added (i.e. prices of primary factors) on
the one hand and those on traded inputs used in the protected
industry. In this instance, the input conversion factor is sufficient
for the revaluation of all inputs used up in a particular activity.
Expression 4:9 is thus sufficient to obtain "Corden erp's".
The second important modification introduced in the analysis is
with regards to the exchange rate. So far it has all along been
assumed that the existing rate will remain in force even in the
4:11
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(unlikely) event that all tariffs and domestic distortions were to be
eliminated. This assumption however is neither valid nor realistic as
will be shortly shown. Observe first, that with the prevalence of
tariffs and other international trade distortions, a country will be
able to sustain the exchange rate at a much higher level than would be
possible in their absence. Consider then the (hypothetical)
elimination of all tariffs and quantitative restrictions while
maintaining the existing (over-valued) exchange rate. Imports will
increase since the demand for commodities whose prices are higher at
home than abroad will tend to shift towards international suppliers.
Exports however will remain unchanged and therefore there will be a
relative worsening in the current account of the Balance of payments
(BoP), which would be remedied partly by an adjustment (downward, i.e.
a devaluation) of the exchange rate and partly by an increased inflow
of capital. Looking at the problem the other way round, consider an
initial equilibrium with no trade distortions (i.e. a 'free-trade'
situation) and a subsequent application of tariffs and/or quantitative
restrictions; the level of imports will fall and exports will still
be less profitable and an upward revaluation of the exchange rate will
be called for, to maintain equilibrium.
Thus in order to carry out a valid (and realistic) comparison
between a 'free-trade' situation and a tariff ridden one, the exchange
rate must be altered while holding the BoP constant rather than
holding the former constant and implying changes in the latter. In
other words, protection should be analysed relative to the exchange
rate which would compensate for the removal of all tariffs,
quantitative restrictions and subsidies in their effects on the BoP.
The change in the exchange rate needed to maintain a foreign
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balance with the elimination of protective devices can be obtained
from the equation (in chapter 2) which is reproduced here for
convenience: SER = R 1 = 1	 where SER(R1), OER(R) and SCF are
OER R
	
SCF
respectively the shadow exchange rate, the official exchange rate and
the standard conversion factor. Once the magnitude of over-valuation
is obtained, the nominal rates of protection on outputs and inputs can
be accordingly altered to derive the net nominal rates of protection
using equation below:
;1( = (1 - tx) (R - R1)/R1 43
The conversion factors needed to revalue output and inputs of domestic
prices are then reworked and employed, using previous methods, to get
the net effective rates of protection (nerp), the main interpretations
and defects of which we shall now turn to.
4:3:2 Interpretations of the erp
The various positive and normative interpretations given to the
estimated rates of effective protection are well known and will only
be briefly outlined here.
1. Effective rates of protection have been widely used as an ex
post measure of the relative incentives provided by a system of
protection. Ceteris paribus, the higher the rate of effective
protection the greater the incentive offered to primary factors to
move into protected activities; therefore the erp can be used to rank
industries by the relative incentive provided.
2. In addition, the erp can be usefully employed to indicate the
incidence of tariff policy, i.e. to "shed light on the direction of
resource allocation effects of a protective structure" 44 . Sectors or
activities can be ranked by the height of their erp's: the highest
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sectors (i.e. those with high positive erp's) gaining resources and
therefore expanding their output relative to the lowest (i.e. with low
positive and/or negative erp's). More specifically:
(a) Industries with a (net) positive erp are drawing resources
from the non-traded sector whilst those with negative rates are
losing.
(b) Primary productive factors will be pushed to activities
which enjoy higher protection than others and their remuneration
will be higher.
3. Effective rates of protection are also employed to rank
industries by comparative advantage or relative international
efficiency. A high positive value of erp implies that the structure
of protection allows a large domestic value-added in an industry that
has a small value-added in the rest of the world and therefore implies
lower comparative advantage for the country in that process.
4. Under certain assumptions, the erp's have been employed for such
normative purposes as measuring the cost of protection45 or as an
investment criterion. This latter issue will be taken up in chapter 7
when we examine various other investment criteria. In the rest of the
section meanwhile, the validity of the other interpretations and the
conditions under which they hold will be examined.
The interpretations of erp as a measure of relative incentives
offered to industries and as an exante indicator of resource flows are
dependent upon the assumptions of zero general equilibrium
repercussions of commercial policy and of fixed input-output
coefficients. In a general equilibrium context46 where more than 2
goods and 2 factors are assumed, it has been theoretically and
emperically demonstrated that a ranking of industries or activities by
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the size of the erp's implies nothing about the direction of resource
flows except perhaps for the most and least protected sectors.
Moreover, in a multi-product model it cannot even be said that an
activity with the highest erp will expand and the one with the lowest
erp will contract. Indeed, as Corden (1974) theoretically
demonstrated, by making suitable assumptions about the
cross-elasticities of factor supplies and factor intensities, the
reverse could occur: a highly protected industry could contract rather
than expand.47
Interpretation 2b is, it is to be recalled, dependent upon the
validity of the Stolper -Samuelson Theorem. This Theorem holds even in
a multi-commodity world of say 4 goods. However, with more than 2
factors it cannot be applied and therefore the interpretation is not
likely to be valid. Moreover, the interpretation assumes that factors
are specific to an industry or activity. But it is possible in the
real world that there are factors participating in many activities,
some with positive erp's, others with negative erp's and therefore the
uniformity of their prices is no longer ensured. But this is a
condition not compatible with the assumption of perfect competition
and of homogeneity of factors.
The possibilities of substitution between primary factors on the
one hand, and material inputs on the other, or between imported inputs
and primary factors, or among the various intermediate inputs will
also lead to a bias in the estimation of erp. If the magnitude of the
bias is not uniform, i.e. if it varies from industry to industry, it
is very likely to render invalid the ranking of industries and could
even lead to a perverse result48 . Observe first, when substitution is
allowed between inputs, a cost minimizing producer is no more
restricted to the use of high cost inputs since he will rationally
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substitute the cheaper input (not subject to tariff or subject to a
lower rate of protection) for the high cost one (subject to tariff).
This implies that costs of production will be lower in the case of
substitution possibilities and industries, irrespective of their
rankings by erp's will be given the incentive to expand and/or will
contract less than predicted. In other words, the no substitution
assumption reduces the effective rate of protection and therefore the
value obtained under this assumption cannot be the 'true' one.
Secondly, in a partial equilibrium context, if substitution
between primary factors on the one hand and intermediate inputs on the
other as well as among intermediates is allowed, then the input-
coefficients based on 'free-trade' prices and those based on domestic
prices are no longer equivalent and the effective rate of protection
will be over- or under-estimated depending on whether these are
calculated from the post-tariff or pre-tariff input-output
coefficents. Since different activities will be affected differently,
the ranking of industries by erp will be affected.
Finally, the conclusion of the general equilibrium theorists
that the resource pull and push effects of erp are limited is further
strengthened if the possibilities of substitution are allowed in a
general equilibrium context. If substitution between imported inputs
and various factors of production is allowed, the granting of positive
effective protection to industry A with industry B unprotected may or
may not lead to A's expansion, depending on the relative factor
intensities of the two industries and the ease with which imported
inputs substitute for the factor in which A is intensive. By making
suitable assumptions along these lines, Corden (1974) shows that a
bias-effect of substitution could arise and lead to the contraction of
A despite its positive protection49.
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The general conclusion, therefore, is that the theoretical
operational value of the concept of effective protection is greatly
impaired when the assumptions under which its calculation is based are
altered. Whether the interpretations are entirely invalid under the
alternative assumptions and whether therefore the concept should be
discarded would only be resolved within an empirical (rather than
theoretical) context. How significant, for example, are substitution
possibilities in the real world? To what extent are the rankings of
industry altered when the assumptions of general equilibrium
repercussions and of substitutability between inputs invoked?
Empirical evidence does suggest that imported inputs quite generally
substitute with domestic inputs. For example, in many less developed
countries the import of capital goods quite generally substitutes for
domestic labour. Moreover, there is normally a substitution
possibility between intermediate inputs and primary factors. The
study by Balassa and Associates concludes however, that the
substitution issue, while theoretically significant, does not appear
to be of any practical significance. For example, it is argued that
if substitution possibilities are significant, one would expect the
estimates of erp obtained using domestic input-output coefficients to
be higher than estimates arrived at by the use of 'free-trade'
coefficients. However, the reverse was found to be the case in the
majority of the countries studied50 . According to Corden (1971), "for
practical work, it may be reasonable to assume that substitution
effects are not significantly biased"51.
There is also some empirical evidence that a consideration of
general equilibrium repercussions of the effects of tariffs only
slightly influences the rankings of industry. In a study of the
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Australian tariff system, Evans (1971) 52 made a comparison of the
classification of protected industries under the partial equilibrium
effective protection and general equilibrium approaches - which
produces the following results:
(a)Of the five industries classified as 'highly' protected (erp
greater than 50 percent) under the partial equilibrium approach
only one had a different classification under the general
equilibrium case.
(b) None of the nine l low' protection industries (erp less than
25 percent) in the partial equilibrium erp approach has a
different classification in the general equilibrium approach.
(c) The conflict in classification arises only in the case of
medium protection (erp 254 - 50 percent) industries. Here, of
the five industries considered, one had the same classification,
two would have been re-classified under 'low' and the other two
under 'high' protection on the basis of the general equilibrium
approach.
It thus seems that even if the partial equilibrium model fails
to produce the correct rankings of industries by the magnitude of the
resource-pull and push of the system of protection one will still be
able to make an inference, albeit an inconclusive one, since the most
heavily and most neglected sectors will be correctly identified and
this may be sufficient for policy-making purposes. We may thus
conclude with Machealy (1977) that:
If lesser demands are made on analysis, it could still be of
very valuable service, specifically the inferences of the
analyses would have to be interpreted as statements of
probability, rather than certainty53.
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With these qualifications in mind, we move on in the next section to
empirically implement the erp concept.
4:3:3 The Empirical Implementation of the erp: Estimates for 1974 
and 1977 
Using our estimated conversion factors of output and inputs we
determined the value of gross output, intermediate inputs and hence
value-added at border prices, shown, for the year 1977 in columns 1 to
3 of Table 4:4b. Combining the information in each of these columns
with domestic value-added in column 1 of Table 4:4a, it is easy to
calculate rates of effective protection using the specified equations.
In Tables 4:5a and 4:5b estimates of erp by sector are presented. The
main difference between the two tables (and between Tables 4:4a and
4:4b) pertains to the assumption employed in the treatment of
non-traded inputs. Estimates of erp in Table 4:5a were arrived at by
treating these inputs as part of value-added (i.e. the 'Corden
Method') whereas the alternative assumption of treating non-traded
inputs as ordinary inputs but with zero nominal tariffs (the 'Balassa
Method') was employed in arriving at the estimates in table 4:5b. In
general, the use of either method does not alter significantly the
relative ranking of industries although the latter method produces
higher erp estimates than the former. Tb avoid repetition in the
following discussion of erp, attention will be confined to using the
'Corden' rates in Table 4:5a. Here the estimates differ according to
whether adjustments are made for tariffs only (U1 and Zl) or for
tariffs plus 'other' distortions using a 'premium' rate of 40 percent
(132 and Z2) and 60 percent (133 and Z3). The main effect of using the
premium rates is, as might be expected, to elevate the erp's in
comparison
	 to
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Table 4:4a Sectoral Value-added at domestic and border
prices(1977) - The 'Corden' method.
Sector
	
Value-added (N,000) at:
_
domestic
prices
border prices.*
(1) (2) (3) (4)
6 3111/3122 Food 209383 119500.0 99503.6 91387.3
7	 3131/3133 Alcoholic bev. 132592 85452.4 68270.8 61988.8
8	 3134 Non-alcoh.bev. 43215 38238.8 28340.4 24975.5
9	 3140 Tobacco 63492 16828.3 37533.3 15987.3
10	 3211 Textiles 226442 183533.0 83888.3 80009.4
11	 3212 Made-up	 text. 21576 15029.8 16179.7 14169.0
12	 3220 Apparel 6191 2314.0 2119.3 2012.6
13 3231/3233 Leather 6470 7953.2 5437.4 4683.6
14	 3240 Footwear 16229 1889.5 2783.4 2947.4
15 3311/3320 Wood 66334 29941.7 25876.0 24151.3
16 3412/3420 Paper 121499 124944.0 89252.8 78019.8
17 3511/3512 Chemicals 5587 4286.9 3281.1 3803.2
18	 3521 Paints 17883 12751.8 9971.7 6448. 7
19	 3522 Drugs 34783 15772.8 14040.7 13164.8
20	 3523 Soap 158073 18973.6 27597.0 29045.1
21 3529/3540 Other Chem. 117493 117519.0 83961.3 73458.3
22 3551/356o Rubber 109235 18891.7 67303.0 59939.6
23 3610/3699 Cement 102292 103535.0 69614.1 61278.9
24 3710/3812 Basic Metals 96586 37582.7 34131.5 32303.7
25 3813/3819 Fab.Metals 108700 8 1 6 5 2	 7. 62928.5 56453.9
26 3822/3829 Machinery 71577 55954.0 42712.0 38113.0
27 3832/3829 Elect.Machinery 29093	 - 13919.3 12340.9 11539.4
28 3841/3843 Transport Equip 86840 44451.5 39437.4 36750-8
29	 3851/3909 Misc.products 4774 4 1 3 3	 1. 3069.2 2720.5
•Notes:In cols 2,3 and 4, output and inputs are adjusted
for norminal tariffs only(co12),for tariffs plus other
distortions,using a premium rate of 40% (co13) and
60% (co14).
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Table 4:4b Sectoral Value-added at Border prices,
1977 - The 'Balassa' method.
Sector Value-added (N,000)*
(1) (2) (3)
_
6 3111/3122 Food 155349 129355 118803
7	 3131/3133 Alcoholic bev. 111088 88752.1 80585.4
8	 3134 Non-alcoh.bev. 49710.0 36712.6 32468.1
9	 3140 Tobacco 21876.8 48793.2 20783.5
10	 3211 Textiles 238592.0 109055.0 104012.0
11	 3212 Made -up	 text. 19538.7 21033.6 18419.7
12	 3220 Apparel 3008.2 2755.1 2616.3
13	 3231/3233 Leather 10339.1 7068.7 6088.7
14	 3240 Footwear 2456.3 3618.5 3831.6
15 3311/3320 Wood 38924.3 33638.8 31396.7
16 3412/3420 Paper 162428.0 116029.0 101426.0
17 3511/3512 Chemicals 5572.9 4265.5 4944.1
18	 3521 Paints 16577.3 12963.2 8383.3
19	 3522 Drugs 20504.7 18252.9 17114.3
20	 3523 Soap 24665.7 35876.5 37758.7
21 3529/3540 Other Chem. 152775.0 109152.0 95495.8
22 3551/3560 Rubber 115936.0 87493.9 77921.5
23 3610/3699 Cement 134595.0 90498.3 77662.5
24 3710/3812 Basic Metals 48857.5 44371.0 41994.8
25 3813/3819 Fab.Metals 106148.0 81807.1 73390.0
26 3822/3829 Machinery 72740.1 55525.6 49624.9
27	 3832/3829 Elect.Machinery 18095.1 16043.2 15001.2
28 3841/3843 Transport Equip 57786.9 51268.6 4777.1
29	 3851/3909 Misc.products 5373.0 3989.9 3536.7
*Notes: coll:output and inputs adjusted for tariffs only; cols 2 and 3,
output and inputs adjusted for tariffs and plus a premium of 40%
60% respectively.
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Table 4:5a Sectoral Effective Rates of Protection,1977.
(The 'Corden' method).
(Tariff-adjusted) (Tariff + Premium-adjusted
---	 ___--- 
Sector u
1	z
	 u	 z	 u	 z
1	 2	 2	 3	 3
42.93 75.22 52.48 110.43 56.35 129.12
6 3111/3122 Food
7 3131/3133 Alcoholic bey. 35.55 55.16 48.15 94.21 53.25 113.90
8	 3134 Non-alcoh.bev. 11.52 13.01 34.65 53.03 42.21 73.03
9	 3140 Tobacco 73.49 277.29 8 69.16 74.82 297.13
10	 3211 Textiles 18.95 2 3.38 6420..985 169.93 66.67 183.02
11	 3212 Made-up text. 30.34 43.55 25.01 33.35 34.34 52.76
12	 3220 Apparel 62.62 167.55 65.77 192.13 67.49 207.62
13 3231/3233 Leather
-22.92 -18.65 15.96 18.99 27.61 38.14
14	 3240 Footwear 88.36 758.92 82.85 483.06 81.84 450.62
15 3311/3320 Wood 54.86 121.54 60.99 156.35 63.59 174.66
16 3412/3420 Paper
17 3511/3512 Chemicals
-2.84
23.27
-2.76
30.33
26.54
41.27
36.13
70.28
35.79
31.93
55.7 3
46.90
1 8	 3521 Paints
19	 3 522 Drugs
28.69
54.65
40.24
120.83
44.24
59.63
79.34
147.73
63.94
62.15
177.31
164.21
20	 3523 Soap 87.99 733.12 82.54 472.78 81.63 444.23
21 3529/3540 Other Chem.
22 3551/3560 Rubber
-0.02
18.36
-0.02
22.49
28.54
38.39
39.94
62.30
37.48
45.13
59.95
82.24
23 3610/3699 Cement
-1.22 -1.20 31.95 46.94 40.09 66.93
24 3710/3812 Basic Metals 61.09 157.02 64.67 183.01 66.56 199.03
25 3813/3819 Fab.Metals
26 3822/3829 Machinery
24.88
21.83
33.12
27.92
42.11
40.33
72.74
67.58
48.06
4 6.67
92.55
87.51
27 3832/3829 Flect.Machiner Y 52.16 109.01 57.58 135.75 60.34 152.12
28 3841/3843 Transport Equip 48.81 95.36 54.59 120.20 57.68 136.29
29 3851/3909 Misc.products 13.42 15.51 35.71 55.55 43.01 75.48
Total manufac
facturing
Average 34.26 120.74 47.42 123.79 53.69 148.35
*Notes:cols 1 & 2,output and inputs adjusted for tariffs only;
cols 3 & 4 and cols 5 & 6 output and inputs adjusted for
tariffs and 'other' distortions using a premium of 40% and
60% respectively.
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Table 4:5b Sectoral Effective Rates of Protection,1977
(The 'Balassa method).
6
(Tariff-adjusted) [ Tariff + Premium-adjusted ]
Sector U1 Z1 U2 Z2 U3 z3
3111/3122	 Food 45.07 82.06 58.55 141.24 63.71 175.5!
7 3131/3133	 Alcoholic bev. 37.95 61.16 53.90 116.93 59.64 147.7E
8 3134	 Non-alcoh.bev. 12.55 14.35 38.24 61.91 46.62
87.3:
9 3140	 Tobacco 75.86 314.21 44.88 8 1 .	 34 79.38
385.01
10 3212 	 Textiles 26.25 35.60 68.87 221.26 72.18 259.4E
11 3212	 Made-up text. 30.85 44.62 30.43 43.75 40.23 67.31
12 3220	 Apparel 65.77 192.15 71.19 247.06 73.69 280.09
13 3231/3233	 Leather -19.11 -16.05 24.53 32.51 37.77 60.69
14 3240	 Footwear 91.89 1131.48 90.77 983.69 91.23 1040.06
15 3311/3320	 Wood 58.64 141.77 66.91 202.16 70.25 236.17
16 3412/3420	 Paper 1.79 1.82 34.43 52.52 44.80 81.17
17 3511/3512	 Chemicals 28.74 40.33 50.53 102.13 44.80 81.14
18
19
3521	 Paints
3 522	 Drugs
40.83
57.11
69.01
133.16
59.01
67.74
143.96
209.98
75.90
72.09
315.01
258.31
20
21
3523	 Soap
3529/3540 Other Chem.
90.11
0.05
911.40
0.05
87.83
31.62
721.60
46.26
87.95
41.38
729.64
70.58
22 3551/3560 Rubber 20.32 25.51 45.59 83.80 54.03 117.54
23 3610/3699 Cement 1.93 1.97 3 6 .	 34 57.32 45.51 83.53
24 3710/3812 Basic Metals 62.53 166.88 68.12 213.71 70.69 241.13
25
26
3813/3819 Fab.Metals
3822/3829 Machinery
28.85
22.93
40.54
29.76
52.43
4 4.55
110.23
80.33
60.48
51.89
153.05
107.88
27 3832/3839 Elect.Machinery 54.24 118.51 6 5 .	 12 1 8 7 .	 34 69.76 230.69
28 3841/3843 Transport Equip 51.49 106.15 72.06 257.88 79.86 396.48
29 3851/3909 Misc.products 17.02 20.51 4 5 .	 94 8 3 .	 54 54.83 121.37
Total manufac
turing sector
Average 37.65 152.79 54.55 186.77 62.03 238.62
Notes: Cols 1 and 2, output and inputs adjusted for tariffs only;
Cols 3 and 4 and cols 5 and 6 output and inputs adjusted
for tariffs and 'other' distortions using a premium of 40%
and 60% respectively.
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the tariff-only-adjusted estimates but the change in relative position
of sectors is not particularly significant. (The rank order
correlation coefficients are 0.82 between Zl and Z2; 0.84 between Zl
and Z3 and 0.88 between Z2 and Z3). Thus the difference between say
columns 6 and 2 gives an indication of non-tariff induced distortions
in the economy.
The erp estimates for 1974 are displayed in Table 4:7a and 4:7b.
In arriving at these, the same procedures were followed as in the
previous section: erp's were computed initially taking into account
the effects of nominal tariffs only on the domestic price. Given that
there was considerable liberalisation of trade during this period it
was not considered necessary to make adjustment for 'other'
distortions. However for illustrative purposes we adjusted the c.i.f.
plus tariff price by a premium of 35%. To ensure comparability with
the 1977 rates, we will mainly consider the results based on the
'Corden' method in Table 4:7a.
One significant feature of the results is the high levels of
protection accorded to the manufacturing sector as a whole as well as
to the different sub-sectors. Average erp ranges between 120.74
percent (ZI) to 148.35 percent (Z3). In the first case, of the 24
sectors considered, about 29 percent have effective rates exceeding
the unweighted average (of 120.7%). These include sectors
manufacturing wearing apparel (167%), footwear (759%), basic metals
(157%) and tobacco products (277%). In the second case, 42 percent of
the sectors were accorded higher than average effective protection.
These include, in addition to those above, textiles (183%), wood/
furniture (175%) and electrical equipment (152.12%).
In Table 4:8 we provide a summary of the number and percentage
195
Table 4:6 Sectoral Value-added at domestic and border
Prices ,l974.
Value-added at:
SECTOR
domestic
prices
(
border prices
N,000
(1)	 (2) (3)
)
(4)
6 3111/3122	 Food 135155 135398 72849 131367 67429
7	 3131/3133	 Alcoholic bev. 79954 35285 28521 33736 26440
8	 3134	 Non-alcoh.bev. 8792 2876 2731 2659 2344
9	 3140	 Tobacco 44316 22535 19250 22069 18455
10	 3212
	
Textiles 90210 62425 41447 60053 35834
11	 3212
	
Made-up text. 9339 6416 3617 5964 3010
12	 3220	 Apparel 747 285 268 232 177
13	 3231/3233
	
Leather 5224 5627 4121 5502 3886
14	 3240	 Footwear 12568 2930 3073 2367 2111
15 3311/3320	 Wood 18797 7957 7161 7380 6176
16	 3412/3420	 Paper 40399 19330 16703 17376 13443
17	 3511/3512	 Chemicals 2321 1683 1348 1655 1253
18	 3521	 Paints 7167 3512 3111 3341 2526
19	 3522	 Drugs 5968 2322 2216 2162 1671
20	 3523	 Soap 45219 -17995 -9290 -18808 -12065
21	 3529/3540	 Other Chem. 5484 3095 2654 3034 2446
22	 3551/3560 Rubber 38497 33255 22227 30995 19189
23	 3610/3699 Cement 45745 40170 29508 39287 27865
24 3710/3812 Basic Metals 31214 32143 23659 31341 20923
25	 3813/3819 Fab.Metals 39739 30861 22013 33219 15166
26	 3822/3829 Machinery 1462 1175 918 1160 869
27 3832/3839 Elect.Machinery 13197 5016 4845 4787 4064
28 3841/3843 Transport Equip 21427 16083 12788 15845 11976
29	 3851/3909 Misc.products 3679 2713 2163 2678 2044
Notes: cols 1 & 3 and cols 2 & 4 are derived by adjusting
domestic output and inputs using respectively tariffs
only and tariffs plus a premium of 35%.
cols 1 and 2 (3 and 4) derived using the Corden (Ballasa)
method of treating inputs.
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Table 4:7a Sectoral Effective Rates of Protection,1974
(The 'Corden' method).
(Tariff-adjusted) (Tariff + Premillui
-adjusted)*.
Sector uz zi
6 3111/3122
	
Food -0.18 -0.18 46.09 85.53
7	 3131/3133
	
Alcoholic bev. 55.87 126.59 64.33 180.33
8	 3134	 Non-alcoh.bev. 67.29 205.74 69.14 224.03
9	 3140
	
Tobacco 49.15 99.66 56.56 130.20
10	 3212	 Textiles 28.80 40.45 54.05 117.65
113212	 Made-up text. 31.30 45.56 61.27 158.20
123220
	
Apparel 61.88 162.36 64.19 179.23
13 3231/3233
	
Leather
-7.72 -7.16 21.11 26.77
14	 3240	 Footwear 76.68 328.90 75.55 308.99
15 3311/3320
	
Wood 57.67 136.24 61.91 162.51
16	 3412/3420	 Paper 54.63 120.40 58.66 141.88
17 3511/3512
	
Chemicals 27.49 37.92 41.91 72.15
18	 3521	 Paints 51.00 140.09 56.59 130.40
19	 3522	 Drugs 61.10 157.04 62.87 169.30
20	 3523	 Soap 139.80 -351.29 120.54 -586.78
21 3529/3540 Other Chem. 43.57 77.20 51.60 106.62
22 3551/3560 Rubber 13.62 15.76 42.26 73.20
23	 3610/3699 Cement 12.19 13.88 35.50 55.03
24 3710/3812 Basic Metals
-2.98 -2.89 24.20 31.93
25	 3813/3819 Pab.Metals 9.99 11.10 53.89 116.87
26 3822/3829 Machinery 19.67 24.48 37.24 59.34
27	 3832/3839 Elect.Machinery 61.99 163.13 63.29 172.38
28 3841/3843 Transport Equip 24.92 33.23 40.31 67.56
29 3851/3909 Misc.products 26.27 35.62 41.21 70.11
Total manufac
turing sector
Average	 40.17
	 65.62	 54.35
	
93.89
*Notes: cols 1 and 2 ,output and inputs adjusted for tariffs
only;cols 3 and 4 ,output and inputs adjusted for other
distortions using a premium rate of 35%.
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Table 4:7b Sectora1 Effective Rates of Protection,1974
(The 'Balassa' method).
(Tariff-adjusted) (Tariff + Premium-adjusted)*
Sector
1 1 Z2
6 3111/3122 Food 28.03 2.88 50.11 100.44
7 3131/3133 Alcoholic bev. 57.81 136.99 66.93 202.40
8 3134 Non-alcoh.bev. 69.76 230.64 73.34 275.12
9 3140 Tobacco 50.20 100.81 58.36 140.13
10 3211 Textiles 33.43 50.22 60.28 151.75
11 3212 Made-up text. 36.14 56.59 67.77 210.31
12 3220 Apparel 68.99 222.48 76.32 322.20
13 3231/3233 Leather
-5.32 -5.05 25.61 34.42
14 3240 Footwear 81.17 431.02 83.20 493.31
15 3311/3320 Wood 60.74 154.72 67.15 204.37
16 3412/3420 Paper 56.99 132.51 66.72 200.52
17 3511/3512 Chemicals 28.69 40.24 46.01 85.23
18 3521 Paints 53.39 114.56 64.77 183.75
19 3522 Drugs 63.77 176.04 72.01 257.23
20 3523 Soap 141.59 -340.43 126.68 -474.81
21 3529/3540 Other Chem. 44.68 80.76 55.40 124.19
22 3551/3560 Rubber 19.49 24.20 50.16 100.62
23 3610/3699 Cement 14.12 16.44 39.09 64.17
24 3710/3812 Basic Metals
-0.41 -0.41 32.97 49.19
25 3813/3819 Fab.Metals 16.41 19.63 61.84 162.02
26 3822/3829 Machinery 20.65 26.03 40.59 68.32
27 3832/3829 Elect.Machinery 63.73 175.72 69.21 224.77
28 3841/3843 Transport Equip 26.05 35.23 44.11 78.92
29 3851/3909 Misc.products 27.22 37.39 44.46 80.04
Total manufac
turing sector
Average 43.00 79.97 60.13 139.19
Notes: Cols I and 2, output and inputs adjusted for tariffs only;
Cols 3 and 4, output and inputs adjusted for tariffs and
other distortions using a premium rate of 35%.
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of sectors within particular ranges of erp. Thus, if only the tariff
adjusted erp's are considered, we find a significant number (14 = 58%)
with erp equal to or less than 50%; 3 (13%) within the range 51 -
100%; 4 (17%) within 101 - 200% range and the rest with erp's above
200%. Considering Z3 however, only about 8% of the industries have a
rate of effective protection below 50%; 38% have rates between
50-100%; 41% have their erp's within the rage 101-200% while the rest
have rates above 200%.
More striking than the level of protection is perhaps the high
degree of variations in relative erp's between the different sectors.
The values of Zl range between -18.65% (leather products) to 758.92%
(footwear industry) and those of Z3 from 38% to 451% for the same
sectors respectively. The high degree of variance is also to be
expected within the broad sectoral groupings as presented above. This
can be illustrated using a few sectors for which a more disaggregated
information is available. Within the wood products sector, for
example, the furniture-making sub-sector received an effective rate of
protection amounting to 995.97 percent as against 58.58 percent for
other wood products. In the building materials sector (cement,
concrete products, glass, etc) the cement sub-sector was accorded
negative protection while the glass sub-sector received very high
effective protection. Similarly for the machinery sector. Thus a
high level of aggregation will conceal the degree of protection or
disprotection accorded to firms.
Sector
Wood products
Tariff	 Adjusted for	 Adjusted for
adjusted	 tariff + 40%	 tariff + 60%
premium	 premium
U1 	 Z1	 UL	 Z %	U3	 Z3
Furniture 90.88 995.97 84.59 548.99 83.27 497.70
'Other wood' 36.94 58.58 48.57 98.28 54.49 119.75
Cement & Glass
Products
Cement -3.03 -2.94 27.01 36.99 36.29 56.98
Glass 60.89 115.69 63.45 173.58 65.26 187.83
Machinery
Agricultural -15.14 -13.15 20.65 26.03 31.39 45.77
Industrial 10.31 11.50 33.98 51.47 41.69 71.48
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Table 4:9 Effective Rates of Protection Within Selected Industries
The bias of the tariff structure to import substitution is
clearly greatest for consumer goods industries, less for capital goods
and least for intermediate goods producing sectors. For the consumer
goods producing sectors, the estimates of erp range between 52.76
percent (made-up textiles) to 450.6 percent (footwear); between 87.5
percent (machinery) to 152 percent (electrical equipment) for the
capital goods sector and for the intermediates between 46 percent
(Industrial chemicals) to 199 percent (basic metals). The unweighted
averages for the three broad categories of sectors are summarised in
Table 4:10. It should be realised that the classification of sectors
which we have had to adopt because of the lack of more detailed
information has resulted in lumping together sectors which are
somewhat different in the sense of having very different types of
goods	 finished,
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Table 4:10 Average Effective Rates of Protection by three
broad categories of sectors.
Sectors
measure
	
consumer
goods
manufacturing:
intermidiate
goods
capital
goods
Corden method
1977	 Z
1
	188.08 27.54 77.43
Z 2
	
162.85 66.29 107.84
z 3	 195.62 80.18 125.31
1974	 Z	 83.681 33.27 73.61
Z 2
	
102.28 78.05 99.76
Balassa method
1977	 Z	 242.421 32.64 84.81
z 2	 250.65 87.31 175.21
Z 
3	
315.62 111.11 242.02
Net effective rates
Corden method
NZ 1	121.60 -1.89 36.49
NZ 2	 102.19 27.91 59.88
NZ
3
	127.37 38.60 73.31
Balassa method
NZ 1	 111.31 57.34 161.37
NZ 2	 57.34 6.33 -2.51
NZ 3	 161.37 49.13 99.13
source:computed from tables 4:5a,4:5b,4:11,4:12,4:7a and 4:7b.
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semi-finished, as well as raw materials - and which received very
different levels of nominal protection on inputs and outputs. this is
especially true of sectors such as basic metals, rubber and plastics,
leather and wood products, which include bother intermediates and
consumer non-durables and electrical and transport equipment sectors
which include both capital and consumer durable goods. It will thus
appear that the averages shown for the consumer goods sectors may have
been grossly under-estimated while those for intermediate and capital
goods sectors may have been over-estimated. Even then the trend is
unmistakable. Majority of the sectors with an above average erp
belong to the consumer goods category.
Another noticeable feature of the structure of protection is the
bias against those sectors in which, one would have thought, the
country would have a comparative advantage. These include domestic
IL put-usingsectors like petroleum and coal, cement, leather, and
rubber and plastics, which apart from the latter received either
negative (Z1) or very low positive (Z3) effective protection. In
contrast, a few of the more highly protected sectors - drugs and
medicines, soap and perfumery, basic metals, electrical machinery and
transport equipment - appear to be those that are imported-input
intensive. This would seem to be contrary to the government's
priorities and objectives of, among other things, saving foreign
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exchange, as well as the diversification of the industrial base to
include the production of intermediate capital goods.
The estimates of net effective rates of protection shown in
Tables 4:11 and 4:12 are derived under the assumption of an exchange
rate over-valuation of 30 per cent in 1977 (i.e.
	
= 1/SCF
1/0.769). As the tables reveal, the effect of the exchange rate
adjustment is to lower the level of protection offered to different
industries. We see, for example, that the mean nerp amounts to 69.8
and 91.02 per cent respectively for NZ1 a n8/423. downward
adjustment is further reflected in the increasing number of
disprotected industries: from 4 in the case of Zl to 9 in the case of
NZ] . But in general, the main features of the tariff structure remain
basically the same as in the previous case of no exchange rate
adjustment. In particular, (a) the degree of variation in relative
erp's between sectors is still fairly high; the range of effective
protection in the 24 sectors becomes -37.42 per cent (leather
products) to 560.7 per cent (footwear) in column 2 of Table 4:11 or
6.265 per cent to 324 per cent respectively for the same sectors in
column 6; (b) the bias of the tariff structure is in favour of
consumer goods producing sectors and against intermediate goods
producing industries which are also domestic raw material based. It
can be seen that all the negatively protected sectors with the
exception of non-alcoholic beverages and textiles fall within the
latter category.
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Table 4:11 Net Effective Rates Of Protection(1977)
(The 'Corden' method)
*-
(Tariff-adjusted) (Tariff + Premium-adjusted
Sector
NU NZ
1
NU
21
NZ2 NU 3 NZ 3
6 3111/3122 Food 25.81 34.78 38.22 61.87 43.26 76.24
7 3131/3133 Alcoholic be y 16.22 19.35 33.06 49.39 39.22 64.54
8	 3134 Non-alcoh.bev -15.03 -13.07 15.05 17.71 24.87 33.09
9	 3140 Tobacco 65.54 190.22 23.15 30.12 67.27 205.49
10	 3211 Textiles -5.37 -5.09 51.84 107.64 54.07 117.71
11	 3212 1ade-up
	 text. 9.44 10.43 2.51 2.58 14.63 17.14
12	 3220 Apparel 51.41 105.80 55.49 124.72 57.74 136.63
13 3231/3233 Leather -59.80 -37.42 -9.25 -8.47 5.89 6.26
14	 3240 Footwear 84.86 560.71 77.70 348.50 76.39 323.56
15 3311/3320 Wood 41.32 70.42 49.29 97.19 52.67 111.28
16 3412/3420 Paper -33.69 -25.19 4.50 4.71 16.52 19.79
17 3511/3512 Chemicals 0.25 0.25 23.65 30.98 11.51 13.00
18	 3521 Paints 7.30 7.88 27.51 37.95 53.12 113.32
19	 3522 Drugs 41.05 69.63 47.52 90.56 50.80 103.20
20	 3523 Soap 84.39 540.89 77.30 340.60 76.11 318.64
21 3529/3540 Other Chem. -30.03 -23.09 7.10 7.64 18.72 23.03
22 3551/3560 Rubber -6.13 -5.78 19.90 24.85 28.67 40.19
23 3610/3699 Cement -31.58 -24.00 11.53 13.03 22.12 28.41
24 3710/3812 Basic Metals 49.12 97.71 54.07 117.70 56.52 130.02
25 3813/3819 Fab.Metals 2.35 2.40 24.74 32.87 34.48 48.11
26 3822/3829 Machinery -1.63 -1.60 22.43 28.91 30.67 44.24
27 3832/3829 Elect.Machinery 37.80 60.78 44.86 81.34 48.44 93.94
28 3841/3843 Transport Equip 33.46 50.28 40.96 69.38 44.98 81.76
29 3851/3909 Misc.products -12.55 -11.15 16.42 19.65 25.92 34.99
Total manufac
turing sector
Average 14.77 69.80 31.69 72.14 39.77 91.02
*Notes: Cols 1 and 2, output and inputs adjusted for tariffs only;
Cols 3 and 4 and cols 5 and 6 output and inputs adjusted
for tariffs and 'other' distortions using a premium of 40%
and 60% respectively.
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Table 4:12 Sectoral Net Effective Rates of Protection,1977
(The 'Balassa' method).
(Tariff-adjusted) (Tariff + Premium-adjusted)*.
Sector
NU 1 NZ 1 NU NZ 2 NU3 NZ 3
6
7
3111/3122	 Foodl3131/3133	 Acoholic bev.
23.42
15.02
30.58
17.68
13.50
26.39
15.62
35.86
47.64
43.22
90.99
76.11
8 3134	 Non-alcoh.bev. -16.81 -14.44 7 .18 7.73 27.41 37.77
9 3140	 Tobacco 65.78 192.24 17.92 21.83 90.36 237.40
10 3212	 Textiles -1.60 -1.57 31.67 46.34 58.11 138.73
11 3212	 Made-up text. 6.89 7.40 -7.28 -6.78 19.08 23.58
12
13
3220
	
Apparel
3231/3233	 Leather
51.63
-61.70
106.72
-38.16
40.55
-49.36
68.21
-33.05
61.92
12.24
162.61
13.96
14 3240	 Footwear 83.10 491.89 67.93 211.82 82.26 463.65
15 3311/3320	 Wood 42.22 73.07 37.68 60.46 57.32 134.30
16 3412/3420
	
Paper
-33.29 -24.98 -4.81 -4.59 22.62 29.24
17 m3511/3512	 Che icals 0.80 0.80 7.44 8.04 21.67 27.67
18 3521	 Paints 15.04 17.71 28.79 40.43 60.64 154.05
19 3522	 Drugs 37.09 58.96 34.63 52.98 56.57 130.23
20 3523	 Soap 82.78 480.66 66.08 194.81 79.96 399.06
21 3529/3540	 Other Chem.
-32.26 -24.39 -15.80 -13.65 20.85 26.33
22 3551/3560 Rubber
-10.07 -9.15 9.51 10.51 33.75 50.95
23 3610/3699 Cement
-31.28 -23.83 3.32 3.43 25.37 34.00
24 3710/3812 Basic Metals 48.46 94.03 46.21 85.92 59.07 144.29
25 3813/3819 Fab.Metals
-1.12 1.11 6.30 -5.93 39.99 66.67
26 3822/3829 Machinery
-4.01 -3.86 12.71 14.57 33.64 50.69
27 3832/3839 Elect.Machinery 33.64 50.69 15.55 18.42 53.82 116.56
28 3841/3843 Transport Equip 20.05 25.08 -68.13 -40.52 56.92 132.15
29 3851/3909 Miec.products -16.14 -13.90 -4.11 -3.94 33.01 49.27
Total manufac
turing sector
Average 13.23 62.26 13.49 32.85 44.89 116.26
Notes: Cols 1 and 2, output and inputs adjusted for tariffs only;
Cols 3 and 4 and cols 5 and 6 output and inputs adjusted
for tariffs and 'other' distortions using a premium of 40%
and 60% respectively.
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Changes in the level of protection: 1974 - 1977 
The erp estimates for 1974 show similar characteristics as those
for 1977: the results are also characterised by considerable
variations in rates of protection between sectors, with the highest
rate recorded for the footwear industry (309%), closely followed by
the nonalcoholic beverages industry (224%), while the lowest (-586%)
was recorded for the soap and perfumery sector.
Nine of the 12 sectors with above average effective rates of
protection belong to the consumer goods category: these include
alcoholic beverages (180%), non-alcoholic beverages (224%), tobacco
(130%), textiles 118%), made-up textiles (158%), wearing apparel
(179%), footwear (309%), paints (130%), and drugs and medicines
(169%).
There are a few sectors whose relative position of protection
has changed between the two periods. For example, sectors
manufcturing alcoholic beverages, non-alcoholic beverages, textiles,
made-up textiles, paper and printing, and electrical equipment had
more than overall average erp in 1974, but became less protected than
overall average in 1977; while basic metals, fabricated metals, soap
and perfumery sectors had less than average erp in 1974 but became
more protected than the national average in 1977.
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Despite the considerable switch over and fluctuations in rates
between the two periods, the change in the structure of protection
towards higher erp for sectors is clearly evident. For example, the
percentage of those industries with erp less than 50 per cent dropped
from 62 per cent in 1974 to about 50 per cent in 1977. The proportion
of sectors within the range of protection 51 - 100 per cent doubled to
18 per cent in 1977 from 9 per cent in 1974. Finally 9 per cent of
the sectors had erp greater than or equal to 200 per cent in 1974
compared with 15 per cent in 1977.
The consumer goods producing sectors as a group received an
average erp of 102.28 per cent in 1974 compared with an average of
195.6 per cent in 1977; the average for intermediate and capital goods
producing sectors are, 1974, 78.05 per cent and 99.76 per cent
compared with 80.18 per cent and 125.31 per cent respectively in 1977.
A similar conclusion emerges if the erp's for earlier years are
considered vis-a-vis the more recent estimates. In table 4"13 we show
the average rate of protection accorded to the manufacturing sector as
well as to the consumer intermediate and capital goods producing
sectors from 1957 to 1977. Thus, effective rate of protection
increased from slightly above 40 per cent in 1957 to about 150 per
cent in 1977: an increase of about 255 per cent. It can be seen also
that since 1957, the structure of erp has barely changed.
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Table 4:13
Average Effective Protection in Nigeria. 1957 - 1977
Total
Manufacturing
Consumer
goods
Intermediate
goods
Capital
goods
Year Average Change Average Change Average change Average Change
1957 41.74 69.58 35.02 6.73
1962 43.68 1.94 72.49 2.91 25.55 -9.47 18.60 11.87
1965 147.0 103.32 181.00 108.51 76.00 50.45 --
1967 97.57 -49.43 120.61 -60.39 91.15 15.15 69.42 50.82
1970 299.0 201.43 315.00 194.39 85.00 -6.15
1974 93.89 -205.11 102.28 -212.7 78.05 -6.9 99.76 30.34
65.62* -233.4 83.67 -231.3 33.27 -51.7 732.61 4.19
1977 148.35 54.5 195.62 93.34 80.18 2.13 125.31 25.55
120.74* 55.12 188.08 104.40 27.54 -5.73 77.43 3.82
*Nominal tariff-adjusted only.
SOURCE: Figures for 1957, 1962 and 1967 from Oyejide, T.A.. (1975)  op
cit, pp67-59; figures for 1965 and 1970 from Oyelabi, J.A. (1979),
p30; and figures for 1974 and 1977 from table 4:10 of this chapter.
Available evidence	 • indicates that in comparison to many
other LDCs, the Nigerian manufacturing sector is highly protected. In
table 4:14 we present estimates of average erp for a number of
countries. Admittedly these are not easily comparable given that they
were obtained for different time periods. Around the year 1962,
Nigeria ranks above Mexico (27%) but well below dhile (182%) and India
(313%). Around 1967, Nigeria ranks above Argentina (89%),Brazil (76%).
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Table 4:14
Average Effective Rate of Protection in Selected LDICt
Country	 Year	 Average Effective Rate of Protection
Argentina
	
1958
	
162
1969
	
89
1977
	
39
Brazil	 1966
	
181
1967
	
76
1973
	
47
Chile
	 1961
	
182
Columbia
	 1969
	
29
India
	 1961
	
313
Kenya
	 1968
	
48
Malaysia	 1965	
-6
Mexico	 1960	 27
Pakistan	 1964	 271
Phillipines
	 1965	 51
1974	 125
Rep. of Korea	 1968	
-1
Taiwan
	 1965	 33
Thailand	 1969	 50
1971	 40
Nigeria	 1962	 44
1965	 147
1967	 98
1970
	
299
1974	 93
1977
	
148
SOURCE: Balassa et al. (1971), p54; Little, I. et al. (1970), p174;
Oyejide, T.A. (1975), p60; Oyelabi, J.A. (1979), p30; Tyler,
W.G. (1976), Manufactured Export Expansion and Industrialisa-
tion in Brazil, Tubingen, J.G.B. Mohr.
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Kenya (48%), Malaysia (-6%), Phillipines (51%), Korea (-1%), Taiwan
(33%) and Thailand and in 1977, Nigeria ranks below Brazil (39%). It
is to be noted also that while the average erp in Brazil and Argentina
has been declining that in Nigeria has substantially increased over
the years.
It should be pointed out in conclusion that the 'height
dispersal and 'cascading' of these tariffs over the years may (or may
not be viewed as alarming by the policy makers, since their
application is not seen as an end in itself, but as a means towards
achieving stated developing objectives. Thus the benefits and costs
of maintaining such effective tariffs can only be appropriately judged
in terms of the policy goals. To this, we shall now turn.
4:4 Effective Protection,_ import Substitution and Sectoral Growth
,Rates
One of the desired effects of the protectionist policy in many
LDCs is the expansion of domestic manufacturing production at a rate
that would not have been possible in a 'free trade' situation. The
general presumption that industrial growth and trade policies are
closely interrelated is widespread not only among policy makers in
LDCs but among economists as well. The objective of this section is
to examine, briefly, the progress being made in import substitution
and relate this to the country's trade policy.
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4.4.1 The scope and extent of import substitution in Nigeria
It was shown in chapter 3 that although the manufacturing sector
is relatively small in terms of its contribution to national output,
many of the industries have enjoyed a remarkably rapid rate of growth
between 1963 and 1978. This rapid growth in output coupled with the
reduction in level of certain categories of imports for some sectors
indicate some progress being made in import substitution.
The broad scope and extent of import substitution in the country
is shown in tables 4:15 and 4:16. As measures of import substitution
we use the ratio of imports to total supply (MTS) shown for the year
1962, 1971/72, 1973/73, 1974 and 1977 in table 4:15, as well as the
ratio of imports to domestic production (MDP) for the same years shown
in table 4:16. The lower ratios are, the more the progress made in
import-substitution. In these tables we also show the base year
(1962) ratios relative to those of 1973/1975, 1974 and 1977. A high
ratio indicates much import substitution; a low ratio indicates less.
If these are accepted as measures of import substitution, then the
only general statement one can make is that the process of
substitution is still in its infancy and there is considerable scope
for further substitution even in the earlier established consumer
goods producing sectors.
The average MTS ratio ranges from 0.632 in 1962 to 0.540 in
1973/5, 0.456 in 1974 and 0.535 in 1977. In the latter year slightly
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Table 4:15 The Scope of Import Substitution in Nigeria:
Imports as a proportion of total supply,by
sector (1962 - 1977).
Sector
1962 1971/72 1973/75 1974 1977
6 3111/3122 Food 0.693 0.351 0.493 0.351 0.577
7	 3131/3133 Alcoholic bev. 0.484 0.330 0.125 0.065 0.288
8	 3134 Non-alcoh.bev. 0.312 0.010 0.437 0.016 0.390
9	 3140 Tobacco 0.203 0.020 0.000 0.022 0.018
10	 3211 Textiles 0.896 0.390 0.369 0.368 0.258
11	 3212 Made-up text. 0.250 0.500 0.256 0.379
12	 3220 Apparel 0.841 0.640 0.889 0.893 0.886
13	 3231/3233 Leather 0.029 0.360 0.333 0.212 0.539
14	 3240 Footwear 0.844 0.240 0.250 0.137 0.448
15 3311/3320 Wood 0.124
-0.310 0.220 0.135 0.247
16 3412/3420 Paper 0.770 0.310 0.604 0.437 0.460
17 3511/3512 Chemicals 0.979 0.860 0.892 0.955 0.933
18	 3521 Paints 0.471 0.350 0.583 0.514 0.521
19	 3522 Drugs 0.850 0.838 0.772 0.648
20	 3523 Soap 0.551 0.090 0.161 0.089 0.151
21 3529/3540 Other Chem. 0.930 0.250 0.659 0.804 0.341
22 3551/3560 Rubber 0.578 0.315 0.476 0.411 0.488
23 3610/3699 Cement 0.647 0.554 0.686 0.473 0.633
24 3710/3812 Basic Metals
-2.660 0.568 0.273 0.531
25 3813/3819 Fab.Metals 0.130 0.284 0.267 0.656
26 3822/3829 Machinery 0.993 0.925 0.959 0.991 0.908
27 3832/3829 Elect.Machinery 0.998 0.840 0.933 0.772 0.899
28 3841/3843 Transport Equip 0.658 0.990 0.911 0.828 0.703
29	 3851/3909 Misc.products 0.940 0.825 0.903 0.954
Sources: 1962 figures from Oyejide,T,A,(1975),op cit,pP 16;
1971/72 from Federal Republic of Nigeria(1975),The
Third Plan 1975-1980,op cit,p357 1973/75 figures
from Federal Republic of Nigeria (1981),The Fourth
Plan 1981-1985,op cit,P177;1974 and 1977,computed
from FOS,Industrial Surveys and Trade Summary.
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Table 4:16 The Scope of Import Substitution in Nigeria:
Imports as a proportion of domestic production,
(1962-1977).
Sector
1963 1971/72 1973/75 1974 1977
6 3111/3122 Food 2.259 0.194 0.382 0.540 1.362
7 3131/3133 Alcoholic	 bev. 0.937 0.108 0.105 0.069 0.406
8 3134 Non-alcoh.bev. 0.454 0.157 0.268 0.016 0.638
9 3140 Tobacco 0.255 0.016 0.000 0.022 0.018
10 3211 Textiles 8.145 0.319 0.250 0.583 0.347
11 3212 Made-up	 text. 0.499 0.375 0.344 0.609
12 3220 Apparel 5.197 0.399 7.616 8.357 7.729
13 3231/3233 Leather 0.030 0.285 0.205 0.269 1.169
14 3240 Footwear 5.406 0.042 0.182 0.158 0.810
15 3311/3320 Wood 0.142 0.072 0.156 0.775 0.852
16 3412/3420 Paper 3.342 0.243 0.782 0.775 0.852
17 3511/3512 Chemicals 49.132 0.199 1.162 21.153 13.882
18 3521 Paints 0.892 0.129 0.789 1.057 1.089
19 3522 Drugs 0.205 2.868 3.038 1.837
20 3523 Soap 1.226 0.019 0.069 0.097 0.178
21 3529/3540 Other Chem. 13.278 0.354 0.957 4.094 0.516
22 3551/3560 Rubber 1.198 0.114 0.504 0.697 0.951
23 3610/3699 Cement 1.830 0.142 1.250 0.897 1.725
24 3710/3812 Basic Metals
---- 0.040 0.626 0.376 1.129
25 3813/3819 Fab.Metals 0.418 0.158 0.363 1.905
26 3822/3829 Machinery 136.981 0.552 24.950 111.316 9.818
27 3832/3829 Elect.Machinery 617.053 0.220 3.673 3.376 8.853
28 3841/3843 Transport Equip 1.925 0.261 4.289 4.816 2.367
29 3851/3909 Misc.products 0.334 1.625 9.306 20.829
Sources: 1963:0yejide,T.A(1975)op cit,p16;1971/72 and 1973/75:Federal
Republic of Nigeria,Third Plan,p357 and Fourth plan,p177;
1974 and 1977:calculated from data in FOS,Industrial Survey 
(1975/78) and  Nigeria Trade Summary  (1974 and 1977).
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Table 4:16 contd. (The scope of Import Substitution)
Sector
1963 ratio of imports to domestic production
relative to the ratio
	
in
1973/75
	 1974	 1977
6 3111/3122
	
Food 5.911 1.976 1.658
l7 3131/3133
	
A coholic bev. 8 .924 7.486 2.317
8	 3134	 Non-alcoh.bev. 1.693 19.682 0.711
9	 3140	 Tobacco
10	 3212	 Textiles
%
32.582
9.320
2.433
14.173
23.472
2	 3220	
Made-up text.
1 	
3212
Apparel
13	 3231/3233
	
Leather
14	 3240	 Footwear
1.331*
0.682
0.144
29.702
3.905*
0.941
0 .135
6.186
0.919*
0.672
0.025
6.677
15 3311/3320
	
Wood 0.909 0.920 0.422
16	 3412/3420	 Paper
17	 3511/3512
	
Chemicals
4.272
42.282
1.764
1.026
3.92 4
3.53 9
18	 3 521	 Paints 1.130 0.917 0.819
19	 3522	 Drugs 0.072* 1.296* 0.112*
203523	 Soap 17.761 6.203 0.688
21	 3529/3540	 Other chem. 13.875 1.157 25.726
22	 3551/3560 Rubber 2 .3	 77 1.407 1.260
23 3610/3699 Cement 1.243 1.368 1.061
24	 3710/3812 Basic Metals 0.064* 3.662* 0.035*
25	 3813/3819 Fab.Metals 2.656* 3.753* 0.219*
26 3822/3829 Machinery 5.490 1.002 13.952
27 3832/3839 Elect.Machinery 167.997 1.294 69.703
28 3841/3843 Transport Equip 0.449 0.795 0.813
29 3851/3909 Misc.products 0 .206* 1.108* 0.016*
* the ratio for 1971/72 relative to that of the years shown.
source:computed from table 4:16
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more than half of the 24 sectors considered had their MTS ratios
within the range 51 - 100 per cent. As is to be expected, most of
these are in the intermediate and capital producing sectors as well.
This is however not to deny that progress -- substantial in some cases
-- has been made. For exmaple the MTS ratio has been reduced to less
than 25 per cent by 1873/75 in 8 (=33%) of the sectors. This is
fairly significant because by 1962 only 3 (9%) of the sectors had
achieved a similar ratio. Within the range 26-50 per cent there five•
sectors in 1962. This number was more than doubled by 1974. Import
substitution was virtually complete in the tobacco industry and a lot
has been achieved in sectors manufacturing alcoholic beverages, non
alcoholic beverages, wood and furniture products and soap and
perfumery.
The tremendous growth in manufacturing output and the
achievement in import substitution are, however, confined to the
domestic market only. Manufactured exports, very small to begin with,
have virtually stagnated. In table 4:17 we show the trend in the
value of Nigeria's manufactured exports for the years 1964 to 1978.
The ratios of manufactured exports to gross output by sector are shown
in Table 4:18. Table 4:17 shows that Nigeria's manufactured exports
constituted only 7.1 per cent of total exports in 1964. The ratio
fluctuated then increased by less than 1 per cent in 1969, 2 per cent
in 1972 and to less than 1 per cent from 1974 to 1978.
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Table 4:18 Ratio of Manufactured Exports to Gross output in Nigerian
Manufacturing Sectors (1974&1977)
Sector 1974
(	 1)
1977
(	 2)
difference
(2-1)
6 3111/3122
	
Food
7	 3131/3133	 Alcoholic bey. *
8 	 3 1 3 4	Non-alcoh.bev.
9	 3140	 Tobacco
__
*
---
10	 3212	 Textiles 0.0035 * -0.0035
11	 3212 
	
Made-up text. * * ----
1 2	 3220
	
Apparel
13	 3231/3233
	
Leather
14	 3240	 Footwear
0.0012
0.4815
*
0.0017
0.3279
0.0001
0.0005
-0.1536
0.0001
15 3311/3320	 Wood 0.0767 * -0.0767
16	 3412/3420	 Paper 0.0012 0.0004 -0.0008
17 3511/3512	 Chemicals 0.1944 0.0795 -0.1149
18	 3521	 Paints 0.0002 0.0012 0.0009
19	 3522	 Drugs 0.0131 0.0017 -0.0113
20	 3523	 Soap 0.0021 0.0010 -0.0012
21 3529/3540 Other Chem. 0.1032 0.0739 -0.0293
22 3551/3560 Rubber 0.0009 * -0.0009
23 3610/3699 Cement 0.0021. * -0.0021
24 3710/3812 Basic Metals 0.12673 4.041_6 -Z.0849
25	 3813/3819 Fab.Metals
26 3822/3829 Machinery
-- ----
27 3832/3839 Blect.Machinery 0.0085 0.0085
28 3841/3843 Transport Equip
-- ---
29	 3851/3909 Misc.products 0.0017 0.0092 0.0075
Notes:
	 implies no exports for that sector
* implies a negligible ratio
} these figures are for both 3710/3812 and
3813/3819.
Source: Computed from FOS,Nigeria Trade Summary,1974&1977,
and FOS,Industrial Surveys 1974 and 1975-78. 
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We can also observe two general trends. On the one hand, it can
be seen that chemicals (SITC5) has had a fairly consistent, though
unsystematic upward trend. The sharp drops in 1968, 1976 and 1978 are
the exceptions. On the other hand, basic manufactures have, over the
years, exhibited considerable short-term fluctuations but with a
noticeable downward trend, especially toward the end of the 1960's.
Overall, the picture which emerges from the table is the fact that
manufactured exports since 1970 have not only declined steadily as a
share of total exports hut have also shown a downward trend in
absolute terms. That the growth in exports has been rather
disappointing is further confirmed in table 4:18. Of the total number
of sectors, less than 5 exported up to 5 per cent of their output in
1977. The share of exports in output has increased only in 3 of the
24 sectors between 1974 and 1977. It is thus fairly obvious that the
rapid growth in manufacturing output has been exclusively for the
protected domestic market.
4.4.2 Correlation Analysis
The simple hypothesis to be tested derives from the discussion
in the previous sections. A protectionist policy is expected on the
one hand, to promote the expansion of positively protected sectors and
on the other, to discourage the growth of activities with negative
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erp's -- including those with export potentials. The higher, there-
fore the rate of effective protection accorded to sectors, the more
rapidly are imports substituted (i.e. the lower are the i-MpO rt ratios)
and the higher is the sector's rate of output growth and the lower is
its export growth. Simple parametric as well as non-parametric tests
of association are employed to test the hypothesis.
Before presenting the details of the analysis we would like to
briefly mention a few of the difficulties involved in establishing any
firm relationship between erp and import substitution on one hand and
between the former and the rate of output growth on the other.
First, as was previously noted at the beginning of the chapter,
the partial equilibrium resources pull and push implication of the erp
has been questioned on both theoretical and empirical grounds. There
may be some problems in determining accurately the direction of
resource flows where many goods/sectors are involved.
The second problem has to do with timing. During which period
do the effects of trade policy on resource allocation and/or growth
become operative? Do tariffs have instantaneous effects on the
allocation of resources? Do producers take a long or short time to
adjust production levels? An instantaneous adjustment may be highly
unlikely though not inconceivable in an environment with forward
looking investors or where investors fully anticipate changes in the
tariff levels. Given that tariff changes are often sudden and
unanticipated it may be more reasonable to allow for a short or long
period of adjustment. Assuming that it is a short run phenomenon,
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then sectoral production levels will adjust themselves a short while
after changes in the rates of effective protection. Thus ) the effects
of protection in growth can be discerned by simply comparing the rates
of growth of output per sector with changes in the level of protection
between any two time periods. However, it is also very likely that
the impact of commercial policy only reveals itself in the long-run,
in which case it will be desirable to relate erp's with the sectoral
growth rates during a more or less ample period. However, it may be
impossible for one to determine exactly the adjustment rates for all
industries in the economy. That is, different industries are tom& to
differ considerably in their adjustment rates: some may be able to
adjust in the short-run while others may take years to do so. It is
thus possible to obtain different sets of results depending on the
assumptions employed regarding the timing of the effects.
Third, the ratio of imports to total supply and the rate of
output growth probably reflect the cumulative effects of several
different types of complex, mutually interchanging factors --
technological, social, economic -- which cannot be captured by the erp
measure.
Thus there may not appear to be any general pattern to the way
in which protection of the individual sectors is related to, either
import substitution, export development or output growth. There are,
of course, quite outstanding cases as will be shown shortly, but it
seems that each case has to be considered separately. The statistical
results have therefore to be supplemented with fairly general
comments.
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The total number of industries considered is 24, each having a
single observation from each of the relevant variables viz effective
rates of protection (1974 and 1977), incremental erps (1974-1977), the
rate of output growth (1975-1978), absolute as well as incremental
import ratios (1974-1977) and absolute as well as incremental sectoral
gross output. Each of the variables is then paired with erp's and
divided into above average (or 'high') and below average (or 'low')
categories. 2 x 2 contingency tables are then constructed for the
tests. The statistics computed include Spearman's rank and Pearson
correlation coefficients, as well as Chi-square and Fisher's Exact
test. For purposes of the tests, 3 methods based on 3 different
assumptions, are employed.
It is first of all assumed that no adjustment period is
necessary; rates of effective protection by sector at time t are then
correlated with the sectoral characteristics as of that year. That
is, for example, net effective rates of protection for 1977 are
correlated with the ratios of import to total supply for the same
year. This will be referred to as Method 1. In Method 2 it is deemed
more meaningful to compare the level of protection accorded to sectors
at any particular time t with achieved Import substitution at a later
date (i.e. at time t + s, where s is any number of years for which
data is available). This method incorporates the assumption that the
influence of protection will be more exerted at a later date, without
specifying the length of the adjustment period and assuming that all
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entrepreneurs adjust at the same rate. The effective rates of
protection for say 1974 are then correlated with 1977 ratios of
imports to total supply, ratios of imports to domestic production, the
incremental ratios of imports to total supply (1974-1977) and the rate
of growth of gross output (1975-1978). Finally, in Method 3 the rate
of output growth as well as the incremental import ratios are
simultaneously introduced into the analysis with the latter being used
as a control variable and the former being correlated with the
effective rates of protection.
Results 
(i) Method 1:
The results obtained by applying Method 1 are summarised in
contingency tables 4:19 and 4:20. In table 4:19, we see that of the
14 industries with below average ratio of imports to total
supply, 9 (or 65%) had above average erp and of the remaining ten
industries with above average import/total supply ratios, 50 per cent
had a below average erp. Similarly, in 1977, 70 per cent of the
'highly' protected sectors that achieved low import/total supply
ratios, received below average protection. In both years, therefore,
there are more sectors with 'high' erps which achieved low
import/total supply ratios, than there are sectors with high erp but
which still had high import/total supply ratios. The association
between the variables remains however weak because, as can be seen,
the proportion of those sectors which conformed to the hypothesis
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(high erp, low import ratios and low erp, high import ratios) is only
slightly higher than that of sectors which did not. In 1974, the
negative Pearson's coefficient of correlation is significant only at
25 per cent level. In 1977, however, although the x 2 is extremely
small, both the rank correlation and Pearson's coefficients are
statistically significant at the 10 per cent level. No significant
relationship can be deduced between erp and the ratio of imports to
domestic production in either 1974 or in 1977.
(ii) Method 2:
The assumption of a future adjustment rate incorporated in
Method 2 does not seem to significantly alter the previous results.
But it provides some interesting insight into the analysis. We shall
interpret the results by considering two categories of sectors in
relation to the protection received and import substitution achieved.
Within the first category are those sectors whose import ratios have
been reduced to less than the national average in 1977 and which
enjoyed fairly high rates of protection at earlier dates. These
include industrial sectors manufacturing alcoholic beverages,
non-alcoholic beverages, tobacco, textiles, made-up textiles,
footwear, wood and paper products. These together constituted 64 per
cent of the highly protected sectors in 1974 and 60 per cent of the
sectors with low import ratios. For some of these, the relationship
between protection and substitution is not so obvious. For example,
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even by 1962, the tobacco industry had a very low WS ratio which
continued to decline (from 20 per cent in 1962 to 2 per cent in
1971/72) and by 1973/75 import substitution was complete. Despite
this however, the sector had continued to enjoy effective protection
well in excess of the national average (its erp rose from 91% in 1962
to 128% in 1967, 215% in 1970 and to almost 300% in 1977).54
Similarly for wood products/furniture sector.
However, the majority of the sectors in this category started
with fairly high MTs ratios and received over the years fairly high
rates of effective protection. A notable example is provided by the
footwear industry; its high import ratio in 1962 was significantly
reduced to less than 15 per cent in 1974 and over the years, the
sector's erp has also been progressively increased. It may well be
that protection has had some influence.
A common characteristic of the industries in this category is
that despite the progress made in domestic substitution and the high
erp's received, their exports have been very negligible. The only
exception is perhaps the sector manufacturing wood products/furniture
which in 1974 exported about 8 per cent of its gross output. Even
then, its exports in 1977 declined from the 1974 level. Another
possible exception is the metal products sector (basic metals and
fabricated metals) which exported 12 (4) per cent of this output in
1974 (1977).
At the other end of the scale are sectors which enjoyed low (or
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negative) protection in 1974 and which had high import ratios in 1977.
These constitute 70 per cent of the sectors with below average
protection, and 64 per cent of the sectors with above average import
ratios in 1977. They include sectors manufacturing paper, leather and
petroleum and coal products, cement, machinery and industrial
chemicals. For two of these sectors, despite the law protection, we
find a little bit of progress being made in exporting. For example,
the ratio of exports to gross output in the leather products sector
was in 1974, 48 per cent and although the ratio declined in 1977 to 32
per cent, it remained the single most important manufacturing export
sector in the economy. Industrial chemicals sector exported about 19
per cent of its output in 1974 and close to 8 per cent in 1977.
As can be seen, there are several cases which cannot fit neatly
into our classification. For example there are sectors like wearing
apparel and electrical equipment with very high levels of erp (1974)
but in which not much progress has been made either in import
substitution or exporting; and there are sectors -- soap and
perfumery, rubber and plastics and basic metals -- which achieved
considerable (i.e. below average) substitution despite the low level
of protection they received.
The classification can be extended to other variables as well.
Consider the relationship between erp and sectoral rates of growth.
Here, our findings point to a paradox: there are more industrial
sectors with an above average erp which achieved lower than average
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rate of growth than there are sectors with an average erp and above
average rate of output growth. Moreover, the proportion of sectors
with below average erp and above average rate of output growth is
higher than that of sectors with below average erp and below average
growth rate. This tends to suggest that higher rates of growth are
associated with lower rates of protection.
The results, summarised in Table 4:21 are therefore mixed: on
the one hand, the 1974 erp's are fairly associated with the 1977 ratio
of imports to total supply. The Pearson's coefficient is negative (as
expected) and statistically significant at 5% level; the raw x2 is
also significant at the 5 per cent level. On the other hand, the
association between erps and growth rates is not only weak but
negative: the Pearson's coefficient is -0.269. The Spearman's rank
correlation coefficient is however positive -- but extremely low and
statistically insignificant even at the 10 per cent level.
(iii) Method 3:
Following Guisinger (1971) 55 we perform a third type of test by
assuming that another factor other than theerp, exerts some influence
on the rates of growth of sectors and that the explanatory power of
erp could be increased by controlling for this factor. We therefore
introduce the change in ratio of imports to total supply as the third
variable and split the sample of 24 industries into two sub-samples of
(11 and 23) industries with belowavenge and aboveavenge
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ratios of imports to total supply. The rate of growth of industries
(1975-78) was then correlated with (i) the erp for 1974 (ii) the erp
for 1977 and (iii) the incremental erp's within each of the two
sub-samples. Tables 4:22 and 4:23 provide a summary of the results.
It is again surprising to note that the relationship between erp and
growth rate of sectors within sub-sample 1 is not only weak but
negative. For example, Spearman's rank correlation coefficient
between sectoral growth rate and 1974 net effective rate of protection
is -0.38, while the correlation of 1977 erp and sectoral growth
produces a coefficient of -0.005. The results obtained for sub-sample
2 are mixed: on the one hand no significant relationship could be
deduced between the 1974 net erp and sectoral growth rates, or between
the latter and 1974-77 incremental erp's; on the other hand the 1977
net effective rates of protection seem to be closely associated with
sectoral growth rates. The rank correlation coefficient is close to
0.80 and statistically significant at 1% level and so are the
coefficients of other test. The introduction of the control variable
thus alters significantly the previous results obtained and lends some
support to the resource Full and push implication of the erp. The
results from the two sub-samples imply that effective protection has
more influence on the growth rates of these sectors which achieve more
substitution than on the growth rates of those sectors in which less
progress has been made. To our knowledge there is no theoretically
intuitive explanation for this, and the result could easily have been
the other way round, although
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Whatever are the possible explanations, the close association
between effective rates and growth rates of sectors does not
necessarily imply any rationality in tariff making policy in Nigeria.
Indeed, given that the instruments of protection are not applied with
the principal criterion of industrial promotion (but rather with the
objective of dealing with balance of payments problems), the
association of growth and protection could have been purely
accidental: the growth rates of some sectors could have been quite
unrelated to the level of protection provided. Moreover, the rather
low association between protection and import substitution which we
have found emphasises the need to search for additional explanatory
variables which perhaps play a more significant role in influencing
import substitution than effective rates of protection. There is
certainly no shortage of possible candidates: the size of the market
for an industry's product, the nature of the competitive environment,
the profitability of the ventures, the accessibility of the different
industries to investible funds, etc, which may or may not be related
to the system of protection in the economy. For example, for some of
the Nigerian manufacturing sectors under review, the phenomena of
growth without protection (or of protection without growth) could
perhaps be partially explained by their access or otherwise to
investible funds over the years.
One of the most significant features of the 'oil boom' era was
the massive increase in public investment programmes concentrated
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mainly in intermediate and heavy goods industries -- iron and steel,
cement and glass, industrial chemicals, refineries and petrochemicals
etc. Thus in the Third National Plan, about 23 per cent of the total
public investment expenditure was earmarked for the iron and steel
(basic metals) industries, 5.18 per cent for cement and related
products, and 8.25 per cent for industrial chemicals. 57 In addition,
these sectors benefited immensely from foreign direct investments.
The share of industrial chemicals sector in foreign investment rose
from 8 per cent in1970 to 12.3 per cent in 1975; that of basic metals
sector from 1.6 per cent to 3.5 per cent; from 9.1 per cent to 10.10
per cent for cement and from 0.4 per cent to 2.1 per cent for the
machinery sector. 58 This could have contributed to the above average
rates of growth achieved by these sectors, in spite of their relative
disprotection.
In contrast, few of the highly protected sectors may have been
retarded from growing by the lack of the direct support either from
the government or from the foreign private entrepreneurs. None of the
highly protected sectors -- apart from petroleum and coal products,
and paper products -- had a share in total public investment exceeding
0.5 per cent. The sectors manufacturing beverages were allocated 0.41
per cent, textiles, made-up textiles and wearing apparel, 0.53 etc.58
In addition, there was a substantial reduction in the share of these
sectors in foreign direct investment: from 8.7 per cent in 1970 to
4.6 per cent for beverages industries and from
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.12.7 per cent to 6.5 per cent for the tobacco industry 60
Unfortunately, the lack of more detailed and adequate information does
not permit a more elaborate analysis but it does seem that this is an
important aspect of growth that cannot be easily assumed away.
How does our finding compare with those of other authors?
Attempts to empirically verify the relationship between erps and
sectoral growth and/or some measure of import substitution were made
by, among others, Oyejide (for Nigeria), Humphrey (for Argentina),
Grissinger (for Pakistan), Lewis (for Pakistan) and Adrian Tenkate
(for Mexico). 61 The results obtained are mixed and differences of
opinion as to the usefulness of erp as an accurate predictor of
resource flows remain.
Oyejide produced successful regressions of (a) domestic
production as a proportion of total supply (b) average growth of
domestic production and (c) incremental import ratios, on estimates of
net effective rates of protection for 1957, 1962 and 1967. Proxy
measures of the size of the market - population size elasticity and
per capita income elasticity - were included in the equations. In
addition, the notion of delayed response on the part of producers when
tariff changes are made, was introduced. Judged by the value of R2,
his equations performed quite well: the proportion of import
substitution explained by one set of the equations was 75 percent
(1975), 89 percent (1962) and 91 percent (1967)
In contrast, Humphrey and Lewis have correlated effective rates
with index of growth and structural change finding little or no
evidence that differential erps exert any significant influence on the
allocation of resources. In a regression of output on erp, Humphrey
found that the higher the incremental erp, the lower the change in
real output. The value of R2 was less than 0.1.
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The analysis by Guisinger which we closely followed in this
study, provided another example of mixed results - both successful and
unsuccessful - in testing the predictive power of erp on resource
allocation. Using a sample of 24 manufacturing industries, the rate
of growth of output (1959/60 - 1956/66) as well as the 1963/64 share
of imports in total supply (MZ) were each correlated with erp for
1963/64 using non-parametric techniques. MZ did not show any
significant association with erp; a significant association was
however found between erp and growth rates. He also found that erp
exerts more influence on the growth of sectors which achieved more
import substitution than on the growth of sectors in which less
progress has been made - a result which we also found.
It thus appears that the empirical evidence on the relationship
between erp, and growth and/or import substitution is still
inconclusive and it can be claimed for our result that they seem at
least as reasonable as any others and that they allow us to have an
insight into the effects of trade policy or resource allocation which
is much closer to the truth than could be achieved by ignoring the
whole question. For, even though we could not form a very clear idea
of the various positive influences on import substitution and/or
growth, our analysis suggests that the policy of protection is one of
such influences to reckon with and that it has had same success
(albeit minimally, judging from its low, though significant
association with import substitution) in promoting the expansion of
certain industries. It remains to be seen, in later chapters, whether
this allocation of resources carries any normative implications.
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4:5 Summary and conclusion
The major objectives of this chapter are, first, to examine the
theoretical and empirical aspects of the policy of protection in
Nigeria and second, to relate the structure of effective protection to
import substitution and/or sectoral growth rates achieved. We traced
the evolution of the Nigerian tariff system, pointing out that the
process of tariff setting has, over the years, been dictated by a
multiplicity of changing objectives rather than by the sole objective
of promoting industry. The lack of a clear objective would probably
introduce some elements of instability and inconsistency in the
application of tariff rates. In otherwords, the price signals which
tariffs are expected to convey may not be properly perceived by the
entrepreneurs, as a consequence of which, output and investment
decisions could be highly distorted.
Effective rates of protection for 1974 and 1977 are found to be
generally high in comparison not only to the available estimates for
earlier years but also to those found in other LDCs. There is great
inequality in the inter-industrial structure of protection with the
consumer goods sectors receiving on average the highest support,
followed by the capital- and intermediate goods producing sectors. A
comparison of our estimates with those earlier obtained by Oyejide and
Oyelabi shows considerable fluctuations, although the structure of
protection has barely changed over the years since 1957.
To examine the possible benefits and costs of this structure of
protection, we analysed the relationship between effective protection
and import substitution and sectoral growth rates. We hypothesized
that the structure of protection will tend to channel resources into
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the more highly protected sectors and to confine output to the
domestic market. The evidence we found from our correlation analysis
is only suggestive in nature. The analysis shows that the benefits,
in terms of higher growth and much import substitution are rather
minimal, while the costs, in terms of discriminating against exports
could be enormous. For not only are manufactured exports negligible,
they have also failed to develop.
In view of the many problems associated with the concept of erp,
we would like to emphasize that our analysis in this chapter must be
interpreted with caution. First, it is well-known that estimating erp
implies several rather restrictive assumptions and approximations -
fixed input coefficients, the absence of general equilibrium effects
etc. - which may not be a reflection of the real world situation.
Second, as we earlier pointed out, tariffs are by no means the only
trade policy instruments employed by the government either to protect
industry or to achieve other objectives. We have seen that
complementing protection through tariffs are other fiscal incentives
granted to industries under the PIS and ADS schemes. In addition to
quantitative restrictions which are a noticeable feature of the
Nigerian trade regime, there could be several distortionary trade and
industrial policy aspects for which we have made no adjustments. As
such, to arrive at a more definite conclusion, one must evaluate these
other policies in conjunction with the application of tariffs.
Inspite of these and other shortcomings already pointed out, we
hope that our results provide us with a picture of the level and
structure of protection which is accurate enough for a general
evaluation of trade policy such as the one presented in this and other
chapters. As will be shown in the following chapters, the estimated
rates of protection can be quite useful in the analysis of other
aspects of industrial growth such as employment, productivity growth
and investment efficiency.
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prices of the primary factors it uses intensively. In other
words, D looses resources to C (as predicted), C expands w,
while B contracts (a paradox). See Corden, W.M. (1974) s2R
cit, pp84-85.
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CHAPTER 5 
The EMpirical Evaluation of EMployments. Output and Income
Potential of Sectors in Nigeria
5:1 Introduction
The objective of employment creation in Nigeria is perhaps
second only to that of rapid growth of the industrial sector. The
emphasis on the employment objective stems largely from the
seriousness of the unemployment problem in the economy. Available
evidence suggests that significant increases in the Nigerian labour
force have occurred over the years: from 24 million in 1966/67 to
29.22 million in 1975 and 32.74 in 1980, implying an absolute increase
of about 0.7 million per annum between 1975 and 1980. Over the years
too, the rate of unemployment has gone up tremendously from 1.7% in
1966/67 to 4.5% in 1975 and only slightly down to 4.4% in 1980. The
1981-85 plan envisages an increase of 3.85 million in the country's
labour force between 1980 and 1985, out of which 2.4 million will be
gainfully employed, by the end of this year. Thus the rate of
unemployment is expected to be down to 4%1 • These estimates however,
grossly underestimate the real unemployment problem since they refer
only to open unemployment which by definition excludes
underemployment. According to the fourth plan, "there is no doubt
that our underemployment problem although difficult to quantify, is as
serious as the unemployment problem, if not more"2.
Although all the economic sectors will be expected to make a
contribution in the alleviation of the unemployment problem, the
manufacturing sector, the government asserts, "provides the greatest
prospect for absorbing the manpower being turned out from our
educational and training institutions" 3 . Is that a realistic
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assessment? is the expectation attainable? if not, why? and what can
be done? The central objective of this chapter is to examine the
employment potential of industries in Nigeria and determine the extent
to which it is influenced by government's trade policy.
Of no less importance is the government's objective of fostering
domestic linkages of sectors and hence of minimizing the 'import
leakages' which, as we have previously indicated, (Chapter 3) have
been quite serious in the Nigerian industrial sector. Thus, our
second objective in this chapter is to determine which of the various
sectors have the potential of promoting such linkages.
Although our emphasis is on the employment and industrial
linkage objectives, an attempt will also be made to appraise the
income and foreign exchange potential of the manufacturing sector.
The chapter is organised as follows: section 5:2 discusses the
methodology employed in the analysis. In Section 5:3, we examine the
employment (and other inputs), output and income potential of sectors.
The implications for factor and output requirements, of an
hypothetical export promotion strategy will be examined in section
5:4. In section 5:5 we shall examine the theoretical as well as the
empirical relationship between policies of protection and the factor
intensity of production. Then in section 5:6, the extent of
inter-industrial linkages will be examined, to be followed in section
5:7 by a summary and conclusion of the chapter.
5:2 EgthgdaggY
The static Leontief input-output system provides an appropriate
starting point for the quantitative evaluation of the incentives for
complementary investment directly and indirectly caused by industrial
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net investment (i.e. interindustrial linkages) and for the appraisal
of the employment and income implications of industrialisation. The
empirical analysis proceeds as follows.
Let the input-output balance equations for the economy be
expressed as
X = AX + Y	 5:1
where
X = (nxl) vector of domestic production
A = (nxn) interindustrial coefficient matrix
Y = (nxl) vector of final demand, made up of public as well as
private consumption expenditure, exports, imports etc.
Solving 5:1 gives
X= (1-A) -1Y	 5:2a
or in difference form
AX = (1-A) -1AY	 5:2b
where
(1-A)-1 = 'Leontief Inverse'.
A solution to equation 5:2a determines the gross output levels
required to sustain a given vector of final demand y. Thus if Ay in
equation 5:2b is assumed to be a unit vector each element Aij of the
Leontief inverse can be interpreted as total i.e. direct and indirect
impact on the output level of sector i per unit increase in the final
demand of sector j. The direct and indirect impact on the gross
output levels of all sectors in the economy when the jth sectors final
demand changes by unity is given by the sum of the column elements of
the inverse
V
i=1
	
=
Similarly, the sum of the row elements of (1-A)-1 , vz,
	 Aij = Al.
j=1
5:3
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captures the direct plus indirect impact on sector i's output per unit
increase in the final demand of all sectors in the system.
(i) Employment potential of sectors:
To evaluate economic sectors in terms of direct plus indirect
employment impact, let the Leontief technology assumption (fixed
proportional relationship between inputs and output) be invoked: then
if we let
.=labour employed in the jth sector13
then
1 = lj/x j 	 5:4
is the direct labour requirement per unit of gross output of sector j.
In otherwords lid measures the initial effects on employment which are
!
confined to the effects of the industry whose output has increased.
Let
1 = lux,
then the matrix of sectoral employment multipliers, 1* is given by the
expression
1* =	 = 111-A)	 5:5
where Id is a diagonalised matrix whose elements are defined by
equation 5:4. Fpr a. given change in the final demand in sector j,
each element of 1* WO denotes the employment created directly . and
indirectly in sector i, and the sum of the elements l*ii (= l*ii)
measures the total Employment created throughout the economy when the
final demand for the jth sector increased by unity.
More generally, the direct plus indirect effects on different
types of labour or on other variables such factor incomes (wages,
payments to capital) imports, capital etc can be calculated by again
249
invoking the fixed coefficient assumption and using the general
expression
V = Z(1-A) -1 Y	 5:6
where Z is a matrix of type mxn, (m is the number of variables in the
system and n is the number of sectors) with elements Zij.
Thus if each sector needs to be evaluated in terms of its direct
plus indirect impact on factor incomes, Z will be interpreted as a
matrix of factor payments per unit of gross output, so that Zij
is	 part of the output of sector i paid to factor j etc. and
V will be a vector of factor receipts whose e1Q4ilents represent
the direct plus indirect increase in the payments to the ith factor
when the final demand of the jth sector increases by one unit.
The indirect impact on employment of a unit increase in final
demand can be isolated from the direct plus indirect effects:
11 = [1*-1d] 	 5:7
and more generally
V1 = (61 -Z)Y
	 5:8
where
11 and V1
 are the indirect effects on employment and on other
variables respectively; and 1*, l d, y, V and Z are as defined
previously.
Once equations 5:6-5:8 are solved, sector can be ranked
according to the size of the effects. Thus if 11: > lt, we can
conclude that sector 1 is more labour using relative to sector 2 etc.
Having determined the total input requirements and factor income
generated in the system, it is often useful to examine the
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implications (for employment and factor incomes, capital and foreign
exchange etc), of alternative trade regimes, such as export promotion
and import substitution, and hence test, following Leontief, the H-0
factor proportions theory of international trade. Given the relative
abundance of labour and the scarcity of capital and/or foreign
exchange in the LDCs, one would expect their exports to embody more of
the former and their imports or importables to be more capital and/or
foreign exchange intensive. To the extent that this is true for
Nigeria, then one would expect an export promotion strategy to
generate more employment and to be less capital and foreign exchange
using, for a given level of investment as compared to an import
substitution strategy.
The simplest way to test for the relationship is to assume a
hypothetical change (increase) in total manufactured exports and
(decrease) in total imports (or competitive imports) and then examine
the associated shift in the demand for labour, capital and other
inputs in the economy. For example, assume that total or competitive
imports are decreased by one mil1ioni4 and to be replaced by domestic
production; assume further that the decrease and the subsequent
domestic production are to be shared among sectors in proportion to
each sector's demand for imports; then the total labour, say, required
directly and indirectly for the replacement will be given by:
1M = ld (1-Arlpm = l*pm
	5:9
where prn is a vector of the share of sectoral imports in total or
competitive imports. In a similar fashion, (assuming no domestic or
external constraints to export expansion) we could derive the total
labour generated in the economy when the quantity of manufactured
exports is assumed to be expanded proportionately by 144million. One
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needs only replace the vector pm
 above with a vector p of sectoral
export shares and thus obtain
A	 -A
le = ld (1-A)pe. = l*pe
As will be shown, these expressions can be easily extended to
incorporate other inputs and/or outputs in the system4.
(ii) Interindustrial Linkage Effects of Sectors
The main idea behind the linkage effects theory is to trace out
those processes and/or activities in the economy, the promotion of
which could lead to the creation of an industrial structure that could
enhance the structural interdependence of sectors within the domestic
economy. Such are the activities or processes with high
'technological linkages', capable of not only inducing the expansion
of other sectors, but also of initiating the establishment of new
enterprises through their supply of output or demand for inputs.
TWo types of technological linkage effects have been identified
in the literature: the forward linkage effect which results when the
increased availability of an industry's output induces or stimulates
the setting up of firms or industries which use a substantial portion
of its output as their inputs. Thus the development of an iron and
steel industry or basic metal industry could, in principle, induce the
growth of small firms manufacturing a wide variety of articles as
cutlery, metal furniture etc. Then there is the backward linkage
effect which results when the increase in the demand of a sector's
output by other industries provides a stimulus for the expansion or
initiation of production of the input providing industries. Thus for
example, the demand of the food processing or tabacco industries for
agricultural products could, in principle, create pressures and lead
5:10
b. 5:11
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to increase in the production volume of the latter sector. It is
possible of course to conceive of a process or industry that has both
forward and backward linkage effects: the development of the iron and
steel industry could, not only induce the development of firms
manufacturing say, bicycle chains, metal containers, etc. (forward
linkages) but could, also by demanding an ever larger supply of
electricity lead to an induced investment in the latter (backward
linkages); and the processes could be extended to cover activities
and/or industries which may be unrelated to the activity originally
set up5.
Following Chenery and Watanate (1958) 6 , a rough idea of the
scope of backward and forward linkage effects realised can be obtained
from the input share of domestic economic sectors in the total output
of an industry (backward linkage) and from the share of sales to
processing industries in the economy related to the output of an
industry (forward linkages). More formally, the degree of backward,
(bi) and forward (fi) linkage effects are defined respectively by the
following expressions:
11/: X..
j=1
f. - 	 	 5:12
X
3
.
where
/ X.. = total purchased inputs
13
1 X.. = total input sales
j=1 13
xj = total production of sector j
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The size of bj and fi will determine the importance of a sector as a
buyer of the output of other sectors as its inputs or supplier of its
output as inputs to other sectors. Thus, a large value of bj implies
that a sector draws heavily on its purchased input from industries in
the system, while a large value of fi would indicate that other
industries draw heavily on their purchased inputs from the sector i.
Once these are estimated, sectors can be classified in order of
priority: sectors with high bj and fi being most important; those with
low bj and low fi least important and second and third priority
assigned to sectors that have high-bj-low fi and low-fi-high-bj output
linkages respectively7.
These measures, though simple to apply, once an input-output
table is available, have nevertheless a certain drawback. First,
observe that they capture only the direct backward and forward linkage
effects of an exogenous increase in sectoral output, ignoring the
indirect and/or spread effects. For example, one cannot distinguish
between the bj
	sectorfor a 
	 which draws heavily on only one
or two industries and that for another sector whose reliance on other
sectors for its purchased inputs is more evenly dispersed. Similarly,
certain sectors may have a highly skewed input deliveries pattern and
would tend to have large fi values which cannot be distinguished from
those of sectors whose structural relationships might be more evenly
characterised. Thus if the main consideration of economic policy is
the maximisation of the total effects as well as the dispersal of
these effects as widely as possible throughout the economy, the above
measures will be of limited relevance.
As an alternative to these, one could consider the measures of
technological linkages as suggested by Rasmussen (1957) 8 . These,
i=
5:14
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which deal with the magnitudes contained in the Leontief inverse are
defined simply as the average value of coefficients in a given row or
column relative to the average value of all coefficients in the
inverse matrix. More formally, the 'Index of power of dispersion'
(the backward linkage effect) is defined by the expression
1- A .j
U.
	 j=
1	 7 A .
2 L	 '3
II j=1
Similarly, the 'Index of sensitivity of dispersion' (the forward
5:13
linkage effect) is expressed as
1
U. = 	1	 1	 Ai.
2 .
II 1=1
where A. and Ai. are as defined previously,.
The denominator in both equations represent the overall averages i.e.
1
	 A . _ 1	 A.	 _ 1	 A..
2	 •3 - 2	 1• - 2	 • -13
n	 i=1
	 n j=1 i=1
The interpretation of Uj and Ui is similar to that given to bj and fi
- that is, Uj is a measure of the extent to which industry j uses as
purchased raw material inputs, the final output of other industries in
the economy. If Uj > 1, the industry in question draws heavily on the
system of industries and the reverse holds for Uj < 1. In a similar
fashion, the magnitude of Ui can be used to gauge the relative
importance of an industry as a supplier of material inputs to other
industries, rather than as a supplier of final goods. If Ui > 1, this
implies that industry i is important as a supplier of materials and
semi-finished goods. Thus by expanding capacity in that sector
inducements are provided to using industries which now have an
incentive to expand output due to the increased availability
n j=1
11	 _ 1 A ,2
V. 	 n-1 j=1	 3-3
	
n j=1 j_j)
1
1	 A.fl =1 13j
, i = 1, 2, ...,n	 5:17
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of output. A key sector is one with both U1 and Ui > 1. The indices
Uj and Ui can be weighted according to the importance of each sector
in say, the final demand, in order to overcome the possible errors
arising from simple averaging. Accordingly, the weighted versions of
the index of forward linkage will be
= I
j1 
Aij Y)
= 
11Y, Yj
1	 Aij Yj 
Aij Yj
wherey . =jth element of the final demand vector y. Alternatively,
sectoral measures of variability represented by the following indices
of the coefficient of variation can be defined:
1	 _ 1 vL, A 12
- 	
	
n-1 i=1	 ij	 n i=1 iji V.
	
= 1,2
	
1	
,...,n
1	 5:16
—	 .
n .
=1 
A.
5:15
j=1
A high V) implies that a particular sector j draws heavily on only a
few of the industries that it does affect, and a low V) means that an
industry draws relatively evenly from the affected sectors. Similar
interpretation can be given to VI. A key sector can then be redefined
as one for which, not only are the U's above unity but the irs are low
as wel19.
In a similar fashion, we can following Diamond (1975), identify
'Key' employment sectors in the economy. These are defined as sectors
5:18
5:19
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"which cause a disproportionately large increase in the
employment of other sectors when the final demand for their
products is increased. At the same time, the labour input of
these 'key' industries must expand more than average to meet the
final demand on other sectors"10
In equations 5:13 - 5:17 we simply replace the A's to substitute L,
the elements of the direct plus indirect employment matrix. Thus the
Indexofemploymentbackwardlinkage,Ujis given by
LL.j
3
U. =  n 
	 j =
 1
—2-	 L.j
n j=1
and the index of employment forward linkage U1,
1 Li.
U
I 
- 	 , i = 1,2,...,n
Li.
n 1=1
UP > 1 implies that the system of industries as a whole will need a
comparatively large increase in employment to cope with a unit
increase in the final demand for sector jth product. Similarly if It
> 1, this implies that sector i will have to increase its labour input
relatively more than other sectors for a given increase in final
demand.
The coefficients of variation analogous to 5:16 and 5:17 are
given as
1	 VL	 -)
i=1 13
5:20
11.	 (L.	 -	 L..) 2
	
L	 lil
1
-1 j=1	 13	 j=1 13 
	
VI	 n
1	 v.
LL..
	
n j1	 13
i 
1
L 	 n-1V. =
3
2
and
5:21
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The Ita
The total, direct and indirect input requirements and factor
incomes generated in production are estimated from an updated and
disaggregated input-output matrix for the Nigerian economy for the
year 1977. The inputs considered are labour, capital and raw material
imports, the latter being a proxy for foreign exchange input. Factor
incomes are represented by value-added, disaggregated into labour
income (wages) and non-labour income, which can be roughly considered
to represent payments to capital employed in the production process.
As we previously indicated in Chapter 1, the input-output matrix
currently available for the Nigerian economy must be considered as out
of date, being constructed using 1973 as a base. A number of methods
have been suggested in the literature for updating input-output
tables. The most commonly used is the RAS or biproportional method,
the theoretical properties, practical usefulness and efficiency of
which, have been examined in great detail by many authors 11 . In
simple terms, the RAS method finds a 'new' matrix, having prescribed
row and column sums, provided such a matrix exists. This matrix will,
ordinarily, be 'near' to a given matrix which has been employed as the
initial approximation. Thus, to apply the method, one needs only the
input-output matrix estimated from the full data for a given (base)
year and the row and column constraints for the current year 12 . The
computer algorithm we used is due to Slater (1972)13.
The disaggregation procedure we followed is not defined by any
rigid mathematical formula and, on many occasions, we have had to
employ our own value-judgements. The first step is to estimate the
sectoral intermediate input sales and purchases, of the disaggregated
sectors, which are used as 'control' rows and columns. The column
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controls can be easily obtained from the FOS industrial survey data,
as the difference between gross-output (G*) and value-added (V*). The
row controls are given by gross output less total final demand (FD*).
The latter is not available to us, and the only category of final
demand we can estimate with some degree of precision is the level of
sectoral imports and exports. Thus, the row totals had to be
a p proximated using available data from pest industrial
surveys, or from the input—out p ut tables of other LOCs or
14	 .from Clark's (1972)
	
disaggregated input—output table for the
Vig P rian economy.
The second step is to obtain estimates of the disaggregated input
coefficients for each of the cells in the new matrix. These estimates
can be obtained from different sources: either from the normally
available statistics for other countries, or by using the methods of
forecasting of the individual coefficients or a combination of the
two. Here too, we have had to rely on 'borrowed' data to fill in the
cells, and, in some cases, the distribution of the estimates is made
in an ad hoc (but sensible) fashion. For example, where the borrowed
data does not look 'sensible' enough, we employ the assumption that
the disaggregated coefficient (aIj) is proportional to the original,
i.e. aggregated coefficient (aij), the factor of proportionality being
the ratio of value added to gross output of the disaggregated sector -
i.e.,
aij = (3aij
= VyGj
The resulting matrix, (and the row and column 'controls' already
obtained) is then used as the initial approximation in the RAS
technique. (This procedure and its limitations are further
examined in the qppendix)
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5:3 IteMWIlaulta
5:3:1 Output, Factor Requirements and Factor Incomes in Production
For each objective (the generation of employment, labour,
income, value-added and gross output) and constraint (capital and
foreign exchange requirements), two sets of direct plus indirect
coefficients are estimated. The first set takes into account the
effects of the primary (sectors 1-5) and tertiary (sectors 30-35)
sectors in the economy. In otherwords, the full 35 x 35 input-output
table was used. These will be referred to as the global input, output
and factor income coefficients. By this approach, one would be able
to examine the interdependence of sectors not only within the
manufacturing sector for which we are mainly concerned with, but also
between the three main groups of sectors viz primary, modern
manufacturing and tertiary or services. However, because of certain
limitations imposed by the available data, a second set of estimates
referring only to the input, output and income coefficients in
manufacturing are also computed. For example, data related to
employment, wages and capital in the non-manufacturing sectors are
always difficult to come by and the available ones are not very
reliable15. It is necessary therefore to map out a 24 x 24
input-output table that contains information on the manufacturing
subsectors to estimate what will be referred to as the M-sector 
coefficients. As will be shown, the M-sector coefficients are often
considerably lower than the global coefficients due to the omission of
the linkage effects of the primary and tertiary sectors.
Tables 5:1 - 5:4 give a complete listing of the direct, indirect
and the direct plus indirect (le. total) output, value-added, factor
income, employment, capital and foreign exchange effects of one unit
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of sectoral expansion in the Nigerian economy. The ranking of sectors
by the size of these effects on the objectives and constraints are
also shown in these tables. The direct coefficients displayed in
tables 5:1 (for the manufacturing sectors) and 5:4 (for the primary
and tertiary sectors) will be considered first.
It can be seen from the tables that in terms of total
employment, the agricultural sector ranks highest, followed by Finance
and Insurance, distributive trade and 'other' services. The ten most
(direct) labour intensive sectors in 1977 were agriculture, finance
and insurance, distributive trade, 'other' services, livestock,
forestry and fishing, electricity and water, transport and
communications, wood and furniture and wearing apparel. That eight of
these are all non manufacturing sectors is indicative of the relative
unimportance of the industrial sector in direct employment provision.
Within the industrial sector, the most labour intensive sub-sectors
include wearing apparel, footwear and textiles and the five least
labour intensive were sectors manufacturing petroleum and coal
products, transport equipment, alcoholic beverages, paints and
machinery.
Not suprisingly, the most imported input dependent are sectors
which can be described as the high technology industries, whose
operations consist of no more than 'last-stage' production or assembly
of manufactures. Given that most of the components they assemble are
not domestically produced, their production process must be highly
import intensive and thus highly dependent upon the availability of
foreign exchange. These sectors include transport equipment,
machinery, electrical machinery, fabricated metal products and
industrial chemicals; others are paints, drugs and medicines etc. The
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direct import requirements for the primary sectors (0.0529) and the
tertiary sectors (0.1791) are certainly negligible in comparison to
that of the manufacturing sector (5.036).
Industries manufacturing tobacco, footwear and basic metals,
rank highest in terms of, respectively, value-added, wages and labour
income, while the most capital using sector is soap and perfumery,
closely followed by paper products and footwear. Other sectors with
high capital-output ratios include tobacco, basic metals, and cement.
The relatively low capital intensity of the 'capital-goods' sectors is
highly suprising and could perhaps be due to the fact that, being
engaged in the assembling and/or repair of equipment, less capital is
required than would be the case if they were engaged in actual
capital-goods production.
A feature of the tables worth emphasising is the wide range of
variation of the employment, capital and income coefficients: compare
for example, the direct labour requirements per one million N of gross
output of 7332.92 (agriculture) workers and 16.83 (petroleum and coal
products) workers. The direct manufacturing wage coefficient range
from 0.227 (footwear) to 0.0346 (transport equipment); direct
non-labour income from 0.547 to 0.106. Even wider variations are
noticeable in the direct capital coefficients which range from 0 to
1.890; direct value-added, 0.988 to 0.141 and direct imports, from 0
to 0.746.
In general, the relative size of the indirect vis-a-vis the
direct effects varies depending on which objective and/or constraint
is being considered. In terms of labour requirements for instance, 22
of the 35 sectors have higher indirect than direct coefficients and
all the 35 sectors have higher indirect than direct output
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coefficients. On the otherhand, only very few of the sectors have
indirect wage, non-labour income, value-added and import coefficients
larger than their respective direct coefficients. However,
incorporating both direct and indirect effects leads to an entirely
different result. It can be seen that the total, are substantially
higher than either the direct or the indirect coefficients, in some
instances by 100 percent or more. For the whole economy, the total
labour requirement per one million N of gross output will be 32560
workers compared to a direct requirement of 16500 workers; Total wages
(value-added) generated by a unit expansion of all sectors amounts to
7.2691 (28.9305) thousand, compared to 5.020 (20.3508) thousand
directly generated etc. This implies that a consideration of these
(indirect and total) effects cannot be assumed away for policy making
purposes.
The rankings of sectors by the size of the effects of sectoral
expansion on these variables have altered - some drastically - when
the indirect and total effects are considered. For example, if we
consider the global coefficients, by the indirect employment effects,
sector 35 (other services) ranks 26th, 8th by the total effects and
4th when only the direct effects are considered; sector 33
(distributive trade) ranks 3rd by the direct, 32nd by the indirect and
7th by the total effects; in terms of value-added generated, sector 35
(other services) ranks 4th by the total effects, 3rd by the direct
effects and 34th by the indirect effects; sector 33 (distributive
trade) ranks 6th by the direct, 4th by the total and 29th by the
indirect effects etc. It is important to realise also that the fact
that one sector is directly more input using or more income generating
relative to another carries no implication of whether it will be more
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input using or income generating sittriar.yIc_l_jr_lt_yxVrecl. The
following will serve as examples:
d	 d
2,
11 
> 6
 but 2.T > T
6	 11
d 
>
d but k
T
 > kT
15	 7	 7	 15
The opposite could also occur such that
d d	 T T
56
13	
> 2,
14 
but 2,
14
< 2.
13
d	
<
d	 but k
T
19	 419 < 18
where 4 d and tT are respectively, direct and total labour requirements
and the subscripts refer to the sectors. An inspection of the tables
will reveal that the above holds true for all other coefficients as
well.
Two other main features of the tables depicting indirect and
total requirements can now be summarized.
1. The tables illustrate, as in the case of the direct
coefficients, some dominance of the non-industrial sectors in terms of
especially, employment, wage and value-added generation. In terms of
the total employment coefficients for example, the agricultural
sector's lead is maintained; and of the sectors within the top third
ranking, five (about 42%) are non manufacturing. In terms of total
value-added generated, the eight top ranking sectors comprise of the
primary and tertiary sectors only; and finally in terms of total wages
generated, only five of the twelve highest ranking sectors are
industrial. Table 5:5 shows that the average direct value-added
coefficient is 0.892 for the primary, 0.753 for the tertiary and 0.474
for the manufacturing sectors; value-added directly and indirectly
generated for the same broad category of sectors is respectively
0.983, 0.957 and 0.761. Similar differences can be observed in terms
of the employment and wage coefficients. The manufacturing sectors
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clearly however, dominate in terms of the direct, indirect and total
output generated, as well as capital requirements. This could imply
some potential conflict between employment provision and output
generation, since sectors with higher employment potential (i.e. the
primary sectors) are not necessarily those with higher output
potential. This will be further examined in later sections.
2. The results are however slightly different from the above as
the same table shows, in terms of the indirect effects on employment,
value-added and wages, though not in terms of indirect output. Here,
the dominance of the manufacturing sectors is clearly visible.
Average indirect value-added coefficient is only 0.091 for the primary
sectors, 0.203 for the tertiary sectors, compared with about 0.30 for
the manufacturing sectors. Similarly for the employment coefficients.
Tthle 5:5 
Average direct. indirect and total coefficients
by 3 broad categories of sectors
Bectors:
Coefficients of Primary
(1-5)
Manufacturing
(6-29)
Tertiary
(30-35)
Output
Direct a 0.099 0.316 0.218
b 0.372 1.179 0.812
Indirect c 1.029 1.127 1.056
d 0.935 1.024 0.960
Total e 1.128 1.443 1.274
f 0.824 1.054 0.931
Continued/....
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Table25:5 - Continued/.
Sectors:
Coefficients of Primary Manufacturing Tertiary
(1-5) (6-29) (30-35)
Value-added
Direct	 a 0.892 0.474 0.753
b 1.540 0.816 1.216
Indirect	 c 0.091 0.287 0.204
d 0.370 1.171 0.831
Total	 e 0.983 0.761 0.957
f 1.190 0.920 1.160
Employment
Direct	 a 1.840 0.083 0.960
b 3.900 0.180 2.040
Indirect	 c 0.140 0.600 0.150
d 0.305 1.310 0.330
Total	 e 1.980 0.688 1.120
f 2.130 0.740 1.200
Capital
Direct	 a 0.122 1.048 0.113
b 0.161 1.387 0.149
Indirect	 c 0.030 0.204 0.080
d 0.190 1.292 0.507
Total	 e 0.152 1.250 0.193
f 0.163 1.350 0.208
Wages
Direct	 a 0.245 0.118 0.200
b 1.713 0.825 1.399
Indirect	 c 0.029 0.076 0.048
d 0.443 1.169 0.737
Total	 e 0.225 0.194 0.248
f 1.082 0.933 1.192
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Notes: rows a, c and e are the averages of the variables achieved by
the different sectors; rows b, d and f represent each sector's average
as a proportion of the economy wide averages.
Source: Calculated from Tables 5:1 - 5:4.
Moreover, of the 12 highest ranking sectors in terms of indirect
employment effects, only 3 (oil mining, forestry and fishing, and
agriculture) are non-manufacturing, and only 2 (other mining, building
and construction) of the 12 highest ranking sectors in terms of wages
-indirectly generated, are non-manufacturing.
5:3:2 The evaluation of 'key' sectors: (i)
Having determined the size of the impact of sectoral expansion
on our variables, we now move on to evaluate 'key' sectors. The
ranking of sectors by the size of the employment, value-added, output
and labour income coefficients, can provide the basis on which such an
evaluation can be made, sectors with higher coefficients being more
preferred to those with lower coefficients. A simple rule of thumb
will be to select those sectors falling into the top third ranking of
all sectors in terms of each objective, for expansion, and to
discourage the growth of those falling into the bottom third ranking
of all sectors. One could also evaluate sectors on the basis of
maximizing benefit from the scarcest factor of production in the
economy. If the objective is to maximize immediate employment, and
assuming that capital is the scarce factor, we may seek to choose
those sectors for which the capital-labour and capital-output
coefficients (direct and total), are lowest.
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Table 5:6 Direct Plus Indirect Capital-output,Capital-
Value-added and Capital-labour requirements
in manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors.
(1977)
capital/ r	 capital/ r	 capital/ r
Output
	 labour	 v-added
Sector
Manufacturing
6 3111/3122
	
Food 0.996 17 12.161 19 2.539 17
7 3131/3133
	
Alcoholic bell. 0.594 19 15.745 15 1.016 20
8 3134	 Non-alcoh.bev. 0.325 26 5.916 25 0.544 24
9 3140	 Tobacco 1.760 9 30.792 7 2.735 14
10 3212	 Textiles 1.140 14 11.495 22 2.549 16
11 3212	 Made-up text. 0.670 18 6.899 24 1.442 19
12 3220	 Apparel 1.968 3 14.447 16 4.249 3
13 3231/3233	 Leather 0.113 30 2.666 28 0.268 29
14 3240	 Footwear 1.808 6 17.453 14 3.511 8
15 3311/3320	 Wood 1.778 8 10.828 23 3.602 7
16 3412/3420	 Paper 2.153 1 28.991 9 4.276 2
17 3511/3512	 Chemicals 1.458 12 30.039 8 3.491 9
18 3521	 Paints 1.734 10 44.317 5 3.475 10
19 3522	 Drugs 1.587 11 36.743 6 3.241 11
20 3523	 Soap 2.085 2 54.871 4 3.920 5
21 3529/3540 Other Chem. 1.844 5 107.024 2 4.157 4
22 3551/3560 Rubber 0.355 24 5.023 26 0.660 23
23 3610/3699 Cement 1.863 7 23.215 12 3.128 12
24 3710/3812 Basic Metals 1.850 7 28.795 10 2.961 13
25 3813/3819 Fab.Metals 0.491 20 11.813 21 1.448 18
26 3822/3829 Machinery 0.478 21 12.156 18 0.821 21
27 3832/3839 Elect.Machinery 1.380 13 25.618 11 3.892 6
28 3841/3843 Transport Equip 1.041 16 56.598 3 7.171 1
29 3851/3909 Misc.products 1.088 15 12.131 21 2.5891 29
Primary
1	 Agric. 0.034 34 0.517 33 0.062 33
2 Livestock 0.006 35 0.074 35 0.014 35
3	 Forestry 0.113 30 2.188 31 0.124 32
4 Oil Mining 0.459 23 159.255 1 0.515 25
5 Other Mining 0.151 28 4.887 27 0.229 29
Tertiary
30 Electricity 0.445 22 19.274 13 0.667 22
31 Building 0.113 32 2.531 29 0.194 30
32 Transp&Comm. 0.280 25 13.468 17 0.429 26
33 Trade 0.103 29 2.168 32 0.143 31
34 Finance 0.185 27 2.414 30 0.322 27
35	 Other Servs. 0.032 33 0.486 34 0.049 35
* r=rank
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Table 5:6 provides a listing of these coefficients. Thus from
the point of view of minimizing capital per unit of output and/or
value-added, the most desirable are the primary and tertiary sectors
plus a few manufacturing sub-sectors such as non-alcoholic drinks,
leather and rubber & plastics; the least desirable are sectors
manufacturing transport equipment, paper products, wearing apparel,
petroleum products, soap and perfumery, electrical equipment,
footwear, industrial chemicals, wood products, paints, drugs and
cement products. Similarly, from the point of view of maximizing
employment per unit of capital, eleven of the twelve least desirable
sectors are all manufacturing, the only non-manufacturing sector being
oil mining. It can be seen that within the manufacturing sector, the
least desirable sectors belong to the intermediate and capital-goods
category, although there are few of the consumer goods producing
sectors as well.
This approach to the selection of key sectors is intuitively
plausible; but it might also be correctly argued that in reality, for
the country as for many LDCs, the key constraint will be the
availability of foreign exchange with which to purchase these capital
goods since they are not produced at home. Thus, sectors should be
evaluated in terms of the size of their coefficients generated per
unit of imports or foreign exchange. In otherwords, only those
sectors which have potentially high labour/import or output/import
coefficients, say, can then be defined as 'key' sectors 16 . This
approach is followed here, the more so because as earlier indicated,
the capital coefficients in the primary sectors can hardly be
considered as reliable. In table 5:7 we show the global as well as
the M-sector direct plus indirect labour, value-added, wages and
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output requirements per unit of direct plus indirect imports. A
comparison of this table with table 5:3 will reveal the modification
in the ranking of sectors by the size of impact, when the coefficients
are related to the import constraint.
Applying the 'top 3rd ranking' criterion, we can now choose our
'key' sectors. For convenience we present in the tables below,
highest as well as lowest generators of employment, output,
value-added and wages both in terms of the global and M-sector
coefficients per unit of foreign exchange.
Table 5:8A
'Key' employment, output. value-added, and labour income sectors
Sector	 'Ranking of sectors in terms of: 
Llailr.ait= Wages/import Value-added/ Output/imports
imports
Agriculture 1 2 3 3
Forestry/Fishing 3 1 2 2
'Other' services 4 3 4 4
Distributive trade 6 5 5 5
Tobacco 7 8 9 9
Non-alcoholic bevg. 8 12 11 11
Miscellaneous 11 9 12 10
Other mining 12 4 8 12
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Table 5:8b
IS • ."-Ai • 	Al	 t J."	 :12! • "A 111..".1 	 S. 1.4!-	 V_ - • 0•-40 t
labour income per unit of foreign exchange
Sector
	
Ranking of sectors in terms of: 
IAIMUZiMPSY-t Wages/import Value-added/ Output/imports
koports
Paints 25 26 28 28
Indus. Chems. 27 27 32 31
Drugs & Medicines 28 28 30 29
Petroleum & coal 29 31 26 25
Soap 30 30 29 30
Machinery 31 33 31 32
Fabricated metals 32 32 33 33
Electrical equip. 33 34 34 34
Transport equip. 35 35 35 35
The worst sectors therefore, from the point of view of our objectives,
given the foreign exchange constraint, are those that belong to the
intermediate and capital goods category; while only a handful of the
manufacturing sectors can qualify as 'key' sectors. Thus if the
availability of foreign exchange is the only constraint, Nigeria
would be better off promoting the more 'traditional' consumer goods
producing sectors such as made-up textile goods, tobacco, cement,
textiles, non-alcoholic beverages and rubber and plastic products;
these are the sectors which conventional trade theory would argue, the
country has comparative advantage in.
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Table 5:8c
0-s	 • t Ti 	 C.;,-	 zAPII •4 AL 	 toc-o
and labour income: 14-sector coefficients per unit of foreign exchange
Sector	 Ranking of sectors in terms of: 
1,abouramport Wages/import Value-added/ Output/imports
imports
Miscellaneous 1 2 4 2
Made-up textiles 2 4 5 5
Tobacco 3 1 1 1
Cement 4 6 3 3
Textiles 5 7 7 7
Non-alcoholic bevg. 6 5 2 3
Rubber & plastics 7 8 8 8
Table 5:8d
Sectors generating lowest employments output. value-added and
labour income: 14-sector coefficients per unit of imports
Sector
	
Ranking of sectors in terms of:
Labour/import Wages/import Value-added/ Output/imports
imports
Fabricated metals 20 20 23 22
Electrical equip. 23 22 22 23
Transport equip. 24 24 24 24
Drugs & Medicines 18 18 20 18
Soap & perfumes 20 19 18 19
Machinery 21 23 19 20
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5:3:3 Evaluation of 'Key' EMployment Sectors (ii)
The total requirement measures have the defect, as was
previously indicated, of ignoring the spread effects of sectoral
expansion and of treating all sectors equally irrespective of their
different sizes. An alternative approach to the evaluation of 'key'
employment sectors is to consider the indices of (employment and
output) linkages in the economy.
Applying equation 5:18-5:21 we obtain the sectoral employment
backward and forward linkages and the sectoral coefficients of
variation. Both the indirect and direct plus indirect global and
M-sector coefficients are utilised. The resulting total and indirect
employment linkage indices are depicted in Tables 5:9-5:10.
An inspection of the tables will reveal that the results
obtained here are as disturbing, with regards to manufacturing
employment, as the previous ones. The only sectors with both backward
and forward employment linkage indices - viz agriculture, forestry and
fishing, distributive trade, finance and insurance and other services
- are all non-industrial. Of the eleven sectors with high backward
employment linkage indices, slightly above 50 percent are industrial:
food processing, non-alcoholic beverages, tobacco, textiles, made-up
textiles and miscellaneous products; while none of the industrial
sectors has a high forward linkage effect.
The 'spread effects' of sectoral expansion are also quite
minimal. This can be seen by considering the number of sectors with
backward and forward employment linkage indices above unity in terms
of the indirect coefficients (table 5:9). High indirect forward
linkages are recorded for agriculture, livestock, distributive trade,
finance and 'other' services, and high indirect backward linkage
indices are recorded for food processing, alcoholic beverages,
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Table 5:9 Direct plus Indirect Inter-Industrial
Linkage Indices, (global coefficients).
Employment
(1977)
Sector V.1- U.1- v.L
1 1 I 1
Manufacturing
6 3111/3122 Food 3.093 3.769 0.119 5 .704
7 3131/3133	 Alcoholic be y . 0.747 5.183 0.041 5.846
8 3134	 Non-alcoh.bev. 1.830 5.566 0.079 5.811
9 3140
	
Tobacco 1.943 5.533 0.061 5.905
10 3212	 Textiles 2.312 4.099 0 .278 5.412
11 3212	 Made-up text. 1.143 5.511 0.174 5.571
12
13
3220
	
Apparel
3231/3233	 Le a t	 rhe
0.741
0.769
5.801
5.455
0.187
0.126
4.996
4.705
14 3240
	
Footwear 0.403 5.111 0.144 5.699
15 3311/3320 Wood 0.528 5.155 0.295 4.3E0
16 3412/3420	 Paper 0.273 4.790 0.154 4.391
17
18
3511/3512	 Chemicals
3 521
	 Paints
0.215
0.210
5.823
5.332
0.062
0.044
3.025
3.264
19 3522	 Drugs 0.163 5.529 0.045 5.909
20 3523 Soap 0.152 4..53166 0.043 5.861
21 3529/3540 Other Chem. 0.123 5	 8 0.030 5.342
22 3551/3560 Rubber 0.423 4.918 0.171 4.012
23
24
25
3610/3699 Cement
3710/3812 Basic Metals
3813/3819 Fab.Metals
0.315
0.182
0.157
4.841
5.586
4 .607
0.148
0.087
0.073
4.53 3
4.544
5.876
26 3822/3829 Machinery 0.135 5.761 0.041 5.848
27
28
3832/3839
3841/3843
Elect.Machinery
Transport Equip
0.146
0.132
5.808
4 .569
0.057
0.019
5.849
5.915
29 3851/3909 Misc.products 1.378 5.364 0.114 3.404
Primary Sectors
1 Agr ic. 8.123 3.087 19.709 5.068
2 Livestock 1.283 5.855 1.947 5.595
3 Forestry 0.659 5.387 0.915 4.766
4 Oil Mining 0.030 4.873 0.005 5.412
5 Other Mining 0.307 4.863 0.138 3.846
Tertiary Sectors
30Electricity 0.739 5.555 0.578 2.911
31Building 0.295 2.171 0.131 5.713
32Transp&Comm. 0.471 3.996 0.613 3.139
33Trade 1.427 3.135 3.255 4.964
34Finance 2.761 5.416 3.270 3.942
350ther Servs. 1.392 4.987 1.849 5.024
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Table 5:9 contd.
The indirect inter-industrial employment linkages.
Sector U.1-
1
VI'
1
L.
U.
1
VI'
i
Manufacturing
6 3111/3122	 Food 6.154 2.264 0.048 5.659
7 3131/3133	 Alcoholic bev. 1.453 4.811 0.003 5.019
8 3134	 Non-alcoh.bev. 3.597 4.397 0.001 5.665
9 3140	 Tobacco 3.866 4.653 0.007 5.732
10 3212	 Textiles 4.475 2.389 0.297 5.501
11 3212	 Made-up text. 2.002 3.698 0.012 4.882
12 3220	 Apparel 1.163 3.459 0.025 4.504
13 3231/3233	 Leather 1.364 2.652 0.044 4.749
14 3240	 Footwear 0.538 4.548 0.006 5.873
15 3311/3320	 Wood 0.628 4.487 0.149 3.058
16 3412/3420	 Paper 0.365 5.784 0.140 5.093
17 3511/3512	 Chemicals 0.331 5.863 0.017 5.489
18 3521	 Paints 0.348 4.229 0.006 5.832
19 3522	 Drugs 0.243 5.891 0.002 5.885
20 3523	 Soap 0.228 5.099 0.004 5.965
21 3529/3540	 Other Chem. 0.216 5.511 0.025 4.863
22 3551/3560 Rubber 0.623 4.301 0.106 4.442
23 3610/3699 Cement 0.387 4.157 0.044 4.863
24 3710/3812 Basic Metals 0.230 3.123 0.035 4.229
25 3813/3819 Fab.Metals 0.175 4.513 0.003 5.225
26 3822/3829 Machinery 0.192 4.776 0.000
27 3832/3839 Elect.Machinery 0.182 4.529 0.000
28 3841/3843 Transport Equip 0.234 4.115 0.000
29 3851/3909 Misc.products 2.607 4.536 0.011 4.229
Primary
1	 Agric. 0.838 5.797 24.630 1.475
2	 Livestock 0.015 4.037 1.414 2.879
3	 Forestry 0.096 3.119 0.619 3.638
4	 Oil Mining 0.054 4.649 0.003 5.835
5	 Other Mining 0.417 2.981 0.691 3.987
Tertiary
30	 Electricity 0.583 5.900 0.252 4.810
31	 Building 0.401 5.130 0.066 5.009
32	 Transp&Comm. 0.469 5.136 0.761 4.35
33	 Trade 0.151 5.767 3.906 2.170
34	 Finance 0.259 5.572 1.306 2.001
35	 Other Servs. 0.229 5.264 1.167 2.206
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non-alcoholic beverages, tobacco, textiles, made-up textiles, wearing
apparel, leather products and miscellaneous manufactured goods. But
none of the sectors has both backward and forward linkage index above
unity.
Turning to the indices obtained using the M-sector coefficients,
we find that in terms of total employment linkage, eleven of the
twenty four industrial sectors have both backward and forward linkage
indices above unity and therefore qualify as key employment sectors.
The largest backward linkage indices are registered for wood products,
made-up textile goods and wearing apparel; while wood products and
textiles have the largest forward linkage effects.
Thus if we rank sectors by the size of their linkage effects and
apply the top and bottom third criterion to select key sectors we come
up with the following, in tables 5:11a and 5:11b, as, respectively,
the most labour intensive and least labour intensive sectors in the
economy:
Table 5:11a
gt both fongard and backward eiraccMeat_thAAWZ
Sector Global Coefficients
Rank
Backward linkage	 Forward linkage
Agriculture 1	 1
Finance & Insurance 3 2
Textiles 4 10
Trade 7 3
Other services 8 5
Livestock 10 4
Made-up textiles 11 12
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Table 5:11a - Continued/....
Sector M-Sector Coefficients
Rank
Backward linkage	 Forward linkage
Wood 1	 1
Textiles 5.5 2
Wearing apparel 3 3
Made-up textiles 2 4
Rubber products 8 5
Cement 7 7
Footwear 5.5 8
Table 5:11b
Least labour intensive sectors: sectors within the bottom third
ranking in terms of both forward and backward linkages
Sector Global Coefficients
Rank
Backward linkage	 Forward linkage
Industrial chemicals 28	 25
Paints 26 29
Drugs 28 28
Soap 30 30
Petroleum & coal 34 33
Fabricated metals 29 24
Machinery 32 31
Electrical machinery 31 27
Transport equipment 33 24
Oil Mining 35 35
Sector	 M-Sector Coefficients
Rank
Backward linkage 	 Forward linkage
Alcoholic beverages 21 22
Petroleum & coal 23 23
Transport equipment 24 24
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Thus the most labour intensive sectors are the non-traded (i.e.
tertiary) and primary sectors with only two manufacturing sectors;
while of the 10 least labour intensive sectors, only one was
non-manufacturing.
The inevitable conclusion one would arrive at from these results
is that, for Nigeria, it appears that the ability and/or capacity to
generate employment (and income) via industrial promotion is severely
limited, at least within the existing policy framework. The key to
more rapid employment generation perhaps lies in the forward effects
of expansion of the primary and the tertiary sectors, and especially
the former. For example, it is possible, at least in principle, that
by expanding those processing industries using raw materials from the
primary sectors, considerable employment would be directly and
indirectly generated. It is instructive to note that some of the few
sectors with high backward linkage indices (indirect as well as total)
involve the processing of agricultural products: food processing,
tobacco, non-alcoholic beverages, textiles, made-up textiles, or of
forest products: wood products and furniture, paper products and
rubber products etc. In practice, whether the expansion of these
sectors does lead to an increased utilisation of productive factors -
labour - will crucially depend upon a multiplicity of factors,
including government policy, which may or may not encourage industries
to respond to the stimulus.
However, a direct assault on the problem would perhaps require
not just the expansion of primary and tertiary sectors, but also a
complementary change in actual policy and strategy of
industrialisation. In the section which follows, we intend to briefly
look at the factor content of the country's trade in manufactures, so
5:22a
5:22b
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as to gain some insight into the possible employment implications of
alternative trade strategies. We shall attempt to explore the
possible gains (or losses) in employment from the adoption of an
export promotion (or the continuation of the import-subsitution)
policy in the country. Will increases in the export of manufactures
lead to better results with regards to the employment of labour or of
capital?
5:4 Factor proportions in import substitution and export promotion in
Nigeria
Although we are essentially concerned with the 'employment
problem' we find it necessary also to consider the implications of
alternative strategies on other crucial variables, such as
value-added, output, wages, capital and foreign exchange. We follow
the conventional approach as earlier described in section 1, and use
the following general expressions to derive the input and output
multipliers in import-substitution () and export-promotion (x)
where (I)* is a matrix of type mxn, in is the number of sectors (=24) and
n is the number of variables (=5), viz direct plus indirect labour,
capital, foreign exchange, wages and value-added as earlier derived,
and pm (pe) is a vector of sectoral shares in total imports (exports).
Note that one could use not only the direct plus indirect
coefficients but also the direct and/or indirect coefficients in
deriving the multipliers. Thus for example, the direct employment
Multiplier in importing (exporting) will be given by the expressions:
m	 dmede
4) 131, = k P ( (Pa = k P ) etc.
5:23
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Once these expressions are estimated, we can calculate the net effect
that foreign trade has on our variables. For example, let lm
 and le
be the direct plus indirect employment multipliers in import
substitution and export promotion respectively. Then the net
employment effect of foreign trade can be measured by
Nn = stm/t e
 5:24
so that if Nr < 1, one can conclude that importables generate less
employment vis-a-vis exporting and the opposite holds if N n > 1.
Applying the various expressions for the 1977 data gives the following
results, summarised in tables 5:12 and 5:13.
Table 5:12 
Direct. Indirect and Total Employment Capital, Foreign Exchange
Wages and Value-added Generated in Import Substitution and
Exporting in 1977 
Replacement of
Imports
Direct Indirect Total
Employment
a 60.90 532.00 593.00
34.30 251.00 284.90
Capital
a 0.914 0.119 1.033
0.914 0.121 1.035
Foreign exchange
a 0.3743 0.0190 0.3935
0.3453 0.0145 0.3598
Wages
a 0.0878 0.0560 0.1438
0.0543 0.0326 0.0869
Value-added
a 0.3955 0.2108 0.6063
0.2326 0.1261 0.3587
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Table 5:12 - Continued/.
Production of
Exports
Direct Indirect Total
c Employment 51.970 181.000 232.900
d Capital 0.938 0.337 1.275
e Foreign exchange 0.238 0.049 0.287
f Wages 0.077 0.040 0.116
g Value-added 0.428 0.285 0.713
Notes: a: Sectoral shares in total manufactured imports;
b: sectoral shares in competitive imports.
* labour requirements are per one million N of gross output.
Table 5:13 
Ratio of Requirements in Import Substitution to Requirements in
EXportinn
Direct Indirect Total
Employment a/c 1.17 2.94 2.54
b/c 0.66 1.39 1.22
Capital a/d 0.97 0.35 0.81
b/d 0.97 0.356 0.81
Foreign a/c 1.58 0.39 1.37
exchange b/e 1.45 0.30 1.25
Wages a/f 1.15 1.41 1.24
b/f 0.71 0.82 0.75
Value- aA3 0.92 0.74 0.85
added b/g 0.54 0.44 0.50
Table 5:12 shows the total input requirements and the total income
generated for hypothetical changes in exports and imports. For
example to replace 1 N million worth of imports would require 593
workers (or 285 in the case of competitive imports), would generate
wages and value-added amounting to, respectively, N143.8 and N606.3
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thousand and would require expenditure on foreign exchange and capital
to the tune of, respectively, N393.5 and N1033 thousand. On the
otherhand, to produce 1N million worth of exports would require about
233 workers and about N1,275 thousand worth of capital etc.
Table 5:13 shows the ratios of the direct, indirect and total
requirements in import substitution to those in exporting. For
convenience, we shall consider only the ratios relating to the total
requirements (Col. 3).
It can be seen that with regards to employment, import
substitutes paradoxically embody more labour than exports. This is
true whether we consider total manufactured imports or competitive
imports. The ratio of labour requirements in import substitution to
that in exporting is 2.54 when total import shares are used and 1.22
when only competitive imports shares are used. Similarly, capital
requirements are lower in importing and this is also regardless of
whether total or competing import shares are used. In either case,
the amount of capital needed to replace N1 million worth of imports
could produce about N 1.2 million worth of exports in 1977. The total
amount of wages generated would be N143.8 thousands in the replacement
of total imports, N86.9 in the replacement of competitive imports and
N116.3 thousand in the production of manufactured exports. However,
import substitution is unambiguously more foreign exchange using than
exporting: the ratio of foreign exchange needed to replace N 1 million
worth of total imports to the foreign exchange needed to N 1 million
worth of exports is 1.37; this implies that the foreign exchange
needed to replace N 1 million worth of imports could, alternatively,
be used to produce N 729.9 thousand worth of exports in 1977.
Finally, it can also be seen that export production is unambiguously
more value added generating than the production for imports.
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Thus with regards to the employment of labour in the Nigerian
economy, the result reached here to the effect that Nn
 > 1 does not
support the H-0 theorem and would, therefore, seem to confirm the
paradoxical result obtained by Leontief with regards to U.S. trade.
From the point of view of the employment problem our results
have important implications in the choice of trade policies. Given
that importables embody more labour (and/or less capital per head)
than exportables, a policy of import substitution (with exports held
fixed) would generate a higher demand for labour than a policy of
export expansion with imports held fixed. Thus with
distribution of income between factors, if we assume
employment and a less than perfectly elastic supply
higher demand for labour would have an additional
effect in favour of labour. This conclusion implies
the rate of labour absorption in the economy (which
regards to the
less than full
of labour, the
redistributive
implicitly that
we found to be
low) would be (even) lower under an export expansionary policy.
From the point of view of increasing value-added and foreign
exchange earnings however, the attractiveness of the IS policy is
limited. Given the acute shortage of foreign exchange and the urgent
need to reduce the economy's dependence on earnings from oil exports,
one would be inclined to conclude that a strategy based on the
promotion of exports would place the country on a more sound footing
than the existing strategy which emphasises the replacement of
imports.
It must be emphasised that the above analysis is highly
hypothetical and restrictive in its assumptions. In particular, our
results depend crucially upon the technology and the structure of
Nigeria's foreign trade as of 1977. Given that both variables are not
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invariant through time, it will be wrong to project these figures to
other - previous or future - years.
In spite of this shortcoming however, the paradoxical result
that Nigeria's manufactured exports embody less labour than imports
requires some further explanation. More generally, one needs to
explain why the rate of labour absorption within the Nigerian
manufacturing sector is generally low. This will be discussed in the
following section.
5:5 Factor Intensity and Protection: Theoretical explanations and
morical verification: 
5:5:1 Theoretical Explanations 
The inability of the industrial sector to generate sufficient
employment opportunities is a phenomena that is widely observed in
many LDCs. Inspite of the significant progress made in manufacturing,
the growth of employment in the sector has been far slower than labour
force or population growth and indeed some countries are said to have
experienced absolute fall in the level of employment 17 . How is this
poor performance explained in the literature?18
In explaining the factor intensity of production in the LDCs,
one can identify a number of 'schools of thought' each placing
different emphasis on the relative importance of the critical
determinants of technology choice. The conventional or neo-classical
school stresses the critical importance of relative factor prices in
determining such a choice.
In many LDCs pursuing the IS strategy, it is asserted, credit,
fiscal and exchange rate incentives have been liberally extended in
order to promote rapid investment in the industrial sector, to the
effect that the private price of capital is rendered cheap relative to
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its social opportunity cost. In addition, certain government measures
have tended to substantially increase the market price of labour
relative to its social opportunity costs. The net effect of the
capital and labour market distortions has been to increase the
relative price of labour and hence to induce cost minimizing
entrepreneurs to utilise more of the cheaper input.
The neo-classical approach is, put simply, based on the premise
that there exists a wide range of production techniques with varying
input requirements from which private profit maximizing producers can
choose. This approach is illustrated below:
Fi g ur e 2
Two factors of production are assumed: homogeneous capital (K forming
the y axis) and labour (homogeneous too, the quantity of which, L
forms the X axis) to be used in different combinations to produce a
given volume of production represented by the equal product curve Q.
The slope of Q at any point is the marginal rate of technical
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substitution between K and L measured in physical units. Each
technique of production - i.e. any possible combination of capital and
labour - is represented by a straight line from the origin at an
angle that is greater in proportion as the technique is
capital-intensive or labour-saving. If the prices of the factors (or
their rewards) are given and represented by AA & MM, the slope of
which is the relative price of capital and labour, one can choose from
among the different possible techniques the one which, with a given
stock of factors of production, weighted in accordance with their
relative prices, makes it possible to maximize immediate production.
To see the response of private enterpreneurs whose goal is
cost-minimisation to the variation in relative factor prices in
choosing techniques, suppose first, that the flatter line MM represent
the relative factor prise ratio facing entrepreneurs in the economy;
the optimum K/L combination lies on the ray OB; point n being the
point at which the marginal rate of substitution between K and L is
equal to their relative prices, is thus the cheapest way of producing
the level of output Q.
Suppose now the level of output is kept constant but that a
subsidy in some form on capital is introduced or that a government
wage legislation pushes up the price of labour such that it is
available only at increasing costs. The relative price line AA will
then represent this situation. Labour is now relatively more
expensive and therefore the cost minimizing producer is induced to use
the subsidized input relatively more intensively. The optimum input
combination from the point of view of the producer, now lies on the
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ray OC and point nn, being the point at which MRS = Px/Ry , is now the
cheapest way of producing the level of output Q.
Given that the LDCs are characterised by cheap (because of
plentiful) labour supplies, the relative price line MM more correctly
represents their factor availability and the optimum allocation of
resources therefore will be achieved by using a more labour intensive
technique and by being at equilibrium point n. on the other hand,
since these economies are often characterised by highly distorted
product and factor markets, relative factor prices may bias the choice
of technique and the actual equilibrium point at which producers using
inappropriate techniques find themselves is represented by the point
nn. Thus an appropriate change in the relative primary factor prices
as a way of reducing capital deepening and/or increasing the rate of
labour absorption in the economy is often recommended.
The neo-classical theorists' recommendation that LDC's should
make use of capital-saving equipment since they are labour-surplus (or
labour abundant), is considered even by its critics 19 as intuitively
plausible. A fundamental objection to the approach, the critics
argue, stems from the premise underlying the theory, about the range
of techniques available and the critical determinants of their choice.
With regards to the latter, it is argued that undue emphasis is placed
upon the role of relative factor prices to the neglect of the basic
structural features of the LDCs, a set of characteristics associated
with different techniques of production, the nature of the environment
in which industries operate as well as the differences in objectives
between entrepreneurs, which are equally important and often more so
in determining the possibility and/or desirability of
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adopting a particular technique in a particular country and the
implications of so doing.
In explaining the nature of technological choice especially in
less developed countries, critics of the neo-classical theory
generally start from the premise that such a 'rational' choice of
technology does not, in fact, exist or is at least "largely
circumscribed by technological developments in the advanced
countries" 20 . Since the under-developed countries are largely
characterised by a structural incapacity to produce the capital goods
that are required for 'enlarged reproduction', they will be forced to
assimilate certain techniques of production embodied in a technology
that is produced in the advanced countries. But the machines and
technology produced in the developed countries, like any other goods,
are often designed for and adapted to, the requirements of the markets
in which they are produced and sold. Specifically they emerge as a
natural response of the developed countries' own local factor
endownment (i.e. their relative labour scarcities, the availability of
complementary inputs such as skilled labour), vastly large markets as
measured by the level and distribution of income, their competitive
structures and other historical and economic circumstances, alien to
or not shared by the LDCs. As such, these techniques need not be
appropriate to the LDCs requirements. The LDCs are therefore
described as 'technology dependent' 21
 with the obvious consequences
that the factor bias of imported technology, the types of industries
that can be set up and even the range in the choice of products that
is acceptable within the given structure of domestic demand are
rigidly specified. For, as Stewart (1976) argues, to import a foreign
technology, a country must also be ready to import the whole 'package'
that goes with it, including "the nature and specification of the
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product, scale of production, skill and managerial requirements,
marketing arrangements and brand names, raw materials processing,
packaging, selling and marketing" 22
 etc. This is particularly true in
the case of import substitution strategy which more often than not,
begins with the production at home, formally imported products, with
the same or only slightly different product specification to ensure
'consumer satisfaction'. Under this circumstance the tendency to
adopt capital intensity (and as will be argued in later chapters, the
observed foreign exchange intensity) in production is really necessary
irrespective of the prevailing factor prices.
Technological constraints of this nature are however only one
factor in determining the capital intensity of industrial investment
in the LDCs. Indeed, even barring the existence of these supply side
constraints, the arguments are often advanced that the criteria of
choice made among available technologies can vary widely depending on
the type of investor making the selection, as well as the objectives
of such a choice. First, where the government plays a dominant role
in the choice of techniques, capital intensive methods may be
preferred, because of certain dynamic considerations such as the
development of a skilled workforce, the fostering of interindustrial
linkages and other external economies which cannot be reaped from the
application of labour intensive processes. Second, even private
entrepreneurs it is argued,may be driven by certain competitive
pressures to select capital intensive techniques, irrespective of the
prevailing factor prices. For example, it is very likely that to
produce internationally competitive products, a domestic producer in
the LDCs must have recourse to the same methods and standard of
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efficiency in the production of export goods as in the developed
countries against which he wishes to compete. This argument may be a
weak one in so far as empirical evidence does suggest that
manufactured exports from the newly industrialising countries to the
developed countries have tended to be labour intensive. However, the
clamour by unions in the developed countries for their governments to
erect high tariff barriers to imports of labour intensive goods from
the less developed countries could be cited as an example of why, in
the real world, choice could not be so very different in the
under-developed countries from what they are in the industrialised
world.
Third, within the class of private profit seeking entrepreneurs
operating in the economy, it is possible also to make a distinction in
respect of the financing of investment in the sort of choice made by
foreign firms and domestic firms. As a rule there is a wide gap in
technological knowledge, availability of funds to finance investment
etc. between a multinational enterprise and domestic firms.
Possession and use of a superior technology is infact one of the
distinctive features of multinational corporations. The foreign
entrepreneur may want to maintain similar techniques to those used by
the parent company in the more developed countries, either because he
is less financially constrained, or because they are more factor
productive or simply for the convenience of having the expertise and
same maintenance team all over the world. For these reasons, even
where domestically produced capital goods are available in the LDCs,
foreign firms may not be willing to risk their operations by
substituting domestic equipment which might appear to be cheaper (and
inferior) for more modern imported machinery unless compelled by the
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government to do so. On their part, domestically based entrepreneurs
may be inclined to copy such techniques existing in the developed
countries and used by their foreign counterparts in order to achieve
the same standard of efficiency and survive in the domestic
competitive struggle.
It must be emphasised in conclusion that it is not so much that
the neo-classical model is invalid and therefore should be rejected as
that it only partially explains the choice of techniques in practice.
It emphasises only two (capital and labour) of the manifold items
contained in a technology package and concentrates in terms of the
selection criteria on just one, the relative prices of factors. It
thus leads to the conclusion that 'rationality' in behaviour dictates
for the LDCs the policy of getting 'prices right' to promote what is
considered an appropriate technology choice. On the other hand,
critics argue that in so far as there exists no local capital goods
sector able to facilitate the introduction of new machines designs and
labour intensive technologies and processes more in line with the
factor endownment of the LDCs, one cannot meaningfully talk of an
'optimum' or rational choice of techniques in these countries. They
emphasise the existence of a multiplicity of objectives and of
decision makers, the institutional and economic environment, the scale
of output etc as significant determinants of choices to be made in
techniques of production. Their arguments then lead to the conclusion
that even in an environment which domestic market prices reflect
relative factor scarcities, the interplay of these factors could
necessitate the adoption of capital intensity in production.
The main threads of the argument can, of course, be offered as
testable hypothesis subject to empirical verification. For example,
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whether ex poste choices of techniques exist and the possible role of
factor prices can be examined by estimating sectoral elasticities of
substitution. This will be undertaken in Chapter 6. Whether foreign
firms are more capital intensive than domestic-owned firms can be
examined by comparing their different factor proportions in production
over a period of timen . This is not undertaken here for lack of a
detailed data pertaining to the operation of the two categories of
firms. In what follows, a more general investigation of the
relationship between factor proportions and effective rates of
protection in Nigeria, will be undertaken.
5:5:2 Factor proportions and effective rates of protection: An
evalcal verification
Within a neo-classical framework, one would expect, ceteris 
paribus, sectoral effective rates of protection to be positively
correlated with capital intensity in production if non optimal
policies are pursued. The hypothesis follows from the H-0 model of
trade which predicts that to induce domestic production (use) of a
good (factor) that would not be produced (used) in a free-trade
situation, higher levels of protection must be granted the further
away the production (use) of this good (factor) would be from its
comparative advantage. In other words, the increasing use of a scarce
factor of production - capital - in a 'surplus' labour economies like
Nigeria can only be induced and/or maintained behind high tariff
walls24.
The relationship between erp and factor intensity in Nigeria is
tested in a number of ways. First, we used the classification of
sectors according to the height of effective rate of protection (see
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Chapter 4, table 4:E5) and then computed average factor intensity for
each group of sectors falling into each of the four erp classes. If
the above hypothesis is valid, we would expect sectors in the lower
class of erp to exhibit higher levels of labour intensity than sectors
in the upper class of erp. Conversely, the more highly protected
sectors would be expected to have higher levels of capital intensity
than the less protected ones.
As measures of labour intensity, we use direct, as well as the
direct plus indirect labour requirements in domestic production, while
capital intensity is measured by direct capital-labour, capital-output
and capital-value added ratios. The results are displayed in table
5:14.
Our results suggest that the structure of effective protection
does have some influence on factor requirements, although the
relationship is not wholly unambiguous. It can be seen that for
example, the most highly protected sectors (erp = 200%) have average
direct labour requirements lower than the corresponding average for
the least protected sectors (erp 50%) as predicted, but higher than
that of sectors receiving low to moderate rate of protection (erp =
50-100%). Similarly, sectors which receive moderate to high rates of
effective protection (101-200%) have, on average, higher
capital-labour ratios than sectors which receive low to moderate erp.
However, with these few exceptions, the results can be used to
confirm a point made earlier, that the effective rates of protection
can be used to indicate resource movement at least for the least and
most protected sectors in the economy. For example, sectors within
the range of erp 51-100% have, on average, lower (higher) labor
coefficients (capital-labour, capital-output ratios) than sectors
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receiving a lower rate of protection; similarly sectors with erp above
200% have on average, lower (higher) labour requirements
(capital-labour, capital-output ratios) than those within the range
101-200%; and finally in all cases, the most highly protected sectors
have lower average labour coefficients and higher average
capital-labour and capital-output ratios.
Table 5:14
Factor intensity coefficients grouped by level of net effective
rate of protection (1977)
Factor intensity level of net effective rate of protection:
measure  50% 51-100%	 101-200%	 200%
(low) (low to mod.) (mod, to high) (high)
Direct labour
requirements 0.084 0.051 0.109 0.077
Total labour
requirements 0.105 0.056 0.132 0.088
Total labour
requirement per
unit of imports 0.969 0.308 0.592 0.951
Total capital
requirements 0.962 0.990 1.652 1.865
Direct capital
labour ratios 14.350 25.600 19.460 29.920
Total capital
labour ratios 22.350 27.530 24.440 34.370
Source: Computed from tables 5:1 - 5:7.
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As a further test, we obtained coefficients of rank and
Pearsonean correlation between the various measures of factor
intensity and effective protection. We also specified and estimated a
regression equation of the form
logFI = oc (+ -)log erp + u 	 5:25
where Fl = factor intensity measure
erp = effective rate of protection.
(The sign of (3 is expected to be positive if Fl is a measure of
capital intensity and negative if Fl is a measure of labour
intensity). The various results are displayed in tables 5:15 and 5:16.
From the former, it can be seen that although, as we hypothesized,
labour intensity is negatively correlated with effective rates of
protection, the coefficients are extremely low and not significant at
any 'respectable' level of significance. The same applies to the
import requirements: although positive, the correlation coefficients
are insignificant. However, all the capital-intensity measures are
positively (and significantly) correlated with erp's, a result which
is confirmed by the regression results shown in table 5:16. Here we
see that in all eight equations, the (3 coefficients have the expected
signs and are significant in five. In addition, all equations -
except 6, 7 and 8 - perform quite well: the proportion of variations
in capital intensity which is explained by the protection granted to
industries ranges from 0.27 to 0.63.
Our results do seem to support the neo-classical contention that
high and differentiated structure of protection would tend to
encourage the movement of resources into sectors which use intensively
the country's scarcest factor of production. More specifically, the
law labour absorption performance of Nigerian manufacturing could be
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Table 5:15 Coefficients of Correlation between
measures of capital intensity and/or
labour intensity and net effective
rates of protection 1977.
Measure of factor intensity	 Coefficients of corr.
correlated with net erp
Pearson Rank
(1) Total labour requirements
per unit of foreign exchange
-0.078 -0.065
(2) Total labour requirements
a) global coefficients
-0.079 -0.005
b) m-sector coefficients 0.163 -0.053
(3) Capital requirements
a)	 direct 0.620* 0.593*
b)	 direct plus	 indirect 0.510* 0.42**
(4) Capital Value-added
	 (direct) 0.380** 0.450*
(5) Capital labour ratio (direct) 0.240 0.360
(6) Total import requirements 0.032 0.070
* coefficient significant at 1% level
** coefficient significant at 5% level.
Source:computed using data in tables 5:1-5:3,5:6-5:7,and 4:11.
erp
capital value-
-added(1977)
-1.89 ++
(-2.60)
0.595 +	0.35	 0.32 11.8
(3.430)
4
310
Table 5:16 Factor Intensity and Effective Protection:
a regression analysis.
equation	 dependent	 const.
no.	 variable	 term
capital/labour
	 -1.82+	 1.541+
	 0.62 0.60
(1974)	 (-6.73)	 (6.79)
2	 capital/labour
	 -0.35	 0.680+	 0.27 0.23 7.98
(1977)
	 (-0.35)	 (2.830)
3	 capital/value-
-added, (1974)	
-5.09	 1.089 +	0.63
	 0.61 35.6
(-5.94)	 (5.963)
5	 capital/output
	 -2.96+
	 0.662 +	0.42	 0.39 15.6
	
(1977)
	
(-4.21)	 (3.96)
6	 direct labour
requirements
	
(1974)
	 1.01	 -0.201	 0.03	 0.7
(0.88)	 (-0.201)
7	 total labour
requirements	 -0.81	 -0.026
(-1.05)	 (-0.144)
8	 total import
.83 
+
-1requirements	 0.03
(1977)
	
(-3.22)	 (0.233)
0.9
--- 0.8
	  implies R2 very negligible or negative.
t ratios in parenthesis.
+ significant at 1% level
++ significant at 10% level
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explained to a fairly large extent by its import substitution policy.
As we have seen in chapter 4, this policy has tended to extend
liberally tax and tariff incentives which could favour the development
of more capital-intensive activities and hence have a negative effect
on employment. It can be concluded therefore that if the government
is fully committed to the expansion of industrial employment, a change
in the existing policy and strategy of industrialisation will be
called for. The specific nature of this change and the likely
magnitude of the employment opportunities to be created with the
change will be outlined in a later chapter.
5:6 The Evaluation of 'Key' Sectors in Nigeria: Technological 
(Inter-industry) Linkage Indices 
In this final section of the chapter, we shall consider the
degree of industrial linkages realised in the economy and hence
identify 'key' sectors - corresponding to those with the highest
backward and forward linkages - for promotion. The relationship
between sectoral linkages, income and employment, which has received
alot of attention in the literature will also be considered.
Table 5:17 provides a complete listing of inter-industry linkage
indices derived by the use of equations 5:13, 5:14, 5:16 and 5:17:
From column 1 of table 5:17 it is observed that nineteen sectors have
high backward linkage indices, 15 of which are manufacturing, 1
primary and the other three tertiary sectors. The high backward
linkage indices of the manufacturing sectors reflect in large part the
resource endownment of the economy. It can be seen that five of
these, namely food processing, non-alcoholic beverages, textiles,
made-up textiles and wearing apparel, involve the processing of
312
agricultural products; the leather and footwear industries could be
linked to the livestock sector and the wood/furniture and paper
products sectors to the forestry sector. On the otherhand, the low
backward linkage effects of the sectors manufacturing and/or
assembling intermediate and capital goods reflects their import
intensity of production. For example, the 1975 ratio of imported raw
materials to total raw materials was above 90% for industrial
chemicals, 68% for fabricated metals, 35% for machinery and 87% and
94% respectively for electrical and transport equipment sectors. (see
table 3:24) More recent estimates (table 4:2) show that the ratio of
raw material imports to output is up to 34% for industrial chemicals
sector, 54% for fabricated metals, 32% for machinery, 55% and 75%
respectively for electrical and transport equipment sectors.
The backward linkage effects of the Nigerian economic sectors
can be compared to the corresponding effects found for a cross section
of LDC's and DCs. The latter are reproduced in table 5:18. It can be
observed from columns 1 and 3 of the table that the linkage effects of
the primary and tertiary sectors are, as we have found, low. Secondly,
most of the sectors we identified in Nigeria to have high backward
linkage effects have also been identified in the case of the DCS and
LDCs. What is very surprising is that Nigeria's backward linkage
indices for some sectors appear to be superior to those in other
countries. One must however be cautious in interpreting this result.
First, the difference in the results could be due to the differences
in the definition and classification of sectors. For example in table
5:18, 'food processing' is defined to include sectors which we
classified separately as food processing, alcoholic beverages,
non-alcoholic beverages and tobacco. The average backward linkage
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Table :17 Inter-Industrial Linkage Indices in the
Nigerian Economy(Global Coefficients).
(1977)
U J V- U1 VI classification*
Manufacturing
sectors
6 3111/3122 touu 1.182 4.155 0.915 5.129 III
7	 3131/3133 Alcoholic bev. 0.951 4.721 0.964 5.889 IV
8	 3134 Non-alcoh.bev. 1.012 4.399 0.744 5.904 III
9	 3140 Tobacco 1.018 4.365 0.739 5.913 III
10	 3211 Textiles 1.199 4.430 1.539 3.626 II
11	 3212 Made-up	 text. 1.262 3.759 0.764 5.719 III
12	 3220 Apparel 1.119 4.031 0.791 5.629 III
13 3231/3233 Leather 1.251 3.938 0.889 5.229 III
14	 3240 Footwear 1.058 4.109 0.753 5.799 III
15 3311/3320 Wood 1.153 4.472 0.979 5.186 III
16 3412/3420 Paper 1.052 4.973 1.328 3.925 II
17 3511/3512 Chemicals 0.099 4.649 0.852 5.451 IV
18 3521 Paints
.1000 4.394 0.795 5.533 III
19 3522 Drugs 0.963 4.636 0.754 5.915 IV
203523 Soap 0.914 4.856 0.767 5.804 IV
21 3529/3540 Other Chem. 1.198 5.520 1.256 5.264 II
22 3551/3560 Rubber 1.086 4.499 1.057 4.617 II
23 3610/3699 Cement 1.091 4.296 0.865 5.428 III
24 3710/3812 Basic Metals 0.973 5.173 0.917 5.489 IV
25 3813/3819 Fab.Metals 0.876 5.024 0.752 5.872 IV
26 3822/3829 Machinery 0.822 5.310 0.742 5.897 IV
27 3832/3829 Elect.Machinery 0.828 5.275 0.741 5.905 IV
28 3841/3843 Transport Equip 0.844 5.194 0.745 5.910 IV
29	 3851/3909 Misc.products 1.349 3.231 0.775 5.666 III
Primary sectors
Agric. 0.801 5.733 1.886 2.666 I
Livestock 0.749 5.824 1.144 4.099 I
Forestry 0.774 5.636 1.102 4.042 I
Oil Mining 0.778 5.633 1.135 3.838 I
Other Mining 1.062 4.242 0.977 4.491 III
Tertiary sectors
Electricity 1.027 4.302 0.937 4.657 III
Building 1.045 4.356 0.976 4.639 III
Transp&Comm. 1.000 4.523 1.864 2.421 II
Trade 0.879 5.057 1.776 2.421 I
Finance 0.895 4.935 0.916 4.503 IV
Other Servs. 0.793 5.523 1.066 4.107 I
*The Classification Procedure used is: I=high forward,low
backward index; II=high forward and backward index; III=
high backward,low forward index and IV=low backward,low
forward index.
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Table 517 contd.	 Inter_Industrial Linkage Indices,
M-sector coefficients.
Sector U
,T
V
J
U
1
V
I
Classification
6 3111/3122	 Food 0.936 4.753 1.037 4.279 I
7 3131/3133	 Alcoholic bev. 0.920 4.625 0.871 4.896 IV
8	 3134	 Non-alcoh bev. 0.890 4.667 0.849 4.896 IV
9	 3140	 Tobacco 0.891 4.638 0.845 4.899 IV
10	 3212	 Textiles 1.031 4.808 1.753 2.982 II
11	 3212	 Made-up text. 1.249 3.585 0.874 4.738 III
12	 3220	 Apparel 1.135 3.765 0.904 4.661 III
13	 3231/3233	 Leather
14	 3240
	
Footwear
15 3311/3320
	
Wood
0.979
0.999
1.013
4.481
4.131
4.761
1.016
0.861
1.106
4.325
4.803
4.346
I
IV
II
16	 3412/3420	 P aper 1.064 4.667 1.438 3.476 II
17	 3511/3512	 C hemicals 1.107 4.317 0.972 4.522 III
18	 3521	 Paints 0.989 4.202 0.901 4.627 IV
19	 3 52 2	 Drugs 0.962 4.390 0.863 4.898 IV
203523	 Soap 0.952 4.418 0.876 4.811 IV
21 3529/3540 Other Chem. 1.300 4.824 1.431 4.371 II
22	 3551/3560 Rubber 1.005 4.612 1.119 4.125 II
23	 3610/3699 Cement 0.996 4.460 0.969 4.587 IV
24 3710/3812 Basic Metals 0.997 4.788 1.032 4.619 I
25	 3813/3819 Fab.Metals 0.878 4.761 0.860 4.897 IV
26 3822/3829 Machinery 0.862 4.804 0.848 4.882 IV
27	 3832/3839 Elect.Machinery 0.860 4.812 0.847 4.889 IV
28 3841/3843 Transport Equip 0.877 4.736 0.850 4.894 IV
29 3851/3909 Misc.products 1.196 3.447 0.878 4.741 III
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index for these sectors amount to 1.04 compared to 1.178 and 1.141
respectively for DC's and LDCs. Similarly, the average index for
industrial chemicals, paints, drugs and medicines, soap and petroleum
products (classified under industrial chemicals in table 5:18) is only
0.834, compared to 1.071 and 1.068 for DCs and LDCs respectively.
Second, even where such differences in classification do not exist,
the higher backward linkage indices for Nigeria's industries need not
imply a superior level of integration of the economy's sectors: they
could for example be the result of sheer inefficient utilisation of
inputs which would tend to inflate the input requirements per unit of
output; or they could have come about because of heavier reliance on
purchased input by these sectors from a few rather than many sectors.
This latter is evident from the larger coefficients of variation found
for Nigeria than for the LDCs and DCs.
Turning now to the forward linkage effects, we find eleven
sectors with an index greater than 1. High forward linkages are
associated with:
(a) The services sectors such as electricity and water,
transport and communication and trade whose 'output' provide vital
inputs to the manufacturing sector.
(b) The primary (i.e. natural resource based) sectors notably
agriculture, livestock, forestry and fishing and mining, whose output
as we have seen is utilised as inputs in several of the sectors with
high backward linkage effects and
(c) A handful of manufacturing industries such as textiles,
paper products, petroleum and coal products and rubber and plastic
products.
If we apply the Chenery-Watanabe --Hirschman classification
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procedure, then the most important sectors are textiles, paper
products, printing and publishing, petroleum and coal products, rubber
and plastic products and transport and communications; the least
important are nine manufacturing sectors (alcoholic beverages,
industrial chemicals, drugs and medicines, soap and perfumes, basic
metals, fabricated metals, machinery, electrical and transport
equipment); and one tertiary sector (finance and insurance).
The low forward and linkage effects of intermediate and capital
goods producing sectors and the general absence of 'key' industries is
then clearly evident. The result may appear disturbing for a number
of reasons: the industries which constitute these categories are often
the largest and most important source of external economies -
technological diffusion, creation of skills etc. They are also known
historically to be very dynamic in the sense that they grow faster and
more rapidly than most other industrial branches. Their absence here
would imply that the Nigerian manufacturing industry is still far from
being an autonomous, self-sustaining sector capable of generating the
necessary inter-industry linkages for self-generating development. It
can be argued that the absence of linkages is perhaps due to the
relative recency of the intermediate and capital goods producing
sectors in particular or even the manufacturing sectors in general and
as such some time is needed for these to induce any significant
linkages. To that extent therefore, it is not their realised linkages
that will be evaluated but the potential backward and forward linkage
effects which can still be achieved in the future. Assuming similar
demand and/or industrial growth patterns in Nigeria and other
developed countries, the differentials between the linkage indices for
those sectors in Nigeria and the sectors abroad may be taken as a
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measure of the strength of the linkages yet to be induced (i.e. of
potential linkages). Thus with time, and as income grows in Nigeria,
those industries with higher absolute differences will develop faster
than the others and the degree of inter-industry linkages enhanced.
The assumption of a similarity in demand and/or growth patterns is
however, very restrictive, and one should not be excessively confident
that the potential linkages will indeed be translated into actual
growth. Moreover, differences do exist in the policy of
industrialisation and certain policies can indeed inhibit the
realisation of these linkages. For example as a rule, the
manufacturing process of several import substituting industries
protected by high tariff walls is often restricted to final touches
and or assembling of imported components. It is therefore, as we have
seen, highly import intensive with the result that the different
sectors carry out only minor domestic exchanges among themselves. No
sector will therefore have any 'integrating' or 'mobilising' effects
upon the rest of the economy. Nor will the profitable establishment
of producer goods sectors be automatically induced - especially given
the extremely narrow home market for luxury consumer goods, the lack
of a widening impact of investment (since most of the income generated
is spent on imports) and the high profitability of consumer goods
industries, thanks to the high protective rates.
The desirability of having a high degree of sectoral
inter-relatedness in the economy can, of course, be questioned
especially when this does not satisfy or conflicts with other
fundamental objectives of industrialisation. For example, the
possibility of a trade-off between high industrial linkages on the one
hand and employment and income-generation objectives of
industrialisation has received some attention in the literature. In a
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study of inter-industry linkages for a cross section of countries in
Asia, Panchamukhi (1975) 25 found an inverse relationship between
income and output multipliers, a result which suggests that
investments made on the basis of sectoral linkages (output) will
actually work to hinder the generation of income. Since the latter is
often associated with employment creation, the results suggest also
that higher linkages will be anti-employment creation. Similarly, in
another separate study of employment and output effects of sectors,
Hazari and Krishnamurty (1970) 26 found that 'key' employment sectors
are not necessarily those that perform best in terms of linkage
effects. The possibility of this conflict arising can be easily seen
in the following way. By definition, a sector j is said to have a
high backward linkage effect say, when it makes an increasing use of
domestic intermediate inputs; it thus substitutes these inputs for
domestic primary factors, including labour, which is typically
abundant in the LDCs; on the other hand, a labour intensive sector is
by definition, one that has large direct plus indirect employment
coefficient which can only be achieved if the sector not only
substitutes labour for other primary factors but also makes smaller
use of intermediate inputs in the economy. Such 'general conflicts of
objectives' can be tidily summarised by calculating the coefficients
of correlation between the various variables. We shall consider
employment backward (UL) and forward linkages (UL), inter-industrial
backward (Uj) and forward (UI ) linkages, direct plus indirect labour
(LO), wage (WO), value-added (70), capital (KO) and output (0)
generated. The correlation coefficients are computed
320
a)
>
a)
.o
3
a)
a)
a)
3
4-, 	•
a) >.
.o E
0
CC
00
•r- U
Ca
- 0)
0) .0
L
o c
4-	 11)
o
(a
4, 	(11C L
a) 4-,
*1-
C
n-
0
0
N
0
*
co
(0
0
*
-
0
*
03
0
*
N
u)
0
*
in
a)
0
Cr
N
0
04
0
0
*
a)
(0
0
*
(f)
0
*
0)
(4)
0
*
CO
ul
0
*
a)
an
0
*
in
II)
0
cD
)
0
co
0
0
*
(0
C')
0
CO
o
0
*
41-
0
+
a)
N
0
03
0
0
If)
0
0
*
st
10
0
I
+
I,
el
0
*
cr
Ln
0
N
0
cD
0
4-
ao
N
0
*
LC)
•
0
I
+
el
0
*
cr)
LU
0
0
*
LU
0
*
•
0
N
•-
0
*
•
t
0
-
LU
-
0
*
o
0
•
•-•
I
0
*
0
*
(.0
•
N
0
—
C •
I	 4-	 CD
L	 4- 0 1/)Q)	 Q)	 L
4-, L 0+' a)
C 3 U
	 >
0	 L C
.00
±nLi (I)+'
0 3 4-
.	 0 o.
- 03
rt)	 I	 34-'
•	 • 4, a) o c
o 3. o
Q)	 -	 Gl
U	 ii	 Ia	 L
> 0
-0 _J	 O. CD
C	 - E .04- 4,
U) 4-'
a) CD 0 - 4-
U -p cif 0
03	 I I	 4,
o o E
C C > 4-, 3
o
CD -1-, 2 C
00)CC	 E C
L	 Q) 0 D a)
03	 .1- 4.-	 .r-
3 C 0+' 0 U
L	 1.-	 U
0	 4- L	 4_
4-	 4-	 ID 4-
-0 a) 4,	 Q)
-10L03.-40
C	 (1)	 (.)
	
0.4-'	 U
Cal	 4-, 3L Q) 3 0.,-
13 0 CO 0 4-, CO
L 4- (t)	 3.0
a)	 1-00
ID	 cc)
C	 4-, 4-,	0) 0)
0(010 - 0	 >
RI	 4-,	0. CD	 a)	 a)
.0 P 0	 L L
>
•	 CD	 •
-
4- L.)
4-
CD '0
o c
L)
Lc)
-
.0
03
.-
(N
N
0
N-
(0
0
0
0
D D
o o o
>
o o 0
RL	 U ••-•	 LU)LU
rt) II	 0	 alt	 0
4' 10— c U) •- -0
C	 3 (1 •(- 4, 	C	 C
U	 4-,	 C 4, 	a) 4, 	(%)
E	 0 u) 0) 03
>,17 u)	 el	 Cf)
0	 4-,	II	 -	 U 4-,	•• 4-,CC1-. CLUC LU
0. 10 0) 0	 4- cif	 CO
E	 4-, 4-	 U) U in
L	 U W	 "- a)
•-•	 •r- U) al 04- -
Li- 4-, 	L	 ”- .0 •1.- .0
3
0 0) 0)0--0  0)	 CO1-
_1	 C 0	 II -
U 0 0 <	 u)	 ••
*	 0) +	 CD
U
L
3	 3
a)	 o	 o(I)
321
using the global coefficient and are displayed in table 5:19. These
can be summarized as follows: the employment backward linkage index is
positively correlated with both indices of inter-industrial linkages
(uj and U1), although the correlation coefficients are low; the
employment forward linkage index is not correlated with the backward,
but highly correlated with the forward linkage index; employment
requirements are, as one might expect, negatively correlated with
capital intensity, and with foreign exchange intensity, as measured by
direct plus indirect imports. As previously explained, this latter
result could arise since, by definition, sectors with high backward
linkages effects are making larger use of domestic intermediate
inputs; and hence smaller of use of imported inputs. An employment
based strategy may not necessarily be in conflict with an
output-generation objective. It can be seen that the coefficient of
correlation between direct plus indirect labour requirements and
direct plus indirect output generated is fairly low (0.28), but
significant (at 5% level) and not negative.
A strategy based on the promotion of investments on the basis of
backward inter-industry linkages will not satisfy the value-added
objective (correlation coefficient negative), will be capital
intensive and will promote the output objective; on the other hand,
sectors with high forward linkages will be pro-value added, anti
capital intensity and output.
Thus it can be said that various policy options are open to the
policy makers; but two main options can be clearly brought. The first
is the promotion of labour intensive sectors, a strategy which might
minimize expenditure on foreign exchange, as well as satisfying the
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labour income and value-added generation objectives. The strategy may
or may not be favourable to the output objective. The second will be
the promotion of sectors on the basis of backward linkage effects, a
strategy which could also satisfy the foreign exchange-saving
objective, since it would imply an increasing use of domestic
intermediate inputs, but could be in conflict with the value-added
objective and would be capital intensive. However, the fact that the
strategy will be capital intensive makes it rather unattractive even
for reasons other than employment creation. Observe that capital
intensity is significantly related to imports intensity and will not
satisfy the wages and value-added objectives. Thus the
foreign-exchange saving capacity of the second strategy must be
questioned, rather, it may well be foreign-exchange using through its
effects on larger capital import requirements. The first strategy
thus appears the more favourable especially since it can be used to
achieve a multiple set of objectives (value-added, wages and foreign
exchange saving objectives).
5:7 Summary and Conclusions 
The preceding sections have evaluated in great detail the
employment, output and foreign exchange implications of Nigeria's
industrialisation using input-output analysis. Our main emphasis was
on the employment implications. We also examined the extent of
inter-industrial linkages in the economy. The results can be
summarized as follows:
1. With regards to employment creation, most of the major or
'key' sectors are, unhappily, non-industrial. Thus the extent to
which the manufacturing sector can play a leading role of integrating
the additional labour force in the production process is severely
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limited, given that its rate of labour absorption is
characteristically low. This is extremely disturbing for the reason
that the largest employment generators - i.e. the primary sectors -
are also the most retarded sectors, registering especially in recent
years, negative rates of output growth. Similarly, the sectors
generating highest output and value-added per unit of imports consists
mainly of the non- manufacturing sectors. Within manufacturing, the
least desirable from the employment, output, value-added and labour
income objectives, are sectors manufacturing chemical and related
products and intermediate and 'capital goods'.
2. Even though an (hypothetical) export promotion strategy
would have been less foreign-exchange using than the strategy of IS,
we found it to be paradoxically, less employment generating. This, of
course, does not imply the optimality of the existing trade regime
with regards to employment creation. Indeed, one could explain
variations in capital intensity of sectors by the policy of
import-substitution as quantified by effective tariff rates. It was
demonstrated that (a) the most highly protected sectors have tended to
generate (require), on average, less (more) employment (capital) per
unit of output than the least protected ones; (b) the coefficients of
correlation/regression between capital intensity and effective
protection are fairly high and statistically significant.
3. In the light of our findings, it was suggested that future
increases in industrial employment would probably come from (i) the
expansion of the primary and related sectors with substantial linkage
effects and (ii) the change in policies which are presently biased in
favour of capital intensive methods. Whether these changes can be
effected will depend on a number of considerations. For example,
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since the emphasis in Nigeria's industrialisation strategy is on
growth rather than employment generation, the bias of policies in
favour of capital intensity is likely to continue well into the
future, with the consequence that (at least in the short-run)
employment opportunities will not be created in larger numbers.
4. The degree of industrial linkages in the economy must also
be rated as low. Only a handful of industries can be said to have any
significant degree of integration with the rest of the economy.
Again, this could be linked to the nature of the present IS regime
which tends to encourage the development of industries with high
import content.
5. The positive association between labour requirements and
wages on the one hand and output on the other suggests that an
output-based strategy need not conflict with the income or employment
objectives. In otherwords, it suggests some degree of flexibility in
policy choice among the various objectives. It remains true, however,
that conflicts arise between objectives as suggested by the often low
correlation coefficients. Specific examples can be provided: the
tobacco processing, non-alcoholic beverage, distributive trade and
livestock sectors have relatively high employment coefficients but
their direct plus indirect output generated are relatively low;
similarly, sectors like livestock, 'other' services, distributive
trade, tobacco and non-alcoholic beverages with high value-added
coefficients have low wage potential etc. This would therefore seem
to indicate the necessity of carrying out a detailed analysis of the
existing situation in each sector of the economy, in order to
determine in which activities an appropriate mix of objectives can be
attained.
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6. In conclusion, we would like to point out at least two
limitations of the analysis, in the light of which our findings should
be read. First, it must be admitted that the problem of unemployment
is a complex one, involving a large number of other variables, social
and economic, which we have not been able to evaluate. Although as
has been found in other studies, the nature of the industrialisation
policy pursued is crucial in deciding the nature of changing
employment patterns in many third world countries, our analysis should
still be considered as partial. The second limitation has to do with
our methodology. The use of input-output analysis can be very
illuminating in that it allows one to, among other things, fully
understand not only the direct but also the indirect and total 
consequences of economic policy. It takes into consideration the
links between the different economic sectors and the degree to which
they depend upon one another, rather than treat each sector
separately. However, its use is based on a number of rather
restrictive assumptions, the main one being the constancy of the
input-output coefficients, an assumption which ignores the problem of
the choice of techniques, and the role of factor prices and technical
progress in affecting the economy's production function. In so far as
these coefficients are known to change over time, our results should
be interpreted with caution and should be regarded only as indicative
of the 'true' state of affairs in the economy.
In the following chapter we shall relax the assumption of a
'Leontief technology' and employ other production relations to analyse
more, the employment related issues in the Nigerian economy.
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NOTES
1. Federal Republic of Nigeria (1981), Fourth Plan, p423.
2. 'lid, pv422-423.
3. Ibid, p144.
4. For similar analyses see, among others, Sheahan, J. (1971),
"Trade and Employment: Industrial exports compared to import
substitutes in Mexico", Research memo, No. 43, Williams College.
Nishat, S. (1977) "Labour content and structure of Pakistan
Manufactured exports", The Pakistan Development Review, XVI, 4,
Winter, pp383-404; Reza, S. (1977), "Trade, Output and
Employment: A Case Study of Bangledesh", The Bangledesh
Development Studies.
Krueger, A. 0. (1982), Trade and Employment in Developing
Countries, National Bureau of Economic Research, New York,
Hazari, B.R. and Krishnamurty, J. (1970), "Employment
Implications of India's Industrialisation: Analysis in an
input-output framework", Review of Economics and Statistics, 52,
pp181-6.
5. Observe that the concepts of indirect effects as well as that of
inter-industrial linkages have no place in the neo-classical
theory of production, with its assumptions of equilibrium in
product and factor markets, nationally integrated and flexible
economies as well as full employment of productive resources.
3 27
An exegenous increment in output demand therefore causes only
marginal changes in factor or input use. Here however, we are
dealing with an economy where these assumptions are not strictly
applicable and which is, therefore characteristically in a
disequilibrium. Thus some capacity can be assumed to be idle
and can always be utilised through 'pressure and tension'
created by changes in demand. For an elaboration of the concept
see Hirschman, A.O., The Strategy of Economic Development, New
haven, Yale University Press.
6. Chenery, H.B. and Watanabe, T. (1958), "International
Comparisons of the Structure of Production", Econometrica, 26,
pp487-521.
7. Ibid.
8. Rasmussen, P.N. (1957), Studies in Intersectoral Relations,
Amsterdam: North Holland.
9. The Rasmussen measures are by no means the only measures put
forward in the literature. Yotopoulos and Nugent ono (1973)
suggested the use of the column sum of the leontief inverse and
defined Lgj as a measure of the direct plus indirect linkage
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CHAPTER 6
An Analysis of the Effects of protection using  Production
• subst t t 1,0 • 0,11.
•
t A__ I
the Nigerian Manufacturing Industry
6:1 Introduction
In the previous chapter it was noted that the 'maintained'
hypothesis in the classical and neo-classical literature is that the
phenomenon of capital intensity in production in the LDCs arises, by
and large, from (trade and industrial) policies - differential tariff
rates favouring capital goods imports, minimum wage legislation etc. -
that have detrimental effect on the demand for labour and for other
primary inputs, except capital. The policy of getting prices "right"
is therefore recommended as a way of reducing capital deepening and/or
increasing the rate of labour absorption in the economy. It is
obvious that both the 'maintained' hypothesis and the policy
prescription rest explicitly on the degree of technical substitution
among primary inputs into the production process. Let us assume, for
example, that the economy is characterised by rapid increases in
labour in relation to capital. Then if the elasticity of substitution
- which measures the ease with which labour and capital can be
substituted for each other - is high, a decrease in the price of
labour (the wage rate) and/or a rise in the price of capital will act
as an inducement for profit maximizing firms to absorb the increases
in labour input. Conversely, with a low degree of substitutability,
increases in labour input can only be satisfactorily absorbed by huge
decreases in wage rates and/or a huge increase in the price of
capital.
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To the extent therefore that substitution possibilities exist
(and are high) the neo-classical hypothesis and recommendation will be
vindicated and will contradict the technical-rigidity hypothesis which
suggests the opposite and therefore sees the role of relative factor
prices as being rather minimal. Estimates of the elasticity of
substitution are therefore crucial in examining the various
contentions and in determining among other things, an appropriate
technology policy, income distribution between primary factor inputs
etc. One of the main objectives of this chapter is to provide these
estimates for the manufacturing industries in Nigeria and to examine
the proper role of relative factor price changes in the choice of
production techniques.
Studies on productivity growth have also acquired great
significance in the context of economic growth in LDCs. The level and
rate of productivity growth has come to be regarded as the most
significant index of technical and economic efficiency, whether of a
firm, industry or the country as a whole.
Until recently, exercises in productivity analysis have confined
themselves to the estimation of 'partial' or 'specific' productivity,
expressed as the ratio between output and a given measure of one
productive factor - notably labour. No doubt this could be of major
importance in economic analysis/planning, such as in forecasting
output and employment as well as in the distribution of manpower and
other resources between different sections of industries. However,
labour is only one of the several inputs that are employed and the
efficiency with which resources are used is better measured by
relating output produced to the total of all inputs employed in the
production process.
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The total-factor productivity (TFP) measures are useful in many
ways: First they can be employed to understand changes in the partial
productivity measures. For example, if the growth rate in the total
factor productivity measure is less than that of a (partial) labour
productivity measure, we know that some of the increase in the latter
is due mainly to the increase in the amount of other inputs; second,
by estimating TFP growth, one would be able to monitor and study the
sources of output growth other than those resulting from growth in
inputs, including technical progress, managerial innovations, improved
resource allocations etc. Third, and most important, the TFPG index
can provide information to policy makers for determining the
appropriateness of policies designed to promote 'infant' industries.
Recall that one of the justifications for infant industry protection
is that such infants cannot compete with imports until they 'grow up';
with time, they are expected to become internationally competitive and
to expand the economy's production possibility frontier and both will
depend on how efficiently resources have been utilised. Thus by
estimating rates of TFPG one would be able to understand those
industries which have 'grown up' as well as the appropriate duration
of policies to promote the infants.
Thus the second main objective of this chapter is to examine the
nature and to enquire into the sources of factor productivity growth
in Nigeria. Our main emphasis will be on labour and total factor
productivity growth. An attempt will be made also to explore the
possible links between variation in productivity and protection.
The chapter is organised as follows: In section 6:2:1 we shall
set out the methodology employed in estimating sectoral elasticities
of substitution. The main results are discussed in section 6:2:2, and
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section 6:2:3 examines the main implications of the findings. Section
6:2:4 summarises the discussion. Section 6:3:2 examines the
theoretical method of obtaining rates of productivity growth; the
empirical findings are discussed in section 6:3:2; the possible
sources of labour and total factor productivity growth are explored in
section 6:3:3 and finally, section 6:3:4 summarises the mainfindings
and discusses their implications.
6:2 The Elasticity of Substitution in Nigerian Manufacturing
Industries: A Time Series Analysis (1963-1978)
6:2:1 Methodology'
The most frequently employed production function to estimate
substitution elasticities between labour and capital is the constant
elasticity of substitution (CES) production function, which includes
the Cobb-Douglas (CD) and Leontief production functions as special
cases. The CES production function can be expresses as
Q =T[CFIL-P + (1 - (5)ICT	 6:1
where	 Q = output
L = labour input
K = capital input
y = rate of Hicks Neutral technical progress
v = returns to scale parameter
p = substitution parameter
6 = distribution parameter
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The CBS function can be estimated directly using non-linear techniques
or by linearising the function. Following the latter approach the
following expression can be obtained by expanding the function around
p = 02
log(Q/L) = logy + v(Slogl +V(1-(5)logK/L
-1 vp d(1-0(logK/L2 ) + U	 6:2
If equation 6:2 is constrained to constant returns to scale (V=1) we
get
log(Q/L) + logy + (1-6)logK/L
-1p6(1-6)(logK/L2 ) +At	 -F u	 6:3
where A = rate of technical change
t = time trend.
Both equations 6:2 and 6:3 can be estimated by ordinary least squares
(OLSQ) to yield an estimate of p and hence of the elasticity of
substitution (a) since a = 1/1+ p or p=1- 1.
The reliance of the equations upon the availability of correct
estimates of capital stock data which in many LDCs are either
difficult to measure or unreliable make them less appealing. To avoid
the use of capital stock data, other relations can be derived and
estimated. Differentiating equation 6:1 with respect to the variable
L and utilising the first order profit maximizing condition (i.e.
equating the marginal productivity of labour with the wage rate) one
can derive expressions 6:4 and 6:5 below:3
log(Q/L) = a0 ---Xt + blogQ +ologW1 - 0- 6:5
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log (Q/L) + ao+al lop/ + a2 log L
	 6:4
where ao = 1
V
al ' V-1-p
a2 = -( 1-cti) (1-V)
and al/(1-a2)
 ' a
and
In equation 6:4 and 6:5 indications of the existence of economies of
scale are given by a2 and b2 respectively.
Expressions 6:4 and 6:5 identically collapse to expression 6:6
if we assume constant returns to scale:
log(Q/L) = ao + (l-0)
	 + G logW	 6:6
where ot o =olog{YP (1-15)-1}
Under the special assumption that the wage rate (W) does not affect
the efficiency of industry, a , the coefficient of logw correctly
corresponds to the elasticity of substitution. This will be referred
to as the ACMS4 equation.
Variants of equation 6:6 can also be considered. Equation 6:7
below is derived by assuming a non instantaneous adjustment of output
per head to its desired value, (Q/L)*. The long-run equilibrium
relation between output per head and the marginal productivity of
labour is
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log(Q/L)* = a+olog W + At + ut
the estimating equation is thus
log(Q/L) = a + al loqW + a2 log(Q/L)_1 + ut
	6:7
and the (long-run) estimate of a is given by the ratio of the
coefficient of log W to one minus the coefficient of the lagged output
per head variable i.e.
aL 'c'1/1-a2
A slightly different relation can also be derived by making an
assumption about the nature of the serial correlation of the
residuals. Following Griliches (1967), assume a first-order serial
correlation in the residuals "due to persistence of the various
possible misspecifications" 5
 so that
Ut = Ut_i + Vt/p/ < 1 .
Combining with the standard ACMs relation 6:6, implies the estimation
of
log(Q/L) = ao +clog W + blog(Q/L)_1 -ablog(W)_1 + At 	 6:8
Equation 6:8 thus collapses to 6:6 if the coefficient of the lagged
wage rate term is equal to zero. Note also that according to this
relation, the coefficient of the lagged wage rate term is negative and
equal to the product of the coefficients of the other two terms.
Equations 6:5 - 6:8 have the common advantage that the data
required for their estimation - output, labour input and wage rates -
are easy to come by and their estimation is less likely to cause
measurement errors than the estimation of equations 6:2 and 6:3.
Moreover, the elasticity of substitution in equations 6:5 and 6:6,
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being a first order parameter, is likely to be estimated with more
precision than when other equations are estimated.
They however suffer from certain obvious disadvantages which
"come from specific assumptions required for this to be a valid
estimating equation, some of which are unlikely to hold true, even
approximately" 6 . The assumptions that the relationship between output
per head and the wage rate is independent of the stock of capital and
that a is constant irrespective of variation in capital-labour ratios
have been challenged in both the theoretical and empirical literature.
And it is shown that to the extent that a is affected by variations
in capital-labour ratios, estimates obtained through the CES will be
biased both upwards and downwards7.
It is appropriate, therefore, to consider few of the variants of
production functions which consider explicitly the role of variations
in capital-labour ratios in estimating a. From a variable elasticity
of substitution (VES) production function of the form:8
(Q) =y[6(K) -P + (1-p)Z-c/I-PL-P] 1/ p
	6:9
the following relation can be derived and estimated, assuming as in
ACMS the equivalence of marginal productivity of inputs and returns to
the factors
log(Q/L)=+ a + blog W + clog Z + u	 6:10
where all the variables are as defined previously and Z = K/L. The
elasticity of substitution, E can be obtained as
= b/l-C(1 +1i;)
where W*, r* are respectively the base year prices of labour and
capital. In this study we define w* as base year wage rate and r* as
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V* -
where V*, W* and K* are respectively value-added, wages and capital in
the base year.
The extent to which a differs from a will depend on the
coefficient of log Z; if it is equal to zero, the equation 6:10
reduces to the ACMS relation (6:6); if it is greater than 0 as found
by Hildebrand and Lu (1960), the 'true' elasticity of substitution
will be underestimated by b.
Using time series data (1963 - 1978) equations 6:5 - 6:8 and
6:10 were estimated for the manufacturing sector as a whole and for
each of the twenty-four industries within the manufacturing sector, to
obtain numerical values of a. In this way, we shall be able to check
the robustness of our results and also to examine the extent to which
alternative assumptions underlying the equations affect the estimated
values of a.
6:2:2 The Main Results
(i) An Overview of the Manufacturing Sector 
In Tables 6:la and 6:1b we present least squares estimates of
the various production relations shown in the previous section. TWo
types of measures of output per head (the dependent variable) are
experimented with: gross output per head (Q/L) and value-added per
head (V/L); and each equation is estimated with and without a trend
variable. What is immediately evident from the table is the wide
variations in the estimated values of the parameters and hence in the
estimates of the elasticity of substitution. Such variations are no
doubt due to the different assumptions underlying the different
relations estimated. It can be seen that measured by their R2 (and F
ratios) all the equations show a fairly good fit. The value of R2
ranges between 0.51 to 0.79.
342
Table 6:la Estimates of Production Functions For the (Total)
Manufacturing Industry (1963-1978).
-
Dependent Variable log(v/1)
Explanatory
variables
Regression Equations
6:5 6:6 6:7 6:8 6:10
constant 1.56 1.42 1.69 1.48 2.03 1.10 2.33	 2.43 1.79	 0.84
(0.5) (0.6) (0.6) (0.5) (0.7) (0.5) (0.9)	 (0.7) (0.7)	 (0.2)
log(w/1) 0.73 0.65 0.93 0.67 0.89 0.65 0.46	 0.68 0.90	 0.58
(0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.4)	 (0.3) (0.3)	 (0.3)
t 0.02 0.011 0.005 0.009
(0.1) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
log(v/1) 0.07 -0.06
(0.1) (0.22)
log(v/1)_1
-0.06 0.24 -0.21 -0.19
(0.07) (0.2) (0.2)	 (0.12)
log(w/1)_1 0.06	 0.06
(0.05)(0.05)
log(k/1)
-0.01	 0.043
(0.04)(0.05)
R2 0.62 0.67 0.52 0.65 0.55 0.79 0.69	 0.60 0.53	 0.72
T;i2 0.55 0.58 0.48 0.59 0.48 0.74 0.56	 0.50 0.45	 0.64
F 9.60 6.20 18.40 11.20 7.20 11.70 4.40	 4.60 6.70	 7.70
DW 2.20 2.10 2.40 2.20 2.50 2.40 2.30	 2.60 2.40	 2.00
cr 0.73 0.65 0.93 0.67 0.84 0.86 0.46	 0.86 0.35	 0.70
standard error in parenthesis.
Equation 6:5 (CES,Variable returns) logv/1=a+blogw+clogy
6:6 (ACMS) logv/1=a+blogw
6:7 (Distributed lag)logv/1=a+blogw+clog(v/1)_,
6:8 (Serial correlations) 1ogv/1=a+blogw+clog(i/1) +dlog(w) .
-I	
-I6:10 (VES) logv/1=a+blogw+clogk/1
Where v,l,w and k are respectively,value added,labour,wages
and capital.
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Table 6:1b Estimates of Production Functions for (Total) Manufacturing
Industry (1963 - 1978).
Dependent Variable=log(q/1)
Explanatory
variables
Regression Equations
6:5 6:6 6:7 6:8	 6:10
constant 3.18	 3.18 3.12	 3.20 3.06	 3.18 2.95	 3.72	 2.72
	 2.69
(0.42)(0.49) (0.42)(0.44) (0.54)(0.58) (0.72)(0.67)
	 (0.51)(0.74)
log(w/1)_1 0.82	 0.80 0.67	 0.81 0.67	 0.81 0.70	 0.31	 0.78
	 0.87
(0.24)(0.26) (0.18)(0.25) (0.19)(0.26) (0.30)(0.25)
	 (0.20)(0.26)
t 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.014	 0.001
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)	 (0.01)
log(q) -0.05	 -0.10
(0.05)(0.17)
log(v/1)_1 0.01	 0.01 0.19	 -0.12
(0.07)(0.08) (0.23)(0.18)
log(w/1)_1 0.04
	 0.07
(0.42)(0.045)
log(k/1) 0.03	 0.34
(0.03)(0.41)
R2 0.54	 0.55 0.51	 0.53 0.51	 0.53 0.77	 0.69	 0.57	 0.57
_2
R 0.46	 0.42 0.47	 0.45 0.42	 0.41 0.68	 0.61	 0.50	 0.45
F 7.00	 3.59 13.30	 6.79 6.13	 3.00 7.00	 7.00	 8.00	 4.00
DW 2.00	 1.80 1.90	 2.00 1.90	 2.00 2.70	 2.00	 1.80	 1.80
0- 0.82	 0.80 0.67	 0.81 0.68	 0.81 0.70	 0.31	 0.75	 0.82
Standard errors in parenthesis.
Equation 6:5 (CES,Variable returns) logq/1=a+blogw+clogq
6:6 (ACMS) logq/1=a+blogw
6:7 (Distributed 1ag)1ogq/1=a+blogw+clog(q/1)_1
6:8 (Serial correlations) 1ogq/1=a+blogw+c1og(q/1)+d1og(w) 1
6:10 (VES) logq/1=a+blogw+clogk/1
Where q,l,w and k are respectively,gross output,labour,wages
and capital.
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For the ACMS model with constant returns to scale, (equation
(6:6)) the elasticity of substitution is seen to be fairly high and
statistically significant at the 1% level. The significant (and
positive) coefficient of the time variable is an indication of some
degree of technical progress achieved during the period. For the
distributed lag model (without a time trend) the coefficient of log W
is positive and statistically significant. With a value of -0.06 for
the coefficient of log(V/L)_1 the long run elasticity of substitution
is 0.840. Adding the trend variable to the equation reduces the size
of the 144 coefficient and increases that of the lagged term hence
increasing slightly the value of a, to 0.86. The rates of adjustment
implied by the equations (1-coefficient of log(V/L)) are respectively
1.06 and 0.76. The serial correlation model is not a good fit. The
coefficient of log(W)_1 is expected to be negative and equal to the
product of the coefficients of loglw and log(Q/L)_1. It can be seen
that it neither has the expected sign nor is it statistically
significant.
In equation 6:5 (in which variable returns to scale are
assumed), the coefficient of the output term is statistically
insignificant at the 10% level and this would seem to lend support to
the assumption of constant returns to scale. Similarly, the
introduction of the logK/L term does not invalidate the assumption
that a is constant. In equation 6:10 we see that the capital labour
ratio coefficient is negative and statistically insignificant,
although when the same equation is re-estimated with a trend variable,
the coefficient becomes positive but still statistically
insignificant.
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Considering the relative poorness of the results from most of
the equations, it seems that one should be more comfortable with the
estimate of a derived from the simple ACMS relation. Thus, at least
for the total manufacturing sector and for the period under
consideration, the assumption of the constant returns to scale cannot
be invalidated and, more important, with such a high value of a, which
is not statistically different from unity, one can conclude that a
high degree of technical substitution does exist in the sector. This
conclusion holds whether the dependent variable in the equations is
gross-output or value-added per head.
(ii) Sectoral Elasticities of Substitution
Table 6:2 provides a complete listing of estimated elasticities
of substitution by sector. Estimating 5 equations for each of the 24
industries gives us a total of 120 estimates of a.
As with the estimates obtained for the total manufacturing
sector, the values of a show considerable variations for each industry
and across sectors. They range between the highest value of 3.85 (IES
function fitted for the tobacco industry) to -1.63 (distributed lag
model fitted for the drugs and medicines industry). To see the
relationship between the various sectoral estimates of a, we computed
the Pearson's correlation coefficients presented in Table 6:3. It can
be seen that a fairly high degree of association exists among the ACMS
constant returns to scale estimates. The lowest degree of association
is between the AGMS relation (6:6) and the serial correlations model
(correlation coefficient = 0.53, significant at 1% level). Estimates
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Table 6:2 Estimates of Sectoral Elasticities of SubOtitution
in the Manufacturing Sector:(1963-1978).
Sector	 Regression Equations
C E S
(v.r.s.)
6:5
ACMS	 0-lag
model
6:6	 6:7
Serial
corr
6:8
VES
(. id- )
6:10
k/1
coeff.
6	 3111/3122 Food	 1.89 2.15 2.66 2.48 2.33 0.286
7	 3131/3133 Alcoholic bev.	 0.30 0.27 0.46 0.45 1.90 0.793+
8	 3134 Non-alcoh.bev. -0.09+
-0.20+ 0.05 0.13+ 0.23 0.281
9	 3140 Tobacco	 2.05 0.69 0.44 1.08 3.85 0.387
10	 3212 Textiles	 0.15+ 1.23 0.11 0.11+ 1.24 0.041
11	 3212 Made-up text.	 -0.12 0.93 0.01 0.04+ -0.97 -0.682
12	 3220 Apparel	 1.32 2.31 3.13 1.63 1.91 -0.153+
13	 3231/3233
14	 3240
15	 3311/3320
Leather
Footwear
	
0.19+
Wood
	
0.46
0.98
0.73
0.73
1.03
-0.05
0.76
1.02
0.23+
0.49
1.36
1.22
0.87
1.07
0.165
0.250
0.231
16	 3412/3420
17	 3511/3512
18	 3521
Paper
Chemicals
	
0.56
Paints
	
0.98
-0.06+
0.23+
0.93
0.36+
0.30
1.42
-0.55
2.69
1.16
0.12
-0.52
0.90
0.24
-0.038
0.280-
-0.163
19	 35 2 2 Drugs	 0.35 1.36 -1.63 -0.23+ -0.63 -0.774
20	 3523 Soap	
-0.10+ 0.78 -0.27 -0.06+ 2.03 0.247-
21	 3529/3540 Other Chem.
	 0.34 1.22 1.02 1.90 1.49 0.539
22	 3551/3560 Rubber	 0.61 0.78 1.02 1.01 0.88 0.120
23	 3610/3699 Cement	 0.93 0.94 0.96 0.94 1.41 0.195
24	 3710/3812 Basic Metals	 0.97 1.05 0.99 1.44 1.12 0.275
25	 3813/3819 Fab.Metals	 -0.19+
-0.44
-0.37 -0.28 0.45 0.374
26	 3822/3829 Machinery	 0.18 0.48 0.63 1.18 0.34 -0.467
27	 3832/3839 Elect.Machinery	 1.45 1.71 1.58 2.37 0.74 -0.480
28 3841/3843 Transport Equip -0.80
-0.003+ -1.10 -0.96 0.29 0.489
29	 3851/3909 Misc.products	 0.86 1.25 1.33 0.93 1.15 0.016
Notes: + not statistically different from zero. The level of
Significance of values of orreported in cols 4 and 5
is not considered as these are not directly estimated.
Equa t ion 6:5 (CES,Variable returns) logv/1=a+blogw+clogv
6:6 (ACMS) logv/1=a+blogw
6:7 (Distributed lag)logv/1=a+blogw+clog(v/1)_,
6:8 (Serial correlations) logv/1=a+blogw+clog(v/1)_1+dlog(w)_
6:10 (VES) logv/1=a+blogw+clogk/1
Where v,l,w and k are respectively,value added,labour,wages
and capital.
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of a from the ACMS constant returns to scale relation (equation 6:6)
are also positively correlated with estimates from fitting the CES
with variable returns to scale (equations 6:5). The correlation
between VES estimates and the ACMS estimates is weak, though the
coefficient is statistically significant at the 10% level. The former
are not correlated with the estimates from the serial correlation
model but highly and significantly related to the CES, variable
returns to scale model estimates.
To see further the differences between the estimates, we show in
table 6:4 their means, maximum and minimum values and other related
statistics. The table is self explanatory. For example, in the ACMS
relation (col 2) we see that of the twenty four industries considered,
9 (38%) have a value of a greater than unity, 3 have negative values,
12 (50%) have values of a greater than the mean of 0.86. The highest
value of a was recorded for food processing and the lowest for
fabricated metal industry.
From column 1 of table 6:4 it can be seen that introducing the
variable returns to scale term (log In to the ACMS equation, (i)
reduces the average value of a(to 0.55) (ii) increases the number of
negative cases (from 3 to 6) (iii) reduces the number of cases with
statistically significant values of a and (iv) reduces the number of
cases with a above 1. It certainly does look as though the assumption
of constant returns to scale has resulted in an upward bias of the
estimates.
Considering the VES estimates, we find 12 industries with values
of a greater than unity, 3 with negative values and an average value
of 0.98. Comparing estimates of a from the VES with those from the
ACMS (cols 5 and 2 respectively of table 6:2), we find that the former
-
- 17
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TABLE 6:4 Summary Statistics for values of the elasticity of
Substitution.
Mean
Number(&%)
of sectors
with a>mean
Regression Equation
6:5 6:6 6:7 6:8 6:10
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
0.55 0.86 0.58 0.84 0.98
11.00
	 12.00
	
12.00
	
13.00
	
12.00
(46%)	 (50%)	 (50%)	 (54%)	 (50%)
Number(&%)
of sectors
with negative
valuesof cr
	
6.00	 3.00
	
6.00
	
4.00
	
3.00
(25%)	 ( 3%)	 ( 6%)	 ( 4%)	 ( 3%)
Number(&%)
of sectors
with a>1
	
4.00	 9.00	 8.00
	
11. 00 	12.00
(17%)	 (38%)	 (33%)	 (46%)
	
(50%)
Minimum
value of a	 -0.80	
-0.44	 -1.63	
-0.96	 -0.97
(transport	 fabricated	 (drugs	 (transport	 (mu text)
equip)	 metal)	 &medicines) equip)
Maximum
value of a
	
2.05
	
2.15
	
3.13
	
2.69
	
3.85
(tobacco)	 (food)	 (apparel)	 (paper)	 (tobacco)
Number of
sectors with
significant
values of cr
16	 19
Source:table 6:2.
Equation 6:5 (CES,Variable returns) logv/1=a+blogw+clogv
6:6 (ACMS) logv/1=a+blogw
6:7 (Distributed lag)logv/1=a+blogw+clog(v/1)_1
6:8 (Serial correlations) logv/1=a+b1ogw+clog(v/1)+dlog(w)_,
6:10 (VES) logv/1=a+blogw+clogk/1
Where v,l,w and k are respectively,value added,labour,wages
and capital.
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are higher - often substantially - than the latter expect for
industries manufacturing made-up textiles, wearing apparel, paper,
industrial chemicals, paints, drugs & medicines, machinery and
electrical equipment. It can be seen that the VES function produces
the highest mean value of B (0.98) with a fairly significant number of
sectors having values ofi3 that exceed the average.
In column 6 of table 6:2 we show the coefficients of the
capital intensity variable. The importance of variations of capital
intensity cannot be easily assumed away in estimating substitution
elasticities even though we found its effects to be minimal for the
manufacturing sector as a whole. It must be noted, however, that not
all of the industries with high substitution elasticities reported in
column 5 of table 6:2 have had statistically significant regression
estimates for the coefficient of the capital intensity variable. For
example, while sectors manufacturing Alcoholic beverages, industrial
chemicals, soap and perfumery and rubber and plastic products have
fairly high values of Ty (column 5, table 6:2), their capital
intensity coefficients are not statistically different from zero. On
the other hand, non-alcoholic beverages, made-up textiles, paints and
transport equipment have statistically significant estimates of the
capital intensity variable, although they have below average values of
6. The results from the VES function have therefore to be interpreted
with caution - the more so because, as we have repeatedly emphasised,
the capital stock series should be considered as mere approximations
and could be subject to substantial errors of measurement.
With these qualifications in mind, one could draw a general
inference from the above analysis. Whether all or only a few of the
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equations are accepted it seems fairly obvious that a significant
number of the Nigerian Manufacturing industries have a fairly high
substitution possibilities between capital and labour inputs, although
with the possibility of increasing returns to scale, this conclusion
needs to be qualified. We cannot therefore easily dismiss the
neo-classical hypothesis of the existence of a reasonable degree of
substitutability between capital and labour.
It will be of interest to examine how these estimates (and our
conclusion) compare with those obtained from other LDCs. In table 6:5
we compare the elasticities of substitution between capital and labour
in various manufacturing sectors of Nigeria, Pakistan, Argentina and
India.
In reviewing studies on substitution elasticites for certain
LDCs, Bruton (1971) 9 found that
The results do indicate that there is considerable
substitutability between capital and labour. Only in isolated
instances do the results indicate that the elasticity may be
zero. Even the stronger statement that the elasticity of
substitution in developing countries is at least 0.5 is
defensible.
In another study of substitution possibilities in another less
developed country, Sicat (1970) found that majority of the industries
have values of a greater than unity and the findings according to the
author, 'appear to contradict the well known hypothesis in the
economic development literature that less developed countries face
smaller degrees of capital-labour substitution possibilities"10.
These findings and conclusions contrast sharply with those of
Kemal (1981) 11 in a study of 16 manufacturing sectors of Pakistan.
The author estimated (directly and indirectly) both the CES and VES
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production functions, assuming constant and variable returns to scale.
For the large scale manufacturing sector, the value of a was not
statistically different from unity; at the sectoral level however, he
found that (i) assuming a VES function with constant returns to scale,
only 31% of the industries have statistically significant values of al
(ii) assuming a VES with variable returns to scale, estimates of aare
not significantly different from unity in 56% of the industries and
finally, (iii) assuming CES with constant (variable) returns to scale,
only 19% (44%) of the sectors have had significant estimates. The
author thus concludes:
the substitution elasticities remain generally low and
insignificant whether we assume constant returns to scale or the
variable returns to scale within the framework of both the CES
production and the VES production function'-2.
The conflicting conclusions could have arisen from many sources
including differences in the method of estimation and the quality of
data used. Bruton's and Sicat's estimates were based on
cross-sectional, while Kemal's on time series, data. It is generally
accepted that the use of the latter, especially when there are no
adjustments to changes in the quality of labour and/or to cyclical
fluctuations in output, will impart a downward bias in the
estimates13 . Given that no such adjustments have been made in Kemal's
(and our) studies, the estimates reported in table 6:5 may have been
downward biased.
In table 6:5 we find that in only 5 of the 13 industries for
which comparable (CES, constant returns) estimates are available, our
estimates (col. 6) are higher than Kemal's (col. 9). Sectors in which
our estimates are higher include food processing, textiles, leather
products, machinery and electrical machinery and equipment. However,
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the number of estimates which are not significantly different from
unity is much higher in Nigeria than in Pakistan. Most of the
estimates for Argentina are fairly low, although not statistically
different unity. It can be seen that they compare favourably with
Nigeria's estimates in column 6.
We have included estimates for the U.S., although admittedly, it
is difficult to pass any meaningful judgement - given the differences
in production structures and the possibility of obtaining data of
better quality than in most LDCs. It can be seen that the estimates
compare favourably with those of other LDCs.
The cross section estimates reported in cols. 4 and 5 confirm
the conclusion of this study, at least assuming constant returns to
scale, that elasticities of substitution in the case of individual
industries are high and statistically significant. The high estimates
reported in these columns, moreover, would tend to confirm the
suspicion that the use of time-series data will impart a downward bias
in the estimates of a.
One can best summarise the findings and conclusions of empirical
studies on substitutability between factors by saying that the
arguments for a unitary and zero substitution elasticies are extreme
positions and by concluding with Bruton that 'factor substitution is
alive and well in developing countries.., policies and models which
assume otherwise are misleading
6:2:3 Employment, wage changes and substitution elasticities: 
Interpretation and Policy Implications of the Results
As we indicated at the beginning of the chapter, the most
obvious and frequently emphasised policy implication of the results to
n14.
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the effect that substitution possibilities exist and are high is that
variations in relative factor prices are likely to result in shift in
factor mix. The average value of a which was 0.86 for the whole
manufacturing sector implies that a 100% increase in wages per head,
with capital prices constant, will induce entrepreneurs to increase
capital use by about 89%. Thus, in a labour-abundant economy like
Nigeria, and where production techniques tend to be capital intensive,
high and statistically significant substitution elasticities, as we
have found, imply that the elimination of policy induced factor market
distortions would have the effect of increasing employment. How much
more employment is generated with the elimination of the distortions
will depend upon the magnitude of the latter and upon the size of the
substitution elasticities.
We shall follow the approach of Menasian (1961) 15
 and Tyler
(1974) 16
 to show how the sectoral estimates of the elasticity of
substitution so derived can be usefully employed to give an indication
of the employment effects of government policies that affect the
prices of factors. For convenience, we shall make the simplifying
assumption that only distortions in the labour market 'matter'. To
show the effect of price variation on the quantity of labour demanded
one needs to estimate a demand function for labour in the economy.
Under certain assumptions17 , Menasian (1961) has shown that the demand
curve for labour can be expressed as
= AWn
	6:11
which can be equivalently expressed in logarithmic form as
(
log IA = -logA - nlogW	 6:12
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where L, Q and W are respectively employment, output and wages, and -n
is the price elasticity of demand for labour, which can be
equivalently interpreted as the elasticity of substitution between
factor inputs, as derived from equation 6:6.18
Thus if we know the magnitude of the distortions in the price of
labour we would be able to determine the amount of employment
generated, through the removal of these distortions, given the
elasticity of labour demand. Following Tyler (1974) the extent of
distortions can be measured as the difference between the actual
market wage MO and the opportunity cost of labour or its shadow
price (Ws), expressed either as a proportion of industry's output (Q),
or as a proportion of industry's average wage (W) 19 . Formally, the
extent of the distortions in labour market is measured by the
following equations:
(ATA - Ws)/4	 6:13a
WS)/7A
	
6:13b
In Chapter One, we made the simplifying assumption that the
price of labour actually paid in Nigeria exceeds its shadow price by
20-25 percent. This assumption is retained here, and in columns 2 and
3 of table 6:6 we show estimates of equation 6:13a assuming labour is
valued at 20 and 25 percent, respectively, less than its market price.
The extent of the distortion thus varies from 15.7% in footwear
industry to 1.2% in transport equipment. Multiplying these by a in
col. 2 of table 6:2 gives columns 4 and 5. And the actual increase in
employment is obtained by multiplying these later columns by the
sectoral employment levels (col. 1).
The increase in sectoral employment shown in column 7 ranges
from 6748.60 (textiles) to 30.29 (paints) units of labour. Sectors
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with large absolute increases include textiles (6748), food processing
(3899), wood products (3466), rubber & plastics (1100) and cement
products (1191). The percentage increases will thus range from 1
percent (alcoholic beverages) to 17 percent (wearing apparel). The
total increase in employment for the whole sector (excluding sectors
with negative values of a ) will thus be 20,396.49 units of labour,
which represents about 6 percent of the total labour employed by the
manufacturing sector in 1977.
Judging by the rather small percentage increase in employment
for the manufacturing sector as a whole, our results imply that a
massive reduction in wage rates will be necessary in order to obtain
even larger increases in employment. However, our assumption that
only labour market distortions 'matter' need not be a valid one and to
the extent that distorted capital prices contribute to the choice of
capital intensive techniques employment growth will be higher in
Nigeria, when both distortions are corrected, than when only
adjustments in the wage rates are made.
By how much wages are reduced and capital prices increased will
crucially depend on a host of factors, including the extent of the
distortions in each market and their relative influence on the choice
of capital intensive techniques. Evidence produced from previous
studies of employment and wage changes in Nigeria suggests that price
distortions in the capital market were by far the more important
determinants of the capital intensity of production than the price
distortions in the labour market 20 . As argued by Fajana (1973) 21 , the
influence of wages on the choice of techniques in Nigeria would be
minimal since wages constitute only a minute fraction of the
individual industries total costs. Entrepreneurs will be expected to
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substitute labour for capital only to the extent that increases in the
price of the former significantly affect their costs of production and
hence reduce their profit levels. However, as will be shown in
chapter 7, wages constitute only between 12% and 15% of total
industrial costs. Thus even a 50% increase in wages will only cause
about 10-13% increase in costs. This is negligible considering the
high profitability of industries. Indeed, it can be seen from our
analysis that the increases in capital intensity induced by the actual
growth in wages are in no way spectacular. For example, the rate of
growth of wages per head between 1963-78 was, for the whole
manufacturing sector, 1.9%. With a value of elasticity of
substitution of 0.89, this implies an increase in capital intensity of
only about 1.69%. Similarly, for the individual sectors, if we
multiply their substitution elasticities by the corresponding rates of
growth of wages per head, we see that the induced capital intensity is
only between 0.007 percent to 6 percent.
It must be emphasised that the above discussion does not seek to
totally assume away the role of wage increases in the adoption of
capital intensive technology. Indeed, as table 6:7 shows, sectors
with above average rate of growth of wages are indeed experiencing
above average increases in capital intensity, although the
relationship is a weak one; similarly, sectors with above average wage
levels tend to have an above average level of capital intensity.
Moreover, regressing the rate of growth of the average level of
employment on the rates of growth of average wages and output, we
found that there is indeed a cost in terms of employment growth, of
rising wages. Between 1963 and 1978, a rate of growth of employment
of about 6 percent was forgone23 . We notice, however, an even
stronger association between capital intensity and prices of capital
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inputs. For example, the correlation coefficient between the growth
in K/L ratios and growth in capital prices is almost twice as high as
the correlation between wages and capital intensity. Thus, policies
which affect the price of capital inputs are more likely to lead to an
inappropriate choice of techniques than those that affect the price of
labour. To the extent this is so, one can argue that given the
flexibility in the choice of techniques, employment growth will be
higher, the larger the relative increases in the price of capital
input.
We would like to emphasise that the decision to reduce wages
and/or increase capital prices could have not only economic, but
social and political consequences. Above 'normal' wages may be
maintained for political or social (such as income distributional)
considerations, and often, any attempt at reduction would be resisted
by organised labour. No doubt too, the increase in capital prices
will be resisted by entrepreneurs and could affect the long-run
investment growth of the economy. But one of the hard realities
policy makers must face is that if the manufacturing sector is to be
an important source of employment in the economy, such adjustments
will be necessary. An additional and/or complementary policy can also
be suggested: the subsidization of labour employed by industries.
This can be done by relating the fiscal incentives granted to
entrepreneurs, under the PIS and AUS schemes, not to the amount of
capital invested as is currently the practice, but to the number of
productive workers employed. It has also been suggested, and shown,
that a fair amount of employment could be generated in the industrial
sector by adopting policies which encourage firms to increase their
rates of capacity utilisation 24 . Such policies will of course
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include factor price adjustments and a comprehensive review of trade
and commercial licencing with a view to eliminating unnecessary
licences and supply bottlenecks.
We would like to emphasise with other authors that the mere
existence of substitution possibilities and the adoption of the
"right" factor prices are, by themselves not sufficient to lead to an
appreciable reduction in the level of unemployment. For example, a
World Bank Report concludes:
Nigeria's employment problems will not respond easily to short
or narrowly conceived remedies and, in the short- and
medium-term, improvement in income and employment for most
workers, particularly for new entrants to the labour force, will
depend largely on developments in the agricultural, small
industry and service sectors. •25
This implies that the problem of unemployment and/or labour absorption
in productive employment can only be tackled effectively within a
(new) framework of a comprehensive and integrated strategy. That is,
rather than seeking to absorb the labour force in modern manufacturing
activities only, the strategy must place emphasis on the development
and diversification of the primary sectors, on the promotion of small
scale agro-based industrial activities and on the gradual
modernisation of the urban informal sector. Improvement in rural
infrastructure, the provision of inputs and extension services and a
review of farm pricing policies would not only achieve significant
increases in the incomes of agricultural workers, but would also
generate increasing non-agricultural employment opportunities in the
rural areas and thus reduce the drift towards the cities. Similarly a
review of tariff and industrial policies to involve the small scale
and informal urban sector, would probably reduce the burden on the
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modern, large-scale formal sector, that is unrealistically expected to
absorb the bulk of the increases in labour force.
6:2:4 Conclusion and Summary
In the preceding section, we have focussed on major issues
relating to the possibilities of substitution between factors of
production in the Nigerian manufacturing sector. We have found that
the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour in a
significant number of industries is fairly high and statistically
significant. Similarly, for the manufacturing sector as a whole, the
elasticity is high and not statistically different from unity. We
have also found that the value of the substitution elasticity is
affected by increasing returns to scale, in the individual sectors,
though not for the whole manufacturing sector. Similarly, although
changes in capital-labour ratios do not seem to have much effect on
the elasticity of substitution estimated for the whole manufacturing
sector, their influence cannot be easily dismissed when it comes to
the individual sectors.
The fairly high and significant estimates of the elasticity of
substitution imply that changes in relative factor prices could result
in a specialisation in labour-intensive activities, better suited to
the factor endownments of Nigeria.
Using a short-run demand function for labour, we showed the
gains in industrial employment, from a change in the existing level of
wage rates. Such gains are, unfortunately, not very appreciable,
especially when viewed in relation to the scale of the unemployment
problem. However, since we made no similar adjustment in the price of
capital inputs, which are no doubt also distorted, we cannot conclude
Qit
L.it
6:14
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that even larger increases in employment will not be obtained with the
elimination of the present biases.
We share the view of other authors that, price policies,
although a central and essential element in increasing the industrial
sector's labour absorption rate, cannot by themselves, yield an
appreciable and/or substantial reduction in the level of unemployment.
Supplementary policies should include the subsidisation of modern
industrial sector employment, the review of policies to increase
capacity utilisation in manufacturing and an integrated development
strategy that involves the rural, small-scale and informal sectors of
the economy.
6:3 Partial and Total factor productivity growth in Nigerian
Manufacturing industries: 1963-1978 
6:3:1 Methodology26:
As commonly defined, the term partial productivity is the ratio
of the physical amount of output achieved in a given period to the
corresponding amount of an input expended. If the input in question
is labour, the partial productivity of labour can then be expressed as
where Qt and Lit are, respectively, industry i th output (gross output
or value-added) and the input of labour expressed in terms of physical
units of labour employed, at time t.
Over a period of time, the trend rate of growth of labour
productivity can be obtained by estimating the equation
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log(Q/L) = a + t 6:15
and 13, the coefficient of the time trend gives the growth rate.
Correspondingly, total factor productivity can be broadly defined as
the ratio of the physical amount of output achieved in a given period
(or over a period of time) to the corresponding amount of all inputs
expended. To obtain an index of total factor productivity growth
(TFPG) one must specify the form of the production function. The
various TFPG indexes suggested in the literature are based either on a
linear production function (the Kendrick Index) 27 , or the Cobb-Douglas
type production function (the Solow Index) 28 or the CES function. All
these indexes are based on the common assumptions of competitive
equilibrium, constant returns to scale and Hicks-neutral technical
change, and differ only from one another with regards to the
assumption about the substitutability of inputs 29 . It has been shown
in the empirical literature that the application of these methods
leads to strikingly similar results, and as such, not much will be
lost by considering only one of these 321 . In this study we shall be
mainly considering the TFPG index based on the Solow Measure, to be
described below - although for illustrative purposes, a CES function
is also fitted.
The Solow Index of TFPG
It is assumed that the technology for each industry and/or
activity in the economy is characterised by a (twice-differentiable,
strictly quasi concave), Hicks-neutral production function of the
following form:
Q(t) = A(t)(K, L, M}
where Q(t) is (homogeneous) output at time t, produced with the inputs
6:17
6:18
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of capital (K), labour 014 and raw materials (m) and A(t) is an index
of Hicks neutral technical progress. We can write the above
expression as
Q = A(t)Ka0MY 	6:16
where a, 13 and y are respectively, the shares of capital, labour and
raw materials in output. Under the assumptions of constant returns to
scale, and perfectly competitive factor and commodity markets, these
shares are to be interpreted as the elasticities of output with
respect to the inputs and their sum will equal unity.
Differentiating equation (6:16), the rate of growth of output
can be expressed as
dQ _ dA(t)	 dK	 dL ydM
Q	 A(t)	 a K	 L
Or
d(Q/L) _ dA(t)	 d(K/L)	 d(M/L)
(Q/L)	 A(t)	 a (K/L)	 Y (A/L)
and the index of total factor productivity growth is given by
dA(t) _ Lig _ 5 dK	 dL+ y
A(t)
	 Q	 K
That is, the rate of TFPG is given by the rate of growth of output
less the rate of growth of weighted factor inputs, the weights being
the respective factor shares of these inputs in output.
This widely used approach to estimating rates of TFPG suffers
from a number of empirical problems. First, as derived in equation
(6:18) the rate of TFPG, (dA(t)/A(t)) is a residual and thereby
sensitive to errors of measurement in inputs, outputs and input
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shares. Indeed some economists have argued that the residual is best
considered as the result of errors in the measurement of the weighted
contribution of inputs rather than as a measure of total factor
productivity growth; that if the weighted contribution of inputs were
to be correctly measured (by taking into account, for example, both
quality and quantity changes) then estimates of dA/A would be either
substantially reduced or even eliminated 31 . Lack of adequate data
will not permit any adjustment in the quality of inputs in this study;
and is so far as these did occur and are important in influencing
productivity growth, our estimates will be biased and must therefore
be interpreted with care.
The second main limitation of this approach is that the
Cobb-Douglas production function sets a priori the elasticity of
substitution between inputs equal to unity. It thus assumes away any
interindustry differences in the relative ease or difficulty with
which factor inputs can be substituted for each other in production.
If this assumption is found to be incorrect, then the appropriateness
of the Cobb-Douglas function in estimating total factor productivity
will be in question and one has to specify a different model.
However, as we found in the previous section, for most sectors, the
elasticity of substitution is not significantly different from unity
and therefore the Cobb-Douglas production function may be conceptually
acceptable. However, for consistency checks, an additional use is
made of the CES, ACMS relation:
logV/L = a+ .40gAl + At u	 6:19
where, as previously indicated, 13 is the elasticity of substitution,
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assumed constant but free to take any value between zero and infinity
and the rate of technical progress is given by the ratio of the
coefficient of the time trend (x) to one minus the elasticity of
substitution i.e.
TFPG = A/1 - b	 6:20
The results of applying equations 6:18 and 6:19 to 24 manufacturing
sectors in Nigeria will now be discussed.
6:3;2: The Main Results
Time series estimates of labour productivity - as measured by
gross output per head are presented in table 6:8. A summary of the
table is provided in table 6:9. Column 1 is obtained by taking a
simple average of the first and last 3 years' gross output per head;
Column 2 shows the sectoral averages as a proportion of the total
manufacturing sectors average. It shows the extent to which each
sector's average productivity exceeds (or falls short of) that of the
manufacturing sector as a whole. Column 3 shows the change in labour
productivity between 1963 and 1978 using the former year as a base.
Finally, Column 4 shows trend rates of growth of labour productivity
obtained by estimating equation 6:15 for each sector. The table
reveals considerable intersectoral variations both in the average as
well as in the rates of growth of labour productivity. Sectoral
averages achieved range from 30.955 (tobacco products) to 3.38 (wood
products). With the exception of tobacco products and transport
equipment sectors, all the sectors achieved average gross output per
head that is exceeded by the average for the whole manufacturing
sector. Sectors manufacturing paper products, industrial chemicals,
4.4
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Table 6:9 Average and Rate of Growth of Labour Productivity:
in manufacturing,1963-1978.
Sector
Each sector's average
as a proportion	 of
Average	 economy-wide average
(N,000)
( 1 )	 (2)
Change in	 Rate of
labour	 growth
product'y
(1963=100)	 (	 %	 )
(3)
	
(4)
6 3111/3122	 Food 10.802 0.487 -14 -2.3
7 3131/3133	 Alcoholic bev. 20.674 0.933 55 2.1
8	 3134	 Non-alcoh.bev.
b9	 3140	 Toacco
9.003
30.955
0.406
1.396
-8
-82
4.3
-1.2
10	 3212 	 Textiles 5.253 0.237 77 2.1
11	 3212	 Made-up text. 5.250 0.237 -2 1.3
12	 3220	 Apparel 3.677 0.166 88 0.1
13	 3231/3233	 Leather 8.542 0.385 135 1.3
14	 3240
	
Footwear 5.512 0.249 87 1.6
15 3311/3320	 Wood
16 3412/3420	 Pape r
17	 3511/3512	 C he m i c a sl
3.380
17.322
14.688
0.152
0.781
0.663
92
280
14
2.2
8.5
-0.7
18 	 3521	 Paints 17.150 0.774 102 2.9
19	 3522	 Drugs 14.335 0.647 589 23.8
20	 3523	 Soap 15.114 0.682 467 19.2
21	 3529/3540  Other Chem. 21.962 0.991 252 10.1
22	 3551/3560 Rubber 6.675 0.301 134 1.1
23 3610/3699 Cement 8.117 0.366 9 -0.35
24 3710/3812 Basic Metals 4.254 0.192 -82 -11.96
25	 3813/3819 Fab.Metals 10.079 0.455 50 3.4
26 3822/3829 Machinery 11.674 0.525 5 2.8
27 3832/3839 Elect.Machinery 13.716 0.619 -63 -1.9
28 3841/3843 Transport Equip 28,568 1.289 394 8.6
29	 3851/3909,Misc.products 8.049 0.363 24 0.3
Total manufac
turing sector 22.170 1.000 48 1.3
(2.6)*
Notes: col (1) is an average of the first and last three year's
level of labour productivity as displayed in table 6:8;
col (3) is the difference between the 1963 and 1978 leve
of labour productivity;
col (4) trend rate of growth.The no of observations for
each sector (except machinery and fsbricated metals)
is 16;
* rate of growth of value-added per head;
Source: computed from table 6:8.
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paints, drugs and medicines and petroleum and coal products, have
fairly high average labour productivity, compared to that of sectors
manufacturing wearing apparel, wood products, textiles, made-up
textiles, footwear and basic metals.
The 1963-78 rate of growth of labour productivity for the whole
manufacturing sector amounted to 1.3% (2.6% if we use value-added per
employee as a measure of labour productivity) and is exceeded by that
of 15 out of the 24 sectors considered. It can be seen that 75% of
the industries registered an upward i.e. positive rates of
productivity growth. Industries with exceptionally high trend rates
of labour productivity include drugs and medicine (23.8%), soap and
perfumes (19.2%), petroleum and coal products (10.1%); while negative
trend rates are recorded for basic metals (maximum rate of decline),
food processing, tobacco, industrial chemicals, cement, and electrical
equipment sectors. A comparison of Cols. 1 and 4 will reveal that the
fact that a sector has a 'high' average labour productivity carries no
implication as to whether it will have a positive trend rate of
growth. Of relevance too, is the year to year changes in labour
productivity, as displayed in table 6:10. For anyone sector
considered, one can observe considerable variability in the average
growth rates over the years. Consider for example, the food
processing sector: labour productivity grew by about 8% in 1964,
declined by 36% in 1965 and then rose again to 19% in 1967; it then
declined again until 1973 when the highest annual compound rate of
growth (56%) was achieved; the decline continued from 1975 until 1978.
Similar fluctuations can be observed in the case of the total
manufacturing sector's annual growth rates (col. 25 ). Annual growth
rates were negative in 7 of the 16 years, less than 1% in 1967 and the
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highest (lowest) achieved rates were 16.4% (-13.0). On the whole, the
number or negative rates of growth of productivity varies from 9 in
the food processing sector to 4 in the wood products seector, and the
highest and lowest rates of growth achieved amount to respectively
-930% (transport equipment) and -80.6% (basic metals). These
considerable fluctuations are no doubt concealed by the average rate
of productivity growth for the period 1963-1978 as earlier presented.
Data required to estimate rates of TFPG include rates of growth of
output, capital, labour and raw materials per sector and sectoral
shares of inputs in outputs. The relevant information is provided in
table 3:20 of chapter 3 and table 6:11 below. The former, which shows
the average growth rates of factor inputs and output by sector will
not be further examined here since it was discussed earlier on. The
latter table shows the average share of factor inputs in the Nigerian
Manufacturing sector. The first two columns show the average share in
value-added, of labour and capital; columns 3 to 7 show the
corresponding shares of gross output of labour, raw materials and
capital. The share of capital in value-added and in gross output is
derived as a residual, making it sensitive to errors in the
measurement of other input shares (compare for example, columns 7 and
5). All shares are derived by taking a simple average of the 1963-78
annual shares.
Rates of TFPG are displayed in table 6:12, Columns 1 and 3 show
annual rates of TFPG, derived as a residual (equation 6:18), and based
respectively on gross output and on value added measures of output.
It can be seen that the difference between the two columns can
primarily be attributed to the effect of raw material inputs included
in the first case while excluded from the second. More specifically,
rd
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Sector
Food processing
Alcoholic beverages
Non-alcoholic beverages
Tobacco
Textiles
Made-up textiles
Wearing apparel
Leather products
Footwear
Wood/Furniture
Paper,Printing&Publishing
Industrial chemicals
Paints
Drugs&Medicines
Soap&Perfumery
Petroleum&Coal products
Rubber&Plastics
Cement&Related products
Basic Metals
Fabricated&Struc'l Metals
Machinery
Electrical Machinery
Transport Equipment
Miscellaneous products
Total Manufacturing
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TABLE 6:12 Rate of Total Factor Productivity Growth (TFPG)
in Nigerian Manufacturing Industries (1963-1978).
[ % ]
01-
Production Function Fitted
Cobb-Douglas
Gross output	 Value-added
based	 based
CES
Value-added
based
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
-0.60 -0.18 -0.90 -0.42 0.50 0.15
-1.40 -0.42 2.00 0.44 2.50 0.76
3.60 1.09 5.40 1.20 -1.30 -0.39
-4.90 -1.48 -7.40 -1.64 -4.40 -1.33
-0.20 -0.06 -0.30 -0.07 2.40 0.73
0.80 0.24 5.70 1.27 -4.60 -1.39
-3.90 1.18 -9.40 -2.08 -3.20 -0.97
2.60 0.79 8.00 1.78 1.80 0.55
1.90 0.58 3.80 0.84 8.30 1.91
-6.40 -1.94 -12.40 -2.76 -0.40 -0.12
5.60 1.70 10.90 2.42 10.20 3.09
-6.10 -1.85 -11.60 -2.58 4.30 1.3D
3.70 1.12 7.20 1.60 5.80 1.76
11.30 3.42 24.50 5.44 26.70 8.09
13.34 4.04 26.18 5.82 1.20 0.36
0.20 0.06 6.95 1.54 3.90 1.18
4.30 1.30 7.60 1.69 -1.40 -0.42
0.10 0.03 0.70 0.16 -3.30 -1.00
1.11 0.34 4.67 1.04 -10.20 -3.09
-6.10 -1.85 -13.60 -3.02 0.20 0.06
2.90 0.88 5.50 1.22 3.40 1.03
0.20 0.06 %%%% %%% 1.70 0.52
0.80 0.24 4.50 1.00 5.30 1.61
-4.20 -1.27 -6.80 1.51 8.00 2.42
3.30 1.00 4.50 1.00 3.00 1.00
Note:cols(2),(4) and (6) show each sector's rate of TFPG as proportion of
that of the total Manufacturing sector.
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the effect of excluding raw materials is to make the numerical values
of TFPG higher (if positive) or lower (if negative) than when they are
included. Finally column 4 shows rates of TFPG obtained by fitting
the ACMS relation (equation 6:19).
The similarities and/or differences between the ACMS,
value-added based rates and those obtained by fitting the CD function
can be readily observed. The CD gross output and value-added based
rates of TFPG are respectively 3.3% and 4.5% compared to 3.3% obtained
from the ACMS relation for the manufacturing sector as a whole. There
is much less similarity of the measures at the sectoral level. For
example, six of the nine sectors with negative rates of TFPG reported
in col. 1 have positive rates in col. 5; on the other hand five of the
sectors with positive rates in col. 1 have negative rates in col. 5.
Thus 10 (3) sectors have positive (negative) rates of TFPG from both
equations. The Spearman's rank correlation (of Cols. 1 & 5)
coefficient is low (0.25) and statistically significant at the 10%
level, although the Pearsonean coefficient (0.42) is statistically
significant at 2% level. Of more importance, however, are the extreme
differences in rates of TFPG achieved by different sectors which ever
method of estimation is used. Rates of TFPG range between 13.34% in
the soap and perfumery sector to -6.4% in the wood products sector
(col. 1) and between 26.70% in the drugs and medicine sector to
-10.20% in the basic metals sector (col. 4). For the gross output
based rates, only 25% of the industries have rates of TFPG above 3.3%,
the rate registered for the manufacturing sector as a whole; for the
rates in col. 4, a slightly higher proportion of sectors have rates of
TFPG above that of the manufacturing sector.
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In terms of total factor productivity growth therefore, the nine
most important sectors are: paper products, paints, drugs and
medicines, soap & perfumes, machinery, leather products, petroleum and
coal products, electrical and transport equipment. (These have
positive rates in both columns 1 and 4). The least important sectors
will be tobacco products, wearing apparel and wood products having
registered negative rates of growth of TFP in both columns.
It is worth noting that the gross output based rates of TFGP and
the rates of growth of output per head reveal a strikingly similar
pattern. Of the 18 sectors with positive rates of growth of output
per head, 11 have positive rates of TFPG; and of the 6 sectors with
negative rates of output per head, four have negative rates of TFPG.
(The Pearsonean correlation coefficient = 0.65 and is significant at
1% level and the rank correlation coefficient = 0.46 also significant
at 1% level). The positive association between the two would suggest
that some technical progress would have occurred in the manufacturing
sector. On the other hand, it can also be observed that the sectoral
rates of TFPG are, with few exceptions much lower than the
corresponding rates of labour productivity growth - an indication,
perhaps, that the latter was achieved by simply increasing the amount
of other inputs notably capital and raw materials. The only sectors
with rates of TFPG higher than their labour productivity growth are
leather, footwear, paints, rubber and plastics, cement, basic metals,
machinery and electrical equipment. These issues will be further
examined in later sections.
An attempt has been made to determine how well the Nigerian
manufacturing industries, in the aggregate, as well as at the sectoral
level, performed relative to the performance of industries in other
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countries. It should be realised that a comparison of TFPG rates
across countries is bound to have a number of deficiencies. First, it
is often difficult to have estimates of TFPG rates for many countries
and a consideration of only a few countries could lead to erroneous
conclusions. Second, even where such estimates are available, the
analysis may be hampered since different authors may use different
methods, concepts and,or techniques, consider different time periods
and employ different industrial classification. Even though such
conceptual and methodological differences may not be large or
significant enough to cause large differences in intercountry rates of
TFPG, any attempt to make comparisons must be considered as only
indicative of the trend of events rather than a reflection of
realistic perspectives.
Annual rates of manufacturing TFPG for Hong Kong, South-Korea
and Taiwan (1960-1970), Philippines (1965-1969) and Greece (1958-1968)
as reported in Krueger and Ttncer (1980) 32 were respectively 2.29%,
3.75%, 3.59%, 1.89% and 4%. Other rates reported are for Singapore
(3.47%), Norway
 (3.5%), Japan (3.66%) and for Italy (3.75%). Between
1946 and 1954, the Argentine manufacturing sector registered rates of
TFPG of 0.6% and of 3.2% and 1.3% respectively during the periods
1955-1961 and 1946 - 196133 . Highly impressive rates of TFPG were
also reported for Pakistan by Kemal (1983) 34 . It can be seen that by
the standard of these countries, the growth rate of 3.3% achieved in
Nigeria must be considered as impressive, especially if the Nigerian
performance is to be judged in relation to the fact that industrial
development began in earnest only after independence in 1960. In
table 6:13 below, we present rates of TFPG for selected industries
from 4 different countries: Nigeria, Pakistan, Turkey and Argentina.
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Table 6:13
Sectoral Rates of TFPG in Selected Countries
Industry Rates of TFPG from:
'•eria	 Pakistan Argentina Turkey
a
Food processing -0.60 0.50 0.78 4.27 5.76 5.40 -0.09
Tobacco
-4.90 -4.40 4.61 25.56 -19.42 2.40 7.44
Textiles -0.20 2.40 3.20 4.53 3.58 7.10 1.14
Paper prodts 5.60 10.20 2.41 -9.30 -7.01 10.10 0.59
Leather prodts 2.60 1.80 0.24 10.86 12.31 15.00 -1.17
Rubber prodts 4.30 -1.40 5.96 11.88 48.61 5.80 4.27
Petroleum &
coal prodts 0.20 3.90 0.04 8.00 0.24
Metal prodts
-6.10 0.20 2.40 1.35 1.09 13.00 2.39
Machinery 2.90 3.40 0.84 2.55 1.49 17.10 1.02
Electrical equip 0.20 1.70 3.13 4.66 5.69 1.30
Transport equip 0.80 5.30 0.97 4.85 1.02 15.80 1.42
Miscellaneous -4.2 8.00 1.35 9.74 -16.95
Notes:
Nigeria: cols a and b are respectively C-D and ACMS based rates. They
are taken from cols 1 and 5 of Table 6:10. Pakistan: Col c, trend
rates are based on gross output measure and are for the period 1959/60
- 1969/70. These are computed using the Kendrick measure. See Cheema,
A. A., 'Productivity trends in the manufacturing industries" The
Pakistan Development Review p.48. Cols d and e computed using similar
equations (6:18, 6:19) respectively. These are for 1959/60 - 1969/70.
See Kemal, A.R., op cit, p165. For Ttrkey and Argentina, rates were
computed using respectively equations 6:18 and 6:19; See Krueger &
Ttncer op cit p.31, J. M. Katz op cit, p64.
The performance of the Nigerian industrial sectors vis-a-vis that of
the countries considered in the table, is not however particularly
impressive. Consider for example cols a and g (both being derived
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using the C-D measure). Four of the ten industries for which
comparable estimates are available registered negatives rates of TFPG
in Nigeria, compared to only two in Turkey; and the lowest rate of
-6.1% in the former compares rather unfavourably with the
corresponding rate of -1.17% in the latter. Even larger differences
in sectoral rates can be observed between columns b and f: only one
industry in Nigeria (paper products) registered a rate of growth of
TFP that is (marginally) higher than the corresponding rate registered
by the same sector in Argentina. However, up to 50% of the Nigerian
industries achieved rates of TFPG that are higher than the rates
achieved by the corresponding industries in Pakistan.
6:3:3 Explaining Sectoral Differences in Productivity Growth in
Nigeria
One of the most important issues in the analysis of
industrialisation of LDCs is the determination of the factors which
account for the changes in productivity of labour. As surveyed and
discussed extensively by Nelson (1981) 35 , the literature on
productivity change offers a wide variety of possible determinants
although without any clear concensus as to where one should focus most
attention. The introduction of new techniques of production, the
increase of market size for industrial products, the improvement in
the quality of factors of production, the efficiency of management,
the skill and effort of workers and even employer-employee
relationship could in varying degrees be the bases of such changes.
Unfortunately, the quantification of the relative importance of each
of these factors in the explanation of the behaviour of productivity
will not be undertaken here, first, given the absence of adequate data
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on all relevant variables and second, given the time constraint. We
shall consider few of these that are directly relevant for policy
making purposes in Nigeria.
(i) Sources of Productivity Change: capital intensity and technical 
progress
One of the crucial questions often asked in the empirical
development literature is the extent to which productivity change
ov r time can be attributed to changes in the use of other factor
inputs, notably capital or to changes in the technique of production
which would enable a larger volume of output to be Obtained from a
given combination of capital and labour (i.e to technical change).
Such a distinction is important especially in the context of less
developed countries since-the former (i.e. capital deepening)
represents merely a movement along the production function and
denotes, in the classical economics sense, some form of 'distortion',
while technical change/progress indicates more appropriately, the
extent of the shift in production function and hence of efficiency in
the utilisation of inputs in the production process. The relationship
between capital deepening and labour productivity can be illustrated
by the simple relation
K/L = Q/L * K/Q
where K, L and Q are respectively capital, labour inputs and output;
the use of a more advanced technique characterised by a higher capital
intensity (measured by K/L) will be accompanied by an increase in the
productivity of labour. Under these conditions, two possible cases
present themselves: (a) the improvement in labour productivity (i.e.
the increase in output per man or its inverse, the decrease in labour
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requirement per unit of output) is, less than proportional to the
growth in K/L. In this case, the productivity of capital declines:
while in order to produce a physical unit of Q, it is possible to
employ less labour, one must necessarily employ even more capital (b)
the improvement in productivity of labour is more than proportional to
the increase in capital intensity. In this case the productivity of
capital is obviously improved as well. Technical progress will have
played a role in one form or the other.
What is the relationship of these variables in our study? How
much of the change in productivity can be attributed to capital
deepening and to technical progress? Using the growth rates of
output, capital and labour inputs already presented in table 3:20 we
computed rates of capital productivity and capital-labour growth for
the period 1963-1978. Comparing these to changes in labour
productivity reveals the following first, in 9 out of 24 industries,
the growth in labour productivity over these years, was accompanied by
significant decreases in the growth of the productivity of capital.
Thus while the labour input grows more slowly than output, the same
cannot be said about the capital input; second, 6 (25%) of the
industries considered registered negative rates of growth of both
labour and capital productivity. However in 5 of these, it is found
that the rate of decline in capital productivity is much lower than
that of labour productivity. Thus though more of both labour and
capital inputs are employed in these industries, the rate of increase
of the latter is much higher; third, 9 (or 38%) of the sectors
considered have both labour and capital productivities increasing
(i.e. positive trend rates) which may seem to imply an efficient
handling of both inputs. But of these, 5 have higher rates of growth
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of labour, than of capital productivity; so even here, the capital
input tends to grow faster than the labour input. It can be observed
that the maximum rate of increase of capital productivity is 18.5%
while that of labour productivity is 23.8%.
To gain further insight into the role of capital formation in
explaining productivity differences among industries we carry out an
interindustry correlation study; using various measures of labour
intensity and or capital intensity and average gross output per head
as a measure of labour productivity, we computed the rank and
Pearson correlation coefficients which are summarised in the table
below.
Table 6:14
Relationship between capital intensity or labour intensity and
labour productivity; Nigerian Manufacturing Industries
1963-1978
Average gross output
per head, correlated with:
Coefficient of Correlation
Spearman's rank Pearson
Rate of growth of labour -0.41*
Capital-labour ratio (average) 0.46* 0.32**
Average wage-value added ratio -0.61*
Average value-added labour ratio 0.75* 0.63*
Ratio of non wage value-added to
wage value-added 0.61* 0.59*
* significant at 1% level
** significant at 5% level
*** significant at 10% level
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The positive (and significant) coefficients of correlation between our
measures of capital intensity (capital-labour ratios, average
value-added per employee and the ratio of non-wage to wage
value-added) imply that above average increases in productivity are
obtained in those sectors which, on average, have above average
increases in capital inputs. In other words, those industries with
an above average productivity growth must have substituted capital for
labour. Similar interpretation can be given to the negative
correlation coefficient between wage value-added ratio and average
productivity: sectors which on average are more labour intensive by
this measure, have tended to achieve lower than average gross output
per head. Indeed, the growth rate in output per head is negatively
correlated with the growth in employment indicating that increase in
productivity could have been accompanied by reductions in employment.
Although the foregoing correlation analysis provides strong
grounds for believing that capital intensity has played a prominent
role in the increases, and in inter-industry differences, in labour
productivity, there is nothing to suggest that technical progress was
not present. Indeed as we have previously noted, some sectors have
had positive rates of technical progress. This is further confirmed
by the inter-industry correlation between the rates of technical
progress and the growth in labour productivity over the five
sub-periods.
0.46*
0.50*
1963-1978
(C-D)
(CES)
1963-1971
1971-1975
1975-1978
1971-1978
0.65*
0.72*
0.65*
0.95*
0.58*
0.34**
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Table 6:15
Rate of technical progress and growth in labour productivity
in Nigerian Manufacturing Industries 1963-1978 
Rates of technical	 Rates of labour productivity growth: 
progress	 Rank coefficient
	 Pearson coefficient
* Significant at 1% level
** Significant at 5% level
The positive and significant association between the two variables
suggest that higher than average rates of technical progress tended to
obtain in those sectors in which the productivity of labour also grew
more than average; and conversely those industries with a lower than
average labour productivity growth tended to have lower than average
rate of technical progress.
Combining this with the previous results (of a positive
association between capital intensity and labour productivity) would
seem to suggest that by and large, the productivity differences of
Nigeria's industries can be 'explained' by the joint impact of
technical progress and capital intensity. The relative contribution
of each (and of other variables), which is useful for policy making
37
6:22
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purposes, cannot however be determined easily from the coefficients of
correlation as previously presented. This can be done by the
application of the Johansen (1961) 36
 Model which relates the rate of
growth of labour productivity over a period to the increase in capital
per employee and to technological changes (i.e. to shift in the
production function). The regression equation estimated by Johansen
is of the following type
a.	 A.
log a
itl 
= ailogZ + log Aitl 
it0
where aiti and aito are industry i's labour productivities in two
periods t1 and to respectively; /kit' and Aito are the indices of
technical progress or total factor productivities for industry i in
periods t1 and to respectively; a i is the elasticity of output with
respect to capital for industry i and z is a measure of capital
intensity, which, assuming constant inter-industrial pattern of wages
and capital costs Johansen defines as
6:21
where W and R are (given) wages and capital costs in industry i
respectively. Thus in the regression equation, a decrease in wages
with relative prices of capital goods constant will give zi < 1. For
our purposes, equation (10) was modified slightly by introducing two
different measures of capital intensity viz value-added per employee
(V/L), and capital per worker (K/L).
Thus if say,
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in the regression equation, relative capital intensity has increased
and vice versa. We arbitrarily divided the period 1963-1978 into 4
sub-periods: 1963-71, 1971-1975, 1971-1978 and 1975-1978 and for each
of these, average observations on labour productivity and on measures
of capital intensity are obtained to run three sets of regression
equations: the first set considers labour productivity and measures of
capital intensity for the period 1971-1975 relative to that of the
period 1963-71; the second considers 1971-78 relative to 1963-71 and
the third, the period 1975-78 relative to 1971-1975. Thus for
example, in the first set of equations the following regression
equation was estimated
	
1971-75
	
_ a l
	+log :
	
Elog 	 1971-75 
a
	
a1963-71	 '1963-71
6:24
where a = average labour productivity
z = average capital intensity measure defined as (K/L), (V/L)
and E = is a measure of average technical progress achieved in one
period relative to that of the other etc.
The results of the regressions are shown in table 6:16. Considering
only the equations in which both the coefficients are statistically
significant, the following interpretation can be given. Equation la
shows that of the total growth of 80% (antilog (0.256 - 1)*100),
capital intensity accounts for a growth in the productivity of labour
of 70% and technical progress accounts for only 6% with difference of
4% being accounted for by the interaction between the two variables.
Using capital labour ratio as a measure of capital intensity, on the
other hand, equation 2c shows that of the total growth of (only) 34%,
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capital intensity contributed 12% technical progress 20% and the
interaction between the two 2%. The role of capital intensity is
therefore clearly evident, but whether it is more important than
technical progress would seem to depend upon, among other things, the
period in question. In period 1 capital intensity is more important
than technical progress while the reverse is true in the second
period.
This would then confirm an earlier statement that although both
are important in explaining labour productivity differentials, the
role of capital intensity is more strongly felt.
(ii) Labour productivity and gross output growth: the "Verdoorn's law'
Another well known hypothesis in the productivity growth
literature is the relationship between the growth in labour
productivity and the growth in manufacturing output in the economy.
This relationship has been called the 'Verdoorns law' 38 , according to
which, the expansion of output is positively associated with growth in
labour productivity. According to Kaldor (1967), the phenomenon of
increasing returns to scale is the fundamental explanation of the
empirical relationship investigated by Verdoorn: the expansion of the
market for an industry's output creates certain internal and external
economies, leads to a further division of labour and hence to a higher
labour productivity.
A wide variety of methods can be used to examine the phenomenon,
depending on whether one views it as a static or dynamic relationship.
In a static context, the levels of output and of labour productivity
could be correlated; however, the 'law' is also regarded as a dynamic
phenomenon which is concerned with rates of change of productivity and
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output in which case, cross-country, cross-industry and/or time series
regression equations of the following type are often estimated:39
log(G/L) = a + blog G
	 6:25
or	 log(G/L) = a + blog G + clog W + At + n	 6:26
the latter being the labour productivity side-relation of the CES
(variable returns to scale) production function previously postulated.
(G/L) is gross output per head (labour productivity), b is the
Verdoorn's coefficient, c, the elasticity of substitution and At the
time trend.
Table 6:17 shows Verdoorn coefficients obtained by estimating
equation (6:26).
It can be seen that in almost all cases, the goodness-of-fit is
fairly good; also with only few exceptions, strong and significant
Verdoorn relation exists in the manufacturing sectors, although as was
previously noticed such a relationship was weak and insignificant for
the total manufacturing sector as a whole (see table 6:la rows 3 and
4) .
For the individual sectors, the estimates range from 0.212
(basic metals) to 1.46 (alcoholic beverages). The relation is high
and most significant (at 1% level) in 16 industries including food
processing, alcoholic beverages, tobacco, electrical equipment,
transport equipment and miscellaneous products; it is rather weakly
significant in 4 industries: non-alcoholic beverages, paper products,
cement and machinery) and is not very good in 4: soap and perfumes,
rubber and plastics and basic metals production.
The strong and significant association between productivity
growth and output growth is further shown in tables 6:18a and 6:18b.
Here we show cross-industry correlation coefficients for five
CC
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different time periods. The relationship is strongest in the period
1971-1975, followed by that in the 1963-71 period. It can be seen
that the only period in which no significant association could be
deduced between total factor productivity and output growth is
1971-78. The significance of this finding will be examined later.
Table: 6:18a
Growth in output and in labour productivity: 
Nigerian Manufacturing Industries 1963 - 1978
	Period
	
Correlation Coefficient
(Pearson corr. coeff.)
	
1963 - 1978
	
0.57*
	
1971 - 1978
	
0•45*
	
1971 - 1975
	
0.89*
	
1975 - 1978
	
0.44*
	
1963 - 1971
	
0.64*
Table 6:18b
Growth in output and in total factor productivity: 
Nigerian Manufacturing Industries 1963 - 1978 
1963 - 1978
1971 - 1978
1971 - 1975
1975 - 1978
1963 - 1971
significant at 1% level
** significant at 5% level
*** significant at 10% level
0.63*
0.09
0.85*
0.62*
0.82*
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(iii) Trade policy and productivity growth40
In the development literature, the crucial role of trade policy
in growth and efficiency with which resources are used has long been
emphasised. One of the arguments for a link between trade policy and
productivity is that by opening up the economy to international trade
and competition, a 'challenge-response' mechanism could be induced
which could in principle, stimulate and pressurise domestic
entrepreneurs to adopt methods and techniques that reduce
'x-inefficiency' and costs in order to meet the standards of foreign
competitors. On the otherhand, anti-trade policies which confine
output to the domestic market, reduce or even eliminate the 'threat'
from foreign competition blunting thereby the incentives for cost-
consciousness. A related trade-policy argument is based on the
advantages from large-scale production (economies of scale) that will
acrue to a country with trade liberalisation. It is asserted that the
extent of the division of labour, and therefore the level of output
attainable per worker (i.e. labour productivity) in any economy, are
limited by the size of the domestic market. Thus while both
strategies of import substitution and trade liberalisation (or export
promotion) could lead to significant increases in the output of
industrial products, further expansion in output under the former
strategy is more likely to be constrained, given that most LDCs are
poor and could offer only tiny markets for most of these products.
Moreover, as is usually the case, most LDCs make use of imported
technology which is built for optimum utilisation at scales which may
not be immediately within their grasp (given the narrow home market),
leading thereby to high unit costs and compounding the problems of
excess capacity often faced by the manufacturers. Another argument in
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the literature is that the productivity performance of domestic
industries could be significantly affected by the relative ease or
difficulty of obtaining key inputs which may not be domestically
produced (or which could be produced only at very high costs). This
in turn would be determined by the availability of foreign exchange.
Hence any policies which increase the availability of foreign exchange
and therefore the country's ability to pay for these (better and
cheapter) inputs, could increase productivity performance. In this
view, under an export-promotion strategy, with its high foreign
exchange generating capacity, domestic industries are less likely to
be starved of important raw materials, are more likely to operate at
full-capacity, and could therefore exhibit higher levels of
productivity, than industries operating in highly restrictive regimes.
The relationship between productivity growth and/or technical
progress and trade policy could be tested in several ways, depending
on the availability of data. In a cross-country analysis, one would
expect, if the above arguments are valid, countries with more
liberalized trade regimes to achieve higher levels of productivity
and/or technical progress than the more restrictive regimes. One
could also examine the significance of economies of scale or the
'VeTdoorn's law' separately for the output that is meant for domestic
market and for that which is destined for export. The latter will be
expected to show up higher Verdoorn coefficient than the former. This
was the approach followed by Nishimizu and Robinson (1983) 41 in a
cross-country study of the relationship between trade policy and total
factor productivity. For a single country, one could examine
productivity differences between, on the one hand, import-substituting
industries and on the other, industries whose output is geared to
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exporting. The classification of sectors into import-substituting and
exporting in Nigeria is, however, difficult in the absence of any long
time series data of manufactured exports emanating from the different
sectors. An alternative approach to the above is to consider,
following Krueger and Ttincer (1980) 42 , variations of labour and total
factor productivity growth overtime and relate these to variations in
the trade regime. One could then hypothesize that periods of highly
restrictive trade and exchange controls would exhibit slower growth of
factor productivity than periods of relative liberalisation. This
approach is followed here.
It will be recalled that in Chapter 4, the trade regime was
broadly classified into 4 phases with the period 1975-76 - 1978 having
the highest degree of restrictiveness, followed by the period
1961-1971. The periods 1971-1975 and 1950-1960 were identified as
corresponding to the liberalised phase. As no industrial statistics
are available for the latter period (i.e. 1950-60) our analysis will
be restricted to the first three periods. In tables 6:19 and 6:20 we
present estimates of rates of total factor and labour productivity
growth for these periods. The same method as in the previous section
was employed in arriving at these estimates. If the productivity-
growth-trade-policy hypothesis holds, then one would expect, other
things being equal, the performance of industries to be poorer in the
period 1975-78 than in the periods 1963-71 and 1971-75; one would also
expect the latter period to show higher productivity growth than the
former. Before examining the results, some comments should be raised.
As we previously noted, the Nigerian economy has, admittedly, always
been 'distorted' in the classical economics sense and therefore no
clear-cut 'phases' or 'trade regimes' as such can be meaningfully
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Table 6:19 Rate of Growth of Total Factor Productivity:
A sub-period analysis.
Sector
1963-78
Period
1963-71
	 1971-75 1975-78 1971-78
6 3111/3122 Food
-0.60 1.40 2.20 -3.40 29.60
7 3131/3133 Alcoholic bev.
-1.40 4.20 -7.20 -16.90 -13.80
8 3134 Non-alcoh.bev. 3.60 0.59 -2.50 6.90 1.60
9 3140 Tobacco
-4.90 1.87 -20.78 -7.60 -8.69
10 3211 Textiles
-0.20 4.90 0.50 -8.30 -2.80
11 3212 Made-up	 text. 0.80 4.20 -2.50 4.50 -0.60
12 3220 Apparel
-3.90 -1.20 -9.80 1.90 -3.90
13 3231/3233 Leather 2.60 -0.50 12.50 -6.90 3.10
14 3240 Footwear 1.90 -0.30 18.10 -12.70 5.20
15 3311/3320 Wood
-6.40 -3.90 6.00 -16.80 5.10
16 3412/3420 Paper 5.60 4.70 3.40 -23.90 0.12
17 3511/3512 Chemicals
-6.10 2.20 -4.10 -15.50 -2.10
18 3521 Paints 3.70 4.20 7.20 -15.10 -0.20
19 3522 Drugs 11.30 -16.73 23.96 0.16 13.90
20 3523 Soap 13.34 0.45 -5.75 5.25 1.15
21 3529/3540 Other Chem. 0.20 8.60 -9.80 -8.80 6.10
22 3551/3560 Rubber 4.30 3.40 -3.90 3.20 3.30
23 3610/3699 Cement 0.10 -0.90 -0.34 -3.80 9.80
24 3710/3812 Basic Metals 1.11 -3.75 3.42 10.90 7.36
25 3813/3819 Fab.Metals -6.10 -15.10 0.10 -7.90 -4.30
26 3822/3829 Machinery 2.90 -3.96 18.17 22.79 22.83
27 3832/3829 Elect.Machinery 0.20 2.50 5.00 -25.70 -1.50
28 3841/3843 Transport Equip 0.80 -28.71 65.55 -9.46 -11.30
29 3851/3909 Misc.products -4.20 -4.60 2.60 -13.90 -0.30
Total manufac
turing sector 3.30 2.60 -1.70 -5.80 4.10
4.50* 6.20* -3.50* -12.60* 8.80*
* value-added based;
Due to the lack of relevant data for sector 3822/3829, the
first and second periods begin 1966 and end respectively
1978 and 1971.
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Table 6:20 Rate of Growth of Labour Productivity:
A sub-period analysis.
Sector
1963-78 1963-71 1971-75 1975-78 1971-78
6 3111/3122 Food 2.30 0.39 4.40 1.80 -2.10
7 3131/3133 Alcoholic bev. 2.10 9.60 -0.90 0.90 6.10
8 3134 Non-alcoh.bev. 4.30 7.50 -5.10 -7.20 -8.10
9 3140 Tobacco -1.20 -4.00 -30.40 -3.60 -19.70
10 3211 Textiles 2.10 10.30 3.70 -7.30 0.12
11 3212 Made-up text. 1.30 3.10 -0.60 -0.60 -2.80
12 3220 Apparel 0.11 9.30 -17.50 7.40 -9.00
13 3231/3233 Leather 1.30 2.60 12.00 -14.20 1.40
14 3240 Footwear 1.60 9.10 7.80 -10.30 -1.20
15 3311/3320 Wood 2.20 -2.10 9.30 13.20 7.10
16 3412/3420 Paper 8.50 12.70 4.20 5.30 7.50
17 3511/3512 Chemicals -0.70 2.10 -2.50 -2.80 3.40
18 3521 Paints 2.90 3.20 12.90 -1.20 2.90
19 3522 Drugs 23.80 -14.50 26.90 1.50 17.30
20 3523 Soap 19.20 4.70 5.20 7.40 6.10
21 3529/3540 Other Chem. 10.10 27.20 -15.40 -17.80 0.09
22 3551/3560 Rubber 1.10 4.80 0.22 6.10 2.70
23 3610/3699 Cement -0.35 -0.87 2.30 9.30 2.00
24 3710/3812 Basic Metals -1.96 -25.60 1.30 19.40 2.60
25 3813/3819 Fab.Metals 3.40 2.50 7.20 -0.07 2.80
26 3822/3829 Machinery 2.80 -7.30 5.80 31.46 17.50
27 3832/3829 Elect.Machinery -1.90 9.10 -3.30 -60.80 -12.30
28 3841/3843 Transport Equip 8.60 -15.40 90.61 13.30 4.30
29 3851/3909 Misc.products 0.30 -2.20 13.10 -13.00 10.70
To tal manufacturing 1.30 2.10 5.60 2.50 3.90
2.60* 3.80* 5.20* 1.80* 2.90
Notes: for the Machinery Sector(3822/3829),the periods are
1966-78,1966-71,1971-75,1975-78 and 1971-78,due to the
lack of relevant data for the period 1963-1966.
* value -added per head.
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delineated. We have seen that even the so called liberalisation
measures were not only half-heartedly applied but were also applied
not with a clear cut objective of industrial promotion. So too, were
the measures in other periods. Thus as in the case of output growth,
productivity differences among industries could be quite unrelated to
these economic policies. Moreover, our periods of analysis do not
appear long enough to permit any meaningful analysis. For example, is
the 'liberalisation' period of 2 or 3 years long enough for producers
to respond to any liberalisation incentives to increase output per
man? or are they so short as to frustrate the efforts of producers in
increasing productivity? Such questions are no doubt important,
although not within the purview of this study. They should be however
kept in mind when interpreting our results.
From these tables, considerable variations in the numerical
values of rates of productivity growth both between industries and
sub-periods are quite evident. Consider first, rates of TFPG. For
the total manufacturing sector as a whole, value-added (gross-output)
based rates of TFPG registered were 6.2% (2.6%), 3.5% (-1.7%) and
-12.6% (-5.8%) respectively for the periods 1963-1971, 1971-75, and
1975-78. Out of the 24 industries considered 11 (46%) registered
negative rates of TFPG in the first period and 16 (67%) in the third.
These figures compare rather unfavourably with the corresponding
figure of 10 (42%) over the 1971-75 period. The simple arithmetic
mean rates of TFPG for the three sub-periods amount to respectively
-1.52%, 5.25% and -5.88%. Even when the transport equipment sector is
excluded (because of its unusually high rate of TFPG in 1971-75) the
mean rate of TFPG in the second period was much higher than that of
the other two periods.
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The finding that the productivity growth performance of these
industries was poorest over the 1975/76 - 78 period is further
reinforced by the figures presented in table 6:20. The manufacturing
sector's rate of labour productivity growth were 3.8%, 5.2% and 1.8%
for the periods 1963-71, 1971-75 and 1975-78 respectively; 50% of the
industries had negative rates of labour productivity growth over the
1975-78 period compared with 33% over each of the periods 1963-71 and
1971-75; and moreover, not only was the rate of decline maximum
(-60.8% electrical equipment) but the rate of increase was also lowest
in the period 1975-78.
An additional, suggestive evidence can be found by relating the
sectoral effective rates of protection for 1974 and 1977 to the
sectoral rates of productivity growth around the two years. The erp
for 1974 would be expected to exert some influence - if any - on the
productivity performance around the years 1971-1975 or even beyond.
Similarly, the effects of protection in 1977 may be expected to show
up around the period 1975-1978. We have found that for the period
1971-1975, 70% of the sectors with negative rates of TFPG and 88% of
sectors with negative rates of labour productivity growth, were
accorded above average rates of effective protection in 1974;
similarly, in the period 1975-78, 75% of sectors with negative rates
of labour productivity growth, and 63% of sectors with negative TFPG
rates, received an above average rates of protection in 1974.
Finally, it can be seen also that of the 16 sectors with negative rate
of TFPG in the period 1975-1978, 44% received above average rate of
protection in 1977, and of the 12 sectors with negative rates of
labour productivity growth, 42% had an above average effective rate of
protection in 1977.
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To sum up, the total factor productivity performance of the
Nigerian manufacturing industries was, in general, poor over the
years; given that their performance was poorest over the period that
the economy was most distorted, it would appear that the observed
variations in rates of TFPG and labour productivity, may well have
been determined by the restrictiveness of the trade regime at least,to
some extent. What implications do our findings carry?
6:3:4 Summary, Conclusion and Policy Implications
An attempt has been made in the preceeding section to draw
attention to the crucial issue of productivity growth in Nigerian
manufacturing industries over a period of 16 years. For the total
manufacturing sector, labour productivity has grown, unimpressively,
by slightly above 1%, on average, between 1963 and 1968. The
performance of the individual industries has been more impressive
judging by the number of industries with significantly higher rates of
labour productivity growth than that for the whole sector. The result
is the other way round in the case of total factor productivity growth
or technical progress: the manufacturing sector as a whole registered
a fairly impressive rate of growth which was surpassed only by that of
a handful of industries. Between 1963 and 1978, 38% of the sectors
had negative rates of TFPG and 25% of the sectors achieved rates of
productivity growth which exceeded that of the manufacturing sector.
Of the 15 sectors with positive rates, 33% achieved rates of TFPG
below 1%. Thus about 58% of the sectors had either negative or less
than 1% rates of growth of TFP. That the increases in overall
productivity were not very impressive would cast some doubt upon the
significance of the relatively higher rates of labour productivity
growth.
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Three possible determinants of labour productivity growth were
examined. Increases in capital intensity were found to be
significantly associated with the productivity of labour. One might
be tempted to argue that given its influence on labour productivity
growth, the bias in favour of capital-using techniques by Nigerian
industries is beneficial to the economy. This might pose a delimma to
the policy makers who would like to obtain increases not only in
employment but also in productivity. However, the question should not
be so much whether to sacrifice one objective for another, as to
choose, through rational policies, a number of alternative paths which
could lead to the realisation of an appropriate mix of both
objectives. Moreover, the bias in favour of capital intensity need
not be beneficial to the economy, especially since this bias is not
necessarily total factor productive. We have shown that the relatively
lower estimates of sectoral rates of TFPG could have resulted from the
increases in the capital input. Although some measure of technical
progress could also be used to explain labour productivity changes,
its relative importance appears minimal. This is a discouraging
result considering that a sound economic development rests more or
less on the progress being made to shift a country's production
frontier upwards.
The possible existence of economies of scale which has been used
to explain the significant Verdoorn's relation which we have found for
many industries, emphasises the importance of market size in
determining productivity levels and carries the implication that if
the Nigerian industrial and trade policy is geared towards the
external market, certain benefits in the form of cost reductions and
significant increases in productivity could accrue. The external
4 0,4
market implication is important, for, even though the country is large
in terms of population, the narrowness of the home market (given the
low level of income and its 'skewed distribution) is likely to set
limits to increases in effective demand. Reducing the high costs of
production, by say, building larger plants in a few lines of
production could be a first step towards venturing into exports at
least to the less industrialised countries of West Africa.
The case for policy changes is further provided by our finding
that the low productivity performance of industries was most
noticeable during the most restrictive period of the trade regime.
Moreover, the correlation between output growth on the one hand and
labour productivity and total factor productivity growth on the other,
was found to be highest over the 1971-1975 (the liberalised) period.
Admittedly, our analysis of the relationship between trade policy and
productivity growth is rather simplistic (and our evidence merely
suggestive in nature) and a more rigorous examination is called for,
in order to properly discuss alternative policy prescriptions. But it
does appear to us that certain modifications to the existing regime
are called for.
A final comment on the accuracy of our analysis in this chapter
is in order here. It must be noted that the functional form used for
the production function estimates (of substitution elasticities and
MPG) involve several highly restrictive assumptions which may not be
tenable for the Nigerian situation. Some of the few fundamental
problems which could impair though not necessarily invalidate our
results include: the use of only two factors of production - labour
and capital - their treatment as homogeneous inputs, our inability to
consider possibilities of improvement in their quality, the lack of
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adjustments for capacity under utilisation, the assumption that a
single production function exists for all industries and above all,
the crucial assumption that the economy is characterised by perfect
competition in product and factor markets. In spite of these
limitations, it does seem to us that the magnitude of the substitution
elasticities, and the broad pattern of productivity movements
indicated by our results are not far from the actual productivity
experience of the manufacturing sector, and we believe that the
results can be usefully employed as a guide to policy making in areas
such as employment provision and in overall infant industry promotion.
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CRAPTER 7
EFFECTIVE PROTECTION, INVESTMENT EFFICIENCY
AND DOMESTIC RESOURCE COSTS; 1974 AND 1977 
7.1 Introduction
"The purpose of protection is not to provide undue 
profits for an indefinite period to the manufacturer
at the expense of the consumer, nor will government
allow a higher cost industrial economy to be built
under the umbrella of excessive protection. Nigerian
products must be reasonably competitive with imported
goods, not merely so as to provide Nigerians with
quality goods at fair prices, but also that Nigerian
manufacturers may compete effectively in the markets
of the world. We do not visualize Nigerian industry as
catering for the domestic market, it will increasingly
become the supplier of manufactured goods throughout
Africa. This it can only achieve if it remains 
efficient and fully corpetitive."1
We saw in Chapter 4 that the Nigerian industry does indeed cater
for the domestic market only, as exports have failed to develop.
This, it was suggested, could have been the result of government
restrictionist measures which alter the allocation of resources in
favour of domestic production and penalise exporting by maintaining an
over valued exchange rate. This chapter explores further the
operation of Nigerian manufacturing industries with regards to
efficiency and international competitiveness. It seeks to analyze the
domestic vis-a-vis the 'free-trade' profitability of investment as
well as the cost of import substitution in the economy. The chapter
is in five sections. The following section (7:2) discusses briefly,
the main efficiency criteria employed in the study, and includes a
brief account of the methods and assumptions employed to estimate
factor costs. The economic efficiency or inefficiency of
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manufacturing industries is determined and analysed in section (7:3).
In section (7:4) the correspondence between economic efficiency of
industries and the government's restrictionist measures as quantified
by the effective protective rate is explored and finally in section
(7:5) we provide the main conclusions.
7:2 Criteria for the evaluation of investment efficiency.
To evaluate the economic efficiency of the individual
manufacturing industries in Nigeria, three criteria are employed: Net
Social Profitability (NSP), Social Marginal Product of capital (SMP)
or the Social Rate of Return (SRR) and the Domestic Resource Cost
(DRC) of saving or earning a unit of foreign exchange. As Bruno
(1972), Chenery (1961) and Pearson (1976) demonstrate, 2 each of the
three criteria can be derived from the others. As a convenient
theoretical and methodological stating point, we consider the NSP
criterion expressed as:
11x .p —E pa
i
.	 —E p f
x	 _s sx
where	 'Ix = social profitability in activity x
(7:1)
shadow price of output from activity x
(i.e. the marginal social benefit of activity x)
P. = shadow price of i th material input per unit
1	
of commodity x
input-output coefficient of the ith good
_ utilised in activity x
fsx = primary factor input-output coefficient
employed directly in activity x
Ps = shadow price of all other inputs (labour and
capital) used directly in the activity x.
The social profitability of an activity is thus evaluated as the
difference between the shadow price of the output of the activity
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(i.e. the social benefit attributed to the activity) and the sum of
the direct intermediate inputs valued at their shadow prices and all
other direct inputs of factors valued at their opportunity costs.
Using this criterion, an activity is chosen for implementation (in an
ex ante appraisal) or for expansion (in an ex post evaluation) if and
only if wx > O. Such an activity will be called socially profitable,
efficient and/or viable since it represents an efficient utilisation
of ventures from the point of view of society. On the other hand,
those activities with7rx < 0 are regarded as inefficient, and the
resources employed (material inputs as well as primary factors) could
be more efficiently used in their best alternative uses.
It is useful to go further and derive another important
yardstick of investment efficiency: the rate of return to capital,
which put simply, is the average social profit from an activity
expressed as a percentage of the capital outlay. Formally, rewrite
equation (7:1) as:
m-1
— kx r	 (7:2)ilx =	 3a. p	 f s pLjxi I s=l_x s
which in effect singles out the input of the capital stock (K) from
the bundle of primary factor inputs employed in activity x. Then the
criterion of efficiency and/or viability Oa > 0) can be equivalently
•
expressed as:
P -a. P. -	 f P > r
x	 ix 1	 SX S1	 S=i (7:3)
kx
The numerator is the difference between total value added in
efficiency prices ( Px g aix Pi) and the payments to other factors of
1
production (notably labour in our case) and the denominator is the
value of the capital stock employed in activity x. According to the
criterion, an activity is accepted if it earns a rate of return at
least equal to the shadow rate of return or accounting rate of 
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interest r. In cases of a choice between alternative activities, the
one with the highest rate of return can be selected for expansion
and/or encouragement. If the capital stock can be appropriately
measured, the criterion has the merit of being simple in application.
Its main defect, however, is that it is static, since it does not take
into consideration the whole life span of the activity in question but
relies on one model period. Reliance upon the criterion for
investment decision making could therefore be misleading unless one
could determine appropriately what is considered to be a 'normal' year
in an activity's life for assessing accurately the simple rate of
return. This defect is shared by the two other criteria employed
here.
In an ex ante appraisal of investment projects this problem can
be remedied by the use of the Net Present Value method, defined as the
sum of the discounted net benefits (i.e. gross benefits minus both
investments and recurrent costs)
NW = 7 NB L (i+r)t
t=1
where	 L = sum total for the whole lifetime of the
t=1	 activity from the initial year 1 to year n
NB 
• 
Net (discounted) benefits
• discount factor corresponding to a selected
rate of discount.
An investment project is acceptable if NW > 0; and where there is
more than one project to choose from, the one with the largest NW is
to be chosen for implementation. Although it has the merit that it
takes into account the entire life of a project, its operational
usefulness is limited especially in cases in which sufficiently
detailed information for comprehensive analysis is not available, as
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in our case. Moreover, the evaluation of the economic efficiency of
projects is done in this study in an ex post sense rather than ex ante
sense for which the method is more suited.
An additional problem of the two efficiency criteria
(expressions (7:1) and (7:3)) is that it is possible to obtain several
variants, each usually giving different rate of return or rate of
profit for the same activity. This is because of the several
ambiguities inherent in the methods. For example, there is the
problem of what profit figure one should use: profit before or after
taxes, before or after depreciation, etc. If profit after
depreciation is employed, should the depreciation be on a straight
line basis? What concept of investment or capital should one employ?
Should it be that of total investment (e.g. equity plus loans) or of
equity capital only? It is obvious that any arbitrary selection of
one method could lead to an incorrect ranking of activities and would
be of no help at all in determining the cut-off point between
'desirable' and 'undesirable' activities.
Because of data limitations, we have not been able to take into
account all of such defects and ambiguities. Two single time periods
have been selected (1974 and 1977) for the study in the hope that at
least one (and hopefully both) represent what may be regarded as a
'normal year'. Throughout the study, we have treated capital
consumption as a cost to the industry and therefore the concept of
capital used is that one of profit after depreciation. In the absence
of any information with regards to sectoral profit tax rates in
Nigeria, the before-tax profit concept is employed. The rate of
profit and the yield on capital will therefore be upward biased with
the size and magnitude of the bias depending upon the rate of profit
tax.
or in matrix notation
C'(1-A) -1 
P
x 
- P	 (1-A) 
-1
o o
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However, the figures obtained may not be biased for inter-industry
comparisons to the extent that the rate of profit tax is the same in
all industries.
The efficiency with which resources are being employed to save
(in the case of import substitutes), or earn (in the case of exports),
foreign exchange in Nigeria's manufacturing industries is analysed
using the Domestic Resource Costs criterion which may be formulated as
follows:
DRC
x
-
1 V A.
x ix
(7:5)
(7:6)
where
• value-added in activity x which represents
payments to factors employed in the activity;
P
x	 = world market price of the commodity x;
• vector of imported input per unit output of x;
mo 
Aix = the elements of (1 - AY- the matrix of direct
plus indirect input requirements;
C / 
• 
a row vector of domestic costs per unit of
output by sector;
• an index of imported input prices.
The opportunity costs of all domestic resources -- capital, labour and
material inputs -- involved in producing a unit of commodity are
represented by the numerator while the denominator represents the net
421
foreign exchange gained per unit of production expressed as the
difference between the gross foreign exchange savings (or earnings)
and the direct and indirect foreign exchange costs involved in
importing inputs or in the production of domestic inputs into the
activity. The ratio thus represents the terms on which domestic
resources are to be exchanged for foreign resources. Ranking of
industries or activities in terms of their DI C ratios provides a
measure of relative efficiency or relative comparative advantage and,
according to Bruno (1972), "By comparing it with some measure of the
economy's real or accounting exchange rate, it can be used as an
investment criterion just as the internal rate of return is compared
with some measure of the real rate of interest" 3 . An activity is to
be considered inefficient if its DRC ratio exceeds this exchange rate
since this implies that the opportunity costs of the resources used
exceed the value of the foreign exchange saved or earned. It is well
to bear in mind certain limitations of the DRC method of project
evaluation.
First in common with other criteria mentioned above, the DRC
ratio is essentially a static concept, although it seeks to measure
comparative advantage which is more or less a dynamic phenomenon. The
concept is static in at least two senses: first, it relies on only a
single period's observation on output and inputs and makes no explicit
allowance for future benefits and costs (i.e. outputs and inputs) and,
second, it gives no explicit consideration to issues related to
dynamic efficiency of investments such as 'learning by doing'
economies of scale, etc. Thus to say that an activity is efficient
because its DRC ratio is less than an equilibrium exchange rate is a
comparatively static argument which could be justifiably offset by
these dynamic considerations.
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The second limitation of the concept is that some inconsistency
in the measure of relative efficiency (or inefficiency) of industries
could arise where certain industries being evaluated have negative
value-added at border prices. This can be illustrated as follows: let
industries A and B have value-added at international prices of
respectively -$60 and -$120. Industry B will be less preferred to A
if value-added is accepted as a proxy for national welfare since the
operation of the former causes a twice as much reduction of national
income or welfare as the operation of the latter. Assume, however,
that the value of domestic primary inputs evaluated at their
opportunity costs is the same in both industries and equal to say $40.
Then the DRC ratios implied by the figures are respectively -0.67 and
-0.33 for A and B. If the two are ranked and the minimum DRC
criterion is employed, B will now be preferred, leading thereby to a
perverse result. The problem does not however arise if the ratios are
compared to an equilibrium exchange rate rather than ranked4.
Finally, some biases may be introduced in the DEC estimates in
the event that (i) foreign exchange costs are not properly counted, or
(ii) domestic costs of factors are counted as foreign costs or vice
versa. As Bruno (1967) 5 demonstrated, the DRC ratio is biased
downward or upward if foreign factor costs are erroneously counted as
domestic factor costs, depending on whether the 'true' DRC ratio is
greater than or less than the shadow price of foreign exchange. Thus
it is recommended to use the NSP criterion which does not depend on
the separation of foreign and domestic factor costs in situations
where the allocation of domestic and foreign costs is not so certain.
Our use of both measures is useful for a consistency check of the
results.
4?3
It is often asserted that the effective protective rate (erp)
and the DRC ratio can serve similar objectives, i.e. that the erp can
be usefully employed as a measure of the extent of inefficiency in the
economy and/or as a measure of the domestic cost of saving a unit of
foreign exchange6 . Other things being equal, the 'height' of
effective tariffs will be indicative of a country's comparative
advantage in the activity in question: activities with lower effective
rates being preferred to those with higher erp. However, as pointed
out in the theoretical and empirical literature, the equivalence of
the two measures rests upon the assumption, among others, of
competitive market structures: specifically that all domestic - factor
as well as product-markets are perfectly competitive, and factors are
perfectly mobile within the domestic economy and their prices reflect
their opportunity costs in alternative employment. Where a structural
disequilibrium exists (as in a great many less developed countries) in
the labour and capital markets, such as minimum wage legislations,
subsidisation of capital goods imports and low interest rates on
loans, and/or in product markets such as monopoly profits accruing to
some highly protected domestic industries, market prices cannot be
used to derive an efficiency criterion. The DRC, as we have defined
it, gets around the problem by evaluating domestic factors at their
shadow prices while in the usual erp computations, factors are
evaluated at their distorted prices. The equivalence between the two
as investment criteria therefore breaks down7.
Balassa and Schydlowsky (1972) 8
 suggested making adjustments
between the market prices and true opportunity costs of factors in the
event of imperfect factor markets and introduced the concept of social
effective protective rate which reflects such adjustments. This has
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two implications: first, the erp loses its interpretation as an
indicator of resource flows and second, it becomes indistinguishable
from the DRC concept. Clearly, as Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1978)9
stated,
To derive DRC's by estimating.... the correct shadow factor
prices.., and then to rechristen them as 'social erps' is
therefore likely to lead to confusion; and, in our judgement it
is best therefore to drop the terminology and concept of erps
altogether from cost-benefit analysis.10
No attempt is made therefore to estimate 'social erps' or to employ
erps to measure economic efficiency although we relate the estimated
erps to the three other economic efficiency measures.
7:3 The Main Results
7:3:1 Private Profitability in Nigerian Manufacturing Industries
(1968 - 1978) 
In this section we shall examine the behaviour of private
profits - defined as industrial output less input costs at domestic
market prices - for the manufacturing sector as a whole, and for a
cross section of industries within the sector. We shall first examine
the behaviour of production costs in the sector as it is the change in
these that determines to a large extent an industry's profit or
reinvestible surplus.
In table (7:1) we present the cost elements for the years 1968 -
1978. Total industrial costs consist of raw material costs, costs of
fuel and electricity and other costs (repairs and maintenance, etc).
These are shown in columns 1 to 5. In columns 6 and 7 we show two
concepts of labour costs: wages and salaries and wages and salaries
plus fringe benefits, bonuses, etc., referred to as Total Labour
cv
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Costs. Not unexpectedly, raw material costs are the single most
important cost element taking, over the years, no less than 40% of
gross output. Fuel and electricity costs are more or less negligible
when compared to either raw material costs or to 'other' costs. In
sum, it can be seen that total industrial costs have consistently
taken up more than 50% of gross output since 1968. The share of wages
and salaries in gross output remained below 10% except in 1972, 1977
and 1978 when it went slightly above. The shares in output of wages
and salaries and of total labour costs (which includes wages and
salaries and other incidental labour costs) are strikingly similar.
It can be seen that except in 1978, the percentage share of the latter
had never exceeded the former by more than 1 percentage point. This
obviously points to the insignificance of the so-called fringe
benefits and bonuses in labour costs. In what follows, we shall use
wages and salaries paid as a measure of labour costs.
In columns 9 to 12 we show the measures of market
profitability: profit as a proportion of gross output and as a
proportion of capital employed (i.e. the market rate of return to
capital). The differences between the columns is due to the
assumptions employed in estimating capital consumption. It can be
seen that the rate of return is lower by between 9 and 10% when the
rate of depreciation is set at 20% than when it is set at 10%.
However, the choice of the depreciation rate does not affect the year
to year changes in the measures.
The share of profit in gross output shows less fluctuation over
the years than the rate of return. For example, the former changed by
6% in 1969, then remained fairly stable until 1977 when there was a
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sharp drop; on the other hand, the rate of return had a large increase
(37%) between 1968 and 1969, a drop (-4.1%) in 1972, another increase,
and then a big drop in 1977 (-97.8%). This could perhaps be due to
the slight increase in wages between 1976 and 1977 which reduced
profit and a slight increase in capital investment which would tend to
reduce the profit/capital ratio. Despite the considerable
fluctuations, however, it can be concluded that the Nigerian
manufacturing sector is quite profitable by any standards.
Further evidence of market profitability is best shown in Tables
7:2a and 7:2b which provide estimates of the average rate of return as
well as profit/output ratios in various industries operating in the
country.
As the tables reveal, there are wide variations in the rate of
profit before tax both between industries and over the years. For
example, the rate of profit before tax as a percentage of net assets
varied from -75.6% (fruit canning and preservation) to about 213%
(food preparations and animal feeds) in 1971; from -58% (travel goods)
to 246.6% (machinery) in 1972 and from 2% (machinery) to about 365%
(non-alcoholic beverages) in 1977. We can also observe that, over the
years, the fortune of many industries has considerably fluctuated. In
the wearing apparel industry for example, rate of return fluctuated
from -8% (1971) to 76% (1972), dropped to less than 1% in 1974 and
then rose again to 92% in 1977. A fairly similar trend can be
observed for most of the industries, so that, despite the
fluctuations, one can conclude that the rate of private profitability
has considerably increased over the years and there are clear
opportunities for privately profitable investments in many industry
groups.
In the absence of any market and other distortions the
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Table 7:2a Profitability in Manufacturing Industry:
Profit before tax as percentage of net assets.
Sector 1971 1972
Meat products 178.70 29.10
Diary products 88.00 32.50
Fruit canning&preserving
-75.60 -42.50
Grain mill 23.40 7.10
Bakery 37.20 0.90
Suger&related prod.
-6.20 32.60
Miscellaneous food 213.30 20.60
Alcoholic bev. 49.40 14.90
Non-alcoh. bev. 36.10 87.60
Tobacco 25.10 22.60
Textiles 16.30 0.80
Made-up texts.
----
Apparel
-8.50 76.30
Leather & 20.90 30.30
Travel goods
-60.00 -58.40
Footwear
Wood 10.90 47.50
Paper 20.70 9.70
Chemicals 98.30 38.50
Paints 3.30 36.00
Drugs 40.40 23.90
Soap
Other chems.
Rubber 14.60 6.70
Cement 22.20 11.20
Basic metals 52.20 31.80
Fabricated metals 38.60 44.00
Machinery 100.80 246.60
Electrical equip. 72.40 33.20
Transport equip.
Misc .products
Notes:	 implies data not available.
Source: Federal Republic of Nigeria(1975),The Third Plan
(1975-1980),op cit,p.356
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Table 7:2B Profitability in Manufacturing Industry:
Private Profit per unit of output and Private Rate
of Return by sector,1974 & 1977.
Sector
Private Rate of
Return(%)
1974	 1977
Private profit
(%)
1974	 1977
6 3111/3122 Food 176.19 120.00 62.24 27.6
7 3131/3133 Alcoholic bev. 143.13 123.66 136.95 47.5
8	 3134Non-alcoh.bev. 88.27 364.52 115.96 48.61
9	 3140 Tobacco 161.90 161.97 140.50 48.3
10	 321.1 Textiles 54.08 353.52 42.37 38.9'
11	 3212 Made-uptext. 53.15 75.15 30.97 28.41
12	 3220 Apparel 0.85 92.47 2.04 28.2,
13 3231/3233 Leather 22.68 7.06 35.37 5.4(
14	 3240 Footwear 111.66 85.86 79.29 24.4,
15 3311/3320 Wood 57.44 111.46 42.84 34.7"
16 3412/3420 Paper 103.18 27.05 40.22 23.3(
17 3511/3512 Chemicals 38.56 36.41 44.95 19.5C
18	 3521 Paints 163.32 193.54 68.54 35.9;
19	 3522 Drugs 67.98 216.18 43.20 38.0;
20	 3523 Soap 85.63 247.17 127.21 45.5:
21 3529/3540 Other Chem. 4.58 56.05 15.71 21.7:
22 3551/3560 Rubber 54.72 44.13 48.23 21.2E
23 3610/3699 Cement 76.68 46.24 68.72 34.5E
24 3710/3812 Basic Metals 133.25 301.79 38.29 52.15
25 3813/3819 Fab.Metals 121.12 77.84 34.30 16.52
26 3822/3829 Machinery 164.73 1.71 76.20 13.29
27 3832/3829 Elect.Machinery 240.73 113.55 51.10 22.26
28 3841/3843 Transport Equip 178.35 302.23 56.90 10.09
29 3851/3909 Misc.products 82.54 22.73 62.38 11.16
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maximisation of profits which the operations of a private enterprise
is geared towards, would result in an optimum resource allocation in
the sense that no quantity of any good produced in the economy can be
increased without reducing that of another good. In this ideal world,
the rate of profitability would serve as an index of efficiency as
well as a very perfect guide to investment decisions in the
manufacturing sector.
However, as we argued in Chapter 4, the Nigerian economy is in
fact riddled with market imperfections and distortions - import
duties, export taxes and indirect taxes of all kinds. Thus market
prices of goods, services and productive factors and hence the prices
of costs and benefit items which were employed in estimating profits
do not reflect their true social costs. Moreover, empirical evidence
tends to suggest that many of the industrial sectors in the LDCs are
often characterised by an oligopolistic market structure that permits
a few firms to control prices. High levels of protection, as in the
Nigerian economy, may have accompanied the establishment of domestic
monopoly, making it possible for industries to achieve high profit
levels by restricting output and charging higher prices. In such a
case, the observed profit rates simply represent rent accruing to the
industry as a result of their protection from the world market.
In these circumstances financial profitability may provide an
inadequate guide for investment planning and project appraisal and the
need for a consistent set of prices which reflect the resource costs
and benefits of existing activities becomes apparent. We shall,
therefore, devote the rest of this chapter to examining the rate of
social profitability, which reflects such adjustments in prices in the
Nigerian industries.
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7:3:3 Social profitability in the manufacturing sector: 1974 and 1977 
Table 7:3 presents estimates of the Social Rate of Return (SRR)
and of Net Social Profit (NSP) for the years 1974 and 1977, based on
the assumptions that (a) actual or market wages are equal to shadow
wages and (b) the annual rate of capital consumption is 15%.
The most obvious thing about the table is the wide variation in
both SRR and NSP and hence in the relative efficiency (or
inefficiency) of industries. For example, in 1977 the lowest NSP was
-0.5157 (footwear) while the highest was 0.4619 (agricultural and
industrial machinery). The corresponding values of SRR in the same
year are -0.5264 (footwear) and 1.59 (petroleum and coal products). In
1974, the lowest and highest NSP were respectively -0.842 (soap and
perfumery) and 0.409 (agricultural and industrial machinery); while
for SRR corresponding values are -0.472 (soap and perfumery) and 0.724
(transport equipment). In 1977, the five most socially efficient
sectors are machinery, non-alcoholic beverages, petroleum and coal
products, alcoholic beverages and basic metals; while footwear, wood
products, textiles, miscellaneous manufactures and wearing apparel are
the five least efficient industries.
Another significant aspect of the table is the change in the
relative efficiency (or inefficiency) of industries between the two
years. The SRR increased significantly from -0.108 to 1.59 in the
petroleum and coal industry, from 0.0029 to 1.29 in the non-alcoholic
beverages sector, and from -0.147 to 0.327 in the industry
manufacturing drugs and medicines. On the other hand, industries
manufacturing tobacco, leather products and miscellaneous goods,
experienced significant drops in their SRR. In both years, industries
manufacturing textiles, wearing apparel, footwear, wood products and
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TABLE 7:3 Profitability in Manufacturing Industry:
Social Profit as a proportion of Gross output and
Social Rate of Return on Capita1,1974 and 1977.
Sector
	 Social Profit	 Social Rate of Return
Code	 Name
(1)
1974
(2)
1977
( 3 )
1974
(4)
1977
6 3111/3122	 Food 0.2540 0.0956 0.5993 0.1728
7 3131/3133	 Alcoholic bev. 0.2480 0.2739 0.2159 0.2858
8	 3134	 Non-alcoh.bev. 0.0046 0.3682 0.0029 1.2813
9	 3140	 Tobacco 0.3772 -0.0465 0.3622 -0.0429
10	 3212	 Textiles -0.0325 -0.1685 -0.0345 -0.1718
11	 3212	 Made-up text. -0.0837 0.1826 -0.1197 0.2130
12	 3220	 Apparel
13 3231/3233	 Leather
14	 3240	 Footwear
-0.4847
0.1002
-0.2445
-0.0934
-0.0850
-0.5157
-0.1688
0.0535
-0.2869
-0.1052
-0.0529
-0.5264
15 3311/3320	 Wood -0.2423 -0.2667 -0.2707 -0.1922
16	 3412/3420	 Paper -0.0597 0.0369 -0.1276 0.0199
17 3511/3512	 Chemicals 0.0053 0.0894 0.0038 0.0692
18	 3521	 Paints 0.1430 0.0729 0.2840 0.1435
19	 3522	 Drugs -0.1119 0.1487 -0.1467 0.3274
203523	 Soap -08423. -0.0256 -0.4725 -0.0419
21 3529/3540	 Other Chem. -0.4459 0.3592 -0.1084 1.5969
22	 3551/3560 Rubber 0.0845 0.1692 0.0799 0.2461
23 3610/3699 Cement 0.2804 0.1283 0.2607 0.0808
24 3710/3812 Basic Metals 0.2383 0.2336 0.6911 0.4533
25 3813/3819 Eab.Metals 0.0436 0.0085 0.1283 0.0176
26 3822/3829 Machinery 0.3646 0.4619 0.6568 0.4875
27 3832/3839 Elect.Machinery 0.0513 0.0065 0.2014 0.0137
28 3841/3843 Transport Equip 0.2770 0.0319 0.7235 0.4451
29 3851/3909 Misc.products 0.1501 -0.1304 0.1655 -0.1212
Average 0.0330 0.0560 0.1130 0.1920
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drugs and medicines are inefficient. On the whole, it can be observed
that the rates of profitability are higher in 1974 than 1977: the SRR
and NSP each declined in all but 9 of the 24 industrial sectors, even
though the average NSP (.056) and SRR (.192) in 1977 exceeded the
corresponding averages (.003 and .113) achieved in 1974.
It can be concluded from the table that the extent of
inefficiency measured by negative rates of NSP and SRR was fairly
moderate in both years. In 1974, 9 (=37%) and in 1977, 8 (=33%) of
the industries can be classified as inefficient and/or socially
unprofitable. However, although the number of inefficient industries
appears small, it should be noted that in 1977 alone these inefficient
sectors contributed about 30% to total industrial value-added. This
was equivalent to about 20% of industrial output at world prices.
Assuming that the resources - materials, capital and labour -
devoted to the inefficient parts of the manufacturing sector in
Nigeria could have been employed more efficiently and productively in
other more efficient industries, either within or outside the sector,
it implies that the growth of, and the welfare in, the economy are
lower than they would have been had incentives been structured to draw
resources into the more productive and efficient activities.
The robustness of our results will be tested by making new
estimates of the social yield of capital and net social profit on the
basis of alternative assumptions about capital and labour costs. Such
a sensitivity analysis is crucial since neither the true social cost
of labour nor that of capital could be determined with any degree of
precision. We thus experiment with different values in order to
ascertain the extent to which these variations had a significant
effect on net social profit level and the social rate of return.
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For each of the assumed rates of capital consumption (10%, 15%
and 20%), we re-estimated NSP and SRR by varying the assumed ratios of
shadow to market (1, .80 and .75). Detailed results for 1977
are presented in Tables 7:3A - 7:3t.
In general, the main effect of assuming a lower
opportunity cost of labour is to make marginally inefficient
industries (or marginally efficient ones) slightly more efficient.
For example, Net Social Profit in the tobacco industry increased from
-0.046 to 0.023 and 0.044 when the ratio of actual market wages to
shadow wages is varied from 1 to .8 and to .75. A similar change can
be observed in the drugs and medicines industry. Variation in the
opportunity cost of labour also affects the value of the yield on
capital. A decrease in the former has the effect of increasing the
latter since part of the wage bill is now counted as payment to
capital. Similarly, the main effect of varying the rate of capital
depreciation is to alter the level of the rate of return to capital
and of net social profit without affecting the relative ranking of
industries. Thus increasing the rate from 10 to 20% increases social
costs and thereby causes some of the industries exhibiting relatively
law unit social profit to be reclassified as inefficient.
Table 7:4 provides a summary of the results. Here we show the
mean rates of profitability, the distribution of industries within
given ranges and most importantly, the number and percentage of
industries classified as inefficient. In general, the average SRR
lies within the range 14.2 - 34.0% and the average NSP ranges from
less than 2% to 15.7%; the number of inefficient industries varies
from 3 (assuming rate of depreciation = 10% and shadow wage/market
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Table 7:3A Profitability in Manufacturing:
Social Rate of Return on Capital and social
Profit per unit of output (1977).
(A sensitivity analysis)
_
production costs based on:
capital consumption allowance=10%
Ratio of shadow wages to market wages=
Sector
1.00 0.80 0.75
SP SRR SP SRR SP SRR
6 3111/3122 Food 0.123 0.223 0.161 0.273 0.160 0.289
7 3131/3133 Alcoholic 	 bev. 0.322 0.336 0.367 0.366 0.359 0.375
8 3134 4on-alcoh.bev. 0.383 1.331 0.448 1.478 0.438 1.523
9 3140 Tobacco 0.008 0.007 0.423 0.071 0.098 0.090
10 3211 Textiles -0.119 -0.122 -0.036 -0.056 -0.035 -0.036
11 3212 Made-up text. 0.225 0.263 0.322 0.325 0.294 0.344
12 3220 Apparel -0.049 -0.056 0.026 0.011 0.028 0.032
13 3231/3233 Leather -0.005 -0.003 0.073 0.018 0.040 0.025
14 3240 Footwear -0.467 -0.476 -0.335 -0.354 -0.310 -0.317
15 3311/3320 Wood -0.197 -0.142 -0.072 -0.078 -0.081 -0.058
16 3412/3420 Paper 0.130 0.070 0.226 0.095 0.190 0.102
17 3511/3512 Chemicals 0.154 0.119 0.115 0.156 0.215 0.167
18 3521 Paints 0.098 0.194 0.328 0.286 0.160 0.314
19 3522 Drugs 0.172 0.377 0.206 0.446 0.212 0.467
20 3523 Soap 0.005 0.008 0.029 0.073 0.057 0.093
21 3529/3540 Other Chem. 0.371 1.647 0.391 1.696 0.385 1.711
22 3551/3560 Rubber 0.204 0.296 0.278 0.364 0.264 0.384
23 3610/3699 Cement 0.208 0.131 0.299 0.161 0.270 0.170
24 3710/3812 Basic Metals 0.259 0.503 0.297 0.574 0.307 0.595
25 3813/3819 Eab.Metals 0.033 0.068 0.096 0.154 0.087 0.181
26 3822/3829 Machinery 0.463 0.538 0.488 0.772 0.488 0.844
27 3832/3829 Elect.Machinery 0.030 0.064 0.076 0.141 0.078 0.165
28 3841/3843 Transport Equip 0.036 0.495 0.049 0.653 0.051 0.703
29 3851/3909 Misc.products -0.077 -0.071 0.037 -0.008 0.013 0.012
Total manufac
turing sector
Average 0.090 0.242 0.179 0.317 0.157 0.340
SP=social profit per unit of output;SRR = social rate of return
on capital.
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Table 7:3b Profitability in Manufacturing:
Social Rate of Return on Capital and social
Profit per unit of output (1977)
(A sensitivity analysis contd)
production costs based on:
capital consumption allowance=15%
Ratio of shadow wages to market wages=
Code
Sector
Name
1.00 0.80 0.75
SP SRR SP SRR SP SRR
6 3111/3122	 Food 0.096 0.173 0.124 0.223 0.132 0.239
7 3131/3133	 Alcoholic bev. 0.274 0.286 0.302 0.316 0.311 0.325
8 3134	 Non-alcoh.bev. 0.368 1.281 0.410 1.428 0.423 1.473
9 3140	 Tobacco -0.047 -0.043 0.023 0.021 0.044 0.404
10 3212	 Textiles -0.169 -0.172 -0.104 -0.106 -0.084 -0.086
11 3212
	
Made-up text. 0.183 0.213 0.235 0.275 0.252 0.294
12 3220	 Apparel -0.094 -0.105 -0.034 -0.039 -0.016 -0.018
13 3231/3233
	
Leather -0.085 -0.053 -0.051 -0.032 -0.041 -0.025
14 3240
	
Footwear -0.516 -0.526 -0.396 -0.404 -0.359 -0.367
15 3311/3320	 Wood -0.267 -0.192 -0.177 -0.128 -0.150 -0.108
16 3412/3420	 Paper 0.037 0.020 0.083 0.045 0.097 0.052
17 3511/3512	 Chemicals 0.089 0.069 0.136 0.106 0.151 0.117
18 3521	 Paints 0.073 0.144 0.120 0.236 0.134 0.264
19 3522	 Drugs 0.149 0.327 0.180 0.396 0.189 0.417
20 3523	 Soap -0.026 -0.042 0.014 0.023 0.026 0.043
21 3529/3540 Other Chem. 0.359 1.597 0.370 1.646 0.374 1.661
22 3551/3560 Rubber 0.169 0.246 0.216 0.314 0.230 0.334
23 3610/3699 Cement 0.128 0.081 0.176 0.111 0.190 0.120
24 3710/3812 Basic Metals 0.234 0.453 0.270 0.524 0.281 0.545
25 3813/3819 Fab.Metals 0.009 0.018 0.050 0.105 0.063 0.131
26 3822/3829 Machinery 0.462 0.488 0.481 0.722 0.487 0.794
27 3832/3839 Elect.Machinery 0.007 0.014 0.043 0.091 0.054 0.115
28 3841/3843 Transport Equip 0.032 0.445 0.043 0.604 0.047 0.653
29 3851/3909 Misc.products -0.131 -0.121 -0.062 -0.058 -0.041 -0.380
Total manufac
turing sector
Average 0.056 0.191 0.102 0.267 0.116 0.286
Note: SP= Social Profit
Social Rat= of ReturnSRR =
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Tabl e 7:3c Profitability in Manufacturing:
Social Rate of Return on Capital and social
Profit per unit of output (1977)
(A sensitivity analysis contd)
production costs based on:
capital consumption allowance=20%
Ratio of shadow wages to market wages=
1.00 0.80 0.75
Sector SP SRR SP SRR SP SRR
6 3111/3122 Food 0.068 0.123 0.096 0.173 0.105 0.189
7 3131/3133 Alcoholic bev. 0.226 0.236 0.255 0.266 0.263 0.275
8 3134 Non-alcoh.bev. 0.354 1.231 0.396 1.378 0.409 1.423
9 3140 Tobacco
-0.101 -0.093 -0.032 -0.029 -0.011 -0.010
10 3211 Textiles
-0.218 -0.222 -0.153 -0.156 -0.133 -0.136
11 3212 Made-up text. 0.140 0.163 0.193 0.225 0.209 0.244
12 3220 Apparel
-0.138 -0.155 -0.079 -0.089 -0.061 -0.068
13 3231/3233 Leather
-0.165 -0.103 -0.131 -0.082 -0.121 -0.075
14 3240 Footwear
-0.565 -0.576 -0.445 -0.454 -0.408 -0.417
15 3311/3320 Wood
-0.336 -0.242 -0.247 -0.178 -0.219 -0.158
16 3412/3420 Paper
-0.056 -0.030 -0.010 -0.006 0.004 0.002
17 3511/3512 Chemicals 0.025 0.192 0.157 0.056 0.086 0.067
18 3521 Paints 0.045 0.094 0.094 0.185 0.109 0.214
19 3522 Drugs 0.126 0.277 0.157 0.346 0.267 0.367
20 3523 Soap
-0.056 -0.092 -0.016 -0.027 -0.004 -0.007
21 3529/3540 Other Chem. 0.348 1.547 0.359 1.596 0.363 1.611
22 3551/3560 Rubber 0.135 0.196 0.181 0.264 0.195 0.284
23 3610/3699 Cement 0.049 0.031 0.096 0.060 0.111 0.070
24 3710/3812 Basic Metals 0.208 0.403 0.244 0.474 0.255 0.495
25 3813/3819 Fab.Metals -0.016 -0.032 0.026 0.055 0.039 0.081
26 3822/3829 Machinery 0.461 0.438 0.480 0.672 0.486 0.744
27 3832/3829 Elect.Machinery -0.017 -0.036 0.019 0.041 0.031 0.065
28 3841/3843 Transport Equip 0.028 0.395 0.040 0.554 0.043 0.603
29 3851/3909 Misc.products -0.184 -0.171 -0.116 -0.108 -0.095 -0.089
Total manufac
turing sector
Average 0.015 0.142 0.062 0.213 0.076 0.240
Note: s p = Social Profit
'RR= Social Pate of Peturn
439
wage ratio = .75%) to 11 (assuming rate of depreciation = 20% and
shadow wage/market wage = 1). There is, therefore, a fairly wide gap
both in the averages and in the number of inefficient industries when
factor prices are varied. If we consider, however, other aspects of
the table - particularly the distribution of industries within certain
ranges - we see that the relative position of sectors is quite stable
with respect to variations in factor prices. Assuming that costs
consist of actual wages paid and capital consumption rate set at 15%
per annum, the number of inefficient industries is 8, and this appears
quite modest and reasonable compared to the apparently low and high
figures produced by a combination of other assumptions. Under our
assumptions then, the average SRR in Nigerian industries should be
somewhere around 19%.
Whichever assumptions are used to arrive at the estimates, it is
quite obvious that government policy has channeled resources into some
sectors which, though privately profitable, are from the view of the
society, highly unprofitable. A comparison of the relevant columns in
tables 7:2b and 7:3, will show this. Thus, in 1977, the most
inefficient industry (SRR = -0.526) achieved a private rate of return
above 86% and the 6 inefficient industries achieved a private rate of
return between 7 and 247%. The divergence between private and social
profitability can be seen by noting that the correlation coefficient
though non-negative, is extremely small and statistically
insignificant. In 1977, the coefficient of correlation between
private rate of return and social rate of return is 0.138 and between
social profit and private profit is 0.143. Similarly, in 1974, while
the NSP achieved by the least efficient industry was -0.84, the rate
of private profit for the same sector was 127%. Admittedly, the
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divergence between social and private profitability is not so great in
all industries. Indeed, quite a few industries are both socially and
privately highly profitable although there is no socially profitable
industry that is privately unprofitable. The point here, it must be
emphasised, is not that privately (but not socially) profitable
industries should not exist at all, but that policy could have been
more rationalised in such a way that investment in some of these
industries did not go as far as it should.
7:3:3 The Domestic Resources Costs Criterion
The criteria described above are used to assess the net
financial economic result of activities without explicitly relating to
other fundamental development objectives in the economy. As was
previously indicated, the promotion of industry has been undertaken by
the Nigerian government with the objectives of generating and/or
conserving external economic surplus. It is therefore necessary to
appraise the soundness of the manufacturing activities from the point
of view of their foreign exchange effects and international competi-
tiveness. Equation (7:5) is employed for this purpose.
The estimation of foreign exchange costs of an activity presents
all sorts of methodological problems. Ideally the assessment of the
foreign exchange effects of an activity would entail a careful and
thorough analysis of all inflows and outflows which affect the
activity directly and indirectly. The foreign exchange costs of an
activity will typically include costs of import of capital goods,
equipment, machinery and raw materials, components, parts and
semi-finished goods,; wages and salaries payable in foreign exchange,
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repayment of foreign borrowing, royalty on know-how and patent rights,
and repatriation of profits and capital, etc. However, precise
estimates of these items are difficult to obtain, and, in what
follows, we have had to make a lot of approximations and in some
instances omit some items. For example, dividends, interest payments
on loans and repatriated profits have had to be excluded from the
calculations as we could not obtain the relevant information. As
another example, for the years 1974 and 1977, on which our estimates
are based, no estimates of wages and salaries paid to expatriate staff
in the manufacturing industries, are available -- although we have
data on the number of people employed by industry. We assume on the
basis of previous wage payments (information was available on this
between 1963 and 1972), that the average wage earned by an expatriate
is N 15,000 ($23,241) per annum. This, multiplied by the number of
people employed, gives us the total wages and salaries paid to foreign
personnel. We then assume that 50% of this total is repatriated
abroad as allowed by the government regulations.
Foreign capital costs are estimated by assuming that 75% of the
capital stock is imported and only the rest is considered domestically
produced capital. This can be easily justified since the structure of
production in the Nigerian manufacturing sector is such that almost
all capital goods have to be imported to produce mainly consumer
goods. Thus foreign exchange costs of production include intermediate
imports, a rate of return to foreign produced capital goods and
repatriated payments to foreign labour employed; while domestic costs
consist of payments to domestically employed labour plus an assumed
rate of return to domestically produced capital used in the
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production process. As in the previous sections, alternative
assumptions are made regarding the values of shadow wages and user
costs of capital.
(i) Estimation based on direct costs
Tables 7:5 to 7:7 present nine DRC estimates by sector based on
direct domestic and foreign costs. The difference between the tables
is due to the assumptions employed in estimating employment and
capital costs. As in the previous sections, we hold constant each of
the assumed rates of capital consumption while allowing the
opportunity cost of labour to vary. It can be seen that the ranking
of sectors by the DRC ratios is quite stable, in spite of the
different assumptions employed, although there are variations in the
number of industries that can be classified as inefficient.
The various results indicate that some 54 - 80% of the
industrial sectors had a DRC ratio below the official rate of exchange
(N.647 to the $ in 1977) 9 ; put differently, 20 -46% of the 24
industries are inefficient in the sense that their costs of production
per $ of foreign exchange saved was so high that but for the policy of
protection, they would not have competed against imports. In other
words, if tariffs had been removed at that time, about 54 - 80% of the
industries would have been competitive with imports at the official
exchange rate. The total industrial value-added produced by the
inefficient industries is in the range 17 - 43% which is equivalent to
13.5 - 37% at border prices. This appear quite modest but, as we
shall shortly show, is considerably underestimated by the exclusion of
indirect costs. The sectors with high DRC ratio include textiles,
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TABLE 7:5 Domestic Resource Costs in Manufacturing Industry:
Estimation based on direct costs of production(1977).
(Nigerian Naira/$ U.S)
Production Costs based on:
market wages and capital consumption of:
10%	 15%
Sector
20%
6 3111/3122
	
Food 0.3762 0.4246 0.4817
7 3131/3133
	
Alcoholic bev. 0.2274 0.2624 0.3033
8 	 3 1 3 4	 Non-alcoh.bev. 0.2429 0.2513 0.2599
9	 3140	 Tobacco 0.6419 0.7415 0.8673
10	 3212	 Textiles 1.0661 1.3244 1.7129
11	 3212
	
Made-up text. 0.3887 0.4307 0.4790
12	 3220
	
Apparel 0.8099 0.9580 1.1561
13	 3231/3233	 Leather 0.6983 1.0853 2.0410
14	 3240	 Footwear 2.6420 3.5014 5.0998
15 3311/3320	 Wood 1.1972 1.5329 2.0780
16	 3412/3420	 Paper 0.4495 0.5852 0.7906
17	 3511/3512	 Chemicals 0.4256 0.5088 0.6168
18	 3521	 Paints 0.4769 0.5169 0.5619
19	 3522	 Drugs 0.3344 0.3637 0.3964
20	 3523	 Soap 0.6477 0.7469 0.8721
21	 3529/3540	 Other Chem. 0.0951 0.1013 0.1078
22	 3551/3560 Rubber 0.3699 0.4053 0.4452
23 3610/3699 Cement 0.3855 0.4701 0.5825
24 3710/3812 Basic Metals 0.2951 0.3184 0.3439
25 3813/3819 Eab.Metals 0.6039 0.6687 0.7446
26 3822/3829 Machinery 0.1162 0.1168 0.1173
27 3832/3839 Elect.Machinery 0.5844 0.6529 0.7344
28 3841/3843 Transport Equip 0.4237 0.4426 0.4627
29 3851/3909 Misc.products 0.8595 1.0337 1.2754
Average 0.5980 0.7270 0.9390
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TABLE 7:6 Domestic Resource Costs in Manufacturing Industry:
Estimation based on direct costs of production(1977)
(Nigerian Naira/$ U.S)
Sector
Production Costs based on:
ratio shadow wages to market wages=0.80,and
capital consumption of:
10%	 15%	 20%
6 3111/3122
	
Food
7 3131/3133
	
Alcoholic bev.
8	 3134	 Non-alcoh.bev.
9	 3140	 Tobacco
10	 3212	 Textiles
11	 3212	 Made-up text.
12	 3220	 Apparel
13	 3231/3233
	
Leather
14	 3240	 Footwear
0.3104
0.1899
0.1979
0.5277
0.8759
0.3197
0.6653
0.5892
2.1557
0.3535
0.2219
0.2055
0.6139
1.0959
0.3569
0.7925
0.9299
2.8687
0.4043
0.2594
0.2133
0.7229
1.4268
0.3997
0.9627
1.7716
4.1950
15 3311/3320	 Wood 0.9839 1.2689 1.7318
16	 3412/3420	 Paper 0.3774 0.4984 0.6816
17	 3511/3512
	
Chemicals 0.3537 0.4275 0.5234
18	 3521	 Paints 0.3902 0.4252 0.4645
19	 3522	 Drugs 0.2746 0.3007 0.3298
20	 3523	 Soap 0.5323 0.6183 0.7267
21 3529/3540	 Other Chem. 0.0786 0.0844 0.0905
22	 3551/3560 Rubber 0.3039 0.3352 0.3706
23 3610/3699 Cement 0.3219 0.3976 0.4980
24 3710/3812 Basic Metals 0.2422 0.2631 0.2861
25 3813/3819 Fab.Metals 0.4944 0.2631 0.2861
26 3822/3829 Machinery 0.0941 0.0946 0.0951
27 3832/3839 Elect.Machinery 0.4791 0.5387 0.6094
28 3841/3843 Transport Equip. 0.3449 0.3616 0.3792
29 3851/3909 Misc.products 0.7066 0.8560 1.0633
Average 0.4920 0.6020 0.7840
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Table 7:7 Domestic Resource Costs in Manufacturing Industry:
Estimation based on direct costs of production(1977)
(Nigerian Naira/$ U.S)
-
Sector
Production Costs based on:
ratio of shadow wages to market wages=0.75,and
capital consumption of:
10%	 15%	 20%
6 3111/3122 Food 0.2904 0.3318 0.3806
7	 3131/3133 Alcoholic 	 oev. 0.1785 0.2096 0.2459
8	 3134 Non-alcoh.bev. 0.1842 0.1915 0.1989
9	 3140 Tobacco 0.4927 0.5749 0.6789
10	 3211 Textiles 0.8178 1.0260 1.3393
11	 3212 Made-up text. 0.2986 0.3343 0.3754
12	 3220 Apparel 0.6211 0.7419 0.9036
13	 3231/3233 Leather 0.5559 0.8825 1.6892
14	 3240 Footwear 2.0069 0.6752 3.9183
15 3311/3320 Wood 0.9187 1.1883 1.6259
16 3412/3420 Paper 0.3554 0.4719 0.6483
17 3511/3512 C hemicals 0.3317 0.4026 0.4948
18	 3521 Paints 0.3637 0.3972 0.4347
19	 3522 Drugs 0.2563 0.2815 0.3095
20	 3523 Soap 0.4970 0.5789 0.6822
21 3529/3540 Other Chea. <3.<3735 4.C5T33 10.'0853
22 3551/3560 Rubber 0.2837 0.3138 0.3478
23 3610/3699 Cement 0.3025 0.3754 0.4722
24 3710/3812 Basic Metals 0.2261 0.2462 0.2684
25 3813/3819 Fab.Metals 0.4609 0.5144 0.5771
26 3822/3829 Machinery 0.0874 0.0879 0.0884
27 3832/3829 Elect.Machinery 0.4469 0.5037 0.5712
28 3841/3843 Transport Equip 0.3209 0.3368 0.3537
29	 3851/3909 Misc.products 0.6598 0.8017 0.9984
Average 0.4590 0.5640 0.7370
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leather products, footwear, wood products and miscellaneous goods;
internationally competitive activities include alcoholic beverages,
non-alcoholic beverages, petroleum and coal products and transport
equipment.
(ii) DRC estimates based on direct plus indirect costs (1977) 
According to Bruno (1972) 11 DRC estimates can be obtained at any
stage of fabrication so that, as shown in the previous section, use
can be made of only the direct domestic and foreign costs in
appraising the efficiency and competitiveness of industries. However,
where the production of inputs needed in the domestic activities also
requires imports both directly and indirectly, the concept of DRC
should more appropriately be related to direct and indirect material,
input and primary factor costs. Using similar assumptions about
factor costs as in the previous sections, the ratios based on total
costs are presented in tables 7:8 - 7:10.
One can observe from these estimates that the extent of
inefficiency was considerably understated by the ratios based on
direct cost estimates. Here the range of the number of inefficient
sectors is from 11 to 14, (i.e. 46 - 58% of the industries are
inefficient) compared to a range of 4 to 10 in the case of the
Direct DRCs. This implies that the minimum number of inefficient
industries when the direct and indirect factor costs are considered,
is greater than the maximum number of inefficient sectors when only
direct costs are used. Inefficient sectors in both cases include
textiles, wearing apparel, footwear, wood/furniture, soap and
perfumery, fabricated metal products and miscellaneous manufactured
goods.
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Table 7:8 Domestic Resource Costs in Manufacturing Industry:
Estimation based on direct plus indirect costs of
production(1977).
(Nigerian Naira/$ U.S)
Direct and Indirect production costs based on:
market wages and capital consumption of:
10%	 15%	 20%
Sector
6 3111/3122 Food 0.2608 0.2828 0.3065
7	 3131/3133 Alcoholic bev. 0.3692 0.4272 0.4958
8	 3134 Non-alcoh.bev. 0.2779 0.2870 0.2964
9	 3140 Tobacco 0.5092 0.5604 0.6182
10	 3211 Textiles 0.7147 0.8032 0.9079
11 	 3212 Made-up text. 0.7456 0.8475 0.9707
12	 3220 Apparel 1.6366 2.0953 2.8324
13 3231/3233 Leather 0.4229 0.5229 0.6536
14	 3240 Footwear 3.0198 3.9466 5.5815
15 3311/3320 Wood
16 3412/3420 Paper
17 3511/3512 Chemicals
18 	 352 1 Paints
19	 3522 Drugs
20	 3523 Soap
21 3529/3540 Other Chem.
22 3551/3560 Rubber
23 3610/3699 Cement
24 3710/3812 Basic Metals
25 3813/3819 Fab.Metals
26 3822/3829 Machinery
27 3832/3829 Elect.Machinery
28 3841/3843 Transport Equip
29 3851/3909 Misc.products
Average
0.9219
0.8546
3.0549
1.1321
1.1353
-3.3944
0.2038
0.4720
0.4519
0.4937
-1.1339
0.3406
-0.6403
-0.1319
0.7075
0.5180
1.0665
1.1617
7.1998
1.3079
1.7022
-2.5292
0.2199
0.5154
0.5363
0.5410
-1.0625
0.3451
-0.6229
-0.1404
0.7994
0.8670
1.2488
1.6831
-34.0730
1.5318
2.2337
-2.0452
0.2369
0.5636
0.6410
0.5941
-1.0027
0.3496
-0.6075
-0.1482
0.9090
-0.6340
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Table 7:9 Domestic Resource Costs in Manufacturing Industry;
Estimation based on direct plus indirect costs of
production(1977).
(Nigerian Naira/$ U.S)
Direct and Indirect production Costs based
ratio of shadow wages to market wages=0.80,and
capital consumption of:
10%	 15%	 20%
Sector
6 3111/3122 Food 0.2155 0.2358 0.2577
7	 3131/3133 Alcoholic bev. 0.3083 0.3613 0.4239
8	 3134 Non-alcon.bev. 0.2266 0.2349 0.2435
9	 3140 Tobacco 0.4191 0.4648 0.5164
10	 3211 Textiles 0.5879 0.6657 0.7577
11	 3212 Made-up	 text. 0.6139 0.7034 0.8116
12	 3220 Apparel 1.3476 1.1739 2.3679
13	 3231/3233 Leather 0.3569 0.4483 0.5675
14	 3240 Footwear 0.3569 0.4483 0.5675
15 3311/3320 Wood 0.7587 0.8845 1.043
16 3412/3420 Paper 0.7173 0.9889 1.4501
17 3511/3512 Chemicals 2.5407 6.0565 -28.9520
18	 3521 Paints 0.9292 1.0807 1.2736
19	 3522 Drugs 1.1161 1.4162 1.8729
20	 3523 Soap -2.7953 -2.0994 -1.7012
21 3529/3540 Other Chem. 0.1685 0.1835 0.1995
22	 3551/3560 Rubber 0.3882 0.4271 0.4703
23 3610/3699 Cement 0.3779 0.4543 0.5491
24 3710/3812 Basic Metals 0.4062 0.4485 0.4959
25 3813/3819 Fab.Metals -0.9295 -0.8763 -0.8318
26 3822/3829 Machinery 0.2763 0.2804 0.2846
27 3832/3829 Elect.Machinery -0.5254 -0.5146 -0.5049
28 3841/3843 Transport Equip -0.1123 -0.1216 -0.1302
29	 3851/3909 Misc.products 0.5825 0.6633 0.7598
Average 0.4350 0.7000
-0.5490
on:
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Table 7:10 Domestic Resource Costs in Manufacturing Industry:
Estimation based on direct plus indirect costs of
production (1977).
(Nigerian Naira/$U S)
Direct and Indirect production costs based on:
ratio of shadow wages to market wages=0.75
and capital consumption of
10%	 15%	 20%
Sector
6	 3111/3122
	
Food
	 0.2016 0.2214 0.2427
7 3131/3133	 Alcoholic bev.	 0.2897 0.3412 0.4019
8	 3134	 Non-alcoh.bev.	 0.2109 0.2190 0.2273
9	 3140	 Tobacco	 0.3915 0.4356 0.4853
10	 3212	 Textiles	 0.5492 0.6236 0.7118
11	 3212	 Made-up text	 0.5737
rAppa el12	 3220
	
1.2592
a t
	 rhe13	 3231/3233	 Le	 0.3367
Footwear14	 3240	 0.6753
0.6594
1.6300
0.4254
0.9362
0.7629
2.2259
0.5412
1
 .3788
15 3311/3320	 Wood
16	 3412/3420	 Paper	
0.7088
Chemicals
	
0.6753
17	 3511/3512
	
2.3845
0 .8289
0.9362
5.7069
0.9802
1.3788
-27.3860
18	 3521	 Paints
3522
	 Drugs
	
0.8672
19	 1.0436
1.0112
1.3287
1.194 6
1.7626
523	 Soap20	 3	 -2.6121 -1.9679 -1.6077
21	 3529/3540	 Other Chem.
	
0.1577 0.1724 0.1880
22	 3551/3560 Rubber	 0.3626 0.4000 0.4480
23	 3610/3699 Cement	 0.3552 0.4292 0.5209
24	 3710/3812 Basic Metals	 0.3794 0.4202 0.4659
25	 3813/3819 Fab.Metals 	 -0.8669 -0.8194 -0.7795
26 3822/3829 Machinery 	 0.2566 0.2606 0.2647
27 3832/3839 Elect.Machinery -0.4903 -0.4815 -0.4735
28 3841/3843 Transport Equip -0.1063 -0.1159 -0.1246
29	 3851/3909.Misc.products	 0.5443
Ave
	
0.4070rage
0.6217
0.6790
0.7142
-0.5220
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The percentage of industrial value-added that is inefficiently
produced ranges between 35 - 50% at domestic prices and is equivalent
to 32 - 45% at border prices. It can be seen that for some of the
inefficient sectors, even with an exchange rate devaluation of 50%
(i.e. assuming the rate of exchange is N 0.969 to the $), their cost
of foreign exchange per $ saved will be too high to allow them to
compete unprotected against imports. These include sectors like
footwear (3.95), industrial chemicals (7.199), wearing apparel (2.095)
and drugs and medicines (1.702); while for other industries like
fabricated metal products, soap and perfumery and electrical equipment
with negative DRC ratios, whatever the rate of exchange assumed, they
cannot survive the competition from imports at all. Such sectors are
so highly intensive in imported raw materials and/or capital that the
cost of their inputs in foreign exchange exceeds the value of the
output produced. This implies that it might be more economical to
discontinue their operation and import the commodities hitherto
produced by them.
The relationship between the criteria of efficiency as
quantified by the NSP and SRR on the one hand and the DRC ratios can
now be demonstrated. Only the DRC ratios based on direct cost
estimates will be compared with estimates of NSP and SRR since the
latter were also based on direct costs of factors.
A comparison of column 4 of Table 7:3 and column 2 of Table 7:5
will show that there is a high degree of correspondence between high
social profitability and low domestic resource costs ratio per $ of
foreign exchange saved. Indeed, all but one of the nine socially
unprofitable industries, i.e. those industries with negative NSP and
SRR have their DRC ratios above the official exchange rate, and the
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three most inefficient industries have equally the highest domestic
resource cost ratios. Moreover, one can observe that the top eight
sectors that could be classified as internationally competitive (in
the sense that their DRC ratios are well below the official exchange
rate) are equally the seven most highly socially profitable industries
in the economy.
The strength of the direct relationship between high social
profitability and low DRC ratios (or of the inverse relationship
between high social profitability and high DRC ratios) can be more
appropriately determined by computing the spearman's rank correlation
coefficients for the industries' NSP and SRR on the one hand and
direct DRC ratios on the other. These are summarised below:
Table 7:11
	 Relationship between social profitability and Domestic
Resource Costs in Nigerian manufacturing industries.
DRC
SRR
NSP
DRR
1
SRR
-0.97
1
NSP
-0.98
0.94
1
Note: DRC based on direct costs only; all parameters estimated
assuming SIR/market wage = 1, and capital consumption allowance = 15%
per annum. DRC estimates from column 2, table 7:5; Social rate of
return and Net social profit from columns 4 and 2 respectively of
table 7:3.
On the basis of the results, it can therefore be argued that the
objectives of social profitability and international competitiveness
are in fact not mutually exclusive. This implies that a policy which
channels resources into more socially profitable industries will be
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equally optimal with regards to the promotion of internationally
competitive and efficient industries.
7:4 Effective protection„economic efficiency and domestic resource
costs
Perhaps what is most important is the determination of the
extent to which, and how, the pattern of the efficiency parameters
estimated and the classic import-substitution model correspond. In
other words, the question that one should pose is to what extent are
the inter-sectoral differences in efficiency related to the differ-
entiated structure of effective rate of protection granted to the
manufacturing industry? It is only when this relationship is
understood that one can suggest alternative policy prescriptions for
improving the economic performance of industry.
To empirically examine the relationship between private and
social profitability and domestic resource costs on the one hand and
effective rates of protection on the other, we shall employ the
following statements, pointed out in the empirical literature, as our
testable hypotheses. In a study of the efficiency of the timber
industries in Ghana, the author asserts
"import substitute firms which benefit from progressive
increases in tariff and quota protection of the domestic
market show higher levels of private than social
profitability"12
and Little and Scott (1976) further stated
"investment in industries with low zero or negative
effective protection have been socially very profitable"13
It is not difficult to visualise the circumstances under which the
first hypothesis will be valid in an environment in which industries
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develop behind high tariff walls. Since the intended effect of a
0
tariff on competitive imports is to provide the local industry with a
decisive cost advantage vis-a-vis foreign suppliers, the imposition of
the tariff could establish the condition for a sharp contraction in
product competition and create a captive market for few producers
which in turn permits them to obtain higher levels of profit than
would be the case in a more competitive environment. According to
Balassa (1971),
"protected industries tend to follow a policy of low
turn-over and high profit rates and have little
incentive for product improvement and technical change"14
The divergence between these high profit rates and what the society
would consider as permissible was noted already.
The relationship between private profitability and effective
protection can be analysed on the basis of columns 6 of table 4:8 in
chapter 4, and columns 1 and 2 of table 7:2b. One could readily
observe that the most highly protected sectors (nerp > average) are
equally those that have an above average private rate of return. The
only exceptions are sectors manufacturing wearing apparel and
footwear, whose private rate of return is lower than average despite
the high protection. Similarly, with the exception of sectors
manufacturing non-alcoholic beverages, all the less protected (nerp <
50%) industries achieved considerably low rate of return. Thus there
is no less protected sector (except the one mentioned) that had a rate
of return as high as the corresponding rates achieved by the highly
protected ones.
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To formally test the hypothesis that higher rates of effective
protection granted to industries lead to higher levels of rate of
return and/or private profit, we fitted the following regression
equations to 24 industries for which we have data:
PP = 1.98	 0.31 erp
1977 (4.64)	 (3.04)	 1977 R2 = 0.29
R2 = 0.26
F = 9.22
PP = 1.99 + 0.29 erp	 +	 0.061 CR
1977 (4.62)	 (2.77)	 1977	 (0.68) R2 = 0.31
11:1 0.24
4.73
PRR = 1.375	 +	 0.737 erp
(1.485)	 (3.344)	 1977 R2 = 0.34
k2 = 0.31
F = 11.19
where PP and PRR are, respectively, private profit per unit of output
and private rate of return on capital, erp is net effective rate of
protection and CR is the ratio of each sector's sales to total sales
in 1977. (t ratios in parentheses).
It can be seen that in all four equations the coefficient of erp
is positive as expected and statistically significant. the
coefficient of CR though positive, is statistically significant in
neither of the two equations. The goodness-of-fit, however, is not
excellent: the ratio of explained variation to total variation ranges
between only 29% to 37%. Still, the influence of protection can be
clearly seen. The correlation coefficients (rank) of private profit
and private rate of return on the one hand with effective protection
on the other, are respectively 0.502 and 0.621. both being significant
at 1% level.
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The association of protection with private profitability was
weaker for the period 1974. A comparison of column 4, table 4:7a
(chapter 4), with columns 3 and 4 of table 7:2b reveals that only 50%
of the highly protected sectors (erp > average) had an above average
private rate of return, and 40% of the sectors with a below average
erp had an above average rate of return. Still, the results imply
that the percentage of sectors with an above average erp and below
average rate of return is less than the percentage of sectors with
below average erp and above average rate of return. Thus highly
protected sectors are more likely to achieve higher rate of return
than less protected ones.
Thus while private profitability appears to be directly related
to the effective protective tariff rates, the latter seem to be
inversely related to net social profitability (and SRR) and domestic
cost ratios, as the above hypotheses suggest. This can be seen in the
following ways:
(a) First, all three industrial sectors (viz, tobacco,
footwear, soap and perfumery) with nerp greater than 200% (1977) are
inefficient and have high direct domestic resource cost ratios; two of
these have also a direct and indirect DRC ratio above the official
exchange rate. The footwear industry had the highest nerp (323%) and
DRC (N 3.50 to $) and is the most inefficient (SRR = -0.526).
Moreover, of the six industries which received a nerp of 101 - 200%, 3
(textiles, wearing apparel and wood products) are inefficient and have
high DRC ratios (both direct and direct + indirect). These imply that
6 of the 9 most highly protected sectors (nerp average or > 100%)
are inefficient and/or internationally uncompetitive. In other words,
only 2 (leather products and miscellaneous manufactures) of the
sectors classified as inefficient did not receive excessive effective
protection.
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(b) Second, with the exception of 3 (leather, metal and
miscellaneous products), all the industries which were accorded low
effective protection (nerp < 50%) had direct DRC ratio below the
official exchange rate and all are equally efficient with the
exception of leather and miscellaneous products industries. In
addition, 2 of the less protected sectors (non-alcoholic beverages and
petroleum and coal products) are the most socially efficient (SRR =
1.28 and 1.59 respectively) and the latter sector has the lower DRC
ratio.
(c) Finally, one can observe that the consumer goods producing
sectors, which enjoy, as a group, higher than average erp, achieve a
higher rate of private, and a lower rate of social profitability than
either the intermediate or capital goods producing sectors. For
example, the average rate of private profitability for consumer goods
sectors is 32.81% compared with 29% and 15% for the intermediate and
capital goods producing sectors respectively. On the other hand, the
average rates of social profitability are, respectively, 0.59%, 10.71%
and 12.72%. In addition, (i) about 50% of the consumer goods sectors
are inefficient; (ii) 88% of the socially unprofitable sectors are in
the consumer goods category and (iii) 70% of the sectors with a DRC
ratio above the exchange rate belong to this category.
A similar relationship can be established between erp and
efficiency parameter estimates for 1974. For example, all but one of
the sectors with an above average erp are classified as inefficient;
and 2 of the 3 sectors with erp less than 50% have a higher social
rate of return (Net Social Profit) than all but 3 of the 12 sectors
which received effective protection of between 101 - 200%. Here also
we find differences between the more highly protected consumer goods
sector on the one hand, and the less protected capital and
intermediate goods sectors on the other. Average rates of private
profitability are respectively 74%, 54% and 43% and the corresponding
average rates of social profitability are -4.02%, 18.4% and -1.99%.
Finally, we can observe that 56% of the socially unprofitable sectors
belong to the consumer goods category.
Observe that not all of the less protected sectors achieve
higher social profit than the more protected ones, or to put it the
other way around, not all of the highly protected sectors will have
relatively lower efficiency parameters than the less protected ones.
For example, sectors producing drugs and medicines and basic metals
which received higher than average erp, have higher social profit in
1977 than most of the less protected ones. This is reflected in the
low, though significant correlation coefficients between the
parameters, as summarised in the table below.
Table 7:12 Coefficients of correlation between effective rates of
protection and measures of profitability and domestice
resource costs.
Rank Pearson	 Rank Pearson
DRC (Direct) 0.355** 0.599*
DRC (Direct and Indirect)
Social Rate of Return -0.38** 0.343** -0.419**
01(-0.58)* 1(_0.59) *
Net Social Profit -0.38** -.0.43* -.0.551*
1(0.57)* 1 ( -0.511)*
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Notes: 'Coefficients computed by excluding soap and perfumery sector.
erp for the sector (1974) was -586% and was considered an 'outlier'
and hence excluded.
sig. at 1%
** sig. at 5%.
The two hypotheses tested received additional support in studies
of Turkish import-substitution industries by Krueger (1966) and of the
Nigerian textile firms by Ekuerhare (1978). Similar conclusions also
emerge from the work of Balassa and Associates (1971), Steel (1972)
and Kemal (1983)15.
In an attempt to explain the variations in the level of relative
efficiency or inefficiency generated by the high and often
differentiated tariff structure, attention is often focussed on the
role of inappropriate choice of factor proportions, capacity,
under-utilisation, economies of scale and technical or 'x-efficiency'
differences among firms and/or industries. Thus, in a study of the
economic performance of 39 industrial sectors in Ghana, William Steel
(1972) 16 found a significant relationship between low efficiency (high
DRC ratios) on the one hand and inappropriate choice of techniques of
production (high capital intensity) and excess capacity on the other.
The theoretical and empirical relationship between the choice of
techniques, technical or 'x-efficiency' and economic performance of
the timber industries in Ghana was also explored by Page (1982) 17 , and
his conclusions lend support to the findings by Steel. Ekuerhare
(1978) found no significant relationship between economies of scale
and efficiency among firms in the Nigerian textile
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industry, and more significantly, found that the firms which adopted
relatively more capital intensive methods of production tended to be
relatively efficient, whilst the firms which adopted relatively more
labour-intensive methods of production tended to be relatively
inefficient.
The findings by Steel and Page on the one hand and that by
Ekuerhare on the other, therefore are contradictory
 and can be
explained thus: the association of high efficiency (i.e. low DRCs)
with high labour intensity (i.e. low K/L ratios) is consistent with
the prediction of the neo-classical theory of trade, according to
which comparative advantage is best exploited in a labour suprlus
economy if labour intensive techniques of production are chosen. In
so far as the choice between labour and capital intensive techniques
is determined by relative prices of factors, a policy of protection
(and of domestic investment and wages) which alters these prices in
favour of the scarce factor, could only bias production towards those
industries which are less competitive at world prices than those
relatively intensive in low-cost labour. In other words, within the
neo-classical formulation, it is to be expected that relatively more
efficient industries would use a more appropriate mix of labour and
capital in their production processes. On the other hand,
the association of capital intensity with economic efficiency as found
by Ekuerhare suggests the presence of factors other than relative
factor prices in influencing the choice of techniques of production.
In discussing the theoretical choice of techniques in chapter 5 the
argument was advanced that irrespective of the prevailing factor price
ratio entrepreneuers could choose a more capital intensive technique
either because of certain supply side constraints, and institutional
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rigidites or for the reason that it is more productive and efficient
in the sense that it generates a higher investible surplus than a
labour intensive technique. If the choice of capital-using technique
is indeed determined by the latter consideration, one would expect
relatively more efficient firms to have employed relatively more
capital intensive methods of production.
Another possible determinant of the degree of efficiency or
inefficiency of industries is the extent of capacity utilisation.
Steel (1972) produced evidence to show that capacity under-utilisation
was a significant source of high cost in industries operating behind
tariff walls in the Ghanian economy. He showed that those "firms
considered 'efficient' in 1967-68 utilised half of their total
productive capacity, whereas the 'inefficient' firms only slightly
exceeded one-third utilisation"18.
The problem of excess capacity in LDCs is a complex one, arising
from a variety of sources. In one major study of the problem in the
Nigerian industries, Winston (1981) points out that "excess capacity..
is explained, in descending order of current importance, by shortages
and quality of supervisory and technical maintenance personnel, by
unreliable electric power supplies, by quality and availability of
domestically supplied materials, by port congestion, by specific
marketing problems working capital and, finally, by sundry
difficulties including strikes, collusion and price-ceilings" 19 . Thus
although it cannot be pinned down to only one cause, the single most
emphasized factor is government's foreign exchange and other
restrictive industrial policies, especially in the face of balance of
payments crises, which cause long delays in the supply of essential
raw materials20 . Moreover, as earlier pointed out, the IS strategy
463
often necessitate the use of capital intensive machinery that are
actually built for optimum utilisation at scales not within the grasp
of most LDC markets; given the non-existant or unexplored export
markets - because investment in the export sector is discouraged -
industries will necessarily have a very high level of production costs
and in addition, the problem of excess capacity faced by the
manufacturers will be compounded.
Whatever the proximate cause, the problem of excess capacity is
shown to exist in Nigeria in two separate studies21 . However, there
is no adequate data (for example, sectoral utilisation rates) which
would permit a systematic exploration of the relationship between our
efficiency parameters and rate of capacity utilisation. We shall
however, examine the relationship between choice of technique and
economic efficiency in Nigerian manufacturing.
The strength and direction of the association between our
measures of social efficiency and capital intensity is tested by
computing coefficients of correlation, which are summarised in table
7:13. As measures of capital intensity, we use direct capital-output
and capital-value-added ratios and direct plus indirect capital-output
ratios. If the neo-classical prediction is valid, we would expect
sectors with high DRC ratios (or low rates of social profitability) to
be on average, capital intensive. Conversely, sectors which have
above average rate of social profitability or DRC ratios, will be
expected to exhibit relatively lower levels of capital intensity.
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Table 7:13 Coefficients of rank correlation between measures of social efficiency
and Domestic Resource Costs and measures of Capital Intensity.
Measures of
Social Efficiency
Measures of
Capital-output
ratio
Capital Intensity
Capital-value-added 	 Direct plus indir
ratios	 capital -output -ra
Net social
profitability -0.355** -0.403** -0.282***
(1977)
Net social
profitability -0.282***
-.0446*
(1974)
Social Rate of
Return -0.32***
-0.259*** -0.265***
(1977)
Social Rate of
Return -0.412**
-0.546*
(1974)
Private Rate of
Return 0.235 0.241 0.114
(1977)
Private Rate of
Return -0.533*
(1974)
Private Profit 0.392** 0.024 0.334**
(1977)
Private Profit -0.008
-0.295***
(1974)
Domestic Resource
Cost (Direct) 0.322*** 0.310*** 0.258
Domestic Resource
Cost 0.184 -0.008 0.180
(Direct plus Indirect)
* significant at 1% level
** significant at 5% level
*** significant at 10% level.
The number of industries considered is 24 in 1977 and 23 in 1974. The excluded se
1974 is soap and perfumery.
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With few exceptions, our results tend to confirm the above
predictions. As we hypothesised, the relationship between u*ao DRC
ratio and (high) capital intensity (as measured by capital-output and
capital value-added ratios), is positive and the coefficients of
correlation statistically significant at the 10% level. Smilarly, in
both 1977 and 1974, social inefficiency tends to be associated with
capital intensity as implied by the negative correlation coefficients
between the variables.22
It can also be seen that, in 1977, the rank correlation
coefficient between private profitability, though low, is positive and
statistically significant at the 10% level. However, in 1974,
private profitability seems to be negatively associated with measures
of capital intensity.
Thus with the possible exceptions of this latter result, our
findings suggest that sectors with an above average rate of social
profitability tend to have a (below) average level of capital
intensity, and those with an above average rate of private
profitability, tend to have an above average level of capital
intensity. Our results, therefore, lend some support to the findings
by Steel and Page, and are consistent with the prediction of the
comparative advantage theory of trade. More specifically, our results
imply that Nigeria's comparative advantage lies, to some extent at
least, in relatively labour-intensive production.
The present policies, which as we have seen in chapter 5, favour
the application of capital-intensive techniques will only channel
resources into sectors which are not competitive at world prices
and/or which are, from the point of view of the society, not socially
profitable.
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7:5 SUMMARY...Conclusion and Policy Implications 
Our first objective in this chapter was to evaluate the
efficiency of investment in, and the international competitiveness and
profitability of Nigerian manufacturing industries. Our second
objective was to relate these efficiency parameters to the Nigerian
trade regime. We have found that the extent of inefficiency as
measured by social profitability and social rate of return is
moderate, judging by the number of inefficient sectors. The loss in
output (and therefor welfare) is however far from being moderate. We
saw that up to 20% or more of output at international prices was being
inefficiently produced. We also found that the cost of import
substitution (in foreign exchange) has tended to be fairly high: not
only in newly set up sectors but also in those that can be regarded as
'daddies' having been operated for many years. The latter include the
textile, wearing apparel, furniture and footwear industries. Other
costly -- in fact more costly -- sectors are those that appear to have
very high import content and/or high foreign exchange costs: for
example, industrial chemicals, paints, drugs and medicines, soaps and
perfumery, fabricated metals, electrical equipment and transport
equipment. Indeed, as was pointed out earlier, the encouragement
and/or further expansion of sectors like fabricated metals, soap and
perfumery and electrical equipment appears to have been a rather
expensive exercise in import displacement.
The pattern of inefficiency and the high cost of import
substitution could be easily explained, to some extent, by the nature
of the trade regime and/or the import substitution strategy. We have
shown that the strategy has enabled highly protected sectors to
achieve signficantly high rates of private, but low rates of social
profitability; on the other hand, the more socially efficient,
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internationally competitive sectors are not rewarded by the existing
system of incentives. In other words, the present policy and/or
strategy of granting high and differentiated levels of protection to
different sectors is not consistent with the social efficiency and
international competitiveness of Nigerian manufacturing industries.
Our results have some implications for the future growth and
development of the Nigerian manufacturing sector. We have seen that
one of the main objectives of the Nigerian government's strategy of
industrialisation is a diversification of the economy in order to lay
the necessary foundation for sustained economic development. But the
diversification of the economy, via backward integration, will be a
function not only of the efficiency of the existing structure of
production, but also of the extent to which government policies shift
the relative profitability of industries in favour of the intermediate
and capital goods sectors. The evidence of our study indicates that
the pattern of private profitability, like the structure of effective
protection, is heavily biased in favour of consumer goods producing
industries, and against those industries which are likely to have a
more 'integrating' and/or 'diversifying' effect in the economy. Since
it is highly unlikely that diversification will be automatically
induced, the most rational thing to do will be a formulation of policy
and strategy of industrialisation which seeks to neutralise and/or
reverse the present biased patternof profitability in the
manufacturing sector. Similarly, whether the Nigerian industry "will
increasingly become the supplier of manufactured goods throughout
Africa" as envisaged by the government, will crucially depend upon
measures to improve efficiency and to alter the bias of protection
which favours production for the home market. Policy reforms needed
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to improve efficiency, diversification and competitiveness will be
examined in the next chapter.
It must be emphasised that we make no pretence of having
explained all possible sources and/or determinants of industrial
inefficiency, nor can it be claimed that the pattern of inefficiency
is necessarily representative of what obtains in other periods. But
our results do imply that efficiency performance and international
competitiveness of Nigeria's industries can be greatly improved if the
tariff structure is more rationalised so that resources are channeled
into more socially productive sectors rather than into those that are
merely privately profitable.
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Notes: Chapter 7.
1.	 Federal Ministry of Information, The Sovereign Budget, p20,
cited in Oyejide, T.A. 91975) op cit pp46-47.
2. Chenery (1961) first provided an analysis of the NSP concept in
a programming context and related it to the concept of SMP. See
Chenery, H.B. (1961) op cit. Bruno (1963, 1967 and 1972)
provided a full discussion of the historical evolution of the
DRC criterion of its use in a linear programming framework and
of how it is related to other efficiency criteria. See Bruno,
M. (1967) "The optimal selection of export-promoting and import
substituting projects" in Planning the External Sector: 
Techniques, Problems and Policies (New York, United Nations).
Bruno, M. (1972) "Domestic resource costs and effective
protection: clarification and synthesis", Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol.LXXX, No.l. The concept of DRc has also been used
by Krueger, A.O. to study the domestic cost of foreign exchange
in Turkish Manufacturing. 'Economic Costs of Exchange Control:
The Turkish Case", Journal of Political Economy, LXXIV, October.
See also the various country economic reports prepared by the
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Foreign Trade 
Regimes and Economic Development, directed by Bhagwati, J. and
Krueger, A.O. For the application of the NSP criteria to the
Nigerian textile firms, see Ekuehare, B.U. (1978) An Economic 
appraisal of Import-substitution Industrialisation with special 
reference to the Nigerian Textile Industry, unpublished PhD
Thesis, University of Manchester. For a comparison of three
criteria of efficiency see also Pearson, S.R. (1976) "Net Social
Profitability, Domestic Resource Costs and Effective Rate of
Protection", Journal of Development Studies, Vol.12, July.
3.	 Bruno, M. (1972) op cit p16-19.
4. This example is due to Kirkpatrick, C.H. and Nixon, F.I. (1983),
The Industrialisation of Less Developed Countries, Manchester
University Press. Footnote 27, pe.
5.	 See Bruno, M. (1967) op cit p114.
6.	 Balassa, B. and Schydlowsky, D.M. (1968) op cit.
7. Other principal assumptions required to consider the ERP and DRC
concepts as equivalent are that all commodities are traded, that
there are no transport costs; that costs of production are
constant and that output is homogeneous and its price is known;
if these conditions are met; Krueger (1972) has shown that
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DRC. - q-1 -	 E.	 q.	 a..1	 3	 31
1 +	 Z.	 a..
1
3	 31
(1+ti) - zj (1+tj ) aji
1 - Z. a..31
E T. +1
where
DRci
 domestic resource cost in activity i;
qi = price of the ith commodity;
ti tariff rate on ouput i;
tj = tariff rate on input j;
ETi = effective rate of protection on activity i.
It should be noted that even where some of the conditions are
met, the erp and DRC concepts differ since the latter generally
includes direct as well as indirect value-added of an activity
whereas the former is usually measured with respect to direct
value added only. If the direct plus indirect value-added
concept is introduced in the erp computations, it can be shown
that
VT DRC.=1 + Z. ET.3 Z .vr
so that DRCF is equal to unity plus a weighted average of erp,
the weight bein9 the direct and indirect value-added per unit of
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of Political Economy, LXXX, 1; Pearson, A.R. (1976) op cit. See
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in Kirkpatrick, C.H. and Nixon, F.I. (eds) (1983), op citr
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8.	 Balassa, B. and Schydlowsky, D.M. (1972) op cit, p67.
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project selection in the presence of distortions", Journal of
Political Econorny, 86, pp97-116.
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manufacturing plant in Nigeria is totally idle 4,950 hours a
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22. We also fitted the following regression equations for the
cross-section of our industries"
1.	 log PRR =	 4.128 - 0.879 log K/V (1974)
(1974)	 (18.23) (-3.057)
R2 = 0.308
F = 0.37
2.	 SP (1974) =	 13.140 - 9.520K/V (1974)
(1.74
	
(-2.54)
R2 = 0.235
F = 6.46
3.	 SRR (1977)=	 41.66 - 21.46 KO 91977)
(2.18)	 (-1.34)
R2 = 0.075
F = 1.79
4.	 SP (1977) =	 16.77 - 4.74 KV (1977
(2.12)
	 (-1.67)
R2 = o.11
F = 2.79
5.	 logPP (1977)= 3.22 + 0.373 logDKO (1977)
(31.35)	 (2.68)
R2 = o.246
F = 7.18
6.	 logPRR(1977)= 4.086 + 0.559 logKV (1977)
(15.118)	 (2.323)
R2 = 0.20
FD = 5.39
where
PRR = Private Rate of Return
PP = Private Profit;
SP = Social Profit;
SRR = Social Rate of Return
K/V = Capital-output ratio;
DKO = Direct plus indirect capital output ratio.
The coefficients of the capital intensity terms are expected to
be positive if the dependent variable is private profit/private
rate of return and negative if the dependent variable is social
profitability measure. Although the goodness-of-fit is not
473
excellent all the equations (except No.1) show that relatively
socially efficient sectors have tended to use relative less
capital per unit of output than the socially inefficient ones.
the low values of R2
 are consistent with the low values of the
correlation coefficients shown in the main text.
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GIAPrER EIGHT
Summary and Conclusions
The Nigerian government has attempted since independence in
1960, to encourage the expansion of manufacturing activities with the
objectives of promoting growth and diversification, reducing
dependence on agricultural exports, earning foreign exchange and
generating employment opportunities etc. The country has followed an
import substitution strategy of industrial development, which has
meant the use of tariffs and quantitative restrictions on imports and
the provision of a variety of industrial tax incentives, to induce and
encourage the establishment of domestic manufacturing industries.
The central objective of this study has been the quantitative
appraisal of the policies and methods employed in the promotion of
industries in the country over a period of 16 years from 1963.
Specifically, an attempt has been made to estimate the repercussions
and effects which resulted from the industrialisation of the country.
The estimates consisted of taking into account repercussions in terms
of growth and import substitution (Chapter 4), employment and
inter-industrial linkages (Chapter 5), productivity growth (Chapter 6)
and investment efficiency or profitability of industries (Chapter 7).
The following paragraphs highlight the major findings and conclusions
of the study. These conclusions are to be interpreted in the light of
some conceptual and methodological limitations of our analysis which
are also discussed here.
Our appraisal of almost two decades of industrialisation shows
indeed a substantial growth and development of the manufacturing
sector. The strategy of import substitution has enabled the country
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to produce a wide range of items from matches, candles and furniture
to alcoholic, non-alcoholic beverages and tobacco; the country
assembles a variety of goods, from watches to radios and TV sets; from
commercial vehicles to agricultural tractors etc. The manufacturing
sector has enjoyed fairly rapid rates of growth over the 1963-78
period. Gross output and value-added registered an average growth
rate of about 14 percent and 12 percent per annum respectively within
the period. At least 40 percent of the manufacturing sub-sectors
registered rates of output growth higher than that of the
manufacturing sector as a whole. Sub -sectoral rates of growth vary
from - 3.9 percent (tobacco) to 34 percent (drugs and medicines).
Although a considerable scope for further import substitution still
exists, substantial progress has been made in some sectors, notably
tobacco, alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages, wood, soap and
perfumery etc. The ratio of imports to total supply has been reduced
from 0.63 in 1962 to 0.45 in 1974 and 0.54 in 1977. The higher ratio
in 1977 than in 1974 reflects in part the increasing importation of
new goods rather than the importation of goods already being
substituted.
Despite the rapid growth and the progress in
import-substitution, however, the manufacturing sector is weak and
underdeveloped contributing only a small amount to the GDP. The
structural characteristics of the sector were found to be fairly
consistent with the classic pattern of structural change associated
with the early stages of import-substitution industrialisation in
Latin America and Asia. Specifically (1) industrial expansion has
been heavily biased in favour of consumer goods notably textiles,
food, beverages and tobacco. The goal of proceeding to diversify and
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to industrialize downwards through the ultimate production of
intermediate products and capital goods is still far from being
realised. The consumer goods sectors accounted for about 65 percent
of industrial value-added over the period 1963-1978. Although their
share in output fell slightly between the two periods, the
underdevelopment of the intermediate and capital goods sectors remains
visible. Despite their high growth rates, the machinery and
electrical equipment sectors are very limited in size and scope,
performing only the final touches of assembling the almost finished
industrial imports into final products, (11) Most of the increases
in output were confined to the domestic market, and manufactured
exports remain under-developed. The ratio of manufactured exports to
total exports declined to less than 1 percent in 1977 from about 7
percent in 1964. The ratio of manufactured exports to gross output
has similarly been on the decline. In 1974, only five sectors -
leather products, wood products, industrial chemicals, petroleum and
coal and metals - managed to export more than 5 percent of their gross
output; and between 1974 and 1977, there was a decline in the ratio of
manufactured exports to gross output in about 46 percent of the
manufacturing sectors. The sector has thus failed to emerge as a
source of foreign exchange earnings. To what extent are these
structural characteristics related to Nigeria's trade regime?
Our analysis, in chapter 4, of the tariff structure reveals a
considerably high and differentiated level of effective protection
averaging 94 percent in 1974 and 1497 in 1977. This shows an increase
of 114 percent and 239 percent respectively from the level of 4470in
1962. The differences for effective rates of protection were great,
ranging from a high of 450 percent for footwear, to a low of 52
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percent for leather products in 1977 and from 309 percent (footwear)to
-586.76 percent (soap and perfumery) in 1974. Net effective
protection averaged 91 percent in 1977 and ranged from 323 percent to
6 percent for footwear and leather products respectively. We found 42
percent of the manufacturing sectors with an above average rate of net
effective protection in 1977. We noted also a cascading in the levels
of effective protection with the consumer goods producing sectors
receiving the highest protection and intermediate goods receiving the
lowest. Average rates for the former increased from 102 percent in
1974 to 196 percent in 1977, while the corresponding rates for the
latter were 78 percent and 80 percent. In 1977, 54 percent of the
consumer goods industries received above average net effective
protection as against 29 percent and 25 percent respectively for the
intermediate and capital goods industries. Put differently, 70
percent of the sectors with above average net effective rate of
protection belong to the consumer goods producing sectors. A similar
trend can be observed from our estimates for 1974 and from those in
earlier years prepared by Oyejide and Oyelabi. Such a wide range in
effective protection is not only inequitable but will have the effect
of transmitting rewards to activities and products that do not
necessarily encourage the development of backward integration via
intermediate and capital goods production.
It must be emphasised that any generalisations and inferences to
be drawn from our estimates of erp should be made only with extreme
caution awing to the existence of several rather serious theoretical
and practical problems. First, as we pointed out in chapter 4, many
writers are critical of the assumptions of lack of substitutability
between imported inputs and domestically produced intermediate goods
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and the absence of any general equilibrium effects; second, the level
of aggregation which we had to adopt for lack of more detailed
information, may be too great to allow making useful generalisations.
It is well-known that tariffs and quantitative restrictions apply to
products, whereas our industry categories often represent more than
one product. Indeed, it was shown that the erp estimated for some
sectors does not accurately reflect the level or degree of protection
accorded to their sub-sectors. Third, there is the limitation which
arises from our assumptions that price differentials are more or less
accounted for by tariffs alone. However, it is well known that
quantitative restrictions and other non-trade distortions such as
indirect taxes, profit markups, transport charges etc, could be more
crucial in explaining these price differentials and protection.
Although an attempt was made to adjust for 'other' distortions, we
consider as inadequate the use of a uniform premium rate since it
implies that industries are subject to the same degree of, say,
quantitative restrictions. Finally, given the assumption that
domestic-international price differences are reflected in nominal
tariff levels, any redundancy in tariffs renders the exercise to be of
extremely limited usefulness. Whether or not it exists can only be
resolved by making price comparisons which we could not do awing to
the lack of adequate information. Given that such refinements have
not been made in our study some bias in the estimates may be
inevitable and this should be borne in mind.
Inspite of these limitations, estimates of erp for the
individual industries are of interest for a number of reasons. First,
comparing our estimates with those available for a variety of
countries will enable us to examine whether a 'normal' pattern of erp
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exists and the extent to which Nigeria deviates from such a pattern;
second, and perhaps more significant, these estimates can enable one
to analyse the extent to which the structural characteristics of the
manufacturing sector are influenced or shaped by the structure of
effective protection, and hence determine the benefits and/or costs of
maintaining a given structure of protection. To what extent for
example, does the existing structure of protection enhance or hinder
the achievement of the desired degree of industrialisation or of other
objectives?
TO test for the effectiveness of the tariff structure in the
allocation of resources among the manufacturing industries, we
examined the relationship between import substitution and industrial
growth on the one hand, and effective tariff protection on the other,
using various parametric and non-parametric tests of association. The
general results of the correlation analysis suggest that the erp does
play a role in stimulating industrial growth, although for various
reasons, the evidence is only suggestive in nature. It is suggested
that the predictive power of the erp would have been vastly
strengthened but for a number of factors. First, in addition to the
problems enumerated above, it was earlier argued in Chapter 4 that
tariffs have tended to be indiscriminately provided to industries and
have been subject to substantial short term fluctuations; as such, the
price signals which they are expected to transmit might not come
through clearly in terms that are understandable and on which
entrepreneurs could depend and act. Second, one would expect that
output and investment decisions are also affected by other factors
such as government direct investment and credit allocations, other
industrial tax incentives, access to investible funds from abroad etc
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which we could not quantify and incorporate in the usual erp
calculations. The relative influence and/or importance of each of
these needs to be further examined before any definite conclusion can
be made. Third, the effective rates of protection used in the
analysis were measures of protection at one point in time whereas it
might be reasonably expected that the growth of industries and the
extent of import-substitution reflect the cumulative influence of a
multitude of factors over a relatively long period of time. Even in
the absence of these limitations, two additional problems present
themselves: (1) As we pointed out earlier, policy instruments in
Nigeria were often applied mainly to cope with balance-of-payments
difficulties and/or to stabilize the domestic price level. Thus their
stimulation of domestic industrial activity because of their
protective effects could have been simply a by-product and (2) there
is the related difficulty of inferring a casual relationship from the
measures of association which we computed. Given these limitations,
it is perhaps premature to accept the neo-classical interpretation of
the erp as an accurate indicator for resource measurements; rather, it
appears more reasonable to argue that the foreign trade regime could
be at least supportive of the general policy and/or process of the
allocation of resources that has taken place within the manufacturing
sector.
With regards to the failure of manufactured exports to develop,
our conclusion is also only speculative in the absence of any
systematic evaluation of the effects of tariff policies. The high
protection offered to domestic industry implies a lower real exchange
rate than would be the case in a 'free-trade' situation. This,
coupled with the high profitability in domestic markets of Nigerian
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manufacturing industries, would tend to pull resources into the
production for the protected domestic markets and impede exports.
Indeed our estimates of erp show that industries for which the country
would seem to have good prospects for exporting (natural resource
based for example) are not encouraged with high effective protection.
Admittedly, the difficulties faced by LDCs in exporting manufactures
do not simply reflect the fact that at present exchange rates costs of
production are higher at home than abroad. They may include the
supply and institutional limitations we enumerated in Chapter 2.
Moreover, we have shown that, owing perhaps to Nigeria's comfortable
position with regards to foreign exchange and the existence of a large
domestic market, no serious efforts were made by the government to
promote exports of manufactures. Further research needs to be done to
determine the various forces at work.
As was shown in Chapter 5, an evaluation of economic sectors in
terms of capital, employment, output, factor payments and foreign
exchange using input-output analysis reveals (i) a considerable
divergence between, on the one hand, the direct effects and on the
other, the indirect and total effects of sectoral expansion,
emphasising the need to consider the latter in policy formulations;
(ii) that economic sectors do vary considerably from the viewpoint of
the effect of their expansion on different objectives; and hence
(iii) the potential difficulties involved in the selection of 'key'
sectors when there are multiple objectives and constraints; (iv)
relatively few 'key' employment sectors within the manufacturing
sector, (v) the superiority of import-substitution over export
promotion strategy in the provision of employment and (vi) the virtual
non-existence of high inter-industrial linkages.
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On average, the direct and total employment multipliers in the
primary and tertiary sectors far exceed those in the manufacturing
sectors. On average however, the direct, indirect and total output
generated per unit of final demand is higher in the latter than in the
former. As one would expect, the manufacturing sectors have much
higher foreign exchange and capital requirements than either the
primary or tertiary sectors. Within the manufacturing sectors, higher
than average capital-output and capital-value added (capital-labour)
ratios can be observed in 70 percent (46 percent) of the sectors.
Assuming the availability of foreign exchange to be main constraint,
our analysis shows that over 70 percent of the selected 'key' sectors
belong to the primary and tertiary group. The most important sectors
(within manufacturing) include textiles, leather products, and wearing
apparel. Thus the country's comparative advantage will seem to lie in
the active promotion of these plus the primary sectors. The least
important sectors, all manufacturing, include transport equipment,
machinery, electrical equipment, paints and drugs and medicines.
Similarly, the employment linkage potential of the manufacturing
sectors is quite minimal. Only 25 percent of the sectors have a high
backward employment linkage potential and none has a high forward
employment linkage potential. Thus none could qualify as a 'key'
employment sector in the sense of having both a backward and forward
linkage index greater than unity. The few manufacturing sectors with
high backward employment linkage indices are food processing,
non-alcoholic beverages, tobacco, textiles, made-up textiles and
miscellaneous products. This genera:, absence of 'key' employment
industries suggests the severe constraints imposed on the creation of
employment opportunities by the present structure of the Nigerian
48 3
economy and casts serious doubts upon the ability of the manufacturing
sector to provide the greatest source of employment opportunities in
the economy.
It was also found in Chapter 5 that in 1977, Nigeria's
manufactured exports embody less labour and more capital than its
manufactured imports. In otherwords, in terms of the H-0 model of
trade, there was something of a paradoxical situation where Nigeria
has not exported manufactured products in accordance with its presumed
international comparative advantage. Given the relative Nigerian
labour abundance, one would expect the country to exhibit a heavy
concentration of labour intensive goods in its manufactured export
basket. However, the opposite has been the case. On the other hand,
it was noted that a strategy of export promotion would have been less
foreign exchange using and more value-added generating than an
import-substitution strategy. Our results imply that in order to
realise an appropriate mix of objectives, the two strategies most be
seen as complementary rather than a substitute for each other.
It must be pointed out that although our conclusions are fairly
consistent with the results obtained by other authors in the context
of other LDCs, they must be regarded as specific to the circumstances
of the Nigerian economy and perhaps to the level of aggregation of
industries which we have adopted. Specifically, the paradoxical
situation which we found must be interpreted with caution especially
in view of its dependence upon the structure of Nigeria's foreign
trade in 1977, which is certainly not invariant through time. In
addition, the analysis is based upon the existing trade and exchange
rate policies which, in our view, are non-optimal. It is conceivable,
therefore, that a more rational policy, leading to a greater resource
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allocational efficiency would lead to an entirely different set of
results. It is also worthwhile emphasising some of the defects of the
static input-output model and of the procedure followed in
disaggregating the table, which could render our estimates doubtful
indicators on which to base future economic policy formulations.
Admittedly, the disaggregation method (described in the appendix) is
rather simplistic and involves several erroneous assumptions; as such,
it could have resulted in (disaggregated) coefficients which are not
truely reflective of the actual structural interdependence of sectors
in the Nigerian economy. The limitations of the static input-output
model are rather well known to be repeated here in detail. In
addition to the proportionality assumption, one has to assume that
each industry produces only a single product and has a single input
structure, that the technological coefficients remain constant over a
fairly long period, that there are no external economies or
diseconomies etc. We recognise that the homogeneity assumption is
rather restrictive and ignores the issue of multicommodity sectors.
The magnitude of the bias can be minimized by a further disaggregation
of the table. But for many LDCs, the disaggregation of industries
into completely homogeneous groups is almost impossible. One therefore
has to contend with the aggregate input coefficients which are no more
than averages over a spectrum of technologies and products. It is
also well known that input coefficients may change either because of
changes in technology or changes in relative prices which cause
certain inputs to be substituted for others. It must however be
realised that often, especially in the less developed countries,
changes in technology (or technical progress) are very gradual.
Indeed, even in the more advanced nations, consumer resistence to new
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products and/or producer resistance to new techniques of production
could make the transmission of technical progress a slow process. As
such, the magnitude of the 'distortions' introduced by technological
changes is not likely to be great especially if the projections cover
a relatively short-period. More sophisticated (e.g. dynamic) models
which take account of many of the above defects of the static model do
exist. However, given the rather shaky data base of the LDCs, one
would be more comfortable with the present, simple but powerful and
useful model, even if it is based on rather strong assumptions. Even
though these assumptions are not easily empirically defensible, our
simple approach is useful and interesting and provides a benchmark
from which further research could be undertaken.
The hypothesis that capital intensity in production results from
a rigidity in the choice of technical blue prints is not supported by
our analysis of the estimates of substitution elasticities between
capital and labour as reported in Chapter 6. High and statistically
significant estimates are found to exist for the manufacturing sector
as a whole. Moreover, of the 24 manufacturing industries analysed,
between 17 and 50 percent (depending on the estimating equation) have
values of substitution elasticities equal to, or greater than, unity
and using the ACMS equation, 70 percent have estimates which are not
statistically different from unity. Estimates of the elasticity of
substitution are found to be affected by inter-industry variations in
capital intensity and by increasing returns to scale. The flexibility
in the choice of techniques is highest in sectors manufacturing food,
textiles, wearing apparel, wood products, drugs and medicines,
petroleum products, basic metals, electrical machinery and
miscellaneous products and lowest in sectors manufacturing
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non-alcoholic drinks, fabricated metals and transport equipment. This
is quite a significant result and also consistent with the study and
findings in some other LDCs. Thus one of the implications of our
analysis is that other things being equal, investments in those
industries with relatively high substitution possibilities may
increase employment.
Although capital intensity in production may well arise for a
variety of other reasons as discussed in Chapter 5, our regression and
correlation analysis in Chapter 6 give a strong indication that the
decision to employ capital and labour are often made in the face of
strong biases arising from the protection system. In general, the
more highly protected sectors tend to be more capital intensive than
the less protected ones. More specifically, evidence was found in the
Nigerian economy in support of the neo-classical contention that
changes in factor prices are decisively important in influencing the
factor intensity of production. It follows, therefore, that the
obstacles in the way of employment creation are liable to increase as
the Nigerian authorities continue to pursue their industrialisation
policy behind high and differentiated tariff walls.
It is important to bear in mind, however, that the mere
existence of high substitution possibilities and/or the removal of
factor-price distortions are not sufficient by themselves to generate
sufficient employment opportunities for the presently large unemployed
labour force. It was suggested that to effectively tackle the
employment problem serious considerations should be given to the
development of the hitherto neglected primary sectors, the small-scale
industries and to policies that encourage firms to produce at full
capacity and to the provision of employment subsidies.
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As for the import/foreign exchange intensity of domestic
industries, we found no strong relationship with the structure of
effective protection. Under a rational tariff policy, one would
expect the authorities to grant the less foreign-exchange intensive
sectors more effective protection than the more foreign exchange using
ones. The opposite seems to be the case however, as the effective
rate of protection is found to be positively (but weakly) associated
with the direct plus indirect import-output ratios of the sectors.
Earlier in Chapter 3, we showed that the IS strategy has not reduced
the level of imports into the country but merely changed the import
structure from dependence on consumer goods to dependence on
intermediate and capital goods.
Our analysis in Chapter 6 of the inter-industrial pattern of
productivity growth has revealed a varied performance between
industries and over time. The rate of labour productivity growth for
the whole manufacturing sector in the period amounted to only 1.3
percent per annum. Sectoral differences are great, ranging from -12
percent (basic metals) to 23 (drugs and medicines). 75 percent of the
manufacturing sectors achieved positive rates of labour productivity
growth; 83 percent of these (or 63 percent of all sectors) achieved
higher rates of growth of labour productivity than that achieved by
the whole sector.
With regard to total factor productivity growth (TFPG), it was
found that, in the aggregate, Nigeria compares favourably not only
with the developing but also with the developed countries for which
data is available. The inter-sectoral pattern of TFPG is however less
encouraging. 63 percent of the sectors achieved positive rates of
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TFPG during the period 1963-78, but only 42 percent achieved TFPG
rates greater than 1 percent and only 40 percent of those sectors with
positive TFPG rates (i.e. 25 percent of all sectors) went above the 3
percent mark obtained by the manufacturing sector as a whole. It has
been shown that food processing, alcoholic beverages, tobacco,
textiles, wearing apparel, wood products, chemicals, fabricated metals
and miscellaneous products are the lowest ranked in terms of TFPG.
The rapid growth in labour productivity for most manufacturing
industries was found to be a function of output growth and the
application of capital intensive technology. Applying the Johansen
model, we found in Chapter 6 that technical progress played only a
minor role. As seen through our CES estimates almost all industries
have displayed strong Verdoorn's coefficients. The existence of scale
economies indicated by these coefficients implies that expanding the
size of the market through export expansion for such industries can
play an important role in increasing productive efficiency. The
association between capital intensity and labour productivity is
likely to pose a policy dilemma in the economy: increase in employment
opportunities would require reduction in capital intensity which
however will run counter to the desirable policy of increasing labour
productivity. However, capital deepening need not be desirable as
such, since as we have found, the slack in TFPG could have resulted
from a disproportionate increase in the capital input.
The influence of protection on productivity growth is much less
easy to determine. On the one hand, the conventional hypothesis that
high and differentiated levels of protection could result in the
persistence of productive inefficiency cannot be fully supported given
the rapid growth of labour productivity for a majority of the sectors
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(although the same does not apply in terms of TFPG). On the other
hand, we found considerable variations in TFPG and labour productivity
growth which seem to be in line with variations in the trade regime.
For example, during the most restrictive phase of the protectionist
regime (1975-78), up to 50 percent of the sectors achieved negative
rates of labour productivity growth and up to 67 percent had negative
rates of TFPG, while during the more 'liberalised' phase, the
corresponding percentages were respectively 29 percent and 42 percent.
A precise delineation of phases is of course extremely difficult but
the findings lend some support, albeit an inconclusive one, to the
contention that variations over time in productivity growth can be
explained by changes in the trade regimes. Additional evidence was
also found. For example, in the period 1975-78 (1971-75), 83 (88)
percent of the sectors with negative rates of labour productivity
growth were accorded higher than average rate of effective protection
in 1974; Similarly, in the same periods, at least 60 percent of the
sectors with negative TFPG were accorded higher than average erp.
Finally, of the 16 sectors with negative TFPG in 1975-78, 38 percent
received above average net effective protection in 1977. These
findings would prompt one to ask whether indeed the granting of high
effective rates of protection is the best way to nurture Nigerian
industrial 'infants'!
Let us hasten to add that we make no claims that our results are
error free. It is well known that the estimation of TFPG and of the
elasticity of substitution using production functions involves several
highly restrictive assumptions especially regarding the nature of
competition and the pricing of factor inputs, the nature of technical
progress etc. which are hardly tenable for the Nigerian situation. By
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far, the most restrictive assumption under which our production
functions are estimated is that product and factor markets are
competitive and that there are constant returns to scale so that each
factor of production is paid its marginal product. With increasing
returns to scale, the assumption of equality of the marginal value
product of factors and the payments they receive is not likely to be
valid: all factors cannot receive their marginal value-product without
exceeding the value-added. In this eventuality, the factors' shares
we used as weights to derive the TFFG index are incorrect and as
Krueger (1982) theoretically demonstrated, the resulting index is
biased. Although the assumption of perfect competition is unrealistic
in a country like Nigeria, we are unable to gauge the magnitude or the
degree of imperfections and hence some biases in our results are
inevitable.
The second major limitation of the analysis derives from the
assumption that a single production function exists and that the same
technological alternatives are available for all sectors. This would
appear to be a particularly difficult and restrictive condition to
satisfy especially in situations where the definition of sectors is
too aggregative, as in our case. Here, one could expect to find so
many different technologies being used simultaneously within a given
sector that the correct specification and statistical interpretation
of technical progress is difficult.
Third, there is a basic weakness in the data especially as it
relates to the measurement of inputs. For lack of more detailed
information, we have had to treat both labour and capital as
homogeneous, malleable inputs, ignoring thereby the crucial
differences in their longevity and productive qualities etc. By
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treating labour as one homogeneous input in the production process,
the two-factor production function fitted will capture neither the
changes in its quality over the business cycle nor the improvement in
its quality over time. Ideally, one should consider a multi-factor
production function which will permit an adequate treatment of the
role of skill, education, entrepreneurship and labour mix or capital
mix in the production process.Ind p ed l the Nigerian Policy makers
may perhaps be more interested in the substitution possibilities
between capital and unskilled labour rather than between the former
and a homogeneous labour.
Finally, it is well known that in time-series analysis, the
observed variation in output and hence in productivity may be
attributed to inter-industrial differences in rates of capacity
utilisation over a business cycle. We have earlier pointed out that,
in general, empirical studies tend to suggest that the use of
unadjusted time series data biases the elasticity of substitution
downwards. We are aware of the wide fluctuations in output of the
different industries over the period studied although no attempt is
made to make any adjustments, especially in view of the lack of
concise data on inter-sectoral rates of capacity utilisation.
In spite of these limitations, the analysis in Chapter 6 has
made a number of important contributions which can be valuable for
policy making purposes. First, we have called attention to the often
neglected question of TFPG in the Nigerian manufacturing industries by
presenting some disturbing evidence regarding productivity growth in
the manufacturing industries of the country. Given that it is
productivity increments that provide the main source of sound economic
growth, the evidence presented here should be a matter of deep
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concern. We have identified the possible sources of productivity
growth and, in particular, the suggestive evidence in support of the
notion that restrictive trade policies may result in a slow down in
TFPG is interesting and defines unambiguously the direction for future
economic policy. We have also been able to identify where the
flexibility in the choice of techniques lies, a result which is of
some policy value in its own right.
An important dimension of the structure of protection in Nigeria
concerns the social and private profitability and international
competitiveness of manufacturing industries.
Our analysis in Chapter 7 reveals that the Nigerian
manufacturing sector is, by any standards, highly (privately)
profitabile, at least in the periods studied. There is however, a
considerable divergence between the private and social profitability
of the industries. Thus the rate of private profitability varies from
140 percent (tobacco) to about 2 percent (wearing apparel) in 1974 and
from 49 percent (non-alcoholic beverages) to 5 percent (leather
products) in 1977. On the other hand, net social profitability varies
from 37 percent (tobacco) to -84 percent (soap and perfumery) in 1974
and from 46 percent (machinery) to -52 percent (footwear) in 1977.
Finally, we showed that while all the industries considered achieved
positive private rates of return in both years, quite a few recorded
negative social rates of return. The divergence between private and
social profitability which we found implies that the former is a very
imperfect guide to socially efficient investment decisions in the
Nigerian economy.
We tested and found evidence in support of the hypothesis that
the resource pull of protection to the protected industries is
493
accompanied by higher rates of private, but lower rates of social
profitability for the more heavily protected sectors. The average
rate of profitability is 55 percent higher for the consumer goods
sectors than for the capital goods sectors in 1977, and 12 percent
higher in the former than in the intermediate goods sectors. In 1974,
consumer goods industries were 27 percent and 42 percent more
privately profitable than, respectively, capital and intermediate
goods industries. On the otherhand, in 1977, consumer goods sectors
had an average rate of social profitability that is 2056 (1715)
percent lower than the average rate for capital (intermediate) goods
industries; similarly in 1974, the consumer goods sectors were 558 and
50 percent less socially efficient than respectively the capital and
intermediate goods sectors. Finally in 1977, 7 out of 8 and in 1974,5
out of 9 sectors that were socially unprofitable were the more highly
protected consumer goods industries. Our findings confirm the
statement made earlier that the structure of effective protection is
so inequitable that it hinders rather than enhances the desired degree
of diversification via intermediate and capital goods production.
This implies that one of the immediate tasks of Nigeria's economic
policy is, in order to foster diversification via backward
integration, the gradual reversal of policy and strategy to neutralize
the existing price and profit bias of the tariff structure. This will
appear to be necessary in order to encourage entrepreneurs to
undertake vigorously the necessary expansionary investment and
production in the neglected sectors.
Our estimates, in Chapter 7, of DRCs show that about 2/5th of
the Nigerian manufacturing industries, contributing more than 20
percent of total manufacturing value-added at international prices in
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1977, were internationally uncompetitive. For these, survival was
only ensured by the high rates of effective protection accorded to
them by the authorities. As one might expect, the international
competitiveness of the less protected sectors is much higher than that
of the more protected industries. For example, of the 10 inefficient
industries, 70 percent are consumer goods producing, 10 percent
intermediate and 20 percent capital goods industries.
Although the social inefficiency of industries could have arisen
from a variety of sources, we found that the choice of inappropriate
techniques of production is a significant determinant. Our finding
lends support to the contention that higher capital-intensity in
production in the LDCs which implies a departure from an optimum
choice of factors will lead to an irrational allocation of resources.
Here, too, it is worthwhile emphasising that any generalisations
from these estimates must be approached with caution, in view of the
many problems involved. First, accurate measures of social
profitability and domestic resource costs require that domestic costs
are correctly measured at their 'shadow-prices' if there are
distortions in the economy. In Chapter 2, we pointed out the
multiplicity of problems involved in obtaining accurate estimates of
shadow prices; our conversion factors, shadow wage rates and
accounting rate of interest, were mere approximations to the 'true'
values. We do not, however, consider this to be a serious source of
bias since, as the sensitivity analysis shows, our estimates are quite
stable with respect to variations in the border prices of output and
factor inputs. Second, there are reasons to believe that the extent
of inefficiency might have been under-estimated given our inability to
consider all relevant costs of production. For example, foreign costs
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would have included dividends and repatriated profits which are bound
to be higher in those sectors with a high degree of foreign
participation. Third, our level of aggregation may also have
concealed the extent of intra-industrial efficiency or inefficiency.
Thus a sector may be socially efficient in the aggregate while the
individual firms are grossly inefficient (or less efficient) and
vice-versa. Third, the estimates of profitability and DRCs must be
regarded as strictly specific to the Nigerian economic environment in
1974 and 1977. If profit rates - and comparative advantage - vary
over time, because costs of production are continuously changing, no
simple generalisations or projections can be made from an analysis
based on two years observations only. The problem can be easily
illustrated. In 1974, industries manufacturing tobacco, footwear and
miscellaneous products were classified as socially efficient in the
sense of having a positive rate of net social profit, but all three
were socially inefficient in 1977. On the other hand, at least four
of the sectors classified as socially inefficient in 1974 achieved
positive rates of net social profit in 1977. Other specific examples
can be cited. The rate of net social profitability in the sector
manufacturing non-alcoholic beverages was only 0.5 percent in 1974,
•
but up to 37 percent in 1977.. On the otherhand, in the tobacco
industry, rate of social profitability was up to 37 percent in 1974
but negative in 1977. The fourth limitatton arises from the fact that
the DRC measure is static and virtually ignores the issues of
externalities which could be regarded as primarily important in
certain situations. Thus it cannot be categorically established that
the Nigerian industries which are found to be socially inefficient
involve a complete waste of resources: perhaps they have generated
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some external economies which could not be included in these measures.
Finally, before any definate conclusions can be drawn, several
important issues, especially those regarding the factors influencing
the efficiency of industries, need to be fully explained. Are these
industries inefficient because they are 'infants'? What is the
relationship between the degree of efficiency or inefficiency and the
size of the industries? Does the efficiency or inefficiency of
industries vary with the type of ownership and control? Is the
private sector more or less efficient than the public sector? etc.
Although we ignored these and other important questions, it does seem
that the system of very high effective protection is keeping certain
industries in operation which from a social viewpoint ought never to
have been started and probably might now disappear.
General Conclusion and Suggestions for Further Research
What general conclusions can one draw from this exercise? In
particular, can we say whether the IS strategy has been unambiguously
a success or a failure? The evidence in our study tentatively
suggests that the form of industrialisation that has taken place in
Nigeria is only partially successful. While it is true that
industrial output has increased, itis also clear that the emphasis on
import-substitution behind high tariff barriers has led to the
establishment of some industries whose social benefits are extremely
small; the progress that is being made is not accompanied by any
appreciable improvement in the employment situation; the output that
is being turned out is often inefficiently produced and the high and
differentiated levels of protection afforded to these industries
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ensured their domestic profitability and offered no encouragement to
entrepreneurs to venture into backward integration or the external
market: thus the economy remains poorly diversified,While heavy
reliance on the magnitude of our estimates is not warranted in view of
(i) the conceptual and methodological problems enumerated here and in
the main body of the study and (ii) the questionable nature of some
data used especially with regards to the level of aggregation, our
findings and conclusions are believed to reflect the underlying real
state of affairs in the industries studied. Moreover, we can claim
for our results that they helped us to bring into prominence certain
issues of industrial development that have too long been neglected in
the country. However, it is our view that the tentative conclusions
of this study should stimulate further research and a great deal of
refinement in the analysis in order to establish more facts about the
structural characteristics and growth of our industries. Specific
lines of enquiry which deserve high priority should include the
following:
(1) In this study the focus is on industrialisation policy and
process; we have therefore neglected several other aspects of
Nigeria's development that could be equally decisive in determining
success or failure. As studies in the context of other LDCs have
suggested, the process of industrialisation often creates a number of
imbalances not only of a sectoral but also of a regional nature.
Future research should be directed at identifying same of the more
prominent of these imbalances - such as the neglect of the primary
sector, infrastructural inadequacy, increasing population pressure etc
- and should examine the extent to which the imbalances have created
or are creating bottlenecks which might impede the further growth of
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industry. For example, the concept of erp should be more usefully
reformulated and employed to analyse the movement of resources not
only within the manufacturing sector but, more crucially, from the
primary sector to industry.
(2) Secondly, it is our view that the utility of the analysis will be
greatly enhanced if future empirical work is done on a much more
disaggregated, single-product basis, rather than on sectoral or
commodity-group basis. This requires a much more detailed and current
input-output table of the Nigerian economy than is presently
available.
(3) Of crucial importance also is the need to explicitly introduce
dynamics into the analysis. In a world undergoing rapid economic
transformation, parameter estimates could more easily become outdated
and thus present a distorted view of the existing or future economic
environment. Thus, sincethe use of dynamic models may not be feasible
now in view of the shaky data base in the LDCs, it is crucial to have
a periodic assessment of economic and industrial policy. For example,
effective rates of protection, measures of productivity and of
investment efficiency etc could be estimated every five years, say.
In otherwords, our analysis and similar exercises in the future,
should not be viewed as a once and for all exercise but should be seen
as a continual process.
(4) Finally, for each particular issue to be analysed, it is crucial
to consider more variables than we have been able to in this study.
For example, the concept of erp should be considerably expanded to
inc . porate not only the effects of tariffs and quantitative
restrictions but also of all other governmental and private
monopolistic forces which distort product and factor prices from their
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normal' levels; similarly, in future research, one should try as much
as possible to avoid what can be referred to as the "erp syndrome",
that is, the erp in particular, and government commercial policy in
general, should be viewed as part of the relevant factors, rather than
as the factors that shape the structural characteristics and growth of
industry.
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The disaggregation of the 1973/74 input-output matrix for
Nigeria and its updating to 1977/78.
The objective of this appendix is to elaborate on the
procedure followed in disaggregating the 1973/74 input-output
coefficient matrix of the Nigerian economy. Some limitations of
the methods adopted are also emphasized.
Essentially,two crucial 	 steps	 are	 involved	 in	 the
disaggregation procedure. First,the total intermediate purchases
of the disaggregated sectors are obtained.This vector(with 35
elements) can be used as a column "control" in the RAS method and
is useful information in the disaggregation methods anyway. There
is also the need to obtain the row "control" vector(also with 35
elements) given by the total intermediate sales from 	 the
disaggregated sectors. Secondly,the coefficients for the total
input of materials have to be disaggregated according to sectors
supplying
	
or demanding) the different kinds of Inputs.Each of
these steps will be discussed in turn.
Step 1. The estimation of total intermediate input purchases
is fairly straight forward,being derived from various published
sources.The most useful source of information is the 1975/78
Industrial Survey of Nigeria.In this source,detailed information
is available on the level of gross output and value-added
produced and of raw materials purchased by each of 	 the
disaggregated	 (manufacturing)sectors. 	 The Third and Fourth
National Development Plans also contain useful 	 information
regarding the average input coefficients of the disaggregated
sectors. For the non-manufacturing sectors,useful sources of
information include the National Accounts of Nigeria(1973/1974)
529
from which the original input-output table is taken,The Gross
domestic product of Nigeria and Allied Macro Aggregates and the
--
Annual Abstract of Statistics. From these sources, the column
totals are easily determined.
It is much less easy to determine the row totals ie the
total intermediate sales from the disaggregated sectors and some
simplifying assumptions had to be made. As a guide we first used
the information given in past Industrial Surveys regarding the
composition	 of	 LQW	 materials	 purchased by sectors. The
information is fairly detailed.For example,for a few of the
sectors,an analysis of materials used is provided as follows:
Sector: Footwear
Materials used	 Cost(N,000)
Pvc compound	 570
Textiles	 122
Rubber	 104
Packing materials
	
24
Chemicals	 10
Other	 184
Sector: Miscellaneous chemicals
Materials used	 Cost(N,000)
Oils and fats	 2376
Packing materials	 1782
Chemicals	 712
Essential Oils	 676
Petroleum jelly	 190
Others	 772
